So, let us hear from you what planes and armaments did that Indian non-puppet BNP govt. of BD bought during its two full terms? Also, can you remind us who wanted to sell away the Mig-29s and who made BNS Bangabondhu a naval museum? Would very much like to hear truth from you.
It doesn't matter on how many more arse kicks are given to a shameless liar like U because that wouldn't change cult personality type of URs as numerous of recent past haven't done any good liked Chora na shone dharmer kahini. But for other board members, BNP bought the finest of new F-7's of that time as BG's form unlike used/junk MIGs that was brokered by UR Bharati Mama to get a sweet deal from Ruskies on their MIG-29Ks for carrier. Until, the BNP GOVT re-negotiated and ex-Finnace minister on behalf of GOB paid another chunk of millions, 6 of those UB/UPG junks couldn't even fly for the lack of spare parts. But more importantly, BNP led GOB from ZIa's era planted the seed of fighting spirit that gave BD-MIL victory over Shanti Bahini, which unfortunately got diminished by now. What good would military hardware brings for mercenaries, anyway? BTW, the following is a descriptive saga of the transformation of BD-MIL as mercenaries...
The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014
Col (Rtd) Mahmudur Rahman Choudhury: The aim of this article is to study the impact of changes on organizations, specifically the Bangladesh Army.
Humans build organizations to fulfill specific needs or purposes or goals or missions (all of these words are used synonymously). So, there are as many varied organizations as there are human needs or purposes. Sometimes an organization is termed an institution when it develops: (1) a hierarchal structure, (2) a set of commonly held values called traditions, (3) a set of rigidly enforced rules and procedures, (4) a more or less clear distribution of power, authority, responsibility and functions, (5) a formalized system of training and education to develop skills of its personnel and finally (6) a formalized system of recruitment, placement and promotions of its personnel. The Army is one such institution within a much greater and complex institution called the State. The Army’s sole purpose is to fight wars successfully. The state as such provides the Army with an absolute monopoly of the use of force and violence in fighting wars; no other state institution has such a responsibility. Of such importance is this function/activity of war-fighting that the Army holds the distinction of being one of the 5 fundamental and primary institutions of the State.
Changes and Organizations
In the biological world, of which humans are a part, every organism is considered an organization and changes are inherent, constant and inevitable. These changes take two forms:
(1) Changes within the organism itself. i.e. an organism is born, it grows, decays and then dies. The needs, purpose or goals of the organism – be they human or otherwise- do not change but remain constant. i.e. changes occur in processes but not in content. Such changes are “Incremental”.
(2) A second type of change called mutation occurs from generation to generation. Such mutations invariably lead to enhanced efficiency, optimization and sometimes specialization of the organism concerned. Changes occur in both content and process. Thus over time mutations may lead to totally new organisms with new need, purposes or goals. Humans developed through such mutations from single-cell organisms. Such changes are “Transformational”.
Organizations which humans create are artificial constructs. The changes they go through follow the pattern described above but these changes do not often lead to efficiency, optimization or specialization. In fact “Incremental” changes in organizations often lead to inefficiency, decay and entropy. Sometimes, though “Transformational” changes occur bringing about new needs, purposes or goals, calling forth the creation of entirely new forms of organizations.
Small unconnected changes often occur in organizations to cater to temporary local needs and some ad-hoc structures are created. Over time these changes are institutionalized because these new ad-hoc structures develop strategies and systems; retrain/reeducate personnel in new skills and styles; and develop shared values. The organization now gives a totally different look to what it originally was because both its content and process have changed, often inadvertently. This is shown diagrammatically below:
All this mutation from old to new organization is fine, specifically for private sector business and manufacturing organization/enterprises that are constantly going through such transformations. Such transformations may even be desirable for certain public sector organizations/institutions but not for the Army as we will explain in subsequent paragraphs.
The Army and Changes
All these conceptualizations have become too philosophical; let me illustrate all the concepts discussed with an example: The development of the personal computer (PC) and the Internet (net) has brought about global changes, worldwide. New needs or purposes gave rise to entirely new organizations to produce and market the PCs and varied organizations were created to cater to the varied services that the net generated. But a rice dealer in Bangladesh did not drop his business of rice dealing and start dealing in PCs because the need or purpose of dealing in the staple still remained. What the rice dealer did was to use the PC and the net to increase his efficiency, competitiveness and profits. To the rice dealer it was a change in process and not in content; to him it was a change in ways and means not in needs, purposes, goals or missions.
The Army like the rice dealer, caters to the single staple of successful war-fighting. Changes will have to be in ways and means (processes) but not in its goal or mission or purpose (content). Just as a rice dealer will not remain a rice dealer if he brings about or allows a change in the content of his organization, so, similarly an Army will not remain an Army if it brings about or allows a change in its content. Historically this has always been so.
For millenniums the Army fought on foot or on horses with bows, swords and lances. The equipment and weapons (means and ways) were replaced with muskets and cannons; still later with guns, missiles, nuclear ballistic missiles, with tanks and APCs, with submarines and air-craft carriers, with jet fighters, with drones and RPVs, with Satcoms but still armies were required to fight wars successfully. Nobody expected soldiers to become nuclear physicists, rocket engineers or IT system engineers. Everybody expects soldiers to capture that barren hill-top in Afghanistan even if he/she has to die for it. Therefore, the basic question dealing with changes in the Army is: Does this change lead to a change in the mission, goal or purpose of the Army? If it does, than the change ought not to take place.
Bangladesh Army 1971- 1991
The Bangladesh Army arose out of the revolutionary need of creating a new state through a war. The nucleus of the Army was formed out of the Bengali military and Para-military personnel who revolted against Pakistan. These were few in numbers and ill-armed and so a citizen guerrilla army was organized which fought a successful war which led to the emergence of Bangladesh on 16 December 1971.
The first change that took place in an independent Bangladesh was the disbandment of the guerrilla army. The Bangladesh Army was thus reduced to three under-manned and under-armed infantry brigades and two artillery batteries with 12 obsolete guns. Those citizens who still wished to bear arms were absorbed in the Police and the para-military Bangladesh Rifles. In February 1972 an entirely new para-military called the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) was raised, which by the end of 1974 reached the same strength as the Army.
Thus we see the Army fulfilling the purpose of successful war-fighting in 1971. After the war due to a combination of internal and external factors the Army’s role, purpose or goal was not seen in the same light as during the war.
Firstly, the experience of successfully fighting a war with a rapidly raised and organized citizen guerrilla army convinced many that perhaps Bangladesh could dispense with a large conventional army to satisfy its security and defense concerns.
Secondly, the devastated economy of the country precluded any significant financial layout for the Army for at least a decade.
Thirdly, many were of the firm conviction, that surrounded on all sides with a friendly and supportive India and with a 25 Years Peace and Friendship Treaty in place, Bangladesh was extremely unlikely to fight a war in the foreseeable future or indeed face any threat to its territorial integrity. So, there was little necessity of maintaining a large conventional army.
Fourthly, internal security and chaotic law and order conditions could be tackled by well organized, equipped and trained para-military force like the JRB.
The extremely chaotic conditions of the country and the Awami League government’s inability to tackle those led to the 4th Amendment to the Constitution, which belied everything the Nation and the Liberation War stood for. Suddenly and most unexpectedly a portion of the Bangladesh Army revolted, massacring the entire political leadership along with their families. For a year from August 1975, the Country faced a continuous cycle of violence unleashed by the Army until Major General Zia ur Rahman the senior-most, popular and charismatic of the three Liberation War force commanders wrested control and enforced Martial Law. This events significantly altered the Army’s conditions.
From 1976 to 1991 the army rapidly raised 5 infantry divisions and 4 specialized independent brigades; training institutions of every sort were established; logistic installation grounded and cantonments rose in different parts of the country. The Army’s manpower was pegged at 130,000 and it received budget allocation which exceeded 10% of the national budget. The Army was equipped with modern conventional weaponry although not the most up-to-date or the most effective and it trained, round the year, for every seasonal condition. The Army’s officers and soldiers now took pride in their profession of arms.
In 1975, the ethnically different population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the south-east of the country started an insurgency. The Army was deployed until gradually 5 brigades were fighting a counter-insurgency war. By the time a peace treat was signed in 1996, the insurgency was destroyed at a significant cost of both soldierly and civilian lives. This counter-insurgency war was the main war-fighting business of the Army during the period.
The two martial law regimes of generals Zia and Ershad pulled the Army into myriad activities under the rubric “Nation-Building”. These tasks included: anti-smuggling; food movement operations to stave off food shortages in various parts of the country; supervision of canal-digging, road constructions and infrastructure development in rural areas of the country; disaster management of periodic floods and cyclones and post-disaster rehabilitation programs; assisting the district administrations in tackling law and order; running martial law courts, which had taken over much of the criminal jurisdiction of the judiciary; and supervising elections at various levels. In fact the Army was running the country. Officers and men, both retired and serving, were seconded to every public organization from the foreign ministry to the civil aviation ministry. Army officers even raised two political parties: Zia ur Rahman’s the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Ershad’s Jatiyo party. Today the BNP is one of the two major political forces in Bangladesh.
In 1988, a small UN observer mission was sent from Bangladesh to monitor the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war. These were two Islamic countries and Bangladesh being a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) felt that it ought to play some role in the peace-making efforts between the two belligerent states; it would, it was felt, enhance the image of Bangladesh. In 1991 during the first Gulf War Bangladesh sent an infantry brigade for the war sanctioned by the UN. These UN commitments and involvements would in the coming decades significantly alter the complexion of the Bangladesh Army and its personnel.
By 1991, the Army, an organization meant solely for fighting wars, was involved in three different fields:
(1) The Army was administering the country, which appeared to be its chief reason for existence.
(2) It was training for war as and when commitments from its nation-building activities permitted.
(3) It was fighting a counter-insurgency war in the CHT and executing all development activities there from running schools to dispensaries; building roads; and getting the local populace to change their way of life.
The Bangladesh Army 1991 to 2014
What the disenfranchised politicians thought of the Bangladesh Army could well be gauged from the mass upsurge which the AL, BNP and Jamat organized in 1991 to oust General Hussain Mohammad Ershad from power. Ershad was ousted and the Army was seen as a major threat to the establishment of democratic dispensation in Bangladesh. Great efforts were exerted to cleanse the civil administration of all military personnel and the Army was told in no uncertain terms to stick to their barracks. The Army’s energies were diverted to UN missions, to disaster management and into a myriad of other activities which were commercial and economic in nature. The government(s) quietly allowed the Army to start operating large business enterprises including banks (Appendix-1 contains a exhaustive list of all economic activities of the Army to date). What affect these economic and commercial activities had on the Army’s organization will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. By 2014 the Army was so firmly under “civilian” control that officers seeking prize posting and promotion approached politicians rather than their senior officers and mentors.
Nonetheless the Army continued to enjoy a budgetary allocation which was the envy of all other ministries. During the period 1991 to 2014 the Army raised two new divisions and a number of other specialized units and formations besides establishing new training institutions and cantonments. New weapon systems including tanks, artillery guns, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and new communication equipments were inducted into the Army. Plans as of 2014 are underway for raising two further divisions. Many appointments tenable by Lieutenant Colonels about a decade back have been upgraded to Brigadiers. New structures created for various purposes created new vacancies and so new posts and appointments have increased exponentially. Secondment to the Border Guards have increased manifold where new structures have created new posts; and Army personnel are even seconded to the Police in the form of Rapid Action Battalions.
The Impact of Economic Activities on Army Organization
In truth Army’s involvement in certain types of commercial activities is unavoidable because without these activities the Army will cease to function altogether. Besides pay and allowances of personnel, the rest of the Army’s yearly budget is consumed in the procurement of food, clothing, health care, housing (basic needs); procurement of arms, armaments, ordnances and equipment. These commercial activities are in the nature of things ever since modern armies were formed in the 16th century and today every army’s (including the Bangladesh Army’s) organization incorporates these activities in its structures. In and by themselves these commercial activities are very large and significant in terms of the national budget (around 10%), but not in terms of the national economy which caters to the needs of 160 million souls. So, such commercial activities are outside the purview of this article although one could endlessly debate about the justifications and layout of various heads in the Army’s budget.
The Army’s Welfare Directorate under the Adjutant General’s Branch of the Army Headquarters was formed right after the independence of Bangladesh as was the Army Headquarters. The Welfare Directorate’s responsibility is to provide “welfare” to both serving and retired personnel. The term “welfare” is vague and may include any perks and perquisites not provided formally by the Army. This directorate had under its control two commercial organizations: (1) the Canteen Stores Department (CSD) which procures and provides consumer goods at subsidized rates to dependents of both serving and retired personnel and (2) the Sena Kalyan Sangstha (Soldiers’ Welfare Organization) which operates a number of trading and manufacturing enterprises. The Sangstha is manned by a few serving but mostly retired personnel and their dependents. By 2014 these two organizations had mutated into massive commercial enterprises as is shown in
Appendix-1.
The Military Estate Office (MEO) has under it all the defense services real estates which are spread all over the country. In Dhaka these estates are in prime locations. In 1977, Army officers demanded that they be provided with housing on the justification that they and their dependents had nowhere to live after they retired. Since the Martial Law regime was running the country, it was not difficult to obtain regulations and sanctions to convert some of this military real estate to Defense Officers Housing Society (DOHS). Officers would pay for the land of course, including development and registration charges, but which was nowhere near the real/market value of the land. The MEO’s and CEO’s (Cantonment Executive Officer) offices, both manned by civilians under the MoD, were given the responsibility of implementing and supervising the DOHSs. This task was much beyond their terms of references but regulations were soon changed. The Movement and Quartering Directorate (M&Q) under the Quarter Master’s Generals Branch was given the responsibility to implement and set criterion for allocation plots to officers. The M&Q Directorate is responsible for movement and quartering of all Army units, formations and logistics. As to how distributing housing plots to officers falls within the mission of the M&Q is thus difficult to imagine. In addition the Military Engineering Services (MES) and the Engineers Directorate were given the task of developing the lands.
The above are but two examples of how economic activities affect Army organizations, whose structures were all created to fight wars successfully. These economic activities and the changes which they bring about diminish the Army’s ability to fulfill its purpose, goal or mission. Shown below are four more glaring examples:
(1) UN Missions
UN Missions are for peace-keeping and peace-making as opposed to war-fighting. So, these activities do not directly contribute to the Army’s ability to fight wars. Indirectly, as will be shown later, they are indeed debilitating to a soldier’s ability to successfully engage in combat. UN missions are classed under economic activities because they generate some business (procurement of equipment, vehicles, logistics, transportation etc); contribute significant foreign currency to the exchequer and to the bank accounts of individuals engaged for such missions.
Starting from humble beginnings in 1988, over the last two decades this activity has expanded exponentially. Today, an entire division strength (8 to 10 thousand personnel) is regularly rotated for UN missions. This has led to the creation of the Overseas Operations Directorate (OOD) under the General Staff Branch, headed by a Brigadier, a training center called BIPSOT headed by a Major General, and a New York based liaison office headed by a Brigadier. These organizations and the hundreds of personnel employed there have no war-time functions or indeed any function connected with the fulfillment of the Army’s purpose of war-fighting.
(2) The Army Medical Corps (AMC)
The AMC is supposed to provide medical care to personnel in war and in peace though its battalions and static installations of CMHs. In addition CMHs also provide health-care to dependents and retired personnel. All this is fine but over the last two decades the AMC has developed into a many-headed hydra running a medical college, a large general hospital and two other institutes, all on commercial basis. The AMC has now on its payroll over 1000 officers (a third of the total number of officers in service in the Army) and it has more generals than all supporting arms combined together. One wonders what these two battalion strength of doctors in uniform are going to do in a wartime Army. These officers (doctors) have flourishing private practices in every major private sector hospital in every major district in Bangladesh.. To make possible all these activities, the TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) of the AMC had to be radically revised.
(3) Educational Institutions
The Army operates more than 50 educational institutions from primary to university levels, all on a commercial basis. To make this possible TO&Es of Education, Engineers, Signals and EME (Electrical and Mechanical)) directorates had to be changed and new TO&Es had to be made for universities creating vacancies, posts and appointments. Hundreds of personnel employed there have nothing to do with their military profession.
(4) Infrastructure Development
Due to various factors the Army has allowed itself to be drawn into developing national infrastructures of massive proportions. For this a heavy civil engineering organization Special Works Organization) has been formed, radically changing the TO&E of the Corps of Engineers. Army engineers perform function critical to war-fighting: they lay mine-field or get rid of them, they create or destroy fortification, they create or destroy obstacles but above all they enhance mobility or impede the enemy’s and their secondary role is that of infantry. The heavy civil engineering organization does not touch, even remotely, on any of these tasks.
Impact of Economic Activities on Army Personnel
The greatest impact of the Army’s economic activities is on the attitudes, motivation and behavior of its personnel. For example, peace-keeping missions call for restraint, compromise and negotiations – skill which are inimical to soldiering. If a soldier shows restraint in combat or attempts to negotiate and compromise with the enemy, he will face the firing squad, where as these attitudes are likely to lead to praise and rewards in UN Missions.
Personnel come back from UN missions with surplus money which exceeds or equals their entire income of 25 years of military service. Personnel and their dependents then invest these surpluses in various commercial ventures and devote a major portion of their efforts in pursuing those. Army laws and regulation do not permit such activities but since all soldiers, both officers and men, are engaged in such activities the organization simply looks the other way, thus creating a “norm” of acceptance of violations of rules, regulations, values and ethos of military service. Often social problems are created because invariably some become very rich, some remain the same, while others become worse off due to loses in businesses. This creates social tensions between families and within families of military personnel. Moreover, a rich person or at least a well-off person is most unlikely to pay much attention to soldiering, having the means to pursue other, less constraining, means of livelihood. For example, Army doctors who are financially well-off due to their private practices, rarely socialize with run of the mill officers or their families.
Personnel employed in organizations which deal with the Army’s commercial/economic activities soon begin to inculcate the values and loyalties of the organization they work for. For example, personnel employed in educational institution will begin to think and act like masters/teachers; personnel employed in infrastructure development or in real estate development will begin to think and act like civil engineers/contractors. All of these attitudinal, motivational and behavioral changes cannot be handled by periodic rotation of personnel. Rotation spreads these changes to more and more people.
A Critique of “Forces Goal – 2030 for Bangladesh Army”.
Before concluding, I cannot resist the temptation of writing a few sentences about how the Army envisages its future developments which have been documented in a paper titled “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army”.
Firstly, Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army has been classified as “Confidential” thereby restricting access to it to the very few. It ought to have been unclassified or at most “Restricted” and uploaded in the Army’s web-site, so that as many as possible could study it and provide comments, remarks or critiques which would have gone a long way in improving it. Moreover it ought to be remembered that the Army is responsible for providing security and defense for the people and the land against foreign aggression and so the “people” must have a say in how this is done. Besides the “people” provide the money and the manpower for the upkeep and maintenance of the Army and so they have an inherent right to know what is happening to their money and to their soldiers.
Secondly, the paper is titled “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” but what about the Navy and the Air Force. Modern wars since World War-I have all been fought jointly by all three or more services and that too in a highly coordinated manner. So, plans for changes and developments have also got to be done jointly, together, so that each service remains “balanced” and capable of supporting the others. Besides services must be fully aware of each others capabilities and weaknesses, if they are to successfully fight wars. Each service living in a “world” by itself is a very simplistic way at looking at very complex issues and would invariably lead to inter-service tussles for funds and resources, jeopardizing the developments that the services desire so much. Ultimately, when called upon, war-fighting could be disastrous.
Thirdly, although the paper is titled “…Goals…” there are no goals in it. All it contains is a few pages of prosaic platitudes followed by a dozen or so pages of tables showing the raising of different types of units/formations over time extending upto 2030, all of which are nothing more than changes in the Army’s TO&E. The Army’s Staff Duties Directorate could have done a much more through and detailed job of it without so much fan-fare and hype. Analyzing “goals” and expressing them for complex organizations, is I am afraid, a much different exercise, involving a detailed study of geopolitics, geography, politics, economy of not only ones own country but also of the potential adversary’s – all of which is absent from the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army”. At the end of such an analysis, typically, the “goal” is expressed in a simple form such as: “The Goal of Bangladesh Army in 2030 would be to develop the capability to fight a two front defensive/offensive war against —– . At the tactical level mission would be —–; at the operational level mission would be —-. At the strategic level the purpose of the war would be to secure the geographical, political, social and economic integrity of Bangladesh”. Only after this has been said can one go on to develop the structure for fulfilling the expected capability.
Fourthly, the development in the military follows a specific, logical pattern: doctrine – structuring – equipping/arming – training. The doctrine lays down the goal/ mission/purpose and the ways of achieving that; the structuring, equipping/arming and training provides the means for achieving that. Starting in the middle with structuring is no way to go about bringing changes in the Army. The “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” violates the existing Army and the Joint Warfare doctrines because it fails to indicate in which tier the proposed units/formations would be operating in – tactical, operational or strategic; whether singly or jointly with other services. The key concepts of the existing Army doctrine are: joint warfare, maneuver warfare and conventional war blended with the unconventional but the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” does not structure these into the developing organization, thereby making the doctrine irrelevant. So, how is the Army going to fight a war where everything of importance remains undefined and vague.
Fifthly, the Army in its preparation of the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” blind-sided and disregarded everything: geopolitics, geography, politics, finances, and economy. Let me write a few sentences about these.
(1) Geopolitics. The study of geopolitics shows who is a “friend” and who is a “potential adversary” because of geographical and political reasons. Without the identification of an enemy or at least a potential adversary there is no justification or logic of maintaining an Army for a potential war. More importantly for the Army, it is impossible to calculate what capability one needs to develop without a crystal clear idea of what one is up against; of the adversary and his capabilities (I have explained how this is done in an article titled Calculating Combat Capabilities published in the Bangladesh Defense Journal, February 2012). The “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” does not explain who the potential adversary/ adversaries are. So, it raises the basic question: Against whom is this Army going to fight and what for? Other important questions which “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” ought to have addressed are: What is the nature of any future conflicts? What would be the scope and extent of such conflicts? Does Bangladesh face any existential threats from such conflicts? The answers to these three important questions would define how the Army, Navy and Airforce of Bangladesh would need to be developed and structured.
(2) Geography. A single glance at the map of Bangladesh would show its four clear divisions defined by the rivers Brahamaputra/Jamuna falling into the Meghna and the Padma falling into the Meghna. Infact from ancient times, from atleast the 3rd century BC, Bangladesh (East Bengal) had been demarcated into four parts: the ancient Varendra, Vanga, Samatata and Harikela and it is from the Sanskrit word Vanga that Bengal gets its name. What immediately springs to the eyes and mind are the maritime regions of Chittagong and Khulna, which ought to be Maritime Operational Commands, with Army forces for landward defense, placed under operational command of the Maritime Commands. And yet disregarding all this geography the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” has chosen two points of the compass – east and west – to form two Army Commands. This was done not out of any geographical considerations but to provide employment to Lieutenant Generals lounging around various offices. This whole problem of higher ranks was created by Moinuddin Ahmed, the much detested former Chief of Army Staff, who promoted himself to a General and a couple of his buddies to Lieutenant Generals for no reasons at all, save one of “prestige”.
(3) Economy and Finance. There is not a single mention in the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” about how much money all these proposed developments are going to cost the country. The Army seems to have simply forgotten that without money nothing gets done, that the citizens provide that money by paying taxes, which the government transforms into yearly budgets, which the Parliament then debates and approves. A complete cost accounting was therefore, mandatory in working out future raisings of units and formations.
The above are but a few of the issues which can be covered in the limited space of this article. In summary, the “Forces Goal-2030 for Bangladesh Army” has been an extremely amateurish, even casual effort. So amateurish, infact that I found it hard to believe that the best brains in the Army could come up with such a “thing”. Perhaps the authors of such a piece of work were constrained by the Terms of Reference; perhaps the tasking authority (the Armed Forces Division) had a political agenda to grind or perhaps the Board of Officers simply did not have the “expertise” to execute such a task. In any case I would suggest that the Army simply “bury” this bit of paper and get on with its job.
Concluding Remarks
The economic/commercial activities are not only affecting the Bangladesh Army’s organization and structures but more importantly its personnel. The very fabric of the Army – its morality, its ethics, its traditions, its laws, rules and regulations – is being destroyed by such activities.
All of these activities are good for the economy and society of Bangladesh but the Army’s purpose is not to provide economic and social goods for the Nation but to be ready to fight wars and fight them successfully when needed to preserve the State and its economy and society.
I could destroy the entire logic and justification of these changes/development taking place in the Army by posing two simple questions: (1) why is the Army making such changes? And (2) what contribution are these changes making to the Army’s sole purpose, goal or mission of war-fighting? No amount of logic can justify the Army’s detraction from its purpose, goal or mission.
I am fully aware that writing this article is not going to have any affect whatsoever on the Army or its leadership but I would like to point out that the Army is funded through the taxes of its largely poor citizenry. While the poor citizenry may not be in a position to ask questions, the richer and educated citizens will invariably raise questions about the role of the Army. If the Army is producing economic and social goods and services why are we arming them with arms, armaments and ordnances – all wherewithal for war? Why indeed are we feeding, clothing and housing them? The Army can fund itself through its economic activities and the 10 to 15 percent of our budget, which we spend on the military now, can be employed for more urgent tasks of educating our people, providing them with power, and improving agricultural and industrial productivity. The Army, in my view, is working its way out of any justification for its existence.
APPENDIX-1
Economic Enterprises/Organizations of the Bangladesh Army
The Army is involved in a wide variety of commercial/business activities in the private sector, some of which are operated through structures specifically created for them, while others are controlled and operated through modified TO&Es of existing structures. Without a detailed study and analysis, it is difficult to understand the depth and extent of the Army’s economic activities or the contribution of these activities to the national economy and the GDP – I do not have the expertise and the qualifications to do this but I hope that someone with the requisite qualifications would carryout such a study. The findings of such a study may well surprise the parliament, the government and indeed the public! Given below is an exhaustive list of the economic enterprises that the Army operates.
1. The Sena Kalyan Sangstha. The Sangstha operates a dozen or so trading and manufacturing enterprises which market everything from bulbs to bread. It also went into real estate development a few years back.
2. CSD. The CSD operates a chain of super-market type stores throughout Bangladesh in every cantonment providing every type of consumer goods to serving and retired military personnel and in the larger stores civilians can do their shopping too. The CSD runs farms, industrial bakeries, a travel agency, at least two large gas and gasoline filling stations, and a supply and logistic chain which would be the envy of other private sector super-markets.
3. The Trust Bank Ltd. The bank has an affiliated merchant bank as well. This bank has branches in every cantonment and large city of Bangladesh and operates as other private sector commercial banks do.
4. Educational Institutions. The Army operates some 50 or so educational institutions which, beside others, include a dozen cadet colleges, two universities and a medical college. These educational institutions are run on a commercial basis but dependents of military personnel get subsidized rates.
5. Real Estate Development, Infrastructures and Construction.
The MEO disposes of huge real estates and new lands are being continuously acquired all over Bangladesh for expanding cantonments, training areas and new cantonments. Military construction projects are massive and continuous. These are controlled by the MES and Engineers Directorate both under the E-in-C or Engineer-in-Chief (a major general).
The DOHS are also in military lands – presently these are all in Dhaka but others are being developed in Chittagong, Comilla and Savar. The DOHS are controlled by three different organizations: the MEO, the CEO and M&Q Directorate. A few years back a private limited company had been formed to acquire lands for housing in Kaliganj, in the outskirts of Dhaka. A couple of years back, this project ran into severe public ire and anger on rumors of forced acquisition, which led to two deaths and scores of injuries.
A separate Engineers organization (Special Works Organization) is probably operating under the Ministry of Communication for public sector infrastructure development. This organization has already implemented the Haitirjheel and the Mirpur-Airport flyover projects in Dhaka as an independent contractor and has also been given supervisory responsibilities for the Meghna bridge project.
(6) Hospitality and Leisure Industry. The Army has built and leased out a 5-star hotel in Dhaka and is the process of building another one in Chittagong. The Army operates a number of golf courses, including two large ones in Dhaka and one in Chittagong – so far the Army has a monopoly of this golfing business. Besides it also hires out facilities, both to military personnel and civilians, for social functions such as marriages etc.
(7) Other Enterprises.
The Army operates the sole public sector Machine Tools factory (BMTF) in Bangladesh as well as the sole Ordnance factory in Gazipur. The ordnance factory produces small arms and supplies them to the armed forces, the para-military and police. The machine tools factory does diverse jobs including assembling of trucks.
The Army also has controlling stakes in a shoe/lather factory established on BMTF lands and a 50 MW power plant installed on Army land in Postogola on the outskirts of Dhaka.
[PUBLISHED IN BANGLADESH DEFENCE JOURNAL,MARCH 2014 ISSUE]
Alan Warnes @warnesyworld
