THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE
By Alexander Wilner
And Anthony Cordesman
November 2, 2011
The Impact of Israeli-Iranian Nuclear Arms Race
While Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon, it already possess aircraft and missiles with the range to target Israel, and Israel has nuclear armed missiles that can reach any target in Iran. This creates a de facto nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and creates an even stronger incentive for Israel to try to suppress Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities than exists for the US and Arab Gulf states.
Despite Israel’s advantage in weapons technology, one nuclear detonation on Israeli territory could prove to be an « existential » threat to Israel given its size, dependence on Tel Aviv and Haifa, and the impact of such a strike on Israel’s political cohesion and Israeli emigration after such a strike.
It must be noted, however, that Iran will be limited to relatively low yield, non-boosted fission weapons for some years into the future while Israel already has high yield boosted and thermonuclear weapons. The greater metropolitan area of Tehran is home to some 15 million people, which constitute 20% of Iran’s population. Furthermore, 45% of large Iranian industrial firms are located in Tehran, as is 50% of all Iranian industry. As such, an Israeli nuclear strike on Tehran would have disastrous consequences for the Iranian state and Israel could target every major Iranian city.
In actual practice, Israel can already deliver an « existential » strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is likely to have against Israel for the next decade. Moreover, Israel has steadily improving missile defenses, and the US has offered « extended deterrence » to Israel and the Arab states. This potentially could mean US retaliation for any Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or an Arab ally of the US.
Potential Israeli Options for Striking Against Iran’s Nuclear Program
Israeli officials have never publically discussed options for striking against Iran. It does, however, have both the air and missile capability to execute a significant strike.
Illustrative Israeli options for such a strike include the following courses of action described in Figure III.54.
- Figure III.54 and Figure III.55 present a picture of what an Israeli conventional strike using air power would like. Israeli aircraft could take any one of three routes (northern, central, or southern), all of which would involve traversing unfriendly air space to reach targets in Iran. The central route would involve flying through 1,500-1,700 kilometers through Jordan and Iraq, the southern route would involve flying 1,900-2,100 kilometers through Saudi Arabia, and the northern route would involve flying 2,600-2,800 kilometers in a loop through Turkey.
Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction of the all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather partial and weak.
In a conventional strike, Israel could launch and refuel two-three full squadrons of 36 to 54 combat aircraft for a single set of strikes with refueling. It could use either its best F-15s (28 F-15C/D, 25 F- 15I Ra'am or part of its 126 F-16 CDs and 23 F-16I Sufas. It has at least three specially configured squadrons with conformal fuel tanks specially designed for extended range use. It could add fighter escorts, but refueling and increased warning and detection would be major problems.
For the purposes of guessing at how Israeli might attack, its primary aircraft would probably be the F-15I, although again this is guesswork.
The key aspects are that Boeing’s (formerly McDonnell Douglas) F-15E Strike Eagle entered service with the IDF/Heyl Ha’Avir (Israeli Air Force) in January of 1998 and was designated the F-15I Ra’am (Thunder). The F-15E Strike Eagle is the ground attack variant of the F-15 air superiority fighter, capable of attacking targets day or night, and in all weather conditions.
The two-seat F-15I, known as the Thunder in Israel, incorporates new and unique weapons, avionics, electronic warfare, and communications capabilities that make it one of the most advanced F-15s. Israel finalized its decision to purchase 25 F-15Is in November 1995. The F-15I, like the US Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, is a dual-role fighter that combines long-range interdiction with the Eagle's air superiority capabilities. All aircraft are to be configured with either the F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 engines by direct commercial sale; Night Vision Goggle compatible cockpits; an Elbit display and sight helmet (DASH) system; conformal fuel tanks; and the capability to employ the AIM-120, AIM-7, AIM-9, and a wide variety of air-to-surface munitions.
Though externally the Ra’am looks similar to its USAF counterpart, there are some differences, mainly in the electronic countermeasures gear and the exhaust nozzles. The Ra’am has a counterbalance on the port vertical stabilizer instead of the AN/ALQ-128 EWWS (Electronic Warfare Warning System) antenna found on USAF Strike Eagles. The Ra’am uses two AN/ALQ- 135B band 3 antennas, one mounted vertically (starboard side) and one horizontally (port side). These are located on the end of the tail booms. They are distinguished by their chiseled ends, unlike the original AN/ALQ-135 antenna, which is round and located on the port tail boom of USAF Eagles.
The Ra’am utilizes extra chaff/flare dispensers mounted in the bottom side of the tail booms. Unlike USAF Eagles, the Ra’am still use engine actuator covers (turkey feathers) on their afterburner cans. The US Air Force removed them because of cost and nozzle maintenance, though curiously, USAF F-16s still have their actuator covers installed. Israeli Strike Eagles and some USAF Eagles based in Europe use CFT air scoops. These scoops provide extra cooling to the engines.
The 25 F-15Is operational since 1999 [and the 100 F-16Is] were procured first and foremost to deal with the Iranian threat. In August 2003 the Israeli Air Force demonstrated the strategic capability to strike far-off targets such as Iran [which is 1,300 kilometers away], by flying three F- 15 jets to Poland 1,600 nautical miles away. After they celebrated that country's air force's 85th birthday, on their return trip, the IAF warplanes staged a fly-past over the Auschwitz death camp.
Israeli aircraft would probably need to carry close to their maximum payloads to achieve the necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, although any given structure could be destroyed with 1-3 weapons. (This would include the main Bushehr reactor enclosure, but is real-world potential value to an Iranian nuclear program is limited compared to more dispersed and/or hardened targets). At least limited refueling would be required, and back-up refueling and recovery would be an issue.
They key weapon to be used against hard targets and underground sites like Natanz might be the GBU-28, although the US may have quietly given Israel much more sophisticated systems or Israel may have developed its own, including a nuclear armed variant.
The GBU-28 is carried by the F-15I. It is a "5,000 pound" laser guided bomb with a 4,400-pound earth-penetrating warhead that can be upgraded by the IAF to use electro- optical or GPS targeting. It is a vintage weapon dating back to the early 1990s, and the IAF is reported to have bought at least 100. It has been steadily upgraded since 1991 and the USAF ordered an improved version in 1996.
It looks like a long steel tube with rear fins and a forward guidance module. It can glide some 3-7 miles depending on the height of delivery. It is 153" long X 14.5" in diameter.
Multiple strikes on the dispersed buildings and entries in a number of facilities would be necessary to ensure adequate damage without restrikes – which may not be feasible for Israel given the limits to its sortie generation capability over even Iranian soft targets. As for hardened and underground targets, the IAF's mix of standoff precision-guided missiles – such as Harpoon or Popeye – would not have the required lethality with conventional warheads and Israel's use of even small nuclear warheads would cause obvious problems.
Israel may have specially designed or adapted weapons for such strikes, and bought 500 bunker-busters from the US in February 2005. Experts speculated whether the purchase was a power projection move or whether Israel was in fact planning to use these conventional bombs against Iranian nuclear sites. These speculations were further exacerbated when the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lt. General Dan Halutz, was asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, he said « 2,000 kilometers ».
The hard target bombs it has acquired from the US are bunker-busters, however, are not systems designed to kill underground facilities. They could damage entrances but not the facilities. What is not known is whether Israel has its own ordnance or has secretly acquired more sophisticated systems.
Its main problem would be refueling – its 5 KC-130H and 5 B-707 tankers are slow and vulnerable and would need escorts – and its ordinary B-707 AE&W, ELINT and electronic warfare aircraft are also slow fliers, although the new G-550 Shaved ELINT aircraft is a fast flier and the IAF has some long-range UAV that could support its aircraft, before, during, and after such missions.
The big manned « slow fliers » would have serious problems penetrating and surviving in Iranian air space. Israel has, however, specially configured some of its F-15s and F-16s with targeting, EW, SAM-suppression aids, and ELINT for this kind of mission. The full details of such capabilities are unknown.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
