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Featured 10 soldiers martyred, 1militant killed and 3 apprehended when BLF attacked military check post in Balochistan's Kech district

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Well they don't call him PM of Afghanistan
And Bajwa minister of sports affairs
For nothing..
Yup - 220 million + of generally selfish self centered ethnicities/sects and a military strength of 500k+ but these people are responsible for everyone of them.

I am suggesting a revolutionary idea
@PanzerKiel @Ghost 125 Lets organize an internal coup to remove the leadership and install a PDF council of selected geniuses that have been offering constant criticism and wont accept any excuses. I mean they must be onto something that perhaps those within the profession have completely missed and more importantly they are able to provide simple 2 line solutions for them.

Im sure in 60 days Pakistan will be as secure as switzerland with the confidence they have in their advice and abilities.

And

if they don’t deliver - they sign a document in blood that lets the entire country parade them and their entire family naked on constitution avenue and pelt them with dog poop and then execute them(and their nasl) publicly.

What do you say? Onboard?
 
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Thanks for the detailed reply. I agree with you, we will take casulties and people have to learn to accept them. I feel people consider some of these casulties as unneccasary.

I have some questions, please answer them if you can without compromising security.

1. In the aftermath of such attacks is there any work done to identify what went wrong and how it could have been avoided? A lessons learnt session?
2. Are the forces in Balochistan integrated? Is there coordination between, Army, Rangers, Police, Levies - whoever else might be on the ground.
3. If there is coordination/integration is it merely high level or on the ground too?
4. If there isn't - do you think such coordination would help get a quicker reaction in these situations?
5. Do our checkposts have access to air support or to recon drones? If not, is it possible to provide them that sort of access?
6. The physical structures themselves - do they have boundaries and barriers that have to be crossed to reach the buildings? Would adding fencing and walls around the posts, ie turning them into fortified compounds help increase the survival rate of troops?
7. Is it possible to have remote controlled mines? minefields around such sensitive sites which are unarmed, but can be armed during an attack?
8. If our forces are stretched to thin and access to posts is restricted because of the geopgrahy, would building more roads connecting posts help? Also should we build some much larger forts in the area and link them to posts? Those forts could house more troops and could also house helicopters to provide ariel backup?

Add this

There are only 3 options to reach at particular post.
1. By foot
2. Motorcycle
3. Air Drop

The second option was also availed to support back up for under attack post but there was an ambush as well. Lets wait for the details in official press release.
 
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1. Its normal. Gets done after every event. Learning and improvisation continues, by both sides.
2. Coordination is there, but the area is simply huge....even if you pump in the WHOLE Pakistan Army, it will disappear in this area.
3. Low level coordination is very well....high level is lacking, and that too MOI. Rest all work together, but MOI guys, since they are non-military, have no understanding of military ops.
4. Possibly.
5. Dear, this was not a checkpost on a road. This was a small section size post perched on a mountain top.
6. They have all sort of structures, walls, fences etc.
7. Nopes, too complex to practice in defensive combat. However. can be used as RCIEDs.
8. Building roads and infra is one thing, but we require God knows how much force if we want to occupy every mountain top here.


As i said before, wait for it....its an on-going op...let it end, then wait for the final report.
Unfortunately this resembles the exact scenario used by Westmorland(was it him?)in Vietnam in small sections holding key positions and the results were also similar.

Both cases the problem seems to be a lack of available QRFs in practice due to the distance of the posts from available support areas.
 
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We both understand that the role of MOI in military affairs of FC is non existent. The Comd of FC is not a civilian bureaucrat sitting in an airconed room on Constitution Avenue.

Simple fact of the matter is, these morons must not be given the right to commit violence. SSG Navy is deployed, PAF is deployed in the province, Marines are deployed, Army is deployed. It doesn't take Sun Tzu to understand that appropriate measures can be taken to once and for all wipe out this insurgency. What's missing is a willingness.

@PanzerKiel @SQ8
 
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We both understand that the role of MOI in military affairs of FC is non existent. The Comd of FC is not a civilian bureaucrat sitting in an airconed room on Constitution Avenue.

Simple fact of the matter is, these morons must not be given the right to commit violence. SSG Navy is deployed, PAF is deployed in the province, Marines are deployed, Army is deployed. It doesn't take Sun Tzu to understand that appropriate measures can be taken to once and for all wipe out this insurgency. What's missing is a willingness.

@PanzerKiel @SQ8
That - is the right question. What is driving that calculus?
I do however, maintain that the expanse of the terrain does compound the problem that has to be tackled.
 
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That - is the right question. What is driving that calculus?
I do however, maintain that the expanse of the terrain does compound the problem that has to be tackled.

You have personally suffered by this and you know exactly what must be done. Terrain is just as harsh to militants as it is to the LEAs. Instead, LEAs have a permanent advantage. The first lesson in COIN warfare is to swing the ambush option to your side. The militants should be the ones getting ambushed.
 
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Also the value chain of BSNMs goes like this.

Militants > IRGC > RAW > NSA in Delhi > Modi.

Intercepting the militants is merely patch work. The entire value chain has to be engaged inside India.
 
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Militants > IRGC > RAW > NSA in Delhi > Modi.

Starting with highlighted part, since we are already doing the patchwork with militants; will lead to put it on offensive and making it more costlier for them to even think about attacking.
 
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We also need to reconsider our position on Iran. Ever since we helped the Persians destroy Jindullah, they've been helping our enemies. It is time to reverse it, as no attack in Pakistan is possible without logistical support of IRGC.

We need to build an alliance with Iran's adversaries, just like they're doing to us with India. Let Iran's enemies take care of the IRGC, Sistan, Ahawaz and other Iranian fault lines.

Iran has to realize the cost of its actions. Maybe reboot Jindullah, Americans and Arabs will love it.
 
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