What's new

16th December 1971: From East Pakistan to Bangladesh

১৯৪৬ সালের ১৬ ই আগষ্টের নৃশংস কলকাতার দাঙ্গায় নেতৃত্ব দিলেন।পাকিস্তান সংগ্রামের তিনিই হলেন পূর্বাঞ্চলের প্রধান সৈনিক।সুরাবর্দির প্রধান সেনাপতি ও ডান হাত শেখ মুজিব। সেই সঙ্গে মুসলিম ছাত্র লিগের একজন অন্যতম নেতা।যখন স্বাধীনতা আন্দোলনে হাজার হাজার হিন্দু যুবক হাসিমুখে প্রাণ দিচ্ছিল,হাজার হাজার হিন্দু দেশপ্রেমিক কারা অন্তরালে কাঁদছিল এবং হাজার হাজার আহত পঙ্গু যুবক মৃতুর দিন গুনছিল,তখন যুবক শেখ মুজিব স্বাধীনতা আন্দোলনে যোগ না দিয়ে হিন্দুর বিরুদ্ধে জেহাদের পরিকল্পনায় ব্যস্ত ছিলেন।এভাবে জেহাদের ডাক দিয়ে হিন্দুর বিরুদ্ধে যুদ্ধ ঘোষণা করেন।আর ব্রিটিশের সঙ্গে সেই ঘৃণ্য দেশভাগ চক্রান্তে লিপ্ত ছিলেন। ’’

There is no doubt that Mujib certainly wanted a separate Muslim country for the Muslims. He fought for Pakistan movement until the Partition in 1947. But, Kalidas Boiddo is preposterous in saying that Mujib was instrumental in the riot of 1946. Even Suhrawardy was not responsible. It was the Hindus who attacked and killed the Muslims in the 1st round of the Action Day. Muslims gathered together and went after killing the Hindus in the 2nd round.

Mujib was in Calcutta, but did not participate in the riot. He rather helped Hindus in the Muslim areas to move to Hindu areas. He saved many innocent lives by doing this charity with the help of his associates. Please refer to his biography "অসমাপ্ত আত্মজীবনী" (Oshomapto AtmoJiboni) to know the details of that time. This Kalidas and the other two conspirators were Hindu supremacists who dreamed of making BD a Muslim entity without Islam always kowtowing India. But, this backfired because Mujib was not willing to accept India as the overlord of BD. This is why they are angry with him. He was not even for a separate BD.
 
Last edited:
. .
Without Indian help there is a possibility Pakistan would have militarily crushed Bangladeshi revolt. I am not sure how long they would have controlled East Pakistan.
Without Indian direct involvement PA troops certainly would have crushed the revolt within a short time. But, BD people wanted to make the country independent by waging a long guerrilla war. But, neither India nor the AL leadership were ready for this. India was burdened with 9 million refugees and the AL leadership were not a fighter type of people. They were basically a bunch of idle street agitators.

Both the sides also feared the rise of Bangali communists led by Bhasani and Muzaffar who would have been more dedicated to do the fighting. So, to avoid giving them leadership, the decision to fight the December 1971 India-Pakistan war was taken. For India it was a good decision because if Indira Gandhi did not act then, she would have to wait for the next December when again the Himalayan snowfall would inhibit a Chinese incursion. Many things could have happened by this one year lapse. No one really knows what.
 
Last edited:
.
Without Indian direct involvement PA troops certainly would have crushed the revolt within a short time. But, BD people wanted to make the country independent by waging a long guerrilla war. But, neither India nor the AL leadership were ready to do this. India was burdened with 9 million refugees and the AL leadership were not a fighting group of people. They were basically a bunch of idle street agitators.

Both the sides also feared the rise of Bangali communists who would have been more dedicated to fight. The result was the decision to fight the December 1971 India-Pakistan war. For India it was a good decision because if Indira Gandhi did not act then, she would have to wait for the next December when the Himalayan snowfall would inhibit a Chinese incursion. Many things would have happened by this one year lapse. No one really knows what would have happened in that case.

I do not know Pakistan controls 60 million people with 100,000 army & paramilitary troops
 
.
I do not know Pakistan controls 60 million people with 100,000 army & paramilitary troops
Yes, it was possible for a short time when the 100,000 troops had modern weapons against the 70 million people without guns. However, a long term guerrilla war was needed to liberate. India and AL leadership were not ready to relinquish their control over to the communists. So, it was December 1971 when the final battle was fought. China was unable to lend hands to Pakistan because the entire Himalayan terrain was under snow.
 
.
Yes, it was possible for a short time when the 100,000 troops had modern weapons against the 70 million people without guns. However, a long term guerrilla war was needed to liberate. India and AL leadership were not ready to relinquish their control over to the communists. So, it was December 1971 when the final battle was fought. China was unable to lend hands to Pakistan because the entire Himalayan terrain was under snow.

for how long ?? If India supplies anti-tank weapons Mukti Bahini rebels will pick off an Pakistani army convoy.
 
.
শাহজাহান সিরাজের কিংবদন্তী রাজনৈতিক জীবন
 
.
A political party’s 60th birthday

Muhammad Quamrul Islam

Colonialism is a terrible practice of subjugation involving political and economic control over a dependent territory. The face of British imperialism is too ugly if the first Indian anti-British revolution called Sepoy mutiny of 1857, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, also known as the Amritsar massacre, of 13 April 1919, (in which over 1,000 were killed) etc. are kept in mind.
East India Company’s perfidy, atrocity

The East India Company obtained permission from the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan to trade with Bengal, and with it began a long history of betrayal, atrocity, breach of trust, duplicity and perfidy.
The Partition of India in 1947 created two independent dominions, India and Pakistan. The boundary demarcating India and Pakistan became known as the Radcliffe Line, named after Cyril Radcliffe the head of the Land Border Commission.

500,000 people were killed — result of Radcliffe Line
Power was transferred from Britain to the newly independent countries of India and Pakistan. But there was a fatal flaw: There were no borders.

Radcliffe arrived in India 36 days before the date of the partition. On Aug. 9, 1937 he finished drawing the map, but the British viceroy Lord Mountbatten, his superior, kept it a secret.
It is regrettable that Radcliffe’s idiotic act saw millions flee across the border. Mass exodus followed. Thousands of Hindus fled Pakistan, most heading east. Millions of Muslims fled India, most heading west. More than 1 crore 5000,000 (one crore and fifty lakh) people had been uprooted, and 500,000 people were killed in the violence that ensued after independence, and millions more were injured.

Father of opposition politics in Pakistan
The father of opposition politics in the then Pakistan in early 1948, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani was the towering political figure at that time in the regional politics.
In 1937 Maulana Bhashani was elected Member of Legislative Assebly of Assam from Dhubri (South) constituency and served till 1946. He worked for the peasants of Assam and Bengal. In April 1944 he was elected the President of Assam Muslim League. Afterwards he devoted himself to Pakistan movement.

The Maulana returned to eastern wing of Pakistan. Soon it was felt ruling Muslim League government of East Bengal was not true to Islamic ideology and democracy it upheld but became subservient to central government deviated to favoritisms and nepotism and negate the demand to make Bengali as a State language.

Moulana Bhashani: founder President of Awami League
It led to establishment of Awami Muslim League on 23 June 1949 under the leadership of Maulana Bhashani as the founding President in Dhaka as the first opposition party of Pakistan. Shamsul Huq was the General Secretary. The word Muslim was dropped on October 21, 1955 and Awami League (AL) became the new name of the party. We were told Prime Minister of Pakistan HS Suhrawardhy while addressing a meeting at SM Hall of Dhaka University on December 9, 1956 stressed on the extension of relations with the West and criticized the demand for autonomy for East Pakistan by Bhashani who insisted on it as per electoral mandate of 1954 election by the people.

It led to the Council Session of the Awami League convened by Bhashani at Kagmari on February 7, 1957. After the Kagmari session Awami League leadership gradually began to be divided on the issues of full regional autonomy and foreign policy. Finally, the democratic workers conference in Dhaka on July 25 formed National Awami Party under the leadership of Bhashani upholding the demand for regional autonomy and neutral foreign policy. Soon NAP became strong mainstream national party with Awami League and Muslim League.

Important observation on Moulana Bhashani
To quote from the book published in 2012 of an eminent columnist and veteran newspaper editor, “If there were no Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (1880 - 1976)”, a man of steel, “there would not be Awami League; Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892 - 1963) wouldn’t have migrated wouldn’t have migrated from Calcutta to Dhaka; and “there would not be Bangladesh under the able leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman”.

After 10 years Awami League Preident Sheikh Mujib, placed 6-point demand at the national conference of opposition parties in Lahore on February 5, 1966 which provided for a true federation on the basis of Lahore Resolution. On next March 1, during council session Sheikh Mujib for the first time was elected President Awami League.

The old relationships between Bhashani and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib warmed up that led to the liberation of Bangladesh comprising territories of erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971 for emancipation of the masses and sustainable development. After emergence of Bangladesh AL and NAP were two mainstream parties. The Bangladesh famine of 1974 is a major source of public discontent. Corruption accentuated the miseries of the people. Bhashani was critical of the sordid state of affairs and reminded the government of the spirit of liberation and democracy till his death on November 17, 1976.

National Awami Party (NAP)
A tiny fra?tion of the National Awami Party (NAP) led by Prof Muzaffar which came out of the mainstream in 1968 and established pro-Soviet NAP, continued to remain so after independence and contested 1973 election. Prof Muzaffar’s wife is an MP of reserved women’s seat under 14-party alliance. As such efforts of ‘Bhashani Followers Co-ordination Council’ in 1990 reorganized NAP, unify all under leadership of Barrister Abdul Haq, but could not achieve unity, and were wound up on November 17, 2006.

Way back in the mid-1950s students of Comilla Victoria College like me became acquainted with annual election to çollege students’ union in 1955-57. Later on as a student at the Dhaka University in 1957 residing at S M Hall we had annual Hall Union polls, Dhaka University Central Students Union (DUCSU) election under the supervision of Provost of S M Hall which promoted democratic culture in peaceful academic atmosphere.

We were aware of history of the partition of India by the British colonialists into two —- India and Pakistan—-in August 1947, and in the family environment being born in 1940s in Bengal, the thriving province politically committed to achieve freedom from British yoke. I was born in Comilla town on 3rd July 1941. When I was 3 years old my father Advocate Muezzul Islam left for Kolkata along with family to promote his law and politics as well as facilitate studies of my elder brothers and sisters. Our contemporaries had varied experiences that we shared amongst us in student life as well as in later life which concerned citizens to pass to next generation in political and academic circles.

The people became citizens of Pakistan in East Bengal on 14th August 1947 as two wings of Pakistan were separated by thousand miles of Indian territory. We bear imprint of woes of tragic Kolkata riot killing innocent people of both communities in memory, which we came to know when grown up, was due to the machinations of vested quarters. After that there was influx of refugees in both ways between Pakistan and India, the implications of which are still felt as communal tensions have not subsided by partition and socio-economic emancipations of the people are yet to be achieved.
At present there are there are 30 parties registered with Election Commission. Except mainstream parties the AL, the BNP and the Jatiya Party many of the rest 28 have no electoral existences in the field. Under the circumstances people expect a free and fair election in a level playing field for all the parties — not like the controversial episode of 5 January 2014 when the majority of the Parliament Members were selected by the Prime Minister, and not elected by the electorate.

[The writer is an economist, advocate and social activist.] Email: mqislambd@hotmail.com

http://www.weeklyholiday.net/Homepage/Pages/UserHome.aspx?ID=10&date=0#Tid=14411
19366548_1593106907369183_4436704789077603810_n.jpg
 
Last edited:
.
Book will tell story of Pakistan, Bangladesh through architecture
SAM Staff, July 15, 2017
pakistan-architecture-700.jpg

The National Parliament House, or Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, was designed by American Louis Kahn. Image: WikiCommons.
An assistant professor in the University of Kansas School of Architecture & Design, the Bangladesh native has received a Mellon-Volkswagen Fellowship to complete the writing of a book on the history of architecture in the nascent state of Pakistan. The fellowship is funded jointly by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation.

“I am looking at the history of post-colonial Pakistan; from 1947 to 1971,” Karim said. “This is a time that has special significance in world history. Pakistan was created as a utopia. East and West Pakistan were combined together under a theoretical understanding of Muslim nationalism, even though they were 1,000 miles apart and even though East Pakistan, which later became Bangladesh, had different languages and cultural practices.”

When, after almost a century of imperial rule, Britain divested itself of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it gave rise to two independent and religiously homogenous nations: mostly Hindu India and the two halves of mostly Muslim Pakistan that lay on either side of it.

LAWRENCE — If it’s not quite a “secret history,” then Farhan Karim’s latest project is at least an overview of an overlooked phenomenon in an important region of the world.

When East Pakistan broke away in a 1971 liberation war to become Bangladesh, it sparked a secondary conflict between (West) Pakistan and India, the flashpoint of which was and remains the province of Kashmir.

“The bloody war was an embarrassing part of history for scholars who work in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Karim said. “In scholarly discussions, there is a large gap. I’m an architectural historian, and that is an even much less discussed area.

“I am trying to understand through the lens of architectural history how this construction of a utopian Pakistan was structured through design, and, specifically, through state-sponsored architecture. The capital of Pakistan, Islamabad, was a completely new city, a la Brasilia in Brazil or Chandigarh in India. Groups of designers arrived at that site. They were excited, yet they had a plan. They were standing in the middle of nowhere and asked to build an entire city.”

At the same time, Karim said, Pakistanis had undertaken a “massive educational reform project.” The Brits had been kicked out, and yet Pakistan had not developed a native educational infrastructure. Thus, he said, “When Pakistan was in a total nation-building project, they did not have enough architects, so they partnered with the USA.”

“The United States became a Cold War ally to Pakistan. With grants from the United States Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation, they went to Pakistan to build that infrastructure.”

Karim said consultants poured in from the United States, Greece, Turkey, Japan and Germany. Perhaps the most famous of them was the American Louis Kahn, who designed the National Parliament House for what was East Pakistan when he received the commission, but which later became Bangladesh. Kahn was invited to design the project in Dhaka by Pakistan’s then-leader, Ayub Khan.

“When it comes to architectural history, we understand Louis Kahn as a lone genius, creating his masterpiece, but he also had a good relationship with USAID,” Karim said. “His take on the Cold War intervention in South Asia needs to be discussed. When discussing architectural history, he saw himself as a representative of the United States, working in South Asia. When we look at how Louis Kahn saw himself, embedded in a larger sociopolitical context, a new story will appear before our eyes.”

Karim said he has been researching the subject for the past five years, poring over records in archives in the United States and Greece, among other places.

“I’ve been to 15 places in the last five years,” he said. “It’s an epic story that needs epic length to tell it.”

Karim has given his book the working title “Dreaming of a Nation.” The Volkswagen-Mellon Fellowship will give him nine to 10 months off from his teaching duties so he can complete his manuscript. He will travel to Berlin to work on the book at the ZMO (Zentrum Moderner Orient, or Center for Modern Oriental Studies) research institute there.

During his previous work, Karim said, “I realized how little we know about the contemporary design history of South Asia.” The book is his attempt to remedy that situation.

The University of Kansas is a major comprehensive research and teaching university. The university’s mission is to lift students and society by educating leaders, building healthy communities and making discoveries that change the world.

[With Special Permission from the KU News Service to Republish/Translate into Bengali for South Asian Monitor]
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/07/15/book-will-tell-story-pakistan-bangladesh-architecture/
 
.
Mascarenhas' 1971 "GENOCIDE" Story Biased All Media Coverage of East Pakistan

Pakistani journalist Anthony Mascarenhas' sensational story headlined "GENOCIDE", published by London's Sunday Times on June 13 1971, had a profound effect on all subsequent media coverage of East Pakistan, according to veteran BBC South Asia correspondent Mark Tully.

Mascarenhas (1928-1986) worked for "Morning News", a Karachi-based English language daily, when he was sent to report on East Pakistan in 1971. It's not clear how he ended up reporting for Sunday Times (now owned by Rupert Murdoch) but it's known that he and his family moved to take up residence in England before the publication of his "GENOCIDE" story. Here's how the BBC reported it: "Pretending he was visiting his sick sister, Mascarenhas then travelled to London, where he headed straight to the Sunday Times and the editor's office".

In a radio interview, Tully said in Urdu: "There are still significant questions in my mind as to whether the media coverage of Pakistani military crackdown in 1971 was balanced.....it (balanced coverage) became especially difficult after the Mascarenhas' exclusive dispatch (headlined "Genocide") published in The Sunday Times".


genocide.jpg


Mascarenhas' "Genocide" story was accepted on face value and widely disseminated by major western and Indian media outlets without any verification or fact-checks. Decades later, Sarmila Bose, an Indian journalist and scholar, finally scrutinized the story and found it to be "entirely inaccurate".

Bose's investigation of the 1971 Bangladeshi narrative began when she saw a picture of the Jessore massacre of April 2, 1971. It showed "bodies lie strewn on the ground. All are adult men, in civilian clothes....The caption of the photo is just as grim as its content: "April 2, 1971: Genocide by the Pakistan Occupation Force at Jessore." Upon closer examination, Bose found that "some of the Jessore bodies were dressed in shalwar kameez ' an indication that they were either West Pakistanis or ‘Biharis’, the non-Bengali East Pakistanis who had migrated from northern India". In Bose's book "Dead Reckoning" she has done case-by-case body count estimates that lead her in the end to estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were killed on all sides, including Bengalis, Biharis, West Pakistanis and others, in 1971 war.

Here are the relevant excepts on the Mascarenhas story in Sarmila Bose's Dead Reckoning:

On Page 10: "An interesting example is Anthony Mascarenhas' famous report in Sunday Times published on 13 June 1971. His eyewitness description from Comilla of how a Bengali, especially a Hindu, could have his life snuffed out at the whim of a single army officer serves as a powerful indictment of the military action, but his description of the army's attack on the Hindu area of Shankharipara in old Dhaka on 25-26 March--where he was not present--given without citing any source and turns out to be entirely inaccurate according to the information obtained from my interviews with survivors of Shakharipara".

On Page 73: "In his (Mascarenhas') book that followed his report in the Sunday Times condemning the military crackdown in East Pakistan, Anthony Mascarenhas wrote ," In Shankaripatti an estimated 8000 men, women and children were killed when the army, having blocked both ends of the winding street, hunted down house by house:". This is not an eyewitness account, as Mascarenhas was not there, and he does not cite any sources for his information---which in this case s totally wrong in all aspects. Mascarenhas' reports, like many foreign press reports in 1971, are a mixture of reliable and unreliable information, depending on where the reporter is faithfully reporting what he has actually seen or is merely writing an uncorroborated version of what someone else has told him.......According to survivors of Shankharipara, the army did not go house to house. They entered only one house, Number 52".

Aided and abetted by the Indian and western media with stories like Mascarenhas', the Bangladeshi Nationalists led by the Awami League have concocted and promoted elaborate myths about the events surrounding Pakistan's defeat in December 1971.

Sheikh Mujib's daughter and current Bangladesh Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina alleges "colonial exploitation" of Bengalis by Pakistan and "Bengali genocide" by the Pakistan Army. They claim economic disparities between East and West Pakistan as the main cause of their "war of independence" in which "Pakistan Army killed 3 million Bangladeshis".

Let's examine the Bangladeshi claims on the basis of real facts and data known today as follows:

1. The per capita income in West Pakistan was 60% higher than in East Pakistan in 1971. But they never tell you that the per capita income in East Pakistan was higher than in West Bengal and India. They also don't tell you that the ratio of per capita incomes between Bangladesh and Pakistan has changed little in the last four decades since "independence'.

Bangladesh%2BIndia%2BPakistan%2BGDP%2BPPP.png


Per Capita Incomes Source: World Bank
2. Bangladeshi nationalists claims that "three million people were killed, nearly quarter million women were raped". These claims have failed the scrutiny of the only serious scholarly researcher Sarmila Bose ever done into the subject. Bose's investigation of the 1971 Bangladeshi narrative began when she saw a picture of the Jessore massacre of April 2, 1971. It showed "bodies lie strewn on the ground. All are adult men, in civilian clothes....The caption of the photo is just as grim as its content: "April 2, 1971: Genocide by the Pakistan Occupation Force at Jessore." Upon closer examination, Bose found that "some of the Jessore bodies were dressed in shalwar kameez ' an indication that they were either West Pakistanis or ‘Biharis’, the non-Bengali East Pakistanis who had migrated from northern India". In Bose's book "Dead Reckoning" she has done case-by-case body count estimates that lead her in the end to estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were killed on all sides, including Bengalis, Biharis, West Pakistanis and others, in 1971 war.

3. Dr. M. Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, a Bengali nationalist who actively participated in the separatist cause, in his publication "Behind the Myth of 3 Million", challenges the falsehood. Citing an extensive range of sources to show that what the Pakistani army was carrying out in East Pakistan was a limited counter-insurgency, not genocide, the scholar discloses that after the creation of Bangladesh, the new de facto government offered to pay Taka 2,000 to every family that suffered loss of life but only 3,000 families claimed such compensation. Had there been three million Bengalis dead, a lot more of such families would have come forward. The actual fighting force of Pakistan was 40,000 not 93,000. They were given the responsibility to maintain law and order and protect civilians from the India-backed insurgents of Mukti Bahini. India's Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw praised the professionalism and gallantry of Pakistani soldiers facing the Indian Army's 50:1 advantage in the 1971 war.

4. Now declassified US State Department transcript of an April 6, 1971 conversation between then Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reveals that the US diplomats in Dhaka were also misled by false media reports of mass graves. Kissinger told Rogers that a reported mass grave of 1,000 dead Bengali victims of "genocide" turned out to be baseless.

Recent books and speeches by Indian officials, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and ex top RAW officials, confirm what Pakistanis have known all along: India orchestrated the East Pakistan insurgency and then invaded East Pakistan to break up Pakistan in December 1971. Unfair and inaccurate media coverage payed a large role in helping India succeed.

Here's a video of Indian Army Chief Field Marshal Manekshaw talking about Pakistan Army in 1971 War:



What Happened in East Pakistan (Yuri Bezmenov Former KGB Psychological Warfare Expert). Yuri Bezmenov ex KGB Psychological Warfare Expert Explains What Happened in East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) in This Video



Related Links:

Haq's Musings

India's Water Plans Alarm Bangladeshis

Ex Indian Spy Documents RAW's Successes in Pakistan

Shaikh Hasina's Witch Hunt

Bangladesh and Pakistan Compared

Economic Disparity Between East and West Pakistan

Is this a 1971 Moment in Pakistan's History?

India's Hostility Toward Pakistan
cleardot.gif


http://www.riazhaq.com/2017/07/mascarenhas-1971-genocide-story-biased.html

The courageous Pakistan army stand on the eastern front —Sarmila Bose
"Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan’s rulers and politicians failed to utilise." https://pakteahouse.wordpress.com/2010/11/17/sarmila-bose-on-pak-army-in-east-pak-during-1971 war/

Authoritative scholarly analyses of 1971 are rare. The best work is Richard Sisson and Leo Rose’s War and Secession. Robert Jackson, fellow of All Soul’s College, Oxford, wrote an account shortly after the events. Most of the principal participants did not write about it, a notable exception being Gen. Niazi’s recent memoirs (1998). Some Indian officers have written books of uneven quality — they make for an embarrassing read for what the Indians have to say about one another.

However, a consistent picture emerges from the more objective accounts of the war. Sisson and Rose describe how India started assisting Bengali rebels since April, but “the Muktib Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control over all the major urban centers on the East Pakistani-Indian border and even establishing a tenuous authority in most of the rural areas.

” From July to October there was direct involvement of Indian military personnel. “…mid-October to 20 November… Indian artillery was used much more extensively in support …and Indian military forces, including tanks and air power on a few occasions, were also used…Indian units were withdrawn to Indian territory once their objectives had been brought under the control of the Mukti Bahini — though at times this was only for short periods, as, to the irritation of the Indians, the Mukti Bahini forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack.”

Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan’s rulers and politicians failed to utilise.

Contrary to Indian reports, full-scale war between India and Pakistan started in East Bengal on 21 November, making it a four-week war rather than a ‘lightning campaign’. Sisson and Rose state bluntly: “After the night of 21 November…Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 to 25 November several Indian army divisions…launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan, and from all directions, with both armored and air support.” Indian officers like Sukhwant Singh and Lachhman Singh write quite openly in their books about India invading East Pakistani territory in November, which they knew was ‘an act of war’.

None of the outside scholars expected the Eastern garrison to withstand a full Indian invasion. On the contrary, Pakistan’s longstanding strategy was “the defense of the east is in the west”. Jackson writes, “Pakistani forces had largely withdrawn from scattered border-protection duties into cleverly fortified defensive positions at the major centres inside the frontiers, where they held all the major ‘place names’ against Mukti Bahini attacks, and blocked the routes of entry from India…”

Sisson and Rose point out the incongruity of Islamabad tolerating India’s invasion of East Pakistani territory in November. On 30 November Niazi received a message from General Hamid stating, “The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support.” The same day Islamabad decided to launch an attack in the West on 2 December, later postponed to 3 December, after a two-week wait, but did not inform the Eastern command about it. According to Jackson, the Western offensive was frustrated by 10 December.

On page 181 in "Dead Reckoning", Sarmila Bose says "it appears possible to estimate with reasonable confidence that at least 50,000-100,000 people perished in East Pakistan/Bangladesh in 1971, including combatants and non-combatants, Bengalis and non-Bengalis, Hindus and Muslims, Indians and Pakistanis".


Taken from the Wikipedia entry:

President Richard Nixon viewed Pakistan as a cold war ally and refused to condemn its actions. From the White House tapes "The President seems to be making sure that the distrusted State Department would not, on its own, condemn Yahya for killing Bengalis".[75] Nixon and China tried to suppress reports of genocide from East Pakistan.[156] Nixon also relied on American disinterest in what was happening in Pakistan, he said "“Biafra stirred up a few Catholics. But you know, I think Biafra stirred people up more than Pakistan, because Pakistan they’re just a bunch of brown goddamn Moslems.”[157]

A 1972 report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) noted that both sides in the conflict accused each other of perpetrating genocide. The report observed that it may be difficult to substantiate claims that the 'whole of the military action and repressive measures taken by the Pakistani Army and their auxiliary forces constituted genocide' that was intended to destroy the Bengali people in whole or in part, and that 'preventing a nation from attaining political autonomy does not constitute genocide: the intention must be to destroy in whole or in part the people as such'. The difficulty of proving intent was considered to be further complicated by the fact that three specific sections of the Bengali people were targeted in killings committed by the Pakistani Army and their collaborators: members of the Awami League, students, and East Pakistani citizens of the Hindu religion. The report observed, however, that there is a strong prima facie case that particular acts of genocide were committed, especially towards the end of the war, when Bengalis were targeted indiscriminately. Similarly, it was felt that there is a strong prima facie case that crimes of genocide were committed against the Hindu population of East Pakistan.[158]
 
. .
Full text of "Hamoodur Rahman REPORT ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL AFFAIRS"
http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default.shtm
page01.jpg




page02.jpg

Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report

The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December 1971. In its secret report, never made public in Pakistan the commission, headed by then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman, held widespread atrocities, other abuses of power by Pakistani generals and a complete failure in civilian and martial-law leadership responsible for the loss of East Pakistan. The report dwells on a range of sins: killing of thousands of Bangladeshis—both civilians and “Bengali” soldiers—rape, pan smuggling, looting of banks in East Pakistan, drunkenness by officers, even an instance of a Brigadier “entertaining” women while his troops were being shelled by Indian troops. It recommended a string of court-martials and trials against top officers . Nothing ever happened. The army’s role in splintering Pakistan after its greatest military debacle was largely ignored by successive Pakistani governments.

The Commission examined nearly 300 witnesses and hundreds of classified army signals between East and West Pakistan. The final report was submitted on October 23, 1974, detailing political, administrative, military and moral failings of then Pakistan.

The Report PDF version
Introduction

download
Cabinet note

download
Press release

download
Chapter 1

download
Chapter 2

download
Chapter 3

download
Chapter 4

download
Chapter 5

download
Annexure

download


To download the .pdf version of the report you need to have Adobe Acrobat Reader. Click here to download Acrobat Reader

https://archive.org/stream/Hamoodur...dur Rahman Commission Report Tanqeed_djvu.txt

Copied from:
Al-zakir SENIOR MEMBER
Lt.General.jpg


I know there has been discussion about the 1971 and separation of Pakistan. Weather we like it or not but it's the truth. I am posting this article about 1971 for sake of history and I believe this article present some good points. My intention isn't bring up any bad memory or hurt anyone feeling. 1971 is a truth and biggest blunder made by our forefather in the history of Pakistan. we the new generation of Pak-BD need live with this truth although it could have been avoided if both side compromised for the sake of saving Pakistan but they chose confrontation rather than peace. In 1947 they shed their blood for a separate homeland and in 1971 they bleed each other for separation of the same homeland.

The separation of East Pakistan was a great setback to Pakistan. By 1970, sentiments for national unity had weakened in East Pakistan to the extent that constant conflict between the two Wings dramatically erupted into mass civil disorder. This tragically resulted in the brutal and violent amputation of Pakistan's Eastern Wing.

The physical separation of a thousand miles between the two wings without a common border, and being surrounded by Indian territory and influences, led to constant political, economic and social conflicts between the two wings; embittering relations bringing the country on the verge of collapse.

As a result of the separation of its Eastern Wing, Pakistan's international credit was depleted and the military, being its most powerful institution, suffered a lot. To some, the very concept of Pakistan as the homeland for the Muslims in Southeast Asia no longer appeared valid.

Trouble started right at the inception of Pakistan in 1947. Almost immediately, East Pakistan claimed that as their population (55 percent as compared to 45 percent in the West) was greater, they were in a majority. Democratically, the Federal Capital, therefore, should have been in Dhaka and not in Karachi.

Since Karachi was the seat of the National Government; ministers, government officials and industrialists exerted immense influence on national and regional affairs, which brought them many benefits. But the East Pakistanis were unable to extract the same kind of advantages, as they were a thousand miles away from the Capital. Moreover, the Capital initially attracted wealthy industrialists, businessmen, administrators, doctors and other professionals who had fled from India

The location of the Capital, it was said, created great economic imbalance, uneven distribution of national wealth and privileges, and better jobs for the people of West Pakistan, because they were able to sway decisions in their own favor.

Secondly, Bengalis resented the vast sums of foreign exchange earned from the sale of jute from East, which were being spent on defense. They questioned how the expenditure for the Kashmir cause would be justified, when it could otherwise have been productively used to build dams and barriers to control floods, eradicate poverty and illiteracy, and supply food and shelter for the ever-growing population in East Pakistan.

Thirdly, the people of the East believed that it was sheer regional prejudice that all white-collar jobs were taken by West Pakistanis.

Many mistakes were made early in the short history of Pakistan. There lived in East Pakistan about 15 million Hindus who, with the help of their fellow West Bengali Indians from across the border, were able to exploit East-West differences that emerged as a result of these mistakes. Grievances were exaggerated to foster anti-West Pakistani feelings that eventually created Bengali Nationalism and separatist tendencies. Bengali political leaders went around depicting the Central Government and West Pakistan as hostile exploiters. However, no effective efforts were made by the Government to check these anti-national trends.

Awami League, formed in 1951, was headed by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. He had always been an ardent Bengali nationalist. He began to attract popular support from Bengalis in East Pakistan. He put forward his Six Points that demanded more autonomy for the Provinces in general, and East Pakistan in particular. He was arrested in April 1966, and soon released, only to be rearrested and imprisoned in June the same year. He languished in prison until February 1969.

Being deeply aware of the explosive political situation in the country, the then Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan, set in motion moves to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, and announced that the general elections would be held on October 5, 1970.

In all his election speeches, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman reiterated his demand for implementation of his Six Points and provincial autonomy plans.

The 1970 elections were postponed from October to December due to heavy floods that caused immense destruction and havoc in East Pakistan. The sheer enormity of the disaster attracted worldwide attention. This gave Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman a golden opportunity to have an international audience for his anti-West Pakistan feelings, which he accused of brutal callousness. The Awami League gained much sympathy and benefit out of this suffering, and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and his people were portrayed on the international scene as victims of West Pakistan's indifference.

In the general elections held in December 1970, the Awami League achieved an overwhelming victory. They captured 167 seats, the highest number in East Pakistan and overall. In the West, the Pakistan Peoples Party had won 85 seats. The way was now open to draw up a new Constitution.

The Awami League, now overwhelmingly victors, stood firm on its Six Points plan and refused to compromise on that issue. The Peoples Party in the West maintained that the Six Points Program did not really permit a genuine federation. It was in fact a unique constitutional proposal that proposed a federation that had power only over defense and foreign policy.

Efforts were made to start a constitutional dialogue and narrow the differences between the two Wings, but all in vain. Mujib-ur-Rahman's adamant stand in support of his Six Points, and his proposal that East Pakistan should have a sovereign status independent of Pakistan, further aggravated the situation.

Mujib-ur-Rahman launched a non-cooperation movement. The civil administration was totally paralyzed. All government and educational institutions were closed. People were asked not to pay any taxes. The transport system came to a standstill. Factories and shops were shut. All government activities between both the Wings ceased. The Awami League setup a parallel government. Gangs of local Awami League freedom fighters, known as Mukti Bahini, led violent demonstrations and howled racial and anti-West Pakistan slogans, inciting the people to more violence.

Amidst these disturbances, Genaral Yahya decided to convene the National Assembly in March 1971. But Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman unexpectedly put forward other demands such as the immediate lifting of Martial Law and power transfer to the elected representatives of the people, prior to the National Assembly session.

Unfortunately, on March 23, the Republic Day of Pakistan, the Awami League declared "Resistance Day" and Bangladesh flags flew all over the Province. There was a great massacre. East Pakistan had reached a point of no return. To quash the armed rebellion of Awami League militants, the Pakistan Army struck its first blow on March 27, 1971. Yahya Khan chose to use force to bring law and order in the country.

In the meantime, India exploited Pakistan's dilemma to the full. It sought to wring full propaganda and strategic value for itself out of the Bengali suffering and misery. India launched an attack on East Pakistan on November 22, 1971. The use of modern Soviet missiles, geographical separation by a thousand miles lying across the hostile Indian territory, and the collusion of Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army, made Pakistan's military defeat in the East almost certain.

On December 10, 1971, the first feeler for surrender in East Pakistan was conveyed to the United Nations. On December 17, 1971, a formal surrender was submitted and accepted. Forty five thousand troops and an almost equal number of civilians of West Pakistan were taken as prisoners of war.
 
.
Pakistani men loved Bengali women. Army officers and other well-to-do west pakistanis frequently took them as wives. I've met few of them as a child. Of course they are all older than 70 now and out of public life.
 
.
East Pakistan: Even the Skies Weep
By HP-Time.com Monday, Oct. 25, 1971


IN New Delhi last week, one member of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Cabinet was heard to remark: "War is inevitable." In Islamabad, President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan spent the better part of a 40-minute television speech railing against the Indians, whom he accused of "whipping up a war frenzy." Along their borders, east and west, both India and Pakistan massed troops. Both defended the action as precautionary, but there was a real danger that a minor border incident could suddenly engulf the subcontinent in all-out war.

Several factors are at work to reduce the likelihood of such an explosion. The Indian-Soviet friendship treaty, signed early in August, deters India from waging war without consulting the Soviets. At the same time, rising discontent and political and economic pressures within West Pakistan have also placed restraints on Strongman Yahya Khan and his military regime. Nonetheless, war remains a distinct possibility. As Mrs. Gandhi said last week at a public meeting in South India: "We must be prepared for any eventuality."

Intolerable Strain. The current dispute has grown out of the Pakistani army's harsh repression of a Bengali movement demanding greater autonomy for the much-exploited eastern sector of the divided nation. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees has placed an intolerable strain on India's already overburdened economy. New Delhi has insisted from the first that the refugees, who now number well over 9,000,000 by official estimates, must be allowed to return safely to their homes in East Pakistan.

Before that is possible, however, a political solution must be found that would end the Pakistani army's reign of terror, wanton destruction and pogroms aimed particularly at the 10 million members of the Hindu minority in predominantly Moslem East Pakistan (pop. 78 million at the start of the civil war).

Once, Sheik Mujibur ("Mujib") Rahman, leader of the Awami League, the East's majority party, might have held the key to that solution. As the overwhelming winner of the country's first national elections last December Mujib stood to become Prime Minister of Pakistan; now he is on trial for his life before a secret military tribunal in the West on charges of treason.

Though Islamabad has ordered the military command to ease off on its repressive tactics, refugees are still trekking into India at the rate of about 30,000 a day, telling of villages burned, residents shot, and prominent figures carried off and never heard from again. One of the more horrible revelations concerns 563 young Bengali women, some only 18, who have been held captive inside Dacca's dingy military cantonment since the first days of the fighting. Seized from Dacca University and private homes and forced into military brothels, the girls are all three to five months pregnant. The army is reported to have enlisted Bengali gynecologists to abort girls held at military installations. But for those at the Dacca cantonment it is too late for abortion. The military has begun freeing the girls a few at a time, still carrying the babies of Pakistani soldiers.

A Million Dead. No one knows how many have died in the seven-month-old civil war. But in Karachi, a source with close connections to Yahya's military regime concedes: "The generals say the figure is at least 1,000,000." Punitive raids by the Pakistani army against villages near sites sabotaged by the Mukti Bahini, the Bengali liberation army, are an everyday occurrence.

The fighting is expected to increase sharply in the next few weeks, with the end of the monsoon rains. Both the Pakistani army, most of whose 80,000 troops are bunkered down along the Indian border, and the Mukti Bahini, with as many as 60,000 guerrilla fighters, have said that they will soon open major new military offensives.

Plentiful Arms. On a recent trip deep into Mukti Bahini territory, TIME Correspondent Dan Coggin found an almost surreal scene. He cabled:

"Leaving the road behind, I entered a strange world where water is seasonal king and the only transport is a large, cane-covered canoe known as the country boat. For seven hours we plied deeper into Gopalganj subdivision in southern Faridpur district. The two wiry oarsmen found their way by taking note of such landmarks as a forlornly decaying maharajah's palace and giant butterfly nets hovering like outsized flamingos on stilt legs at water's edge.

"As darkness approached, we were able to visit two neighboring villages, with about 25 guerrillas living among the local folk in each. The guerrillas were mostly men in their 20s, some ex-college students, others former soldiers, militiamen and police. Their arms were various but plentiful, and they had ammunition, mines and grenades.

"A Mukti Bahini captain told me that the Bengali rebels are following the three-stage guerrilla warfare strategy of the Viet Cong, and are now in the first phase of organization and staging hit-and-run attacks. So far the guerrillas in the captain's area of operations have lost about 50 men, and larger army attacks are expected. But the Mukti Bahini plan to mount ambushes and avoid meeting army firepower headon.

"On my way back to Dacca next day, I came upon a convoy trucker who had been waiting for five days for his turn to board a ferry and cross the miles-wide junction of the great Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. As we huddled under the tailgate to keep dry, a shopkeeper joined us. Gazing at the puddle forming beneath us, he said: 'Even the skies are weeping for this land.' "

Always Hungry. As conditions within East Pakistan have worsened, so have those of the refugees in India. The stench from poor sanitation facilities hangs heavy in the air. Rajinder Kumar, 32, formerly a clerk in Dacca, says he is "always hungry" on his daily grain ration of 300 grams (about 1½ cups). His three children each get half that much. "They cry for more," he says, "but there isn't any more."

Malnutrition has reached desperate proportions among the children. Dr. John Seamon, a British doctor with the Save the Children Fund who has traveled extensively among the 1,000 or so scattered refugee camps estimates that 150,000 children between the ages of one and eight have died, and that 500,000 more are suffering from serious malnutrition and related diseases.

It is now officially estimated that refugees will swell to 12 million by the end of the year. The cost to the Indian government for the fiscal year ending next March 31 may run as high as $830 million. The U.S. so far has supplied $83.2 million for the refugees, and $137 million in "humanitarian" relief inside East Pakistan. Two weeks ago, the Nixon Administration asked Congress to grant an additional $250 million.

Senator Edward Kennedy charges that the U.S. is sending another sort of aid to the subcontinent as well. In spite of a State Department freeze on new military aid shipments to Pakistan, says Kennedy, the Pentagon has signed new defense contracts totaling nearly $10 million with the Pakistan government within the past five months. Kennedy's investigation also revealed that U.S. firms have received State Department licenses to ship to Pakistan arms and ammunition purchased from the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Catalyst for Violence. Observers doubt that the situation would ease even if Yahya were to release Mujib and lift a ban on the Awami League. Where the Bengalis once were merely demanding greater autonomy, they now seem determined to fight for outright independence.

In his speech last week, Yahya also announced that the National Assembly would be convened in December, immediately following by-elections in the East to fill the Assembly seats vacated by disqualified Awami Leaguers. With the main party banned from participation, however, the election is likely to provoke more violence. Already the Mukti Bahini have vowed to treat candidates as dalals ("collaborators").

Nonetheless, Yahya may find himself compelled to put his government at least partly in civilian hands. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of West Pakistan's majority Pakistan People's Party and Yahya's most probable choice for Prime Minister, has become more and more outspoken about "the rule of the generals." Recently he said: "The long night of terror must end. The people of Pakistan must take their destiny in their own hands." Formerly that sort of talk would have landed him in jail. Now even Yahya seems to have recognized that unless the military allows some sort of civilian rule it may face trouble in the West as well as in the ravaged East.

The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report | A Review
Dec 2012
By M.A.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had only been in power for one week, when he asked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman, to investigate “the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern command, surrendered”, “laid down their arms” and ordered “a ceasefire”.

Of the 12 copies submitted by Hamood-ur-Rehman, all but one was destroyed. Bhutto kept the final copy.

Ten years ago, India Today got a hold of the supplementary report. The report was later declassified by the Pakistani government–after being kept under wraps for 30 years. It is this supplementary report that we have access to today. And though it leaves out some key aspects (like the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission’s analysis of the international and local context within which 1971 took place), it is nevertheless a fascinating, and telling, read.

Its 68 (A4) pages read like a war thriller. Skip through the heavy parts, and you’ll run into stories about the “moral lapses” of the Pakistan Army, how the Mukti Bahini “butchered” “West Pakistani officers”, and the long list of “allegations” and “excesses committed by the Pakistani Army”–including “senseless wanton arson and killings”, “killings of intellectuals and professionals”, “deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority” and “Raping of a large number of East Pakistani women (…) as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture”.

Tanqeed revisits the report, 41 years after Pakistani soldiers surrendered to the Indo-Bangladeshi High Command, and 10 years after the supplementary report as declassified.

Click here for the full report.
And here is our take on its top 5 most interesting parts.
The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report | A Review
Dec 2012
By M.A.

1. “Allegations”. Against the “excesses committed by the Pakistani Army”.

The report lays out 7 major allegations against the Army–that can be grouped into 2 major categories.

One, the Army is accused of “Excessive use of force and fire power in Dacca during the night of the 25th and 26th of March 1971”; “Senseless and wanton arson and killings in the countryside” during “sweeping operations”; “Killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors (and) engineers”–many of whom were buried in “mass graves”–as well as “civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists” and, of course, the “Hindu minority”.

And, two, the Army’s “officers and men” are accused of “Raping (…) a large number of East Pakistani women (…) as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture”.

Later on, the commission reports that Mujibur Rehman had proof of the Pakistan Army’s plan for “Painting the Green of East Pakistan Red”–though some say it might have been a communist slogan (!).

2. The Numbers Game & Conclusions on the “Magnitude of Atrocities”.

Our obsession with numbers continue to obfuscate the reality of those on the receiving end of violence–whether we are talking about drones and army actions in FATA, or the kill-and-dump policy in Balochistan. The sides try to play the numbers up, or down, in an endless attempt to discredit the other.

That was no less the case in the 1970s. The commission interviewed 213 people–including General Yahya, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Navy, senior commanders and other political leaders. When it submitted its supplementary report, it interviewed another 73 bureaucrats and military officers.

There is no indication that any of the victims, or any Bengalis were interviewed.

We still do not know how many died, or how many were raped. And the report admits that higher or lower numbers does not “justify” the atrocities that were committed. But we still found the defence interesting. Read on:

“According to the Bangladesh authorities, the Pakistan Army was responsible for killing three million Bengalis and raping 200,000 East Pakistani women. It does not need any elaborate argument to see that these figures are obviously highly exaggerated. So much damage could not have been caused by the entire strength of the Pakistan Army then stationed in East Pakistan even if it had nothing else to do. In fact, however, the army was constantly engaged in fighting the Mukti Bahini, the Indian infiltrators, and later the Indian army. It also has the task of running the civil administration, maintaining communications and feeding 70 million people of East Pakistan. It is, there, clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful”.

3. How Yahya Khan Stoked the Fire–and the Trials that never happened.

A range of recommendations, never implemented, call for trials against those found guilty, including “General Yahya Khan”–for “illegally usurp(ing) power from (…) Ayub Khan by the use of force” and incluencing “political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each othe rbrought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan.”

The report goes on to calling for a public trial for a range officers–including General Yahya–for bringing “disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy.” Those trials have still not happened.

4. “The Moral Aspects”. On the Pakistan Army’s wine, women, lust… and corruption.

In its introductory section, the commission reports on “the moral aspect of the causes of our defeat in the 1971 War”. You can read about the “corruption” of “highly placed and responsible Service Officers”. And learn about their “lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses” and their “highly immoral and licentious ways of life”.

The highest placed officer and Commander of the Eastern Forces, Lieutenant A. A. K. Niazi, is accused of “making money in the handling of Martial Law cases” while posted in Sialkot and Lahore; of being on “intimate terms with one Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore who was running a brothel under the name of Senorita Home, and (…) also acting as the General’s tout for receiving brines and getting things done; that he was also friendly with another woman called Shamini Firdaus of Sialkot who was said to be playing the same role as Mrs Saeeda Bukhari of Lahore; that during his stay in East Pakistan he came to acquire a stinking reputation owing to his association with women of bad repute, and his nocturnal visits to places also frequented by several junior officers under his command; and that he indulged in the smuggling of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan.”

5. “Misdeeds of the Awami League Militants”.

And finally, read about the commissions accusations against the Mukti Bahini, under the “Misdeeds of the Awami League Militants”.

According to the report, “a large number of West Pakistani officers were butchered by the erstwhile Bengali colleagues”, and between “100,000 and 500,000 persons were slaughtered during this period” by the Mukti Bahini (though the commission seems much more critical of its sources when investigating Pakistani atrocities, than it seems to be when investigating Bengali atrocities–where it relies among other on a “renowned journalist of high-standing” instead of detailed investigations into the death toll).
http://www.tanqeed.org/2012/12/hamood-ur-rehman-report/
 
.
Baaghi ko taaj pehnane wali qaum sirf ruswayi apni taqdeer me likh sakti hai.

Sadi guzar jaegi per ye wese hi roenge jese kufi rote honge
 
.

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom