Vietnamese conquest of Muslim/Hindu Cham and their current situation

[Soryu]

They almost did.

Where's this map come from !?
And what did your point on this topic !?

 

[Roybot]

If this people are Hindu in civilization, than would Champ be part of India according to the definition of how India define their country by civilization?

I think you are confusing India with China. Thats how China defines its territorial boundaries, once upon a time , gazillion years ago a chinese sailor took a dump on this island, therefore the island belongs to PRC in the 21st century.

 

[faithfulguy]

I think you are confusing India with China. Thats how China defines its territorial boundaries, once upon a time , gazillion years ago a chinese sailor took a dump on this island, therefore the island belongs to PRC in the 21st century.

India define nation hood by civilization. This is how India justified being a 5 thousand year old country. Indian civilization, specifically, the Indus valley civilization may be that old, but that is definitely not the Indian nation. Other Indians claimed India as a country had been around for since the time of Ashoka. But the reality is that is Hinduism that had bind India together as a nation for such a long time as a civilization. The Indian nation to none Indians was created to British. To Indians, because the country encompasses the civilization, the annihilation of Champa by Vietnamese is actually the destruction of an Indian state by a none Indian entity.

 

[bornmoron]

I would like to know which defination of Indias Civilization ur talking about ,,,appreciate if u could elaborate,,

They can be Indian ,,Presently they are not Indian but yes they can be termed as hindu as they are practicing hinduism,,

If this people are Hindu in civilization, than would Champ be part of India according to the definition of how India define their country by civilization?

 

[NiceGuy]

India define nation hood by civilization. This is how India justified being a 5 thousand year old country. Indian civilization, specifically, the Indus valley civilization may be that old, but that is definitely not the Indian nation. Other Indians claimed India as a country had been around for since the time of Ashoka. But the reality is that is Hinduism that had bind India together as a nation for such a long time as a civilization. The Indian nation to none Indians was created to British. To Indians, because the country encompasses the civilization, the annihilation of Champa by Vietnamese is actually the destruction of an Indian state by a none Indian entity.

Dude, at least hundred million Indian dont know and dont care where was Champa on the map

 

[angeldude13]

India define nation hood by civilization. This is how India justified being a 5 thousand year old country. Indian civilization, specifically, the Indus valley civilization may be that old, but that is definitely not the Indian nation. Other Indians claimed India as a country had been around for since the time of Ashoka. But the reality is that is Hinduism that had bind India together as a nation for such a long time as a civilization. The Indian nation to none Indians was created to British. To Indians, because the country encompasses the civilization, the annihilation of Champa by Vietnamese is actually the destruction of an Indian state by a none Indian entity.

lol chini you don't know nothing about india.

we have a chakarvarti(central) king.every chakarvarti king when he was able to conquer the whole india used to make a calender in his name and we have lots of calenders like vikram samvat.

the last conqueror of india was the queen of brittania and now we follow there calender now.

 

[faithfulguy]

Dude, at least hundred million Indian dont know and dont care where was Champa on the map

Indians in here has the right to know that you destroyed one of their states. A state that adopted Hinduism and Islam and that would easily be part of India today. But the old Vietnamese kings vaporized this one Indian state.

 

[Soryu]

Kick PRC out of Vietnam, your compatriots is talking about invade and occupy China. I told him to first occupy India first. Now, I'm not saying would be easy or right for Vietnam to occupy India. For sure, it would be completely impossible for a country like Vietnam to occupy India. But the odds are better for Vietnam to conquer and occupy India than China.

He can speak anything he want, as like you, this is open forum. But I bring the true to you ... lol

Vietnam other claims.

claim what!? EEZ!?

 

[faithfulguy]

lol chini you don't know nothing about india.

we have a chakarvarti(central) king.every chakarvarti king when he was able to conquer the whole india used to make a calender in his name and we have lots of calenders like vikram samvat.

the last conqueror of india was the queen of brittania and now we follow there calender now.

The calendar that people use today, as in Jul/20/2013 or Jul/21/2013 was created by pope Gregory. That is why its called the Gregorian calendar. Also, would Indians let people such as Vietnamese destroy one of its own states?

He can speak anything he want, as like you, this is open forum. But I bring the true to you ... lol


claim what!? EEZ!?

The truth is that Vietnam destroyed an Indian state in the past. The Indians have the right to know.

 

[Soryu]

India define nation hood by civilization. This is how India justified being a 5 thousand year old country. Indian civilization, specifically, the Indus valley civilization may be that old, but that is definitely not the Indian nation. Other Indians claimed India as a country had been around for since the time of Ashoka. But the reality is that is Hinduism that had bind India together as a nation for such a long time as a civilization. The Indian nation to none Indians was created to British. To Indians, because the country encompasses the civilization, the annihilation of Champa by Vietnamese is actually the destruction of an Indian state by a none Indian entity.

So this is for India sake , not because this shjt of you !?

The bottom line is that Vietnam needs to shut up with the victimhood bullcrap.

The calendar that people use today, as in Jul/20/2013 or Jul/21/2013 was created by pope Gregory. That is why its called the Gregorian calendar. Also, would Indians let people such as Vietnamese destroy one of its own states?



The truth is that Vietnam destroyed an Indian state in the past. The Indians have the right to know.

Did Champa call themselve as Indian !?

 

[Wholegrain]

Katip Suma led a Jihad against the Vietnamese's final, brutal annexation of Champa in 1832.

The Art of Champa - Jean-François Hubert - Google Books

http://chamunesco.com/index.php?opt...m-malay-relations&catid=45:van-hoa&Itemid=120

Meanwhile, lack document to record the yourneys of Malay came to Champa by sea. Execpt, the yourney of Tuen Phaow from Kelantan come to Champa by sea to lead a Jihad movement to expel theVietnamese army from the land of Champa

The uprising of Jathak Wa (1834-1835)

The uprising of Jathak Wa (1834-1835)
Written by Prof. Dr. Po Dharma and translated by Musa Porome

Prof. Dr. Po Dharma
“…if anyone kill one of the member of the movement of Ja Thak Wa, he will be awarded a big junk of money that has “Phi-Long” seal on it. and anyone kill one of the commander fighter of Ja Thak Wa, they will be awarded greater…” After the dead of Le-Van-Duyet in Saigon in 1832, Emperor Minh-Mang immediately sent his forces to barbarous expedition

Panduranga-Champa before he deicide to wipe out the kingdom of Champa from the Indochina’s map. The perish of the Kingdom of Champa in 1832 led the Champa community into agony situation. They can no longer tolerated the aggressive war, and living under such great oppression, they have no other alternated choice but to find way and form any rebellion movements to fight the invader. A movement that first formed was the movement of Katip Sumat in 1833. Katip Sumat was a Cham Muslim from Makah (Kelantan state, Malaysia). Unfortunately, Katip Sumat movement fail to defend their country in 1834 due to the Daiviet forces were bigger and stronger at that time. The fall of Katip Sumat was just a tinkle of bell showing that there another stronger and well organized movement will be established next that was the movement of Ja Thak Wa, a Cham Muslim from Van-Lam village (Phanrang). He was a leader used to hold many importance position in Panduranga-Champa at the previous time.

The Ja Tak Wa movement was born at the very right time, because it was a time that the people of Champa are facing such a great oppression daily due to the oppressions and harsh policy that the Hue’s Court was post on them. Therefore, Just heard the first call of Ja Thak Wa, people of Champa came together and rise up under the same flag to liberate a nation of Champa. They put all differences aside no matter what religion they believed in or what tribe they were belong to, and what location they are coming from, but just for a sake to liberate Panduranga-Champa, and to restore whatever the emperor Minh-Mang has destroyed. Such as economic system, social system, History and culture and traditional, etc. To advance a purpose, in the year of Horse (nassak athaik) in 1834. Ja Thak Wa bring forward the first action was to reorganize and redraw a new strategy how to liberated some of the region that needed to liberated first from Dong-Nai-Thuong region to Kauthara state (Nhatrang and Phuyen present day).

REVISE THE DYNASTY OF KING PO ROME

After completed prepare the war zone, Ja Thak Wa gathering the nation Assembly to appoint Po War Plei a Raglai descendant from Cadang village to be King (Po Patrai) of Panduranga State. He is a brother in-law of Po Dhar Kaok (Nguyen-Van-Nguyen a Vietnamese name) and were a deputy of King Po Phaok-The (1828-1832) in Panduranga State. Along with this promotion of appointing, Ja Thak Wa consecrated a Churu descendant a potion of Cei Aia Harei (prince of the sun) to be a prince to succeed to the throne, and Ja Yok Ai a Cham descendant to be a Panroang Sa-Ai (a Military leader).

We ought to know that Po War Plei is related to King Po Rome, a King that created a dynasty 6th of Panduranga from 1627 to the last throne of Po Ceng Cei Brei (1783-1786) since Po Ceng Cei Brei gave up his throne and fled to Kampuchea seek refuge in 1786. The appointment of the leading person to the position above at that time proved that Ja Thak Wa wants to revise the dynasty of Panduranga to became an independent state. Noting that, even though the Cham history wrote that Po War Plei came to the throne and was recognized by the people of Champa but, the Hue’s Court see it just as a group of the savage and illiterate people no more or less. (…) came to stole the properties and attack the Viet people living in the land of Panduranga.

THE STRATEGY OF KATIP JA THAK WA

In order to get ready to launch an uprising, Ja Thak Wa leading the movement and change all the region from the west mountain of Phu-yen, Khanh-Hoa and Binh-Thuan-Thanh became a reserve region, in the other hand, this leader know how to depend on the people of highlander (Raglai, Churu, Koho, and Stieng ..etc.) from Dong-Nai-Thuong zone were a strong force that always fought to defend there region from the attack of the Viet invader since 1832. By the help of Po War Plei and with the prince to succeed the throne in the group make Katip Ja Thak Wa an easier to recruit the people from the highland to join his movement. To begin launching the war, Katip Ja Thak Wa first sent his rebellion arose and bravely fought the Viet invader from Dong-Nai-Thuong zone and then all the way from Phanri to Phu-Yen region in the 7th month of the year of Lamb (nassak athaik 1834). The rebellion rose led by Katip Ja Thak Wa caused a significant change with the political realm in the land of Panduranga.

THE LAND OF BOILING POT OF THE POLICY OF MINH-MANG

During the up rising of the movement of Ja Thak Wa, Emperor Minh Mang, did not hesitate to apply the land boiling pot policy toward the fighter from the movement. According to Ariya Gleng Anak (poem, or tail of history) wrote in 1835, Minh Mang launch an attack Katip Ja Thak Wa movement in the 7th month of the year of Lamb (nassak athaik 1834) Champa calendar were a terrifying and bloodiest war where the ammunition explored from and gun battle shook the ground up to the sky. All the resident home of the Champa people were burn to ash and destroyed completely by fire. In order to frighten the rebellion, Minh Mang used a terrible and inhuman tool to punish the fighter royal to Katip Ja Thak Wa.

Rely on the land boiling pot policy, Minh Mang has won the first battle with Ja Thak Wa rebellion. Even though Ja Thak Wa has lost the first battle, but he thought that this lost just due to the fact that Champa people were not stick and woe together to fight against the enemy as his wished.



KATIP JA THAK WA AND THE IRON RULES

Before prepare for a second uprising, on the 10th month of the year of the Lamb, the Champa calendar (1835). Katip Ja Thak Wa order to appoint a commander of the rebellion force to be a Chru and Raglai descendant because they will be neutrally and carefully purge and apply a tough rule of punishment to whomever doesn't wants to join the rebellion movement just because they afraid of a revenge by Minh Mang. Due to a tough discipline, the second battle led by Katip Ja Thak Wa was victory over all the regions that were controlled by Minh Mang in the early year 1835.

For Minh Mang, Panduranga is an importance zone for political strategy of war. therefore, in order to recapture Panduranga and to restore power at the Hue’s Court in the south again, he has to direct command his military at the battle field. His first priority was to use harshly punishment to get rid of all his former feckless commander that could not fought against the Ja Thak Wa rebellion fighter in Panduranga.

A POLICY OF EXTERMINATED

According to the Champa history wrote that Minh Mang has ordered his militia that anyone who kill a fighter of Ja Thak Wa will be rewarded a big chunk of money that have a Phi-Long seal. And anyone kill a commander of Ja Thak Wa fighter will be reward greater. Minh Mang also ordered his militia somehow to beheaded at least three of the Ja Thak Wa fighter per day then they will be grant his salary and benefit otherwise he will be punished. Therefore, the Minh Mang’s militant took advantage of the benefit to fight harder, and competed each other to kill even the innocent people of Champa as much as they can just to get the benefit. This is a clear and frightened case of massacre by Minh Mang's policy to exterminated and destroy the whole nation of Champa, the case that were never happened to any race on this earth.

AN EXHUME POLICY OF MINH MANG

Beside enforcing a policy of extermination the people of Champa ordered by Minh Mang to receive a benefit as described above, Minh Mang also entrusted his militia to freely massacred, deported and jailed the Ja Thak Wa rebellion fighter and rush to converted the whole nation of the people of Champa to be slave for the Viet. They started to burn out the palace, the residential home, the villages of the Champa people into dust, and stolen the land, the properties and all belonging to the Champa people, and destroy all the sacred places and exhume their forefather and the place of respected (Kut) for the Cham people to worship their ancestors such as the grave of Po Kloang Haluw (1567-1591/1579-1603), Po Saong Nyung Ceng (1799-1822), and burn out the Po Rome temple.

After completely destroyed the nation and exhume the ancestors Champa, and to prevent another rebellion movement should rose up in the future, Minh Mang started redraw the map of Panduranga state. He ordered the Champa people to move out from their resident in to another location close by or among the Vietnamese community so that the Champa people have no chance to get together. From then, the social culture and tradition life gradually beginning either be destroyed or vanished and fade away. All the old Champa grave yard laying along the Oceanside in central Vietnam today especially in Phanrang and Phanri province is a valuable tool to prove to the world for an horrible criminal act toward the Champa people by emperor Minh Mang of Daiviet.

Depend on the power of Minh Mang and the protection by Hue's Court, the Viet people acting like they are the owner of the land of Panduranga, and they took advantages of the policy that post by Minh Mang to order the Champa people to move out from their properties so they can freely started to occupy the land that were left by the Champa people.

Finally, the Minh Mang has ordered to separate the Champa Highland from the lowland apart so that he can easily control the these people. Minh Mang believed that with this policy he can prevented the further communication in between this communities that most loyal to Katip Ja Thak Wa, and so that they will never be regroup to rise up against the invader of Minh Mang.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Along with the policy of exterminated the people of Champa, Minh Mang has thought that a psychological warfare is an important war to fight among the Cham to separated them from the revolution movement of Katip Ja Thak Wa a revolution that the Champa people respected and loyal to. Therefore, the Minh Mang's administrator started to call on the Champa to renounce the believe in Ja Thak Wa and stop having a felling of distrust the Viet administration and believe in the Hue's Court for support.

Beside the open arm policy, Minh Mang has find way to pacify the intellectual and noble Cham Panduranga descendant to stay on his side. One of the men that Minh Mang wanted most were a sister of Mr. Dhar Koak (a former deputy of dynasty, Panduranga 1828-1832) a wife of Po War Plei. and another that Minh Mang also wanted was Po Phoak-The, a former King of Panduranga (1828-1832) and want to promoted him to a position of Dien An Ba (Ba Tuoc Dien An), but the position were never reaching him, due to the fact that in June 1835, Po Phaok-The was charged by the Hue's Court to have a death penalty by chopping his hand off, then his foot and then cut each part of his body so that he is slowly die in pain., It was a horrible Charge during the time of Minh Mang.

Even though the Minh Mang has impose many horrible strategy to fight and destroy the revolution movement of Ja Thak Wa, but the blooding war in between the Movement of Ja Thak Wa with the Viet still goes on in the battle of Panduranga until April 1835, mark the day of Po War Plei and Katip Ja Thak Wa died on the Battle field near Huuduc commune, Vanlam Village, Phanrang. Even though these two were death, but the Hue's Court still order to behead and bring them to show the Champa communities around.

Panduranga-Champa was a piece of land undergoing a terrifying and bloody war between Nguyen-Anh and Tay-Son, destabilizing the country. This small piece of land was repeatedly invaded, and exchanged hands between Nguyen-Anh, and Tay-son. The Panduranga-Champa people were innocent victims of a war that brought their nation to chaos, causing heavy burdens and much suffering.

The death of Katip Ja Thak Wa in April 1835 has turned the new page of the Champa history, the history of a nation without leader, military and government. The death of Katip Ja Thak Wa also mark the change of the leader and name of our beloved Panduranga. The nation of Champa now no longer belong to the Champa Kingdom, but became a citizen of Vietnam, a citizen of an alien that have no any right over their land and even have no right over their own life.

Through out 16 century, thousand and thousand of Champa warriors have died not for the sake of conquer other people land, but just for a sovereignty of the country and for a human dignity that they expected to have while they are still living in their own land. Katip Ja Thak Wa was one of the warrior that sacrifice his for this cause.

Ja Thak Wa was death on the 4th month of the year of At Vi in 1835, but his name, and his soul never died and will live for ever in the mind of the people of Champa.. Long live Katip Ja Thak Wa.

The Uprisings of Katip Sumat and Ja Thak Wa (1833-1835)

The Uprisings of Katip Sumat and Ja Thak Wa (1833-1835)
Written by Dr. Po Dharma and Translated by Sean Tu

Dr. Po Dharma
Le Van Duyet, the famous Vietnamese governor of Gia Dinh who dared to sponsor and encourage Panduranga-Champa to stand up against the Hue court, died in 1832. After this event, King Minh Menh ordered his military to reoccupy Panduranga-Champa in order to punish the Cham king who had broken away from Hue. Every Cham and high-ranking official in the city was killed or imprisoned.

This event was one of Minh Meng’s bloodiest campaigns, for he launched it with the intention of erasing the remnants of Champa from the map once and for all.

After this brutal suppression, the Hue court further oppressed the Cham people by imposing heavy taxes and hard labor upon them in their own lands. In addition, they continued to suffer from those unscrupulous Vietnamese aristocrats and officers who constantly harassed them or sought to acquire their land and property by any means. As this oppression was carried out in broad daylight day after day and year after year, the people were pushed to the limit. Finally, they concluded that the only way to change their situation was to rise up against their occupiers and oppressors. The first uprising was led by Katip Sumat.

The Uprising of Katip Sumat (1833-1834)

The spark that set off this uprising was the political and military upheaval in the Gia Dinh citadel (later known as Saigon) after the death of its governor (Le Van Duyet) in 1832. On 8 May 1833, the Chronicle of Vietnam[1] recorded that Le Van Khoi, his adopted son, gathered those who were loyal to him in order to attack the central Hue government, which controlled his adopted father’s domain in Gia Dinh. Within six months, he controlled six southern cities.

This uprising initiated a period of crisis throughout all of Vietnam. In June of the same year, Le Duy Luong revolted in the north at Ninh Binh and Hung Hoa.[2] A month later, Nung Van Van, a brother-in-law of Le Van Khoi,[3] started another uprising throughout the Central Highlands in the northernmost part of Vietnam.[4] And in Panduranga-Champa, Katip Sumat led his own army to liberate that country from Hue’s control.

Katip is a Muslim title used to denote the man who gives the Friday sermon in the mosque. His real name was Sumat (some reports say “Tamat”[5]), and he was born in Cambodia. According to one of the Cham records written in Cambodia, Katip Sumat went to Malaysia to study the Qur’an at “Makkah” (in reality, this was the present-day Malaysian state of Kelentan[6]). However, since the date is not mentioned, we do not know for certain whether his uprising took place before or after that of Le Van Khoi. However, regardless of what happened, the Chronicle of Vietnam[7] does not link the two uprisings together; Minh Menh believed that Katip Sumat received help from the splinter groups of Le Van Khoi’s revolt in the south.[8]

Katip Sumat Arrives in Panduranga-Champa

Cham historical records indicate that Katip Sumat returned to Cambodia after finishing his studies in Kelentan. At that time, Minh Menh was besieging Cambodia.. Therefore, he went to Panduranga-Champa with large number of Muslim Cham in order to start a resistance campaign against the Vietnamese occupation. The Cham Muslims received him as a hero and a savior because of his superior knowledge of the Qur’an. In addition, they believed that he had magical powers, such as moving about without leaving any traces behind. The Cham officials treated him with the utmost respect and promised to join him in the noble cause of national liberation.[9] Po Phaok The, the former king of Panduranga-Champa, and such high-ranking officers as Po Nyi Liang, Po Ling, Po Ceng, and Katip Ja Thak Wa, joined the movement and accepted his leadership.[10]

Internal Struggle

In order to maintain a low profile, the leaders decided to keep Katip Sumat’s presence a secret until they had built up a sufficient infrastructure.[11] Unfortunately, Po Kabait Thuac, a former Cham Hindu officer who had been a member of the resistance groups fighting the Hue court, was afraid that he might be captured and so secretly informed the Vietnamese officers of the planned uprising. Minh Menh immediately ordered the capture of all people suspected of collaborating with or sheltering Katip Sumat. All of those who were committed to the movement refused to reveal his whereabouts. In the absence of any evidence, the Vietnamese had no choice but to release them. On the other hand, they executed Po Kabait Thuac on the grounds that he accused people without clear evidence. This incident indicated that the Hue court did not have control over Panduranga-Champa’s sociopolitical situation during that time.[12]

The Holy War

Given the atmosphere of suspicion that this event engendered within the Cham community, Katip Sumat began to consider whether he should return to Cambodia, restore peace in the Cham community, or continue the struggle.[13] When this became known, his loyal followers begged him to continue the struggle. He accepted their request on the condition that the movement must be based on Islamic principles, having decided that such a foundation would make its members more disciplined and loyal. He believed that once these people believed in the one God, they would be willing to sacrifice everything for the noble cause.

Katip Sumat then brought his movement to Mount Con Cong (Cham: Cek Aih Amrak) in Dong Nai,[14] located on the southern border between Cambodia and Panduranga-Champa, in order to study Islam and learn how to fight. He also sent his men to the Raglai and Churu tribes living in the Central Highlands to recruit more members, and urged them to believe in the one God of Islam. In pursuit of his dream, he secretly purged all Cham Bani members who opposed him.[15]

Looking back, no one denies that his intention was to liberate Panduranga-Champa. However, his method reveals that he was more concerned with spreading Islam and making Panduranga-Champa an Islamic country, a dream that he had failed to realize while staying in Cambodia.[16] To realize this goal, he invented an ideology of a holy war against the Vietnamese occupiers.[17]

After refusing to submit to the Hue court,[18] Katip Sumat placed Tuan Lik[19] in control of Phan Ri province, a Cham officer named Kuac Riwa in control of Long Huong province, and Katip Ja Thak Wa[20] in control of Phan Rang. When the preparations were complete, he raised the flag of revolt, on which was written “Po Rosat,”[21] and ordered his forces to attack the Vietnamese troops in Panduranga-Champa.

This uprising represented a grave situation for Minh Menh, who not only reinforced the thousands of his excellent troops already stationed in Panduranga-Champa, but also ordered local Vietnamese settlers, most notably those Binh Thuan county, to burn, loot, and steal as much of the rebels’[22] property as they could and without any fear of punishment.[23] Responding to this officially sanctioned scorched-earth policy, they went on a rampage throughout the land, trying to settle unfinished businesses with the local Cham by driving them toward the mountains or the uninhabited areas in order to steal their lands. In response to this onslaught, the Cham resistance movement, which included members of the Raglai and Churu tribes, put their faith in Po Auloah’s (Allah) protection.[24] Full of faith but without any actual warfare experience or a sound strategy, their resistance soon became no more than a suicidal mission. Facing a powerful army equipped with advanced weaponry, Katip Sumat’s forces collapsed within a few weeks.

After this failed revolt, Katip Sumat retreated to Mount Con Cong in upper Dong Nai, leaving behind a few poorly equipped troops to hold off the advancing Vietnamese army. In no mood to be merciful, the Vietnamese ruthlessly annihilated the remaining pockets of resistance, along with the local inhabitants of Phan Rang and Phan Ri as collective punishment, even if they had not been involved with the revolt.

Conclusion

This uprising stemmed from years of oppressive Vietnamese rule after Minh Menh’s forces had erased Panduranga-Champa from the map in 1832. It was an act of desperation after years of cumulative suffering directed at the oppressor, and one result of the people’s belief that Katip Sumat could channel their anger by using Islamic principles to organize a powerful force capable of defeating the Vietnamese enemy.

The Expanding Islamic Movement

The suppression of Katip Sumat’s revolt was one Minh Menh’s bloodiest campaigns against the people of Panduranga-Champa. As a result, they suffered greatly. However, this uprising had one – albeit small – positive outcome: Minh Menh abandoned the traditional policy of Vietnamizing non-Vietnamese races and directed his efforts toward a new threat: Islam. The Hue court described this new religion as “They only recited prayers in a strange language, believed in the saints, and housed evil spirits in their residences.”[25] In other words, the people of Panduranga-Champa had been “mislead” to embrace Katip Sumat’s beliefs. It was well known that Minh Menh adored Vietnam’s long-standing Confucian-based culture and tradition that it had received from China many centuries ago.[26] He was worried that Katip Sumat, a fighter from a foreign land, had successfully brought a new religion into Panduranga-Champa, one that he considered counterproductive to Vietnam’s dominant culture.

He also feared that Katip Sumat’s imported religion would destroy his own dream of using Vietnamese culture to assimilate the people of Champa-Panduranga. If he did not stop this new belief from spreading, in time it would gradually creep into the traditional beliefs of Vietnamese. Faced with such an imminent threat, Minh Menh issued an immediate order and sent reinforcements to Panduranga-Champa to destroy Katip Sumat’s movement as quickly as possible. Furthermore, during this time, the inhabitants of six provinces located in Gia Dinh province secretly embraced Christianity, another foreign religion, and joined in Le Van Khoi’s uprising. In King Minh Menh’s mind, this development was concrete proof that Le Van Khoi was receiving help from foreign powers that were conspiring to remove Gia Dinh from Vietnamese control in order to establish a Christian country.

The Carrot Policy

In order to suppress Katip Sumat’s movement as quickly as possible, Minh Menh devised a plan to isolate him from Po Phaok, Panduranga-Champa’s former king who had close ties with Le Van Duyet and his adopted son Le Van Khoi. Based on his assumption that Po Phaok had played a decisive role in the uprising, Minh Menh thought that he must bribe Po Phaok The at any cost.[27]

In June 1833, therefore, he proposed to knight Po Phaok The. The latter man, now known as Dien An Ba, thus acquired a very respectable title and position. Furthermore, Minh Menh offered to build a temple or a monument to commemorate the previous Cham kings who had commanded great respect among the Cham and to provide the necessary state funds needed to restore those Cham temples that were not being properly care for or had fallen into ruin. He even allowed Po Phaok The to collect taxes in Panduranga-Champa.[28] The underlying goal of all of these offers was to thwart what he believed to be a direct relationship between the uprisings of Katip Sumat and Le Van Khoi. If he could bring Po Phaok The over to his side, this presumed relationship would cease to exist. If not, their combined uprisings would pose a grave threat to the Vietnam’s national unity.

Even though the royal records of the Hue court discussed this potential alliance between Katip Sumat and Le Van Khoi, as well as the plan to bribe Po Phaok The at any cost, the Champa chronicle does not mention Po Phaok The or his involvement in the uprising. No matter what happened to Po Phaok The, his absence was not very significant, for the uprising went on without him.

Why the Uprising Failed

To defeat the uprising quickly, Minh Menh told his military forces in Panduranga-Champa to use any means necessary to suppress the rebels. He did not care if the method was brutal, only that it was effective. The other reason was that Katip Sumat had mislead his forces into placing their entire belief in Islam instead of studying the arts of warfare and fighting. He and his followers recruited the Cham Ahier and the Cham Bani, as well as such Central Highland tribal peoples as the Churu and the Raglai, by persuading them that their absolute belief in the one God of Islam would cause Him to protect them on the battlefield. In addition, he convinced them of the superiority of Katip Sumat’s leadership and magic powers over military strategy. During their training, therefore, they were taught that their pure belief would render them invisible and transform their bodies into steel so that neither gun nor sword could harm them. However, these beliefs proved futile, for the Vietnamese troops were well equipped with modern weapons and their generals were experienced in warfare.[29]

Ja Thak Wa’s Resistance Movement

The failure of Katip Sumat’s uprising led several senior members of the organization to voice their protest of his policy[30] of placing thousands of untrained men on the battlefield “protected” only by their belief in God and magic spells in place of any military training. They also opposed his policy of disguising the national struggle under the cloak of holy war.

One of these leaders was Katip Ja Thak Wa, a Cham Bani from Van Lam, a small village in Phan Rang province, who had held important posts in Panduranga-Champa before its annexation.[31] Not agreeing with Katip Sumat’s conduct of the uprising, he organized his own resistance movement in 1834. It is interesting to note that Katip Ja Thak Wa was a Cham Bani[32] unlike Katip Sumat, who professed orthodox Islam. His movement has all the characteristics of a modern-day resistance front.

After the birth of this new resistance front, those loyal to Katip Sumat secretly informed the Hue court about the new potential uprising and suggested that he issue an arrest warrant immediately. But Minh Menh ignored this advice, for he wanted the in-fighting between the resistance leaders to escalate, as the resulting confusion and ill-will could only benefit him. This divide-and-conquer policy served him well.[33]

After this, the Champa chronicle does not have much to say about Katip Sumat. Cham records,[34] however, suggest that Katip Ja Thak Wa refused to fight under the banner of Islam, for he thought not following this policy would enable his troops to learn and then use the military tactics needed to defeat an enemy two or three times their size and equipped with advanced weaponry,[35] instead relying solely on the supernatural. There is another plausible cause for this policy: Ja Thak Wa thought that if Katip Sumat brought Islam into Panduranga-Champa and his influence over the people grew too large, it would further complicate his plan to establish a united resistance front comprised of different ethnicities in those communities of which he was the leader.[36]

The birth of Ja Thak Wa’s movement occurred at the right time in terms of politics, for the people of Panduranga-Champa had been suffering under Vietnamese occupation for quite some time and were just waiting for an opportunity to explode. Ja Thak Wa worked his way in and used the existing situation to advance his political agenda. He called upon the people to unite under a common banner, regardless of color, belief, or affiliation; step out of their province-only identity; and adopt one goal in their fight against the common enemy: the restoration of the historical Kingdom of Champa to its rightful position as an independent kingdom, as well as the restoration of everything that Minh Menh had destroyed. Toward that end, he established countless bases in remote areas beyond the reach of Vietnamese influence. In 1834, he started his network in the Central Highlands in Panduranga (upper Dong Nai) and in Kauthura (Nha Trang, Phu Yen province), areas that neither Vietnamese spies nor officers could penetrate.[37]

Restoring King Po Rome’s Dynasty

After securing all of his bases, Ja Thak Wa called upon the national representatives of different regions to anoint a national figurehead for the new movement. They voted for Po War Palei,[38] who belonged to the Raglai tribe in Ca Dang village, to be Panduranga-Champa’s king (Po Patrai). This man was a brother-in-law of Po Dhar Kaok (known in Vietnamese as Nguyen Van Nguyen), a former prince of Panduranga-Champa under Po Phaok The[39] (1828-1832). Ja Thak Wa also proposed a member of the Churu tribe as crown prince, who would bear the title Cei Aia Harei (the Sun Prince), and a Cham individual as vizier, who would bear the title Panraong[40] Sa-ai (senior military officer).

A few Cham records indicate that Po War Palei was knighted not because he was Po Dhar Kaok’s brother-in-law, but because he belonged to the lineage of Po Rome (Churu tribe), who had founded the sixth dynasty of Panduranga-Champa, which had lasted from 1627 until its last king, Po Ceng Cei Brei (1783-1786). Faced with an insurmountable threat from the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, rival Vietnamese powers? who conspired to annex the Panduranga-Champa, he abandoned his throne and made his way to Cambodia to seek help. After ten years of wandering in Cambodia, he finally set foot in Cambodian-ruled Dong Nai in 1795.[41] From 1786 until the last vestige of the historical Kingdom of Champa was erased from the map in 1832, the throne was in the hands of Cham officials who did not belong to King Po Rome’s lineage. All of the officials who ran Panduranga-Champa were knighted either by the Tay Son or the Nguyen Anh[42] after Po Ceng Cei Brei vacated his throne. For this reason, Ja Thak Wa wanted to continue Po Rome’s dynastic lineage.[43]

After the birth of his united resistance front, Ja Thak Wa organized an elaborate ceremony in front of the Po Rome temple in Phan Rang. Thousands of people brought food and offerings to Po War Palei. After the sacrificial slaughter of a buffalo, the people murmured the well-wishing prayers with thundering drums in concert with a saranai (the name derived from Indian language means flute), topping it off with a marvelous show by traditional dancers. Po War Palei then publicly acknowledged his role as Po Patrai (king) of Panduranga-Champa. Together with his beloved wife, he would rebuild the Kingdom of Champa’s heritage and traditions.[44]

Ja Thak Wa’s establishment of military bases and knighting the king and officials proved that he intended to restore the kingdom to its former glory as a fully sovereign entity free of foreign occupation.[45] He believed that a kingdom ruled by a legitimate member of the royal family and following the traditional infrastructure would attract the popular support needed to fight the enemy effectively.[46] To the people of Champa-Panduranga, Po War Palei was the rightful king; however, the Vietnamese royal court in Hue considered this movement a ploy of “those savages who live in the corners of hills and valleys with the intention of robbing property and expelling the Vietnamese settlers who live in that area.”[47]

Ja Thak Wa’s Military Strategy

Before launching an all-out war, Ja Thak Wa personally oversaw the entire preparation process.[48] He converted the rugged mountainous areas west of Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, and Bien Hoa provinces into military bases that were supported and protected by the Central Highlanders, fierce fighters who were always on guard against the Vietnamese settlers who had entered their territory since 1832. Since Po War Palei was from the Raglai tribe and the crown prince was from Churu tribe, Ja Thak Wa’s effort to win their support was easily realized. For those Cham who lived in the lowlands controlled by Hue court, he initiated a political propaganda[49] campaign that accused the Vietnamese settlers and officials of committing crimes against the people of Panduranga-Champa.[50] He then informed them of his conclusion: rise up against the occupiers.[51]

When Nung Van Van launched his uprising in the north (1833-1835) and Le Van Khoi and his supporters rose up in 1832-1835[52] with Thailand’s[53] help in the south,[54] Vietnam was engulfed in crisis. Believing the time to be right, Ja Thak Wa made his first move (July 1834) by attacking the lowlands from Phu Yen to Phan Ri with the intent of destroying the Vietnamese bases. He also urged the people of Panduranga-Champa to stand up against Hue, to rise up and liberate their country.

Minh Menh’s Scorched-earth Policy

Faced with these serious threats, Minh Menh ordered an all-out war and decreed a “scorched-earth” policy. According to a historical record in the form of a poem, the Ariya Gleng Anak written in 1835,[55] the battle between Minh Menh and Ja Thak Wa was the bloodiest in history. Guns and cannons roared like thunder across the sky,[56] and numerous Cham villages were burned to the ground[57] to break the rebels’ will and force their submission. Minh Menh threatened to kill those who followed Ja Thak Wa on the spot. Their bodies would be dismembered and their guts would be ripped out and displayed on the trees to intimidate and demoralize the rebels.[58]

Using such savage tactics, the Vietnamese military thwarted Ja Thak Wa’s first attack. However, Ja Thak Wa thought that the success of Vietnamese offensive was due not to its might, but because the Cham tribes who lived in the lowlands had been too afraid to rise up, as he had expected. Maybe they were afraid of the Vietnamese, or maybe they were not being punished harshly enough for disobeying his orders.[59]

Ja Thak Wa’s Iron Policy

In preparation for second offensive planned for October 1835,[60] according to the Champa chronicle, Ja Thak Wa ordered the Churu and Raglai officers to punish those Cham who did not follow the rebels out of fear of Minh Menh’s retribution.[61] Once on the march, the Churu and Raglai became a powerful force that destroyed Vietnamese military posts and burned the villages of those Cham who did not support the uprising.[62]

The result was astounding: Ja Thak Wa liberated Panduranga-Champa from Vietnamese occupation. The Vietnamese chronicle[63] indicated that he captured numerous counties, such as An Phuoc, Hoa Da, Tuy Tinh, and Binh Thuan. As a result, the Vietnamese forces, suffering from low morale and defeat, retreated. In order to regain this lost territory, Minh Menh started recruiting more men from Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Gia Dinh provinces.[64] Eventually raising over 3,000 men and convincing many thousands of local Vietnamese to join the central force, he sent them to fight Ja Thak Wa’s militia.[65]

Minh Menh could not afford to loose Panduranga-Champa, for this kingdom was the only link between the Vietnamese fatherland in the north and Gia Dinh, the newfound Vietnamese territory in the south. If Panduranga-Champa fell under Ja Thak Wa’s control, then Hue would certainly lose Gia Dinh, where Le Van Khoi’s uprising was still continuing. In addition, the thousands of Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia, a country under threat by Thailand, would receive no help from the north. Given that the stakes were so high for the Hue court, Minh Menh himself directed the assault against Ja Thak Wa in order to boost morale.

To achieve his goal, Minh Menh punished all high-ranking officers who had not foreseen Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. In February 1835/1836 he demoted Phan Phu, the senior officer in charge of Binh Thuan county, for his numerous “errors.” This official had offered plan after plan to restore peace and stability in Panduranga-Champa, but his plans kept failing year after year. As a result, he considered Phan Phu extremely incompetent. If Ja Thak Wa succeeded in capturing Panduranga-Champa, then Minh Menh concluded that such an unfortunate result could only be due to incompetent administrators who did not know how to fight and thus were afraid of Ja Thak Wa’s uprising.[66] He also demoted many junior officers, among them Duong Van Phong, assistant officers who looked after Binh Thuan and Khanh Hoa, and Le Nguyen Trung, the special envoy sent by Hue to Panduranga-Champa in 1832 to help the local officers run the country. Many more officers were demoted in the districts of Ninh Thuan, Tuy Tinh, and Tuy Phong.[67]

Retribution or Genocide?

Having punished his senior and junior officers for their failure to stop Ja Thak Wa, the next step was to turn the tide against the rebels.[68] To achieve his goal, Minh Menh informed his military officers and the local settlers that anyone who killed one rebel or anyone associated with Ja Thak Wa would be rewarded with three gold coins, upon which would be inscribed the respectable title of “Phi Long” (Flying Dragon). Anyone who killed an officer in the rebels’ organization would be rewarded with more prestigious medals. As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese chronicle recorded that Minh Menh decreed that every soldier must behead at least three rebels a day to receive his salary.[69]

Since three Phi Long coins were equivalent to a soldier’s monthly salary, those Vietnamese settlers who were tempted by the prospect of new wealth and status went on a killing spree that did not distinguish between innocent Cham bystanders and those who had joined or supported Ja Thak Wa. They justified the killing by claiming that the dead were rebels or associates of Ja Thak Wa in order to receive gold coins. As a result, this genocidal policy brought the Cham population to its knees.

As the genocide was going on in the lowlands,[70] Minh Menh devised a plan to deal with the rebels in the Central Highlands. For this effort, he ordered an extensive military campaign consisting of massive waves of elephants marching through the forest to crush the remaining rebels. Knowing that the rebels were not equipped with guns or cannons, he believed that elephant fighters were his best choice. One part of the plan was to destroy secret military bunkers where the rebels had stored supplies, weapons, rice, and salt so that future uprisings would not be possible.[71]

Despite the unprecedented cruelty and scorched-earth tactics, the uprising remained strong. Finally, Minh Menh had to summon Phan Thanh Gian, a senior confidant of Hue, back from Cambodia to plan another military campaign against Ja Thak Wa.[72] In addition, he sent more troops to Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa in response to his officers’ requests.[73]

Battle for the Cham’s Hearts and the Minds

Once Minh Menh realized that his army was bogged down in Panduranga-Champa, he pondered whether offering a political settlement would drive a wedge into the uprising.[74] In order to sow the seed of distrust between the people of Champa and Ja Thank Wa, he started to pacify the people of Panduranga-Champa by encouraging them to trust, rather than to suspect, the court at Hue. In addition, he issued a new decree to all Vietnamese officers who ran Panduranga-Champa: They were not to abuse their authority toward the Cham nor to arrest the innocent without due process.[75] At the same time, he actively pursued a propaganda onslaught of promising a general amnesty to Ja Thak Wa’s[76] followers and asked the Cham to trust the Vietnamese government. He even went so far as to state that Hue would forgive and protect those who had followed Ja Thak Wa as a result of having been oppressed by the Vietnamese government. And, as his final touch, he released all Cham political prisoners to show Hue’s sincerity.[77]

In April 1835, Minh Menh released over 200 Cham prisoners who confessed that they had joined Ja Thak Wa due to the oppression of Vietnamese officers. As a token of its sincerity, Hue gave them supplies and gifts on the day they left the prison and warned them that if they rejoined the uprising, they would be executed on the spot if caught. Minh Menh encouraged the Cham to cooperate closely with the Vietnamese military in order to put down Ja Thak Wa’s[78] rebellion.

Hue’s battle for the hearts and minds of the Cham people has a deeper reason than is at first apparent. After a careful study of the uprising in the north, which coincided with the one in the south (namely, Panduranga-Champa), Hue concluded that “the uprising among the Man and the Tho tribes in the north[79] must be caused by the incompetent and greedy officers who do not know how to rule and did nothing good, but oppressed the people.”[80] On the contrary, the governors of Binh Thuan and Khan Hoa confessed that the battle for the hearts and minds of the Cham brought no fruitful results.[81]

Divide and Conquer

Besides this battle for the Cham’s hearts and minds, Minh Menh worked hard to win draw influential members of the Cham royalty over to his side in the hope that they would influence their people to abandon Ja Thak Wa and turn the tide for Hue court. One of the royals Minh Menh had in mind was the older sister of Dhar Kaok, Panduranga-Champa’s former crown prince (1828-1832), who was married to Po War Palei, the very prince whom Ja Thak Wa had anointed king in 1834. Minh Menh captured her and then offered to set her free if she would use her influence to persuade people not to join the uprising.[82]

The Execution of Two Cham Leaders

The other influential person whom Minh Menh had in mind was Po Phaok The, the former ruler of Panduranga-Champa (1828-1832). It is interesting to note that Minh Menh imprisoned this person after the country’s destruction in 1832. However, the Champa chronicle records his presence in Panduranga-Champa in 1833-1834. No one knows whether he was released as part of an amnesty program or whether he escaped from prison. During this time, he joined Katip Sumat’s uprising but was soon captured. Sentenced to prison on the charge of conspiracy against the Vietnamese government, he was later released.[83]

Since Minh Menh desperately wanted to win over Po Phaok The,[84] he planned to knight him with the respectable title of Dien An Ba. However, Po Phaok The did not live long enough to see that title, for the Hue court sentenced him to suffer the slow-death punishment (the “Lang Tri” sentence) for conspiring to join Le Van Khoi’s uprising.[85]

His subsequent death left many unanswered questions. It is a fact that Po Phaok The was imprisoned when Panduranga-Champa fell in 1832. However, his presence there in 1833-1834 was noted, even though he did not join Katip Sumat’s Islamic movement or Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. He was the one whom Minh Menh wanted to knight and then executed. Was the whole story fabricated to discredit a former king who stood up and never submitted to a conqueror? On the other hand, Crown Prince Po Dhar Kaok of Panduranga-Champa was punished with the same death sentence and for the same reason. Why did Minh Menh decide to execute two influential Cham figures just two months after the deaths of Ja Thak Wa and Po War Palei in 1835?

Vietnamese history presents Minh Menh as a cunning politician. His plan to win Po Phaok The has its own merit. He knew that the Cham who were loyal to the kingdom of Panduranga-Champa would always respect their fallen king no matter what.[86] Furthermore, they would sacrifice themselves to protect his well being, for Po Phaok The was a living symbol of the nation and its culture.[87] Since Minh Menh’s strategy did not go according to his plan, the only choice left was to get rid of those who brought no benefit to Hue.

Cruel Punishment for Ja Thak Wa

Both the Vietnamese and Cham chronicles record many bloody battles between Ja Thak Wa and Minh Menh throughout Panduranga-Champa until April 1835, which marked the deaths of Po War Palei and Ja Thak Wa.[88] At the end, Cham records[89] indicate that Ja Thak Wa was injured in a rice field near Van Lam village in Phan Rang. When he was caught, the Vietnamese troops killed and decapitated him and then carried his body away to insult it further. The deaths of these two leaders were fatal blows to the uprising. Now that the tide had finally turned, Minh Menh ordered a final push to eliminate all other pockets of resistance.[90]

However, according to the Vietnamese chronicle, these two deaths did not end the uprising, but rather created two more pockets of rebels at Hoa Thuan and Long Ban provinces in June of the same year. Even though the uprising did not succeed, it left a deep scar in the mind of the Hue court. After Ja Thak Wa’s death, Minh Menh summoned his top military advisor to review the military plan and ordered the governor of Thuan Khanh county to pursue the rebels to the end.

As a result, the fighting continued even after June 1835. But it was only temporary, for the deaths of the two leaders had broken the rebels’ morale and ended their will to fight. The following month, July 1835, Fort Phien An, Le Van Khoi’s last hideout, fell under Hue’s control. Having finally reasserted total Vietnamese control over the south, Minh Menh implemented a policy of assimilation in Panduranga-Champa.

Obliterating the People and Their Past

To end the uprising once and for all, Minh Menh rained death and destruction upon Panduranga-Champa. Those terrible events, which have been recorded in the Cham’s historical memory, still send shivers up and down the spines of many Cham even today. Minh Menh gave the Vietnamese troops carte blanche to kill, deport, pursue, and imprison the rebels and those who had followed Ja Thak Wa. They immediately began to enslave[91] the surviving Cham, who were now completely at their mercy. They destroyed all that they could, set Cham villages on fire, confiscated Cham property, exhumed the resting places of their ancestors (kut), and destroyed the Cham royal tombs, including those of Po Klaong Haluw (1567-1591/1579-1603) and Po Saong Nyung Ceng (1799-1822).[92] In addition, they set many temples on fire, most notably the magnificent temple of Po Rome.[93]

Changing Panduranga-Champa’s Demography

After this phase of complete destruction, Minh Menh decided to change Panduranga-Champa’s demography[94] in order to prevent any future uprisings. He uprooted countless Cham villages and forced their inhabitants to live among the Vietnamese settlers. From then on, the Cham’s social structures were in complete disarray because they did not have a land of their own or their ancestral villages.[95] The disappearance of countless villages along the coast engendered many tales of sadness and endless destruction.

On the other hand, this destruction represented a golden opportunity for Vietnamese settlers. With the help of Hue and the new order, they now had the upper hand and behaved like victors. They seized the Cham’s fertile lands, properties, and wealth in the villages that the Cham had been forced to leave behind while being forcibly driven to Vietnamese-inhabited land … a bitter sentence for a lost people. The people of Panduranga-Champa thus became second-class citizens stripped of their land and property. As a result, they lost all will to fight and hoped only to survive. They became more disenfranchised with each passing day.[96]

Isolating the Central Highlands

Minh Menh issued further orders forbidding any relationship between the people of the lowlands and their ancestral brothers and sisters in the Central Highlands, like the Churu, Raglai, Kaho, and others. The goal of this policy was to control or even prevent, if possible, any relationship between these regions’ peoples that may blossom into a network of resistance, a very real chance, as they had always fought side by side against the Vietnamese throughout history.[97]

Again, Hue sought to destroy a people and their culture forever. Therefore, it implemented many genocidal programs to ensure that the Cham people, whether in the short term or the long term, would disappear. Forbidding all relationships between the peoples of the lowlands and the Central Highlands started to disrupt the continuity and feelings of relatedness between the two communities, both of whom had played vital roles in holding the kingdom’s traditions and beliefs. For example, Champa’s kings had traditionally lived and ruled in the lowlands, and the kingdom’s belongings, precious treasures, and royal documents had always been kept in the Central Highlands, especially among the Churu and Raglai tribes.[98] Both communities synchronized the kingdom’s harmony by performing such national religious ceremonies as the Kate. Once the relationship was cut-off, all remaining ties gradually disappeared, including traditional and national coherence.

****

After this brutal repression dismantled all of Champa’s traditional and historical economic structures, social fabric, and religious rituals that had been built up over a millennia of independent existence, Minh Menh still feared that the resistance would one day start again. To ensure this would not happen, he established a true Vietnamese power in Panduranga-Champa and implemented a Vietnamization policy toward all non-Vietnamese races. In theory, he wanted to enforce his policy to ensure that those in power would not abuse their power to oppress Champa’s people, even though, in reality, Vietnamese offices would be the judge and executioners. So no matter how just the case may be, the Cham would always suffer because they had become slaves in their own land. Without a patron, they had no courage to stand up against the accusers, who were the Vietnamese who had committed the crime.[99] They had no protector to turn to, and no money to pay for the court.
king and the country were gone, and so the people of Panduranga-Champa lost all hope and spirit. In the end, they were overtaken by despair, living day to day without meaning or purpose, suffering day and night under a foreign occupying power. In the following pages, we will briefly go through a famous poem, the Ariya Gleng Anak (Glance Forward), which describes the pain and sadness of a people who have lost everything.


[1] QTCB, 158. For more information, see J. Sylvestre, 1915, 22-23.

[2] QTCB, 159.

[3] Nguyen Phan Quang, 1981-1982, 22.

[4] In July 1933, Nung Van Van attacked in the area of Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, Cao Bang, and Lang Son. His movement, which had close connections with that of his brother-in-law Le Van Khoi, continued until March 1835. QTCB, 158; MMCY, volume V, 145. Tran Trong Kim II, 1971, 206.

[5] CM 32 (6), 113; CM 24 (5), 162.

[6] Malays still call Kalentan serambi Makah (the extension of The Holy Land of Makkah).

[7] MMCY, book I, 69; DNTLCB, book XII, 282-84; DNNTC, book XII (published in Hanoi, 1971), page 137-46. Also see Nghiem Tham (1960), 1359; H. Parmentier, BEFFEO, vol. V, 10; Buu Cam (1958), 1249.

[8] According to DNTLCB (book XVI, 280), Po Phaok The, the former ruler of Panduranga-Champa, was the only member of Katip Sumat’s organization to have a direct connection with Le Van Khoi. Dinh Mo, who had close contacts with Po Phaok The, was captured during one of the battles between Le Van Khoi and Hue and confessed that he was the courier who had delivered Le Van Khoi’s confidential letter to Po Phaok The requesting that the latter join his uprising to fight the common enemy from Hue. Po Phaok The agreed with this proposal. However, there are lingering questions as to why Po Phaok The made such an agreement? Why did he leave Katip Sumat to join Le Van Khoi? According to Cham chronicle CM 32 (6), Katip Sumat’s uprising had nothing to do with Po Phaok The, who was involved with the organization for only a very short time. Did his lack of a position within Katip Sumat’s organization lead him to join Le Van Khoi? So, when Minh Menh sentenced him to death in 1835, was it because f his involvement with Le Van Khoi or Katip Sumat?

[9] CM 32 (6), 113.

[10] According to the Champa chronicle CAM 29 (1), vol. 4, Po Phaok Tho was captured in March, the Year of the Dragon in the Cham calendar (1832) and brought to Hue, where he was imprisoned. If the Champa chronicle recorded that he joined Katip Sumat’s uprising, this would mean that he was no longer in prison in 1833.

[11] CM 24 (5), 162-63; CM 32 (6), 109-13.

[12] It is not surprising to know that few Vietnamese could speak Cham or the Central Highlanders’ languages during that time. Therefore, it was hard for Hue to recruit informers. On the other hand, may Vietnamese officers behaved like warlords during the occupation and thus could not capture the local peoples’ hearts and minds. As a result, they could collect intelligence in Panduranga-Champa.

[13] According to the Champa chronicle CM 24 (5), 163, and CM 32 (5), 109, Katip Sumat considered the Cham of Panduranga-Champa to be treacherous and of wanting to eliminate him. He thought that the struggle against Hue only brought defeat and death to those high-ranking Cham who worked in the Cham royal court. Since he could not gather much support, Katip Sumat decided to return to Cambodia, where he retired in peace.

[14] DNTLCB book XVI, 120, indicates that the rebels gathered at Chu Dien mountain in 1833. This information is accurate, for most Champa uprisings seem to start from upper Dong Nai, given that it was considered a safe location because Hue’s troops never dared to venture into this area.

[15] CM 32 (6).

[16] After King Ramathipati I (or Cau Banya Cand, 1642-1658) of Cambodia married a Cham or a Malay woman, he converted to Islam. The Cham who lived in Cambodia tried to establish an Islamic country in Cambodia. However, they did not succeed in their endeavor (Po Dharma, 1981, 170).

[17] CM 32 (6), 133.

[18] CM 32 (6), 105-06; CM 24 (5), 165.

[19] The Malay word tuan means “respectable” or “mister.” Since it was not common in Panduranga-Champa, we assume that Tuan Lik here is not a person from Panduranga, but maybe a colleague who went to study in Malaysia or someone who is from Cambodia.

[20] According to E. Aymonier, 1885, 194, Ja Thak Wa was a Muslim who belonged to the Cham Bani sect in Van Lam village, Phan Rang.

[21] Po Rosak (Malay word) is synonymous with Po Athur, Po Asur, Po Rasur, Po Rasulak (in some versions). All of these terms are used to designate Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.

[22] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 104-05. According to DNYLCB vol. XVI, 20, this uprising should not have happened, for the Hue court favored the Cham: “For a few years, Hue did not force them to engage in hard labor nor enlist them in military service. Why do they join the uprising? Is it for revenge or because they hate the Hue court? Or perhaps they did it to prove their loyalty to their former king Nguyen Van Thua (Vietnamese name for Po Phaok The), who was captured in 1832 and because now they have forgotten all of the favors that Hue has bestowed upon them? This country (Panduranga-Champa) is rich in agriculture, but the people have a low level of education and are backward.”

[23] According to a hand-written record CM 26(14), 81, when Katip Sumat start the uprising, Minh Menh decided to assert his absolute control of life and death over the people of Panduranga-Champa. After Katip Sumat’s uprising ended, the country was destroyed and the people fell into starvation.

[24] Qur’an 3:133, “Fear not, despair not. Triumph will certainly come if you have faith.”

[25] CM24(5), 164.

[26] M. Gaultier, 1935.

[27] Po Phaok The’s political views at that time were quite confusing. According to the Vietnamese chronicle MMCY vol. I and DNTLCB vol. XII, in 1833, Po Phaok The accepted Minh Menh’s policy of cai tho qui huu, which involved replacing all Cham officers in the royal court with their Vietnamese counterparts in the occupied territories. On the other hand, he joined Katip Sumat and then went over to Le Van Khoi. Did he do this because he did not like the idea of liberating the country in the name of a holy war? The historical record indicates that he also wanted to work with Le Van Khoi in Gia Dinh, even though he had done nothing to support Le Van Khoi. On the contrary, he wanted to work with Minh Menh.

[28] DNTLCB, XII, 282-84; DNNTC, vol. XII (Hanoi 1), 36-37.

[29] A hand-written record of the Champa chronicle, CM 26 (4), 79, indicates that the uprising was totally suppressed in July, the Year of the Snake. In terms of the solar calendar, this would place it at the end of 1833 or the beginning of 1834.

[30] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 103-05.

[31] E. Aymonier, 1885, 194; 1890, 181. Based on the report of An-sat (the Judge) Phan Duy Trinh related to the interrogation of a rebel captured in April 1835 (during Ja Thak Wa’s uprising), DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 197) recorded that the Cham Bani’s head priest was So Co, who lead the uprising in 1834 and then proclaimed himself to be Dien Su (The Priest of Mount Dien). He (Dien Su) used to liven in Tanh Linh, Tuy Dinh territory.? After cross-referencing the name between the DNTLCB and the CM during that era, we know that So Co and Dien Su was the same person. However, all the Champa chronicle indicates is that Ja Thak Wa was born in Van Lam, Phan Rang. Perhaps he moved to Tanh Linh, as the DNTLCB mentions.

[32] The term Cham Bani and Cham Awal denote those Cham who profess an un-orthodox version of Islam. They live in the Phan Rang and the Phan Ri regions. They only follow certain teachings from the five pillars of Islam.

[33] Po Dharma, 1987, 153.

[34] CM 24 (5), 167-68; CM 32 (6), 104-05.

[35] CM 24, 5.

[36] Po Dharma, 1987, 154.

[37] CM 24 (5), 18-169; CM 32 (6), 103.

[38] Po Tang Haok, an individual of Malay origin who was deified in some Cham traditions, was also called Po War Palei (Inrasara, 1996, 276). However, Po Tang Haok and Po War Palei (who was from Raglai tribe) were, in fact, two different persons.

[39] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 103. According to the report of An-sat (judge) Bien Hoa in April 1835, DNTLCB (vol. XVI), Dien Su (Priest of Mount Dien, namely, Ja Thak Wa) knighted La Bon, the husband of Nguyen Van Nguyen’s elder sister.?? He was mentioned in the Champa chronicle CM 29 (1) as Dhar Kaok, titled “Kai Nduai Nguyen” (the crown prince of Panduranga-Champa). However, the DNTLCB did not mention his tribal affiliation. According to the Cham chronicle, CM 24 (5) 168-69 and CM 32, 103-04,the ruler appointed by Ja Thak Wa was from the Raglai tribe. The presence of a royal individual from the Raglai tribe in such a position in Ja Thak Wa’s organization was quite logical, for countless records from the Champa chronicle indicate that many high-ranking Churu, Raglai, and Kaho officers served in Panduranga-Champa’s court in previous generation. This is concrete proof that the Kingdom of Champa does not belong to Cham tribe alone, but rather consists of many different races who share equal rights and responsibilities. For example, King Po Rome, who comes from the Churu tribe, ruled Panduranga-Champa from 1627-1651. He is a shining example of this fact. (Po Dharma, 1987, vol. I).

[40] CM 32 (6), 103-04 and CM 24 (5), 168-69 state that Ja Yok Ai’s (from the Cham tribe) nomination to the organization was not welcomed by many, even though he was one of Po War Palei’s close associates. A few royal officers accused him of working for the Vietnamese. However, Ja Thak Wa brought him on board after both Po War Palei and the crown prince intervened. CM 24 (5), 169, also records that the appointment of Po War Palei (a Raglai), the crown prince (a Churu), and Ja Yok Ai (a Cham) to the supreme command made many people uneasy, because they lacked relevant experience. On the other hand, others criticize them for supposedly being under Ja Thak Wa’s control.

[41] According to Dorohiem and Dohamide, Dan Toc Cham Luoc Su (A History of Champa, 1965), and Inrasara (1994, 60), Po Saung Nhung Ceng, the last king in Sakarai Dak Rai Patao Cham, went to Cambodia for safety in 1822. But in fact, he died in Phan Ri in 1822 from old age (Po Dharma, 1987, vol. 1, 90).

[42] Po Dharma, 1987, vol. 1. Here is the genealogy of Panduranga-Champa’s rulers after the sixth dynasty of King Po Rome: Po Tisuntiraydapuran (1786-1793), Po Ladhuanpaghuh (1793-1799), Po Saung Nyung Ceng (1799-1822), Po Klan Thu (1822-1828), Po Phaok The (1828-1832). The royal bloodline of Ba Them in Phan Ri belongs to this genealogy. Therefore, she who? does not keep anything that belonged to Po Rome’s (Churu) royal line.

[43] A Cham author who had a close relationship with the royal family wrote a poem to discredit Ja Thak Wa as a person who had no talent and only known to trick the Raglai and Churu tribes to help him pursuit his dream.

[44] DNTLCB vol. XVI, 129, recorded that La Bon’s (Po War Palei) wife was placed under house arrest for a while because her husband had been proclaimed the ruler of Panduranga-Champa. She was later released under the condition that she had to favor the policy of the Hue court.

[45] CM 24 (5), 169; CM 30 (17), 49-53.

[46] CHCPI-CAM vol. 1, 1; CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 26 (14), 84; CM32 (6), 103-04; CAM 30 (17), 50 state that the majority of the population supported Ja Thak Wa’s uprising and interim government, for they wanted to live in their predefined borders, as before.

[47] DNTLCB, XVI, 84.

[48] DNTLCB, XVI, 118-19.

[49] CM24 (5); CM24 (16); CM 30 (17); CM32 (6).

[50] One of Ja Thak Wa’s followers testified in DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 190) that “since the day that the Kingdom of Champa was dissolved, its people have been forced to be citizens of Vietnam, the ruling officers have oppressed them and forced them to wear Vietnamese clothes, not to mention that they must pay tribute in such precious items as rhino horns and the ivory tusks of elephants.”

[51] DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 198) records the statement by a follower of Ja Thak Wa who was captured by the Vietnamese: “The entire population of Panduranga-Champa joined Ja Thak Wa’s uprising because the ruling Vietnamese officers only knew how to rob them of their wealth, and those around them did nothing about it.” Furthermore, DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 71) admits that the Cham supported Ja Thak Wa because the Vietnamese settlers in Binh Thuan province pushed the Cham out of their land in order to grab it for themselves. In other words, those who joined the uprising had nothing else to lose.

[52] Even Le Van Khoi passed away in December 1834. The Vietnamese chronicle indicates that his followers continued to fight until the fall of Thanh Phien An at Saigon in August 1835. See DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 35, SG; QQTCB, 170, SG); Tran Trong Kim, vol. II, 1971, 205; Nguyen Phan Quang, 1981, 21. According to H. Parmentir (190, 10), Nghiem Tham (1960, 1960), Dorohiem and Dohamid (1961, 109), who? wrote that Le Van Khoi and Ja Thak Wa worked together. Was this because Le Van Khoi requested Po Phaok The’s support, as mentioned in the Vietnamese chronicle? Why does the Champa chronicle not mention this? In fact, Po Phaok The was not a member of Ja Thak Wa’s organization; rather, he worked against it.

[53] According to DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 121), Hue was extremely worried about the movement of Thai troops toward the Cambodian border.

[54] QTCB (169). In December 1833, Thai troops crossed Cambodian border and eventually reached Phnom Penh and Ha Tien. In June 1834, Minh Menh ordered Truong Minh Giang to place his the troops at Phnom Penh in order to stop the Thai army.

[55] CHCPI-CAM 1, Ariya Gleng Anak. Line 82 of this poem records that this poem was composed on February 10, 1835. At this time, the battle between Ja Thak Wa and Minh Menh has not died down yet. For more information about this poem, see the appendix.

[56] Ariya Gleng Anak, line 7.

[57] Ariya Gleng Anak, line 4.

[58] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 102.

[59] Ariya Gleng Anak.

[60] CAM 30 (17), 50-51. The Vietnamse chronicle mentions Dien Su’s (Ja Thak Wa) uprising only briefly.

[61] CHCPI-CAM, book 1, 3.

[62] CM 29 (1), line 20. MMCY, vol. V, 180, records Ja Thak Wa’s punishment meted out to the Cham people and the killing of Vietnamese settlers in Binh Thuan province. The text of two historical sources relates that his punishment of the first group of people was severe. He wanted to show them that if they disobeyed him, he would be even more severe than Minh Menh.

[63] QTCB, 195, 197-98; MMCY, vol. V, 180-81; DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 71.

[64] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 69, 131.

[65] CM29 (1), line 43.

[66] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 78-79.

[67] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 68-289.

[68] QTCB, 195; MMCY, vol. II, 147. Minh Menh issued an order to kill anyone who disobeyed the Hue court’s orders.

[69] CM 29 (1), line 43. Even though beheading three people a day seems to be out of proportion, we do not overlook that fact of the Vietnamese settlers’ long-standing animosity vis-à-vis the Cham. In CM 29 (1), before Champa-Panduranga was dissolved, the Vietnamese settlers were just “keepers of the market” or workers. After 1832, however the tide turned and they became the owners of Panduranga-Champa. Protected by Hue, they could do whatever they wished - even beheading three people a day. They considered the people of Champa-Pandurange to be savage, untamed.

[70] This genocidal policy was implemented against the Cham because they lived in the lowlands. However, those who lived in the Central Highlands, such as the Churu, Raglai, and Kaho peoples, did not even know who Minh Menh was.

[71] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 79. It seems that the Hue court did not know much about those people who participated in Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. As a matter of fact, the majority of them were native to the Central Highlands and were skilled in the art of taming wild elephants. They were never afraid of these elephant divisions.

[72] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 94.

[73] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 143. After having received an urgent message asking for reinforcement, Minh Menh declared these ruling officers to be completely incompetent. Month after month, they provided reports saying that the rebels were nothing but savages who livee in the mountains and that he did not have to worry about them very much. He said that the local government had over 3,000 skilled troops with advanced weaponry, and therefore should be able to suppress the rebels quite easily. He asked how many more troops were needed to finish the job. Since the governors of Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa could not control the situation, he demoted them.

[74] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 69 ff.

[75] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 82. At the same time, Minh Menh executed all those who still had weapons or still joined Ja Thak Wa’s uprising.

[76] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 102.

[77] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129; QTCB, 197-98.

[78] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129.

[79] In Vietnamese, the ma’n denotes those who live in the north (The Ma’n, the Me`o). On the contrary, the man (savage) denotes the rebels, those who did not share the same culture as the Vietnamese. Therefore, records in DNTLCB, (vol. XVI, 197-98) called Ja Thak Wa and Po War Palei as the man.

[80] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 121. The record in DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 71, states that the Vietnamese ruling officers in the mountainous areas used to rob instead of ruling with justice. Their ill-behavior paved the way for the uprising. Information contained in the Vietnamese chronicle agrees with the record in the Champa chronicle that the Vietnamese officers constantly harassed the people of Panduranga-Champa or stole their lands. From this, we conclude that the Vietnamese discriminated against the non-Vietnamese races under their control. The people of Panduranga-Champa who sruvived the disaster of 1832 suffered far more hardship and discrimination than the Vietnamese settlers who lived in Gia Dinh in the south or the Vietnamese rebels who fought the Hue court.

[81] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129

[82] Po Dharma, 1987, vol. I, 160.

[83] Po Dharma, 1987, I, 161.

[84] DNTLCB, vol. XII, 282.

[85] QTCB, 196; DNNTC, XII, 42; Buu Cam, 1958, 146-49; Nghiem Tham, 1960, 1570.

[86] Po Dharma, 1978, vol. II.

[87] CM29 (1).

[88] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 198.

[89] CAM 30 (17), 51.

[90] MMCY, V, 181; QTCB, 198; BTBNLT, 79; HVGTNB, 336.

[91] According to A. Shreiner (1901, I, 243), there were many different types of slaves: prisoners of war, those who sentenced to slavery, those who were in debt, born into slavery because their parents were slaves, and those who were enslaved. Many of the Cham, who fell into this last category, were then traded among the Vietnamese like any other commodity.

[92] CAM 30(17), 15. The Hue court also meted out a heavy punishment toward the Vietnamese rebels in the south, not to mention those who were executed when Fort Phien An fell and others who were executed in Hue. The Vietnamese chronicle records that 1,137 Vietnamese were executed in Gia Dinh and then thrown into mass grave, their bodies rising up like a hill. See Truong Vinh Ky, 1879, 265.

[93] H. Parmentier, 1905, 10.

[94] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 289.

[95] Po Dharma, 1989, Frontiere…

[96] Po Dharma, 1987, 163,

[97] Po Dharma, 1987, I, 163-64.

[98] See H. Parmentier, 1905, 1-46; Nghiem Tham, 1960, 151-66. A few researchers argue that because of the risk of losing Champa-Panduranga’s national treasures to the Vietnamese, the royal family entrusted its belongings to the Raglai and the Churu tribes. However, this argument does not make sense, because Champa-Panduranga was a cohesive kingdom. If the Raglai and the Churu were not considered to be among its citizens, they would have no right to safeguard these properties. In fact, they belonged to the kingdom and had the right to keep their ancestor’s (King Po Rome) possessions.

[99] According to DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 144), the people of Champa-Panduranga were always the victims of Hue’s policy, for the ruling officers always got the upper hand under the law of their own government.

Geography of historical Champa

History of Champa

 

[NiceGuy]

Indians in here has the right to know that you destroyed one of their states. A state that adopted Hinduism and Islam and that would easily be part of India today. But the old Vietnamese kings vaporized this one Indian state.

Seem like American -Indian should belong to India, too, coz they are called Indian

 

[Wholegrain]

PO CEI BREI FLED TO CAMBODIA IN 1795-1796 TO FIND SUPPORT

PO CEI BREI FLED TO CAMBODIA IN 1795-1796 TO FIND SUPPORT
Written by Dr. Mark Phoeun and Translated by Musa Porome

Musa Porome
From the second to the tenth centuries, Champa was a prosperous kingdom stretching from Hoanh Son in the north to Dong Nai in the south (present-day central Vietnam). After breaking away from Chinese domination in 993, Dai Viet could not expand northward, as it shared that border with China. Therefore, its rulers had to find a way to expand southward.

The Dai Viet king started to provoke his nearest neighbor, Champa, and in 993 a bloody war broke out between the two countries, each of which had a totally different civilization. Dai Viet’s civilization had always been heavily influenced by Confucian China, whereas the source of inspiration for Champa had always been Hindu India. Toward the end of the tenth century, Champa could no longer defend itself against Dai Viet’s aggression and so was forced to move its border further south. This marked the beginning of Dai Viet’s expansion southward. Based on documentation found in steles, it was declared that in the year 1000, in order to avoid conflict with Dai Viet and live in prosperity, Champa had to move its capital of Indrapura (now Tra Kieu) further south and establish a new capital, named Vijaya (now in Binh Dinh province), because of Dai Viet’s continuing military pressure. Each time there was a conflict, Champa had to sacrifice some of its northern lands to the Vietnamese. But this conflict never ended, because Dai Viet continued its aggression toward Champa to acquire more of its land.

No longer willing to stand aside patiently when faced with Dai Viet’s continuous aggression and invasions, the Cham king, Che Bong Nga sent troops to punish the country and capture its Thang Long palace during 1360-1390. Unfortunately, he was killed on the battlefield. King Le Thanh Tong of Dai Viet, taking advantage of the situation, ordered his army to attack and capture Vijaya in 1471. After he accomplished this goal, he punished and killed without restraint all of the Cham who had been loyal to Che Bong Nga, destroyed the kingdom’s imperial palace and temples, and incorporated Vijaya into Dai Viet. This event marks the decline of Indian civilizational influence on the north. According to Cambodian documents, the Cham started migrating to Cambodia because of Dai Viet’s harsh policies toward them and because they could not stand living under oppression.

Although Vijaya was lost, Champa’s remaining two states in the south, Kauthara and Panduranga, remained independent. Regrettably, civil war broke out between Chua Trinh and Chua Nguyen, the two rival kings of Dai Viet. how could this country have two kings? In 1471, the two small states of Champa fell victim to Chua Nguyen’s policy of southern expansion. are chua tring and chua nguyen dynasties? See the first sentence in the next paragraph.

Chua Nguyen invaded Champa until 1692. In 1693, the Cham suddenly rose up and forced him to agree to withdraw his troops in 1694. However, he left behind a palace? in Phu Binh Thuan to represent Dai Viet inside Champa (Panduranga-Champa?), opened the border, and called upon his people to migrate freely to Champa’s northern state and even deeper to Panduranga, the last Cham state. From that point on, Champa began to grow smaller and weaker. The governor of Phu Binh Thuan ordered the Vietnamese who were living among the Cham as illegal immigrants. This continuing trend led to the beginning of Panduranga’s fall.

Po Cei Brei ascended the throne of Panduranga in 1783-1786. By this time, Panduranga-Champa? had become a battlefield used by two brothers dynastic families?, the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, who fought each other from 1771-1802 to determine who would rule the Vietnamese. Po Cei Brei found this familial war on Cham land unacceptable. Unable to withstand the yoke of tyranny any longer, he and his family, along with the royal court, fled to Kampong Cham (Cambodia). For a while, he moved back to Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) in 1812, where he lived until his death, according to the Cham documents found in Cam-37 and Cam-39 (38).[1]

The rise of the Tay Son caused great change within Dai Viet’s political realm. North of Dai Viet, most of the kings who took over the throne from the Le and the Trinh dynasties were assassinated, and the Tay Son were threatening the Nguyen dynasty in the south. If the Tay Son somehow unified Dai Viet, this could only have a negative repercussion on the two neighboring countries of Panduranga-Champa and Cambodia.

At this time, people were aware of the fact that Panduranga-Champa was a small land playing host, against its will, to a terrifying and bloody civil war between the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, and that it was becoming destabilized. Suddenly, the Nguyen Anh and then the Tay Son invaded. This engulfed the nation in chaos, even though it had not caused this war that had brought only great suffering to its people.

Despite the Tay Son’s rise, Cambodia could not prevent the Nguyen’s land invasions along the Mekong River. Thus, this area became a safe haven for Vietnamese fighters. At the end of the war, they settled in the region and showed no intention of returning to their homeland. Meanwhile, Cambodia was being oppressed and threatened by Thailand in the west and the Nguyen in the east. Unfortunately, Cambodia fell into a war with Panduranga-Champa. Taking advantage of this situation, in 1785 the Nguyen appropriated a Cambodian island, Xiemla Bay?, to resettle many Vietnamese. Eventually, the Nguyen claimed the island as its own. During this intra-Vietnamese conflict, both Panduranga-Champa and Cambodia lost land.

After nine years of hiding in Dong Nai Thuong, Po Cei Brei, his family, and his royal court were forced to seek refugee in Cambodia in 1795-1796 at Roka Po Pram, Thbang Khmum province (now Kompong Cham). Upon his arrival, he met all of the Cham who had migrated there during the war. This was not the first Cham migration to Cambodia; they had migrated in 1471 and 1692. The people of Champa-Panduranga started migrating there in 1835.

After seventeen years, Po Cei Brei, his family, and the royal court found peace? in Cambodia. Unfortunately, The Xiem (who is he?)wanted to invade Cambodia and acquire Battambang, Angkor, and Kampong Svay provinces. This created a conflict between the dynastic families in Ondong and Bangkok. King Ang Chan of Cambodia (1797-1834) hailed? the throne in Bangkok, but had to find a way to break free of Xiem by establishing a connection with Hue’s rulers. At the beginning of 1812, King Ang Chan’s brother, Ang Snguon, left the capital of Ondong and went to Pursat to form an army that would fight the Xiem-La. Hearing about this, Bangkok sent its expeditionary forces to Cambodia. In response, King Gia Long of Dai Viet sent his royal forces to help the king of Cambodia. In April 1812, Xiem La’s forces moved deep into Cambodia, attacked its army, and captured Ondong’s capital. Ang Chan was forced to flee Ondong and hide in Deng Eth. Ondong’s capture not only forced Ang Chan to flee, but also caused Po Cei Brei of Panduranga-Champa and his people to flee back to Roka Po Pram to take shelter in Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) province. He remained there until his death.

According to the Cham documents Cam-37 and Cam-39 (38), Po Cei Brei’s seeking refugee in Cambodia helps explain Indochinese history. Each nation’s literary history usually describes the same significant events, but only in a way designed to favor itself. Therefore, researchers have to be careful when searching for the truth based on what, where, and which document is being used.

Cam-37 and Cam-29 (38) are the only documents that clearly recount the story of Po Cei Brei, a king whose nation was in the process of being extinguished. He struggled and sought refuge in Cambodia at a time when his people were suffering. These two documents relate why he migrated to Cambodia, why and how the people Champa-Panduranga began to migrate to Cambodia, and how Rong Damrei (Tay Ninh) became Vietnamese land. In addition, Ang Chan’s presence in Rong Damrei and his month-long stay in Saigon tell us that in 1823-1824 or 1835-1836 that the residents of Rong Damrei rose up against the Vietnamese.

THE REVOLUTION OF TUEN PHAOW IN 1796-1797

By Dr. Nicolas Weber (INALCO, Paris)

Translated by Musa Porome

The revolution led by Tuen Phaow in 1796-1797 has led researchers to study his life based on the Ariya Tuen Phaow (hereinafter Ariya). This document, which contains Cham letters (which is written in Cham?), deals with Panduranga-Champa’s historic struggle and eventual defeat? of its Vietnamese enemy. Panduranga-Champa’s boundaries extend from Mount Hoanh Son to Bien Hoa.[2]

The Ariya purports to describe this revolution, which was led by marquise (What is this in English?) Tuen Phaow (known in Vietnamese as Tuan Phu).[3] He came from present-day Malaysia to help stop the Vietnamese invasion of Panduranga-Champa. In addition, it helps us prove that the Cham rebelled against the Vietnamese and supplies us with the best narrative of the political crisis that engulfed them toward the end of the eighteenth century.

This document was found in a Cham manuscript and was conserved catalogued? by the Vien Dong School, France (EFEO), under the notation “CAM-58a.” In addition, it is present in Paul Mus’ research book (give book’s title). It measures about 155mm x 230mm and consists of 35 pages. The Ariya’s contents are indicated on pages E11-E23,[4] and pages E10 and E24 indicate the name of the person who rewrote this document and renamed it Tajaong.

The Ariya exists in a variety of copies. Some were copied onto microfilm under the label “CAM-MICROFILM 16,”[5] “CAM-MICROFILM 66,”[6] and “CAM-MICROFILM 56.”[7] Another copy is kept at the Asian Society in France, Paris (Societe asiatique de Paris), under the label “CM-25.”[8] Finally, two other copies were found at the Foreign Missionary Association, Paris (Missions Etrangeres de Paris), under the label “MEP, VOL. 1189/4 and 1190/1.”[9]

In 1987 and 1993, Po Dharma was briefed on Tuen Phaow’s history.[10] Inrasara[11] also used it as a reference for his research book on poems?, which was published in Latin letters and translated into Vietnamese in 1996.[12] Inrasara also worked in Cham letters, but the meaning seems to be slightly different from the book written in Latin letters. We use Inrasara for reference purposes in this article.[13]

THE POLITICAL SITUATION BEFORE TUEN PHAOW

In the eighteenth century, Panduranga-Champa’s political situation was chaotic due to the power struggle between the Tay Son[14] and the Nguyen Anh.[15] In 1786, the Nguyen Anh king was defeated and forced to hide in Gia Dinh. In his secret resistance zone, he hoped that he would regain his throne one day. Unfortunately, Panduranga-Champa was being dragged into this conflict that had nothing to do with it, for both the Tay Son and the Nguyen Anh believed that conquering it and then using it as a military base would enable them to win the war once and for all. Panduranga-Champa had no choice but to join the side from which it could benefit the most. This reality led Panduranga-Champa into a political crisis. According to Po Dharma, it had a very small chance of becoming independent because the situation was completely one-sided and either party could end up determining its future prosperity or destruction.[16]

When war broke out in 1771 you’ve been talking about 1786 above. Is this date correct?, Panduranga-Champa was ruled by King Tisuntiraydapaghoh (34th dynasty according to the Cham calendar). dynastic records? What does a calendar have to do with a dynasty?[17] A direct relative descendant? of the famous King Po Rome (1627-1653) of the Churu tribe, he ascended the throne in 1768.[18] After his death in 1780, the Nguyen Anh immediately abolished the treaty guaranteeing his dynasty’s continuation (according to Cham tradition)[19] and installed Po Tisuntiraydaparan (35th dynasty) on the throne. Regrettably, he was not related to the former king at all and thus was considered a usurper. One year later, the Tay Son invaded Panduranga-Champa, overthrew Po Tisuntiraydapuran, and forced him to relinquish his throne to them.[20] In 1783, they offered to make Prince Po Cei Brei (36th dynasty), the son of Po Tisuntiraydapaghoh (34th dynasty), the new king of Panduranga-Champa.

Even though Panduranga-Champa was under the Tay Son’s protection, the Nguyen Anh in the southern region continued to attack it. Po Cei Brei, who could no longer tolerate this constant military pressure, decided to secretly move his family and army the Dong Nai Thuong zone, where they would rearm and prepare to rise up against the foreign occupation.[21] In his absence, Nguyen Nhac of the Tay Son offered the throne back to Po Tisuntiraydapuran (35th dynasty), a king who had previously come to power with the help of the Nguyen Anh and eventually had surrendered to the Tay Son in 1781. His acceptance of this arrangement forced Po Cei Brei to sign a treaty with the Nguyen Anh to resolve his country’s political crisis. To keep the treaty alive and show their support for it, the Nguyen Anh made Po Cei Brei a chuong co (attorney general) in 1790.[22] Unfortunately, this treaty soon led Panduranga-Champa into a harsh civil war between Po Cei Brei (supported by the Nguyen Anh) and Po Tisuntiraydapuran (supported by the Tay Son).

According to the history of Panduranga, (a book, oral history?)[23] after Po Tisuntiraydapuran’s death in 1793, the Nguyen Anh offered Po Lanhuanpaghoh[24] the position of chuong co with full power to govern Panduranga-Champa (Tran Thuan Thanh what is this?).[25] It is easy to understand this choice, because this man had previously held several important positions in the region controlled by the Nguyen Anh during their whose? uprising against the Tay Son. He had also served as governor of Phan Ri in 1790 while Phan Rang was still occupied by the Tay Son,[26] particularly during their whose? participation in the war against the Tay Son.[27] In the eyes of Po Cei Brei, choosing Po Lahuanpaghoh signaled treachery, and so he vowed to launch another war against the Nguyen Anh. According to the two Cham documents[28] and Vietnamese historical records,[29] the ensuing war caused Tuen Phaow to go to Panduranga-Champa in 1796-1797.

TUEN PHAOW IN PANDURANGA

According to a document contained within CM-33, when the Nguyen Anh sent their army to occupy Panduranga-Champa and overthrow Po Tisuntiraydapuran, an alliance with the Tay Son[30] in 1793 occurred between who?. As a result, Tuen Phaow entered Panduranga-Champa through the Dong Nai Thuong zone. The announcement of his presence caused the Tay Son invaders to call upon the Vietnamese living in Panduranga-Champa to capture him so that he could be executed for illegally seizing power and stealing the people’s property while their former (and legitimate) king was hiding in the western mountainous region (Dong Nai Thuong). Surely this was a baseless, not to mention a rather awkward, accusation.

Tuen Phaow’s presence raised a number of questions among the Cham, given that Po Cei Brei and his royal army were hiding in the same region. One question immediately comes to mind: Was there a connection between them and the operations carried out to defeat the occupying army and the Cham traitors on either side? This seems to be a preemptive strategy launched by Tuen Phaow to liberate Panduranga-Champa. The fact that both men were hiding near each other did not come as a surprise to many Cham.

TUEN PHAOW’S REVOLUTION

Before he came to Panduranga-Champa, Tuen Phaow knew what was going on in the region and that the Vietnamese were looking down on the Cham. He concluded that they would soon be wiped out in their own land if he did not intervene in a timely manner to defend Panduranga-Champa. Thus, he arrived at the head of a strong revolutionary army that included some of the Cham from Cambodia (Cham Buruw),[31] Java Kur, and some (cham or khmer?) officers of the Cambodian army. This army was divided in to two groups: the first group wore white uniforms,[32] and the second wore black uniforms and black turbans. The local Cham could easily identify from where they had come.

To implement his plan, Tuen Phaow also recruited local men and women from among the Churu, Roglai, and Kahaow see spellings below peoples (the “highland” Cham) in western Panduranga-Champa.[33] In order to train the new army, he designated an army zone around his residential palace and carefully selected and trained new the recruits, thereby showing his strategic and militant military? intelligence.

Being solely concerned about the local Cham who supported his plan, he called upon the people of Panduranga-Champa to unite so they could rise up against the foreign occupation. Psychologically, he knew what they wanted and so initiated psychological warfare campaign. For example, immediately after his arrival, he announced that he was a bhradhik (just a leader a just leader?) coming from Makkah (Kelantan), the Malay kingdom.[34] To reaffirm his original loyalty to the cham?, he started building his own palace in Kayaon (eastern Phan Thiet).

He made extensive use of Islam, even going so far as to compare himself to Prophet Muhammad and/or the warrior Ali ibn Abu Talib. He also claimed that he had received direct orders from Allah to liberate Panduranga-Champa. Despite his use of Islam, however, he never intended to convert the people and then lead them in a holy war. Rather, he tried to educate them about the importance of feeling pride and love for one’s homeland so that they could distinguish between the foreign occupiers and the local residents and construct guidelines for each group.

After strenuous and careful recruitment and training, he was ready to attack. In July 1796, the Year of the Dragon, he ordered the army to attack Phan Ri.[35] The Vietnamese king ordered the king of Panduranga-Champa, Po Lahuanpaghoh (known to them as Nguyen Van Hao), to crush this revolution. However, he was unable to do, and within a few months Tuen Phaow’s army conquered Phan Thiet and took control of the Central Highlands. After liberating Phan Ri, he decided to move north to liberate Phan Rang. However, he was injured during the battle and had to move some of his army back to a mountain base for treatment. Even though he was injured, he urged the army to continue fighting and not to falter just because he was no longer among them. He ordered them to fight bravely until the Vietnamese occupiers were defeated and withdrew completely from Cham land.

Since the enemy had doubled its forces and acquired more advanced weapons, Tuen Phaow decided to go back to Makkah (Kelantan) to ask for help. He also considered asking France for help. Before he left, he told the army to continue the fight during his absence. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese found out that Tuen Phaow was leaving the country. Along with the help of insiders, they attacked aggressively and defeated Tuen Phaow’s army in December 1787, the Year of the Snake.

Based on the sources that were documented, important news about Tuen Phaow’s revolution was found, showing that it had had a strong support system and that there had been a strong relationship between Panduranga-Champa and Kelantan. In addition, it also reveals that some of the strongest unity was between the Cham from Cambodia and the Churu, Raglai, and Koho peoples living in the Dong Nai Thuong region.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Cham Documents locations needed

Cam 58 (3)

Cam Microfilm 16 (1)

Cam Microfilm 66 (1)

Cam Microfilm 56 (8)

Mep 1189/4 (4)

Mep 1190/1 (9)

CM 25 (4)

CM 33

Cam 112 (1)

Vietnamese Documents (Vietnam Bien nien Su)

Dai Nam Chinh Bien Liet Truyen (The Tay-son), Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, Saigon 1970.

Dainam Nhut Thong Chi (Tinh Binh-Thuan), Bo Van Hoa Giao Duc Saigon 1965.

Dainam thuc Luc Chinh Bien, Part II, De Nhut Ky I:The To cao Hoang-De (1778-1801), nha xuat ban Khoa hoc xa hoi Hanoi 1963.

Hoang Le Nhut Thong Chi, Nha khoa hoc xa hoi Hanoi 1970.

Published Documents

Aymonier, E. 1889 Grammaire de la langue Chame, Imprimerie Coloniale Saigon.

Aymonier, E and Cabaton, A. 1906 Dictionnaire Cam-Francais Publications EFEO VII, Paris.

Bui Quang Trung. 1963 “Tables Synoptiques de chronologie Vietnamienne” BEFEO LI, P.1-77.

Coedes, G. 1964 Histoire ancienne des Etats hindouises d’indochine et d’indonesie, de Boccard, Paris.

Dominique Nguyen. 2003 Tu Vung Hroi-Viet theo bang chep tay CAM 182 and CAM 183 by Vien Vien Dong France, Champaka 3, 2003.

Gay, B. 1988 “Vue nouvelle sur la composition ethnique du Campa” actes du Seminaire sur la Campa organize a l’Universite de Copenhague le 23 mai 1987, Travaux du CHCPI, Paris, P-49-58.

Inrasara. 1993 “Ariya Twon Phauw” Van hoc Cham,Khai Luan-Van Tuyen.Part 1,Nha xuat ban Dan Toc, PP 228-236.

1996 Ariya Twon Phauw” Van hoc Cham II. Truong Ca, nha xuat ban Van Hoa dan Toc, P 195-208.

La Font P. -B., Po Dharma, and Nara Vija. 1977 Catalogue des manusscrits Cam des bibliotheques francaises. Publications EFEO CXIV, Paris.

1991 “Les grandes dates de L’histoire du Campa” Le Campa et le Monde Malais, Publications CHCPI, Paris.

Le-Thanh-Khoi. 1955 Le Vietnam. Histoire et civilizations, Editions de Minuit, Paris.

Lombard, D. 1990 Le Carrefour javanais. Essai d’histoire globale: III.L’heritage des royaumes concentriques, Editions de I’EHESS, Paris.

Mak Phoeun. 1988 “La communaute Cam au Cambodge du XVe au XIXe siecle. Historique de son implantation et son role dans la vie politique Khmer” Actes du seminaire sur le Campa organise a l’Universite de Conpenhague le 23 mai 1987, Travaux du CHPCI, Paris, P.83-93.

1990 “La communaute malaise musulman Ramadhipati ler” Le monde Indochinois et la Peninsule Malaise, Travaux du CHPCI, Kaula Lumpur, P.47-68.

1995 Histoire du Cambodge de la fin du XVIe siecle au debut du XVIIIe. Siecle, Presses de l’EFEO, Monographies, N0#176, Paris.

Maspero, G. 1988 Le royaume de Champa, Reimpressions EFEP, Paris.

Moussay, G. 1971 Dictionaire Cam-Vietnamien-Francais (tu dien Cham-Viet-Phap), Cham culture center, Phanrang.

Muhammad Zain bin Musa. 1990 Contribution a l’histoire du Panduranga (Campa) (La fruited u Po Ci Bri), These EPHE, Paris.

Nguyen-khac-Vien. 1974 Histoire du Vietnam, Editions Sociales, Paris.

Po Dharma. 1978 Chroniques du Panduranga, These EPHE, Paris.

1981 “Notes sur les Cam au cambodge”, Seksa Khmer 3-4, P.161-163.

1983 “Etudes Cam V. A Propos de l’exil d’un roi cam au Cambodge” BEFEO LXXII, P.253-266.

1987 Le Panduranga (Campa) 1802-1835. Ses rapports avec le Vietnam (I,II), Publications EFEO CXLIX, Paris.

1999 quatre lexiques malais-Cam anciens rediges au Campa, Presses de l’EFEO, Paris.

Sharifah Mawnah Syed Omar. 1993 Myths and the Malay ruling Class, Times academic Press, Singapore.

Ta-Chi-Dai-Truong. 1973 Lich su noi chien o Vietnam fr. 1771-1802, van su hoc, Saigon.

Thien-Sanh-canh. 1974 “Bien nien su cac doi vua Chiem-Thanh fr. 1000-1810” Noi san Panrang 8, 05-1974, P. 15-21.

Tran-Trong-Kim. 1971 Vietnam su luoc (I, II) Bo giao duc trung tam hoc lieu xuat ban, Saigon.

*-*

THE FULRO UPRISING IN BUON SARPA ON DECEMBER 20, 1964

Dominique Nguyen (International Program on Malay-Indochinese noun is missing)

Translated by Musa Porome

During 1964-1975, a powerful army played an important political role in Indochina: FULRO (the Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees [United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races]).[36] This army of the various Champa peoples (the Cham, Jarai, Bahnar, Sedang, Churu, Raglai, Koho, Rhade, Stieng, Maa, and others[37]) rose to the occasion after more than ten years (1964-1975) of continuous struggle against Vietnamese occupation. Since its activities had changed the political realities of Indochina during these years, It became a hot international topic when Saigon fell on 30 April 30 1975. The year 2004 marked the fortieth anniversary of its uprising in Buon Sarpa, a fairly important issue that is discussed below.

Two sources of documentation exist for this event: one from FULRO itself and the other based on some published documents. “The History of Bajaraka-Fulro” by Dr. Po Dharma, who will soon publish Champaka 5, was used as a main resource. I take this opportunity to thank him for supporting and supplying the scientific documentary authoritative documents? for this research. Without his support, this story would neither be accurate nor complete.

CENTRAL VIETNAM BEFORE 1954

History records Champa’s presence in central Vietnam since the second century CE. Over the years, it expanded from the Central Highlands to the lowlands, from Quang Binh in the north to the border of Saigon in the south (present-day central Vietnam). This ethnically diverse kingdom was composed of Austronesians (the Jarai, Rhade, Churu, Raglai, Hroi, and Cham peoples) and the Austroasiatics (the Bahnar, Sedang, Stieng, Maa,[38] and other related peoples). Even though Champa is gone, its people remain. More than 800,000 of them still live peacefully in the Central Highlands, and about 100,000 more live in the lowlands of central Vietnam. These latter areas are known as Phan Rang and Phan Ri. More than 500,000 of them also live along the Mekong River in the Vietnamese provinces of Chau Doc and Tay Ninh, and in neighboring Cambodia.[39]

Fifty years after Champa-Panduranga fell completely under Vietnamese rule (1832), the French colonial power and the Hue court signed, on 25 August 1883, a treaty that all Champa people living along the Binh Thuan and the Dong Nai Thuong zone would henceforth enjoy the protection of Cochinchina (Basse Cochinchine), a French colony, and enjoy a special harmand status.[40] (Give a fuller explanation of this status)The transitions? and communication were to be written in Cham and French, instead of han tu (Chinese characters). This special status lasted until the generation of Mr. Duong Tan Phat, a well-known elder among the Cham communities in 1954.[41] After Champa-Panduranga fell in 1832, Highland Champa (are “highland champa” and the “central highlands” the same? I’ve assumed in this article that they are. Maybe a footnote should be added to clarify this)(Gialai, Kontum, Darlac and Lamdong provinces Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dar Lac, Lam Dong?) became a no-man’s land, meaning that they were considered as belonging to the highland Cham tribal groups who lived there.

The French colonialists were the first to step on this land in 1891. When they realized that it was not ruled by the Hue court, they immediately took it over and began developing it according to the traditional guidelines (of the tribes, the French colonialists, the Vietnamese?). In 1945, after the Second World War, the Central Highlands acquired a strategic military importance for both the French and the Viet Minh. To guarantee that this region would continue to enjoy peace and development, on 27 May 27 1946 the French signed a treaty to transform it into an independent region, the “Pays Montagnard du Sud Indochinois” (The Montagnard Country of Southern Indochina), and placed it under direct French protection. The people were also placed under French law.[42]

This “country” was granted a traditional (whose traditions?) court with new rules for administration in order to educate and train the local tribal peoples to eventually take over this country and defend and govern themselves effectively. At this time, the French encouraged and admitted many highland and lowland Champa peoples into their high school in Banmethuot (Ban Me Thuot?) and the Yersin junior high school in Dalat (Da Lat?). By the time of their graduation from high school, they had received enough education to realize who they were and to what nation they belonged, and were better aware of their history. As regards political matters, they were capable of regrouping and arming themselves to fight the Vietnamese, who constantly subjected them to psychological and ethnic abuse.[43]

The French also invested in the region’s economy and transportation. Within a few years, this “country” had become rich (how? Minerals, crops?)and peaceful. As a result, King Bao Dai of Vietnam worried that the French would eventually join it to Cochinchina?. Thus, he worked to convince them that the Central Highlands still belonged to the Hue court. With no other choice (why was there no other choice? What could hue do if france joined the highlands to cochinchina?), the French signed a treaty on 21 May 1951 that reclassified the region as a domain de la couronne (a crown domain) belonging to the Hue court. In other words, no one could sell any land in this region without Bao Dai’s agreement. Thus, the area became an autonomous land under French control. The French had to protect it and rule out the fact there will be no Vietnamese migrating to the highland.? In fact, only 35,000 Vietnamese lived in the region at that time, and all of them worked for the French administration.[44]

THE 1954 TREATY OF GENEVA AND ITS RESULTS

For more than eighteen centuries under the Kingdom of Champa, and then for another sixty years or so under the French colonial protectorate, the highland Champa peoples (what about those in the lowlands?)lived separately and peacefully, following the guidelines of their traditional cultures. They did not interact with the Vietnamese, did not learn their language, and knew them only as yuon or yavana (a foreigner who did not share their culture). After the Geneva treaty of 21 July 1954 partitioned Vietnam into the communist north and the republican south, all of this changed.

Ngo Dinh Diem, now the president of South Vietnam, immediately abolished the two French treaties with the Hue court (hoang trieu cuong tho treaty names or translation of hue court?) concerning the Central Highlands as well as the special harmand status enjoyed by the highland and lowland Champa peoples, without consulting his administrators. Considering these two regions to be under Saigon’s control, he called its people “the people of the Central Highlands” (dong bao thuong) and grouped the Cham, Chinese, and Cambodians together as “minority peoples” (nguoi sac toc thieu so).[45] He also started to move more than 900,000 Vietnamese into the highlands as well as Phan Rang and Phan Ri. This large migration opened up a new chapter in Indochinese history,[46] for it marked the end of the Champa peoples’ rights of ownership over their homeland. Their future was now completely dependent on the new ruler of South Vietnam, a man who considered them “savage” and “uncivilized” people[47] just because they were not Vietnamese.

Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho vowed to separate the Champa highlands placing the Champa in the lowlands (highland and the lowland Champa peoples?) so that the Vietnamese could easily rule them and strip them of their culture, all in the name of assimilation. Ngo Dinh Diem knew that the Cham Rhade (and not the others?)would be very sensitive to this type of transformation and that it could have a severe impact on his own administration.[48] After the French left in 1954 and he became the president of South Vietnam, he placed new – and oppressive – rules on the region’s people, considered them inferior, took away their rights, and discriminated against them. For these and other reasons, the Champa peoples established FULRO to fight for their rights; gain control of their property (homeland?); and preserve their native languages, cultures, and traditions.

THE UPRISING BEGINS

Realizing that all of their rights, ownership, praise?, and national sovereignty had been taken away, a group of Champa peoples met in 1955 to assess their situation. Most of them were graduates of French schools, where they had learned various strategies for dealing with Ngo Dinh Diem’s harsh policies toward the minority peoples. This event marked a starting point for the rise of the Central Highlands’ minority peoples under the leadership of Y Mot Nie Kdam (president) and Y Thih Eban (secretary general).[49] FULRO was inaugurated shortly thereafter.

In March 1955, Y Thih Eban sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem demanding that his government respect the beliefs and traditional cultures of the Champa peoples, treat them equally (namely, the same as the Vietnamese), and return their possessions, including those that had belonged to their forefathers. (what were these? Land, artifacts?) Ngo Dinh Diem, however, ignored the letter and decided to pursue even harsher policies: He denied the Champa people’s ownership of their properties, abolished their traditional courts, forbade the teaching of the Cham language (what about the other tribal languages?), and moved thousands of Vietnamese into the Central Highlands to take over the Champa peoples’ land and other possessions.[50]

Seeing no other solution, the Champa peoples resorted to violence. Taking advantage of a presentation that Ngo Dinh Diem was giving at a conference in Banmethuot on 22 February 1957, an officer from the Champa Highlands Revolutionary Front (this group has not been mentioned before. some background info is necessary – when it was set up, who belonged to it, where it was located, purpose etc….)secretly carried in a gun into the room to assassinate him. Fortunately for the president, the bullet hit and killed his deputy. As a result of this assassination attempt, Saigon propagated yet another new and harsher law designed to crush this movement and arrest its leaders. Thousands of members went into hiding and tried to find a better way of dealing with Saigon.[51]

THE BAJARAKA MOVEMENT

During early 1958, the Champa Highlands Revolutionary Front decided to appoint Y Bhan Enoul as its new president. At first, this movement focused on devising a new strategy to create a network that would persuade all movements having the same purpose to form one group.[52] During January-May, it renamed itself BAJARAKA, an acronym formed by the first two letters of each tribal participant (namely, the Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, Kaho peoples). This movement, which was more of a political force than a military force as regards fighting for their rights, had one central goal: getting Ngo Dinh Diem to restore the Hoang Trieu Cuong Tho (The Right of Ownership of Land and Properties) treaty. In other words, they wanted Saigon to return ownership of their homeland and stop oppressing them.[53]

On 25 July 25 1958, Y Bham Enoul and sixteen colleagues signed and sent an official letter to the United Nations Secretary General, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French ambassador in Saigon seeking their help in resolving the situation with Ngo Dinh Diem and in securing autonomy for the Central Highlands.[54] On 8 September 1958 he sent another official letter (delivered by Y Dhon Adrong and Y Mot Nie) to Ngo Dinh Diem asking that his government develop a new policy toward the region’s minority peoples.[55] After receiving this letter, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered his agents to crack down and arrest Paul Nur, Y Thih Eban, Y Bham Enoul, Y Ju Eban, and Nay Luett. These men were found and imprisoned. Only Y Bih Aleo was released early, because he was not a high-ranking member of the movement.[56]

On 26 November 1958, hearing a rumor that the movement’s members would attack the prison in an attempt to rescue their leaders, Ngo Dinh Diem immediately ordered Y Bham Enoul’s transfer to another facility in Hue; the rest were to be transferred to a higher security facility in Saigon. All of the minority peoples who worked for the Saigon government and were suspected of belonging to BAJARAKA were transferred away from the Central Highlands to work in other provinces.[57]

TWO LIBERATION FRONTS IN CAMBODIA

In order to benefit from this ongoing political crisis in Vietnam, the Khmer Krom (the Cambodian minority population) in southern Vietnam and the Champa peoples in Cambodia came together to reclaim their stolen land. They formed two liberation fronts: the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front, which sought to regain the lands once ruled by Cambodia (land stretching from Saigon to Camau Ca Mau?), and the Champa Liberation Front, led by Les Qasem, a general in the Cambodian army.[58]

The growing numbers of patriotic Kampuchea Krom and Champa peoples in South Vietnam and Cambodia pushed the Ethnic Minorities Liberation Front (first time this is mentioned – explanation/description needed)to organize a conference of the twenty-three former leaders (of what?)as well as BAJARAKA members to establish the Ethnic Committee for an Autonomous Central Highlands. This organization would be led by Y Bih Aleo, a former BAJARAKA member from the Rhade tribe.[59] This new group, which received support from Hanoi, thus entered a new era.

Les Qasem, who did not want his liberation front to fall into the same category as the aforementioned intellectuality (those groups who talked but undertook no military actions?), urged the Central Highlanders to join his Champa Liberation Front. He further proposed that they find a way to rescue Y Bham Enoul from prison and bring him to Cambodia. On 16 February 1962, he contacted Y Bih Aleo to learn about Y Bham Enoul’s actual condition.[60] On 1 May 1962 Y Thih Eban, who was still in prison, wrote to the American ambassador to South Vietnam with a request that Saigon free all BAJARAKA members. Ngo Dinh Diem agreed to free only Y Thih Eban, Nay Luett, Toneh Yoh, Siu Sipp, and Y Ju Eban; Y Bham Enoul and Paul Nur would remain behind bars.[61]

In July 1963, Y Thih Eban joined the American Special Forces located in Buon Sarpa. All of its military men were former BAJARAKA members. Still hoping to rescue Y Bham Enoul, Y Thih Eban took this opportunity to appoint (in secret) Y Nam Eban second lieutenant in charge of the force and Y Klong Nie a liaison worker entrusted with contacting Cham leaders in Cambodia, particularly Les Qasem. During their meeting in Phnom Penh, Les Qasem promised Y Klong Nie that he would welcome Y Bham Enoul and his colleagues to Cambodia after they had been rescued.[62]

At the same time, Major General Nguyen Khanh, a commander-in-chief stationed in the Central Highlands, sent Y Sen Nie Kdam (a Rhade) to Cambodia. In his capacity as a security agent, Y Sen Nie Kdam was to meet Les Qasem to find out what had happened to Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, a F-15 pilot who had bombed the presidential palace in 1960 and had then sought asylum in Phnom Penh under Les Qasem’s protection.[63] Les Qasem informed Nguyen Khanh that if he could secure Y Bham Enoul’s freedom, in return he would guarantee Nguyen Chanh Thi’s life while he was in Phnom Penh.[64]

On 27 August 1963, King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with South Vietnam on the ground that its government was unjust and willfully killing the Khmer Krom.[65] He told Les Qasem to form and then lead a resistance committee to fight South Vietnam, which he would fund covertly. As a result of this decision, Les Qasem acquired more power. But instead of doing as Sihanouk requested, he began to recruit more armed men for his own Champa Liberation Front.[66] (this makes him seem like a rather untrustworthy person.)

On 1 November 1963 Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Tran Thien Khiem, and Ton That Dinh, all of whom were South Vietnamese generals and Les Qasem’s friends and academic peers, attended the same training camp in France during the uprising against Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime. Taking advantage of this political crisis, some officers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces merged with the Cham to form FULRO. This new organization was a coalition of three other fronts: the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front, the Northern Kampuchea Liberation Front (based in Laos’ Champassak region, which had long ago been part of Champa) and the Champa Liberation Front.[67]

After overthrowing Ngo Dinh Diem, General Duong Van Minh assumed the reins of government and immediately called for the release of all BAJARAKA members except Y Bham Enoul, provided that Les Qasem would free the exiled Nguyen Chanh Thi.[68] Y Bham Enoul could become a hostage in exchange. I don’t understand the text in red.

During the first week of January 1964, Nguyen Khanh sent Y Sen Nie Kdam, one of his security agents, to Cambodia to meet with Les Qasem again about exchanging Nguyen Chanh Thi and Y Bham Enoul. In mid-January, Les Qasem agreed to this proposal.[69] Arriving in Vietnam two months after his release, Nguyen Chanh Thi cooperated with Tran Thien Khiem and Nguyen Khanh to overthrow Duong Van Minh on 29 January 1964. Nguyen Khanh emerged as the country’s prime minister.[70] I found him on the net as both president and prime minister. Was he both, did both posts exist, or did Saigon move from a president to a prime minister?

Although Nguyen Chanh Thi had been released, Y Bham Enoul remained in jail. Right after Nguyen Khanh took office in February 1964, Les Qasem asked him to free Y Bham Enoul immediately to fulfill their agreement; he did so on 1 February 1964.[71] The following month, Les Qasem urged Y Bahm Enoul to come to Cambodia through a mediator (a former BAJARAKA member) to continue the mission of liberating the Champa peoples.[72]

During the first week of March 1964, Y Bham Enoul sent Y Klong Nie to Cambodia to meet with Les Qasem at the Dam River, located on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. At this meeting, Y Klong Nie asked Les Qasem to guarantee the lives of BAJARAKA’s members if Saigon began to threaten or arrest them again. After the meeting, Les Qasem asked Y Klong Nie to deliver some official mail to Y Bham Enoul. In a letter, Les Qasem described his respect and admiration for Y Bham Enoul’s work and sacrifice, saying that he had always looked up to him and held him in high respect as a Champa elder. Les Qasem promised to help and protect all BAJARAKA members by offering them political asylum in Cambodia if it became necessary for them to leave South Vietnam.[73]

In June 1964, Y Dhon Adrong, Y Nhuin Hmok, and Y Nham Eban, all of whom were BAJARAKA delegates and officers of the American Special Forces unit based in Buon Sarpa, arrived in Camp Le Rolland (a military training camp in Cambodia’s Mondulkiri province) to meet Les Qasem and Um Savuth, a Khmer Krom leader.[74] At this meeting, Les Qasem explained that liberating the Champa peoples from Saigon’s control and securing external help and assistance required them to base their request on historical facts. If BAJARAKA only sought to liberate the Central Highlands and focused solely on negotiations with Saigon to solve their problems, then no third party would be willing to support them.

He also claimed that all highland and lowland Champa peoples were brothers and sisters and that they should unite under the following name: the Champa-FULRO Liberation Front.[75] His suggestion sounded both reasonable and logical, so the three delegates complied with his request.[76] Les Qasem, Um Savuth, and the BAJARAKA leaders started to devise a new FULRO flag that would contain three colors (green, red, and white), three stars and a crescent on a white background (representing the three nations of Kampuchea Krom, Northern Kampuchea, and Champa), and three red stripes (representing the three revolutionary fronts).[77] To commemorate this event, Les Qasem and his counterparts (Y Dhon Adrong, Y Nhuin Hmok, and Y Nham Eban from BAJARAKA, and Um Savuth from the Khmer Krom), attacked the Vietnamese military base in Buon Sarpa all the way to the Banmethuot I don’t understand the text in red, on 20 September 1964 to rescue Y Bham Enoul and bring him to Cambodia.[78]

THE BUON SARPA UPRISING AND AFTERMATH

From Camp Le Rolland, across the border in Cambodia, Les Qasem and Um Savuth, with the cooperation of Y Dhon Adrong and Y Nhuin, ordered FULRO’s army to raise its flag. This operation had been planned long ago by General Lon Nol, the Cambodian prime minister at the time. (need more info about his involvement and his overthrow of sihanouk)

In Buon Sarpa, Les Qasem ordered his army men officers? to meet with the American lieutenant Charles Darnell, a Sarpa division commander, to inform him of the upcoming military uprising and that it would not affect the nearby American military base. Right after 1:00 a.m. on 19 September 1964, about 3,000 FULRO soldiers attacked and destroyed all Vietnamese military bases in the area. After a few hours of combat, FULRO announced its victory over the Central Highlands. Six American soldiers (among them Lt. Darnell) were taken hostage, and thousands of Vietnamese weapons were captured.

Y Dhon Adrong raised the FULRO flag to announce their victory and declare the operation’s purpose: to liberate the Central Highlands and Kampuchea Krom from the Vietnamese occupiers. This declaration was signed by the Chau Dara (leader of the Kampuchea Krom Revolutionary Front), Y Bham Enoul (representing the Central Highlands), and Po Nagar (namely, Les Qasem, representing the Cham). At the same time, FULRO attacked other Vietnamese military stations in Bu Rang, Ban Don, Buon Mi Ga, Buon Brieng, and other locations. (were they victorious there as well?)

After its victory over Buon Sarpa at 7:00 a.m. on 20 September 1964, FULRO split into two groups. One moved toward Darlac province, where its soldiers attacked Banmethuot and occupied the radio station; the other group headed toward Y Bham Enuol’s residence to remove him from the Buon Sarpa base and bring him to Cambodia. Once there, he was to meet Les Qasem, who was commanding another FULRO force at a Cambodian military training camp. According to General Vinh Loc and Nguyen Trac Di’s sources, FULRO’s soldiers killed all of the Vietnamese soldiers they could find after taking over the Vietnamese military base in Buon Sarpa.

After seizing the Banmethout radio station, FULRO troops distributed leaflets signed by Y Bham Enoul, Les Qasem, and Chau Dara, the three leaders of the FULRO front. In it, they demanded that Saigon allow minority representatives to be present in Parliament, stop drafting minority people to serve in the armed forces, stop discriminating between the minority people and Vietnamese who serve in the military by enforcing equal treatment and ranking, and return all of the minority peoples’ land and belongings that the Vietnamese had acquired illegally.

THE AMERICAN ROLE

George Tanham, an agent CIA? with the Rand Corporation, met with Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, in the presence of General William Westmoreland, to discuss why American hostages had been taken during the recent upheaval.

On 21 September 1964, a day after Banmethuot’s capture, nobody could be found on the streets and the Vietnamese were living in fear. That same day, John Freund, an American adviser to the South Vietnamese Army in the II Division region, was told to go to Buon Sarpa and find way to negotiate with FULRO’s leader. Upon arrival, he was taken hostage. From Camp Le Rolland in Cambodia, Les Qasem secretly found ways to meet with him to let him know that FULRO would withdraw only if the Vietnamese settlers would leave the Central Highlands. Otherwise, FULRO would keep the hostages until its demands were met. Freund did not consider this to be a simple matter, and he had no authority to meet FULRO’s demands.

The leaders in Saigon were very upset with FULRO’s capture of Banmethuot. Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh, the first one to blame America for getting involved in this matter, threatened to bomb and destroy the regions currently occupied by FULRO if it did withdraw its troops from the Central Highlands. Les Qasem urged his colleagues and FULRO’s soldiers not to become discouraged, but to remain ready to fight. He further declared that if Saigon bombed them, they would have the right to defend themselves by any means necessary. Hearing this news, Lieutenant General Westmoreland (in an earlier paragraph, he’s a “general”)ordered Major General Ben Stenberg to fly to the Central Highlands and ask Major General Nguyen Huu Co not to use military force, for he thought that such an action would be harmful to the American hostages.

On 22 September 1964, Ambassador Taylor called for a special meeting with Westmorland and some high-ranking American officers to study FULRO’s demands. The Americans thought that these demands could be met easily. However, some Vietnamese general officers in the II Division region, particularly Major (in the last paragraph, he’s a “major general”)Nguyen Huu Co, accused America of closing its eyes and allowing FULRO to take over the Central Highlands. He claimed that the Americans were no different from the French colonists, for all of them were white men who favored the Central Highland peoples because the considered the whites to be divine beings.? He was not hesitant about ordering his air force to be ready to strike at any time.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

On 22 September 1964, Les Qasem, still at Camp Le Rolland, suggested to Nguyen Khanh that Major General Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh, both members of the Saigon government, could reach a peaceful with Les Qasem, for he trusted them. Regrettably, however, they were arrested in their homes in Dalat for attempting to overthrow the government after the attack on 29 January 1964.

On 23 September 1964, Major General Richard Deputy, the American commander of “Operation Switchback” in the Central Highlands, came to Banmethuot to study the FULRO uprising. According to him, there was nothing to worry about because Y Bham Enoul was now with Les Qasem in Cambodia and was ready to negotiate with Saigon. However, negotiations would proceed only if the following conditions were met: FULRO must agree to let Fruend (check his rank – he was listed as both a colonel and a major general. I’ve deleted both of them, since he was listed as an “advisor” above), one of the American hostages, communicate with an American commander in Banmethuot. In addition, FULRO must release at least one American hostage, transfer him by helicopter to the American base in Banmethuot, and announce that Freund was still alive and well.

The next day, Nguyen Khanh flew a helicopter to Banmethuot to meet the commanders of the II Division region to investigate the ground realities. His presence was also intended to show FULRO that his patience was running thin. In an attempt to answer Les Qasem’s demands, he ordered the release of Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh on 22 September 1964 but we were talking about 24 sept., and asked them to represent him at the negotiations taking place Banmethout. Late in the afternoon of the same day, Fruend met with Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh, who subsequently concluded that Saigon must hold a conference in Pleiku that would include minority representatives from the different regions. If this conference did not resolve the issue, then Saigon would use military force to defeat the uprising.

On 26 September 1964, Y Bham Enoul sent a letter written in French to Nguyen Khanh, complaining that Saigon had not met FULRO’s demands, as set forth on 20 September 1964 in Buon Sarpa. In addition, although Saigon had invited the FULRO delegates to the conference in Pleiku, it had not informed them of its date. Y Bham Enoul still wanted to send the delegates, but only after all Vietnamese settlers had left Banmethuot.

Suddenly, Le Van Kim was called back to Dalat and Nguyen Khanh was being flown to Banmethuot to meet with Ton That Dinh. The two (who? Three people are listed)agreed to avoid the American-proposed conference that would soon be convened in Pleiku. Nguyen Khanh announced that Saigon would shut down FULRO by military means if it did not withdraw its forces from the Central Highlands and release the Vietnamese hostages being held in Buon Sarpa or elsewhere in the region. When Les Qasem received this news, he immediately went to see Freund and asked him to call Major General Richard Deputy to let him know that he was still alive and well and to report that Nguyen Khanh had decided to attack FULRO in the near future. Fruend mentioned a remark by Les Qasem that he did not know if the American hostages would survive such an attack.

After communicating with Fruend on 26 September 1964, Deputy called for another meeting with his colleagues to express his concern over Nguyen Khan’s threat to use military power to shut down FULRO in Buon Sarpa. He said that such an attack would solve nothing; rather, it endanger the hostages, as Les Qasem had stated, and turn the Central Highlands into a new (and bloody) battlefield. Deputy went to Buon Sarpa himself to negotiate with FULRO’s leaders and asked them to free the hostages before 9:00 a.m. the following day. He then phoned Nguyen Khanh to discuss his plans. Nguyen Khanh disagreed with it; Les Qasem welcomed it. At 7:00 a.m. the following day, Deputy and Major Touprong Yaba (a Churu) arrived in Buon Sarpa ready to negotiate. Deputy promised to do his best to pressure Saigon to accept FULRO’s demands. An agreement was reached, and Les Qasem ordered the release of the American hostages and asked all 2,000 of his soldiers (under the command of Y Dhon Adrong) to retire to their base in Mondulkiri, Cambodia.

On 10 February 1964, Nguyen Khanh met with his parliamentary team in Saigon’s Presidential Palace (Dinh Doc Lap) to study what had happened in Buon Sarpa. They ultimately concluded that:

To deal with this sensitive matter, Nguyen Khanh encouraged his administration to find a way to divide the Champa peoples. Saigon soon launched a new propaganda campaign designed to distinguish the peoples of the Central Highlands from the Cham living in the lowlands.? He encouraged all television and radio stations, as well as newspapers, not to use the term Champa, thereby denying the existence of Champa’s highland region (namely, the Central Highlands). Finally, he declared that Saigon would neither reconcile nor deal with the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front; rather, it would recognize what it termed the “FULRO Highlands,” named after the movement that had demanded autonomy for that region alone. Nguyen Khanh also stated that Y Bham Enoul was just a chess piece being used by Les Qasem, a Cambodian Cham. This highly successful propaganda campaign caused a division among the Champa peoples that still continues even to this day.

THE FINAL SETTLEMENT

On 5 October 1964, Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball wrote a top-secret letter to Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Robert MacNamara (Secretary of Defense), and MacGeorge Bundy (Security Adviser for President Johnson) outlining his concerns about this uprising and how it had brought about significant changes in Saigon’s political arena.

After all of the American hostages were released on 27 September 1964, the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front (still led by Y Bham Enoul), asked Deputy to keep his promise to intervene with Saigon to accept its demands. Due to the subsequent American pressure, Saigon agreed to organize a conference in Pleiku on 15 October 1964. The leaders of Champa-FULRO, along with eighty other delegates representing the various tribes living in central South Vietnam, were invited to attend. Nguyen Huu Co was appointed chairman. Paul Nur, Nay Luett, Touprong Hiou, Touprong Yaba, Toneh Han Tho, and others attended in their capacity as BAJARAKA leaders.

The conference room featured several posted banners proclaiming “Champa peoples and Vietnamese uniting against the Hanoi regime,” “A policy of mediation,” and “Preventing foreign interference in Vietnamese matters.” These banners hinted at the Cambodia’s support of the Champa-FULRO Revolutionary Front and the issue that was proposed to the natural state in the Indochinese peninsula by the French. I don’t understand the last part in red At the end of the conference, FULRO presented eight demands:

On 16 October 1964, Nguyen Khanh flew to Pleiku to close the meeting with a promise to meet all but the last two demands. He also decided to release Nha Thuong Vu (what is this, since it’s called “it” later on. Why is this action significant?)from the defense department and put it under the direction of the Office of the Prime Minister. Touprong Yaba was appointed as its director. Nguyen Khanh opened an officer training center and a junior non-commissioned officer school to train minorities, and also granted them priority access to some (e.g., a school of administration and the National Military Academies in Da Lat and Thu Duc).

CHAMPA-FULRO UNDER THE SECOND REPUBLIC

After overthrowing Nguyen Khanh on 15 February 1965, Nguyen Van Thieu became president and Nguyen Cao Ky became vice president. Both men agreed to let FULRO establish a direct? office, the Delegations Speciale et Officielle (DSO-FULRO), which would operate in Buon Ale A, Banmethuot city. The new regime also agreed to the following FULRO demands:

9. Replace the Phu Dac Uy Thuong Vu (translation?) with the Bo Phat Trien Sac Toc (The Minorities’ People Development Department), inaugurated on 12 December 1967.


[1] Muhammad Zain bin Musa, Contribution a l’Histoire du Panduranga-Campa: La fuite du Po Ci Bri, Luan pho tien si,EPHE, Paris, 1990.

[2] More about the Champa History, refer to G. Maspero, 1988; G.Coedes, 1964; P-B Lafont, 1990, Po Dharma, 1987, I-II.

[3] Po Dharma, 1987,II:74

[4] P-B La font, Po Dharma and Nara Vija, 1977:41-42

[5] This copy refer as a hand written A

[6] This copy refer as a hand written B

[7] This copy was not use for this purpose of research due to it is too short and has content nothing new.

[8] This copy refer as a hand written D

[9] P-B La Font, Po Dharma and Nara Vija, 1977:116,216-217

[10] Po Dharma 1987, I:74

[11] Inrasara, 1993:228-236. in this book, Inrasara wrote that Dr. Po Dharma (1987:141-164) the revolution of Tuen Phaow happen to be in 1833-1835. But the truth was (page 141-164) Dr. Po Dharma never mentioning the name of Tuen Phaow, but wrote that the wave of revolution of Tuen Phaow happen to be on 1796 not in 1833-1835. This mistaken indicated that the work of Dr. Inrasara was baseless and dishonest.

[12] Inrasara 1996:45-208

[13] This copy refers as a hand written C.

[14] The movement of the three brothers of Nguyen-Nhac, Hue and Lu rise up against the Trinh dynasty in the North and the Nguyen dynasty in the South.

[15] For more detail on this conflict refer to DNCBLT (Tay-son) 1970, HLNTC 1970; Nguyen Khac Vien, 1974; Le thanh Khoi, 1955; Tran Trong kim, 1971,II; Po Dharma,1987, II

[16] Po Dharma 1987, II:73

[17] Po Dharma, 1978:62

[18] This is one of the tribe the living in the Eastern of Phan-Rang

[19] Po Dharma 1978:62

[20] refer to document (translated by Po Dharma: Cam I:I);DNTLCB (part II);118 & DNNTC (binh-thuan):41

[21] refer to Po Dharma 1983:253-266

[22] Ta Chi Dai Truong 1973:255; DNTLCB (part II): 124; CAM 27:232.

[23] Po Dharma 1978

[24] According to Vietnam history, this prince was Nguyen-van-Hao.

[25] Refer to DNTLCB (part II): 129-188.

[26] DNTLCB (part II):58-125.

[27] DNTLCB (part II): 129-188

[28] Hand written CM-33

[29] Refer to DNTLCB (part II): 249,251-255,275.

[30] About this war, please refer to DNTLCB (part II):188 and DNTLCB (Binh-Thuan):41. Po Tisuntiraydapuran was arrested and sent to Gia-dinh and sentences to death.

[31] New cham or the cham Muslim

[32] White uniform indicated the group of Muslim.

[33] Refer to B.Gay, 1998:49-58 and Dominique Nguyen 2003: 14-36 with the theme “Panduranga is multi-tribes”.

[34] About the word of Maka please refer to Po Dharma 1999:198-199.

[35] DNTLCB (part II): 251-225, 275.

[36] Conference des peoples indochinois,Fulro. Historique. Phnompenh, 25 Fevrier 1965; N.C Labrie, Fulro, The history of political tension in the South Vietnamese Highlands. (Ph.D) 1971; Y Chon Mlo Duon Du, “Quan niem ve nep song cua dong bao Thuong va an hem Fulro”. Nguyet san Thuong-Vu, so 3, 1966; Heckey, G.C. Free in the forest, Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands 1945-1976. Yale University Press, 1982 est l’ouvrage de plus documente.

[37] Gay, B. Vue nouvelle sur la composition ethnique du Champa. Actes du seminaire sur la Campa, CHCPI, Paris, 1988,P. 49-58; Po Dharma, le Panduranga (Campa ses rapports avec le Vietnam (1802-1835). Publication de l’EDEO (deux volumes). 1987.

[38] Gay, 1988:49-58

[39] Hicky, 1967; Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a:11.

[40] Aymonier, 1885:139.

[41] Taboulet, 1955:807; aymonier, 1885:58. Hickey, 1982b:204.

[42] Vinh Loc, 1965: 82; Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a:14.

[43] Hickey, 1982b.

[44] Minh Tuy, 1962:28-29; U.S Army, 1967:322.

[45] Hickey, 1982b: XIV.

[46] Minh Tuy, 1962: 28-29; U.S Army, 967: 322.

[47] Nguyn Trac Di 1969a:11.

[48] Hickey. 1982: 7

[49] Hickey, 1982b: 50

[50] Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a:13; Hickey, 1982b:10.

[51] Hickey, 1982b: 21.

[52] Hickey, 1982b: 54.

[53] Extraits de l’historire … 1956: 7-10; Hickey, 1982, 54; Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a:14.

[54] Vinh Loc 1965: 37-38; Nguyn Trac Di 1969a; 15; Hickey 1982b:57.

[55] Vinh Loc 1965: 43-44.

[56] Nguyen Trac Di 1969a: 15; Hickey 1982b: 58.

[57] Hickey 1982b: 58.

[58] Nguyen Trac Di 1969b: 19-20; Hickey 1982b: 62.

[59] Vinh Loc 1965: 45, Ngon Vinh, Fulro: 17.

[60] Fulro sources: 2-62.

[61] Hickey 1982b:83.

[62] Hickey 1982b: 86.

[63] Hicket 1982b: 88 and 91.

[64] Fulro sourses: 6-63.

[65] Mayer 1971: 263

[66] Fulro Sources: 8-63.

[67] Fulro Sources: 8-63.

[68] Fulro Sources: 11-63; Duncanson 1966:342-354; Hickey 1982: 91.

[69] Fulro sources: 1-64.

[70] Fulro sources: 1-64; Hickey 2002:109; Pike 1966: 347-348.

[71] Fulro sources: 2-64; Hickey 1982b: 94; Hickey 2002: 110.

[72] Fulro sources: 3-64.

[73] Fulro source: 3-64; Hickey 1982b: 94.

[74] Hickey 1982b: 98.

[75] Hickey 1982b: 98.

[76] Fulro sources: 6-64.

[77] Fulro sources: 6-64; Hickey 1982b: 97.

[78] Fulro sources: 6-64; Hickey 1982b: 97.

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[Enemy]

@Wholegrain,

No Y Chromosome can survive and multiply itself without mtDNAs. The Cro Magnon Y Chromosome originated in the Caucasus region but traveled southward and then eastward. It fertilized many native eggs en-route and expanded eastward through South Asia and ending up at South East Asia. I tried to identify and locate the native eggs with reference to the names from the available historical records. There were many such native non Cro Magnon women who helped in the survival and multiplication of the number of Cro Magnon Y Chromosomes. I mentioned a few as examples.

 

[Wholegrain]

From the F.L.M to Fulro (1955-1975)

From the F.L.M to Fulro (1955-1975)
Written by Dr. Po Dharma and Translated by: Musa Porome

Dr. Po Dharma
The situation from 1954-1955

Due to the pressure from the American administration, the Geneva convention was signed in July 21, 1954. In June 17, 1954. Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem, a hardliner conservative member of the Catholic Church, to be prime Minister. In March 11, 1955, this new leader immediately decided to annex the region

that the French called Pays Montagnard du Sud Indochinois-PMSI (the land of the Highlander) into the control of the Vietnamese administration. He also abolished the autonomous policy (Hoang Trieu Cuong Tho)[1] which had been granted by Emperor Bao Dai in April, 1950. As this was occurring, Ngo Dinh Diem appointed Ton That Dinh as a governmental representative, and open an office in the Dalat province to take responsibility of the issues of the Highlanders, including reorganizing the local administration. A special tasks was given to Dinh is to appoint or pick a chief for each province in the Highland is the Vietnamese[2].

Due to this action, five thousand minorities people from of the South and Central Vietnam seeking to joined the movement of Viet Minh and were took to the North Vietnam. Four thousand of these people were selected to be sent to a school and it was the first school that established to educate and training minorities people in ideology and political purpose, especially for the Cham and the Highlanders. The school, which was located in the village of Gia Lam, where Ho Chi Minh and other leaders often visited[3].

The administration of Hanoi also established a school to train the minority people to be teachers. One notably outstanding student was Y Ngong Nie Kdam, who was selected to be sent to Russia to attend medical school. He returned to North Vietnam after he graduated, and was appointed to be in several important positions in the Viet Cong administration. He became a minority leader in the House of Representative of the Republic of Socialist of Vietnam in 1975[4].

The birth of the Highlander Liberation Front

In early 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem invaded the Highlands and turned this region into a Vietnamese colony[5] by resettling a number of Vietnamese settlers and send military personnel to this region. The policies were extremes harsh to the Highlander natives. At the same time, the government nationalized the land and the native people were forced to leave their lands and their livelihoods.

The native people rose up in protest to defend their rights, but the protests resulted in many people being arrested and sent to prison for crimes against the government. As a result, some of the intellectual members of the Highlanders secretly formed a movement under the leadership of Y Thih Eban, a Rade tribal man born in 1932, who had graduated from Sabatier school in Banmethuot.

The first conference organized by the movement in Banmethuot in 1955. The majority of the members decided to establish a new organization, which they named "Front de Liberation des Montagnard-FLM (The Highlander Liberation Front) and appointed Y Mot Nie Kdam (Rade) to be a leader and Y Thih Eban (Rade) to be Secretary-General[6].



In March, 1955, Y Thih Eban sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem requesting the Saigon Administration to consider the following three demands from the Highlanders:

1. Respect the culture and the beliefs of the Highlander people.

2. Enact policies to treat the minority and the Kinh people with equality.

3. Return all the illegally confiscated land by the government and the Vietnamese settlers back to the native Highlanders.

According to a letter from G. C. Hickey, an employee of the Rand Corporation, (and a member of the CIA), the resettled Vietnamese who moved into the Highlands were secret agents, sent out by the Hanoi administration[7].

In June, 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem visited Banmethuot. He asked the Highlanders to organize a conference and they must promised being loyalty to his administration and to the president. Some of the Highlander leaders refused to participate in the conference, and saying that this conference was against their traditions and culture. They especially did not want to promise loyalty and service to the invader. Ngo Dinh Diem ordered a list of names to be compiled of all those who stubbornly refused to comply with his orders[8].

In May 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered to move the School of Administration from Dalat to Saigon. Three Highlanders were accepted into this school; Y Dhat Nie Kdam (Rade), Y Chonmlo Duon Du (Rade), and Rcom Rok (Jarai). Each of them would later hold important positions in the Saigon administration, and eventually they were the important leaders in the movement of Bajaraka[9].

An assimilation policy toward minority

In August 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem order the closure of Sabatier High School which had been established by the French and was only attended by the Highlanders. If students wanted to continue pursued their high school, then they had to attend the Vietnamese high school instead. Unfortunately, most of the Highlander students did not know the Vietnamese language well so they had to drop out of school. Some of the more fortunate students like K'briuh (Sre), Y Bun Sur (Mnong Rlam), Y Gum Buon Ya (Rade), and Nay Bah (Jarai)[10] were able to transfer back to the French school (Lyscee Yersin) in Dalat.

In order to establish a new republic of the government, on October 23, 1955, a referendum was held to discrown Emperor Bao Dai. Ngo Dinh Diem declared that from now on, the Highlander and the Cham were officially became the Viet citizens, and they must obey all laws of the country[11]. Additionally, Ngo Dinh Diem declared, and his intended is to:

1. Abolish the land ownership by the minority.

2. Abolish the minority traditional court.

3. Prohibit teaching of minority languages in the elementary school.

4. Close all the offices that serve the minority.

5. Move thousands of Viet settlers into the Highland to exploit all the land.

Ngo Dinh Diem also authorized the use of force to assimilate the minority people, and to make them learn and live by the new culture of the Viet[12].

The birth of the Khmer Liberation Front

In 1955, the Khmer people living in their ancient land along the Mekong river in Southern Vietnam were not happy with the new harsh policies of the Saigon administration. Therefore, they rose up and formed a movement named Front de Liberation du peuple Khmer (The Khmer Liberation Front), under the leadership of a monk name Samouk Seng[13]. The purpose of this organization was to protect themselves from the assimilation policies of Ngo Dinh Diem.

Events in 1956-1957

In January 23, 1956 Ngo Dinh Diem decided to hold a national assembly to write a new national constitution for the Republic of South Viet Nam. The assembly had 123 members of the House of Representatives, which included 4 members from the Highlanders. These members were from the Rade, Jarai, Sre, and Churu tribes, and one from the Cham tribe. In October 26, 1956, Ngo Dinh Diem announced the birth of the new constitution[14].

A plot to assassinate Ngo Dinh Diem



On February 16, 1957, the American administration signed an agreement with the Saigon administration to donate $1,053070 USD to benefit the Highlander people. Unfortunately, the people of the Highlands never received any of this money[15].

On February 22, 1957, a conference for the program above took place in Banmethuot. Taking advantage of the presence of Ngo Dinh Diem, The Highlander Liberation Front plotted to assassinate Diem. Unfortunately, the Minister of the Agriculture Department was killed instead of Ngo Dinh Diem[16]. After this event, Ngo Dinh Diem proposed several policies against the Highlander Liberation Front, and ordered the administration to hunt down those members that were part of the plot to assassinate him. Y Thih Eban and his commanders went into hiding and conspired with the local tribal leaders including Y Bham Enuol and Nay Luett, and others, to conduct a new strategy[17].

On July 3, 1957, Ngo Dinh Diem established the Social Bureau Office in the Highlands, located in Dalat City. Ngo Dinh Diem appointed Huynh Cong Tinh, a Lieutenant Colonel, to be in charge of the bureau. The appointment of a Vietnamese to be in charge in the office caused more disappointments among the Highlanders and stir more conflicts with the government of Saigon[18].

In 1957 Ngo Dinh Diem proposed a new bill to exploit all the land that belonged to the Highlanders[19]. To implement the bill, he sent thousands of Vietnamese, under the protection of the Saigon military, to the region to ravish the land. Once the land was owned by the Vietnamese, in order to provide for their families, the natives had to work for the Vietnamese on the very land they once owned. This situation created more conflict and hatred between the Vietnamese and the Highlanders[20].









Events in 1958

The reformation of The Highlander Liberation Front

Early in 1958, The Highlander Liberation Front secretly met in Banmethuot to elected new leaders; Y Bham Enuol (Rade) was elected as President, Y San Nie (Rade) as Vice President, Y Thih Eban (Rade) as Secretary-General, Siu Sip (Jarai) as treasurer, Y Ju Eban (Rade) as Liaison, Y Bhan Kpor (Rade)as a First Lieutenant to be a Chief of the Military, Touprong Ya Ba (Churu) as a Major (chief commander), Paul Nur (Bana) to represent the people of Kontum, Y Bih Aleo to represent the people of Darlac, and Touneh Yoh and Touneh Phan (Churu) to represent the people of Lam Dong. Even though most of the newly elected leaders belonged to the Rade tribe, the purpose for the reformation was to unify all the tribes together to create a new plan for the future[21].

The birth of The Bajaraka Movement

On May 5, 1958, The Highlander Liberation Front conducted a secret meeting again in Banmethuot to propose a name change to The Bajaraka Movement. The name Bajaraka comes from the names of the four tribes; Bana, Jarai, Rade and Kaho. In this meeting, the new movement delivered an assessment of the situation on the highland people, which included the findings below;

Economically, the Highlanders are essentially slaves for the Vietnamese settlers who now control the economy in the region.
Politically, the Vietnamese settlers hold power and authority in the region, acting as victors over the Highlanders in the region, who are treated as inferior citizens.
Financially, the Highlanders who worked for the government administration are paid much lower wages than the Vietnamese.
Militarily, the Highlander officers that serve in the military have less chance to get promotions than the Vietnamese officers. Moreover, the Highlanders in the military were never accepted to the officer training school in Saigon.
The Highlands became the theater of the killing field for South and North Vietnam, and this conflict has nothing to do with the people of the Highland region.
The principle of law- the Highlanders have to obey all the Vietnamese laws, a laws that had no respect for the culture, traditions and beliefs of the native people.
Educationally, the children of the native people were being prohibited from learning their own languages in school.
Economically, there was a clear unfairness on the pay rate for the nurses who worked in the hospital. The native nurse was paid $25 DVN while the Vietnamese nurse was paid up to $45 DVN[22].
At the same time May 1958, the Bajaraka movement passed out to its members a new resolution that was written in the Rade language to explain the future aim of the movement. Unfortunately, this resolution was leaked, and got into the hands of Saigon security forces[23]. After studying through the resolution and reading the biography of each member of the movement, the Saigon security concluded that The Movement of Bajaraka was formed and sponsored by outsiders, especially by De Francis Sherry, a CIA agent who was stationed in Saigon. In response, the administration of Saigon launched a new strategy to destroy The Bajaraka Movement by any means[24].

Political activities of The Bajaraka Movement

On July 25, 1958 Y Bham Enuol, president of Bajaraka Movement, asked the Dean of Michigan University in the United States, to delivery a letter with sixteen signatures of the members of the movement to the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon during his visit to Vietnam. In the letter, Y Bham Enuol requested the U.S. to ask the Saigon administration to reinstall a special policy similar to the old autonomous policy that Emperor Bao Dai has granted for the minority people during his administration. Concurrently, Y Bham Enoul sent another letter to the Secretary-General in the United Nations. In this letter he described the extinction of the Highlander people, a nation that soon would be exterminated[25].

In August 1958, Y Bham Enuol started to form new boards of committees in each region and distric[26]t, and continued to send letters to all foreign diplomats in Saigon, including the Ambassadors of France, India, Laos...etc... to ask them for help requesting the Saigon administration reinstall a policy similar to the old autonomous policy that Emperor Bao Dai has granted for the minority people in 1951[27].

Nay Luett (Jarai) and Y Ju Eban (Rade) were appointed to deliver the letters to the foreign diplomats in Saigon, even though they were being strictly watched by the Saigon administration's secret agents. The two men were able to accomplish the assignment. They were able to hold a meeting with Elbridge Durbow, an ambassador of the United States, which gave them the opportunity to explain the situation of the people of the Highlands. The US ambassador promised to get involved, and to try to use his power to influence Ngo Dinh Diem to act on the request[28].

Sept. 8, 1958, Y Bham Enuol sent a letter directly to Ngo Dinh Diem requesting the government grant a special policy for the people of the Highlands. Y Dhon Adrong and Y Mot Nie Kdam were appointed to deliver this letter to the Saigon administration. A copy of the letter was also sent to the chief of each province in the Highland region[29].

Working against the Bajaraka movement, Gen. Vinh Loc, the commander of the second combat division, published a book in 1965 disparaging the Bajaraka Movement. He claimed that it was just a group of savage and uneducated people who were finding ways to disturb the peace and protest against the government. He also claimed that it was not a political movement. He wrote that all the events that happened between September 1957 and May 1958 proved that the leaders of The Movement only knew how to write a vague letter of requests and under the cover of foreigners, with a purpose of stirring up trouble for the administration. He said that the Movement wanted to establish colonial rules in the country. He also said that the Bajaraka Movement claimed that their culture and traditions are completely different from the Viet culture. He said “Unfortunately, the Highlanders have a population of only about 500,000 and are divided into 34 different tribes,” and he asked, “how can those savage people establish their own statehood in the Highlands?[30]”

On September 8, 1958, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered a crack down on the Bajaraka Movement and arrested some of its leaders. Among those arrested were Y Bham Enuol, Paul Nur, Y Thih Eban, Y Ju Eban, Nay Luett, Y Bih Aleo and a few others. With the exception of Y Bin Aleo, these men were taken to a prison in Dalat. Y Bih Aleo was released shortly after the arrest because the Saigon secret police found insufficient evidence of his involvement with the activity of the Movement[31].

An explanation of the arrests came from General Vinh Loc, who wrote that the highlanders were enemies and must be arrested because this movement was an illegal organization and had illegally received funds and support from foreigners[32].



The protesting of the people of the Highlands in Banmethuot

On October 12, 1958. Y Dhon Adrong and Y Bih Aleo (who later became a member of the Vietcong) sent a letter of protest, with thousands of signatures, from the people of the Highland to Ngo Dinh Diem. This letter requested the Saigon administration must release all the members of the Bajaraka Movement who were imprisoned in Dalat. Simultaneously, thousands gathered in Banmethuot to protest the oppressive policies of the Saigon government toward the Highlanders. In response, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered the 23rd Infantry Division to attack and stamp out the protesters[33].

The situation continued to intensify. On October 27, 1958, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered the Darlac's provincial commissioner to gather all the members of Bajaraka to a conference in Banmethuot to find a solution for the political trouble. Unfortunately, the conference was not successful, since the Saigon government refused to release the members of Bajaraka who were under house arrest since September 8, 1958. The failure of the conference created more tension and insecurity in the region[34].

On November 26, 1958, a rumor circulated that the people of the Highlands would rise up at the prison to rescue the prisoners. Ngo Ding Diem immediately ordered the relocation of Y Bham Enuol to the Hue's prison and sent some of the others to the Saigon prison. According to a few witnesses, the Saigon government ordered barbarous torture methods to try to get the prisoners to confess details of their movement and plans[35]. About this same time, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered all the Highlander governmental workers to be relocated to the lowlands along the coast in central Vietnam, a region that only the Viet were living in[36].

Saigon trying to manage the control over the Highlanders.

In order to execute the nationalizations policy in the Highlands, the Saigon government claimed that these measures were the only way to control the native Highlanders. In December 1958, Ngo Dinh Diem decided to move a third group of Vietnamese settlers to the region, and voided the highlanders' titles of land ownership. This allowed the Vietnamese settlers to take the land, which resulted in even more Highlanders being forced into poverty, making them financially dependent upon the Vietnamese settlers[37].



The events in 1959

On January 23, 1959, the Saigon government decided to establish a new province in the Dong Nai region, and named it Quang Duc. This new province made it easier to relocate the new Vietnamese settlers from the North. The capitol of the new province was located in Gia Nghia where most of the Manong people lived[38].

When the new congress was to be elected, in July 30, 1959, Ngo Dinh Diem decide to reduce the chairs of the delegates for the Highlanders in congress from four to two chairs. The Highlanders rose up to protest the decision. Ngo Dinh Diem announced that the government could not allow favors to the traitorous people of Highland. The Saigon administration selected Hia and Y Ut Nie (Buon Rit) be the representatives of the people of the Highlands, because these two men were not members of the Bajaraka Movement[39].

One month later, in September 1959, Ngo Dinh Diem released Y Bham Enuol and Paul Nur from prison. Not long after their release, the two men began to reorganize the Bajaraka Movement. Ngo Dinh Diem realized these men would continue to oppose the Saigon government, so he immediately ordered the two men to be rearrested[40].

The same year, in September, The Saigon administration enacted a policy of Vietnameselization, intending that this policy would force the native people to assimilate into the Vietnamese community[41].

Events in 1960

The birth of the South Vietnam Liberation Front



December 1960, Hanoi installed a liberation front in Southern Vietnam, called The South Vietnam Liberation Front. Again, the Highland region became a battle field for both sides, South and North. Both Saigon and Hanoi found ways to influence and recruit the Highlanders to join their side. Under the pressure from both sides, the native people in Central Vietnam divided into two groups, one group with the communist forces in Hanoi, and the other group with the Saigon administration[42].

The Birth of The Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front

and The Champa Liberation Front

Two political fronts were born in Phnom Penh in late 1960, and both had the aim to fight against the harsh policies of Ngo Dinh Diem. The two fronts were:

The Kampuchea Krom Liberation, which aimed to liberate the Southern region (Cochin chine), a region that once belonged to the Kingdom of Khmer and was invaded during the Nguyen Dynasty[43].
The Champa Liberation Front, under the leadership of Colonel Les Kosem, a Cham descendant and a parachute officer that served in the Kampuchea military[44].
The Events in 1961

The birth of The Autonomous Movement of Highlander



On May 19, 1961, The South Vietnam Liberation Front conducted a conference and gathered 23 delegates of minority people from South Vietnam to form the Autonomous Movement for Highlanders. Y Bih Aleo was selected to be president. Y Bih Aleo[45] was a former member of the Bajaraka Movement who had been arrested by agents of the Saigon Administration in September 8, 1958. After his release he left Banmethuot in September of 1958[46] to join the communist movement.

According to General Vinh Loc, the presence of Y Bih Aleo with the communist movement clearly proved that the rebellion of the Highland people was not instigated by true desires of the native people, but was a tool for the communist party in Hanoi to advance their intention to topple the Republic of South Vietnam[47].

Creations of the strategic hamlet

In early 1961, The South Vietnam Liberation Front launched a terrible guerilla warfare attack. The U.S. military and the CIA suggested that there must be a way to prevent the Highlanders from joining with the northern communists. They offered to build a strategic hamlet which would surround the road and the villages with barbed wires, and would be guarded by the civil guard arm, with a light rifle. The CIA agent proposed to form an armed force, namely Highland Forces (Trường sơn) for the Highlanders to guard their own villages and the people surrounding the strategic hamlet. Under pressure by the Americans, Ngo Dinh Diem hesitated to accept the proposal, but he worried that the people of the Highland would soon be influenced by the CIA agent and increase their desires to fight for autonomy, and for their own nation in the region[48].

1961 marked the first American armed force base in the Highlands. The purpose of the presence of the American arm was to protect the strategic hamlet surrounding the villages. Taking advantage of the presence of the American arm, the notable men in the Highlands found ways to develop close relationships and direct contact with the American officers in the armed forces.

During this time Chau Dara[49], the leader of the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front put forward a political proposal which:

Requested Ngo Ding Diem to enact an equality policy between the Khmer and the Viet.
Requested Ngo Ding Diem to recognize the Khmer people living in the Southern region of Vietnam as citizens belonging to the Phnom Penh administration in Kampuchea[50].
Also in 1961, Colonel Les Kosem, the founder of theChampa Liberation Front, was entrusted with the duty to protect Chu An Lai, the Prime Minister of China during his visit to Kampuchea. Taking advantage of this visit, Colonel Les Kosem met with the prime minister to explain about the aspirations of his Champa nation and the aim of TheChampa Liberation Front in the future. After the visit, Kosem received a promotion to be the commander-in-Chief, an intelligence leader, and a Deputy of the Khmer's armed force of Phnom Penh administration[51].

Events in 1962

Tangential point between the Highlanders and diplomatic foreigners.

In February 1962, General Tran Van Don chaired the opening ceremony of the Highland arm forces which had been proposed by the CIA in Banmethuot. In his speech, General Tran Van Don questioned the motive of the CIA in establishing the organization. He warned that the organization would soon became a special tool for the Bajaraka Movement activities in the future and it would be used to fight against the Vietnamese[52].

Later, on February 16, 1962, a conference organized by The South Vietnam Liberation Front was held in Kampuchea. Y Bih Aleo[53] was appointed to be president of the minority people committee for the front. Colonel Les Kosem desired for Y Bham Enuol to be released from the prison in Hue so that he could work closely with him in Kampuchea. Taking advantage of the conference, Les Kosem met Y Bih Aleo to ask for his influence with the situation for the release of Y Bham Enuol[54].

On May 1st, 1962, Y Thih Eban sent a letter from prison to Frederic E. Nolting, an American Ambassador in Saigon requesting him to ask the Saigon authorities to release all of the members of Bajaraka Movement. Frederic E. Nolting met with Ngo Dinh Diem to discuss this issue[55].

On August 18, 1962, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered the release of five members of Bajaraka, among those were Y Thih Eban (Rade); Nay Luett (Jarai); Toneh Yoh (Churu); Siu Sip (Jarai); Y Ju Eban (Rade). Unfortunately, the Saigon administration did nothing for the two most important figures; Y Bham Enuol (Rade); and Paul Nur (Bana). After the release, Y Thih Eban and Nay Luett were appointed to be translators for the American arm forces at their bases in Banmethuot and Quang Nam[56].

In October 1962, Y Thih Eban requested to meet some of American officers to help arrange the release of Y Bham Enuol and Paul Nur, who were still in prison. Y Thih announced that The Bajaraka Movement would stop its activities against the Saigon administration if all the members of Bajaraka would be released[57].

By the end of 1962, Y Thih Eban gathered all of the members of Bajaraka in Buon Enao to hold a peaceful demonstration in Saigon requesting the release of Y Bham Enuol and other Highlanders still being kept in prison. In response, Ngo Dinh Diem ordered to penalize Y Thih Eban and his members by any means[58].

Events of 1963



In February 1963, an American CIA report indicated that The Bajaraka Movement would join hands with the Vietcong in the near future. After receiving this news, Gilbert Layton, a CIA agent assigned to the Highland region, requested an audience with Y Thih Eban to discuss this possibility. He asked whether Y Bham Enuol intended to join hands with Vietcong or not. Then the two man, Y Thih Eban and Gilbert Layton, went to Pleiku to speak to General Nguyen Khanh a commander of the Army Corps II. After the meeting, Nguyen Khanh immediately ordered the release of Y Bham Enuol and Paul Nur, and had a meeting arranged with them to ask them about their intention of joining hands with the Vietcong. The two men said that they had no information regarding what was going on between Bajaraka and the Vietcong ever. Nguyen Khanh then ordered to bring them back to prison[59].

On February 1, 1963, a letter from an unknown source was leaked to the leader of The South Vietnam Liberation Front which stated that Y Thih Eban has said that if Y Bham Enuol asked him to leave the South Viet Nam Liberation Front, then he would do so to join the Saigon administration. Taking advantage of this statement, Y Thih Eban and Gilbert Lapton (CIA) and some of the military leaders of Saigon decided to free Y Bham Enoul, and arranged a secret meeting with Y Bih Aleo in the secluded place near Yang Prong tower in Darlac. Hearing that there would be a meeting there, Colonel Le Quang Truong, a commander of the 23rd infantry division, ordered air forces to bombard the area where the meeting was to be taking place. From the prison, Y Bham Enuol sent a letter to Gilbert Layton to criticize the double stand of the American CIA agent on the events of the bombardment[60].

According to some Fulro's documents, Colonel Les Kosem is one of the men that proposed the meeting between the leaders of the Highlanders. Even though the meeting was a failure, Colonial Kosem never gave up his efforts to get Y Bham Enuol out of prison, and to somehow bring all the members of Bajaraka to join The Champa Liberation Front. To fulfill his dream, Les Kosem formed a liaison committee to directly negotiate with the members of Bajaraka thru the Highlanders in the army of South Vietnam, which was stationed along the eastern side of the border of Kampuchea[61].

In June 1963, Y Thih Eban went to Buon Sarpa, an area that had an army base close to the border of Kampuchea and Vietnam. Most of the Highlanders who were soldiers were stationed there. Immediately after arriving in Buon Sarpa, Y Thih Eban outlined a new strategy for the Bajaraka activities, then gave it to Y Nham Eban, who was a first lieutenant and commander of the Bajaraka secret armed forces. He appointed Y Klong Nie (Mnong) to be a liaison in direct contact with Colonel Les Kosem and directed him to be ready for the plan of rescuing Y Bham Enuol from the prison in Hue. Y Klong Nie went to see Les Kosem in Phnom Penh where he promised to find a way to help arrange the release of Y Bham Enuol and assured him that all the members of Bajaraka are welcome to join The Champa Liberation Front[62].

About the same time in 1963, Major General Nguyen Khanh, a commander of the II infantry based in Pleiku, sent one of his guards, Y Sen Nie Kdam (Rade) to Phnom Penh. His assignment was to talk with Colonel Les Kosem about Major Nguyen Chanh Thi, an army officer who had political asylum in Kampuchea after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1960. At that time, Colonel Les Kosem was responsible to protect Nguyen Chanh Thi during his asylum in Phnom Penh[63].

A secret meeting between Y Sen Nie Kdam, Major Nguyen Chanh Thi and Colonel Les Kosem in Phnom Penh was held. At this meeting, Les Kosem proposed a condition that if Nguyen Khanh freed Y Bham Enuol, then he would offer Nguyen Chanh Thi more favors during his asylum in Kampuchea. After the meeting, Les Kosem hoped that Saigon would soon release Y Bham Enuol[64].

On August 27, 1963, King Norodom Sihanouk of Kampuchea decided to cut diplomatic relationships tie with Saigon to protest the oppressive policies that Saigon had imposed on the Khmer people living in South Vietnam[65]. After these events, Les Kosem was appointed to be the officer of The Office of Coordinated Fronts to fight against the Saigon government. In fulfilling this appointment, Les Kosem worked is to reorganize and developed the Champa Liberation Front, a front that had been endorsed by King Norodom Shihanouk[66].

The fall of Ngo Dinh Diem regime

In June 1963, Henry Cabot Lodge was appointed to be an American ambassador to Saigon. The presence of Lodge marked a new important political change. Right after he was sworn into the office, rumors spread that the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was starting to fail. Ngo Dinh Diem had to face opposition from the Buddhists and daily protests by the people in the street that security forces somehow could not stop[67].

On November 11, 1963, five generals, with the assistance of the American military agreed to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem. The generals involved were Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Tran Thien Khiem, and Ton That Dinh. Ngo Dinh Diem was successfully killed[68]. After the removal of Ngo Dinh Diem, Colonel Les Kosem immediately find way to connect with General Le Van Kim and Ton That Dinh. We ought to recall that these men had met and know each other while at the military training camp in France. Les Kosem said that if they would reinstall better policies for the minority people in central Vietnam, then he would arrange to have Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi to be sent back to Vietnam in exchange, but with a condition that Saigon had to release Y Bham Enuol[69].

The birth of FULRO Front.

The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 marked a historical change in South East Asia. Taking advantage of the change in the Saigon government, The Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front and The Champa Liberation Frontconduct a new strategy, and they needed somehow to show a unification of the two fronts by decided to form a coalition named Front Unifé de Lute des Race Operimées (The Unified Front for the people being Oppress- Fulro). This unified front was composed of three fronts:

$11. The Kampuchea krom Liberation Front-FLKK.

$12. The Champa Liberation Front-FLC.

$13. The Kampuchea North Liberation Front-FLKN.[70]

The aim of The Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front was to liberate South Vietnam (Cochin chine) stretch from Saigon to Ca Mau, a region that was invaded by the Vietnamese previously. The Kampuchea North Liberation Front was to fight for the Champasak that had an ancient Wat Phu Shrine in the region, and to request for an autonomy in Laos. The two regions were the land that belonged to the kingdom of Kampuchea before the invasions. The Champa Liberation Front had the aim to get independence in the land that had once belonged to the Champa Kingdom since fifteen centuries ago, which included the Highlands and the coast line region of what is now Central Vietnam. The region intended for liberation stretched from Phu Yen to Phan Ri. It was planned that the capital would be in Nha Trang[71].

The two important leaders of Fulro Front were Colonel Um Savut (a Khmer descendant from Tra Vinh, Vietnam) and Colonel Les Kosem (a Cham descendant from Kampuchea). The three fronts were supported in both spiritually and politically by General Lon Nol, a Commander in Chief, and the Prime Minister of Kampuchea during the reign of King Norodom Shihanouk[72].

After the birth of Fulro, Les Kosem increased his efforts to rescue Y Bham Enuol from jail. Les Kosem considered Y Bham Enoul to be a critical leader for the Highlander nation, and one who could secure the alliance between the Bajaraka and The Champa LiberationFront.

After Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown on November 1st, 1963, the new government of Saigon released all the Highlanders that were imprisoned under the orders of Ngo Dinh Diem. They also ordered all the Vietnamese to be deported or to seek political asylum in other countries, including Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi to be return back to their homeland[73].

In the name of Bajaraka, Y Thih Eban took this opportune time to send a letter to General Duong Van Minh, a leader of the Saigon administration, requesting that he should reconsider freeing Y Bham Enuol and Paul Nur who had been imprisoned by Ngo Dinh Diem since September 1958. (They were let out shortly in September 1959, but almost immediately were reimprisoned.[74]) After receiving that letter, the Saigon administration freed Paul Nur, and as soon as he arrived home, he was appointed to be Deputy Chief of the province of Kontum, in charge of the Highlanders. The administration, however, still refused to release Y Bham Enuol[75]. According to a Fulro's document, General Duong Van Minh posted a condition that Y Bham Enuol would only be freed if Colonel Les Kosem returned Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi back to Vietnam. This condition turned the topic of the release Y Bham Enuol into a political game of the hostage exchange[76].




[1]a policy that apply in some provinces to rule the Northern highlanders (in short of PMNI) and in the Southern Highlanders (in short of PMNI) that was stated on the First article.

[2]Gerald C. Hickey, 1982b; N.C. La Brie, 1971:60.

[3] Michigan State...1957:22; Gerald C. Hickey, 1982b: 14-15

[4]Department of State (1) 1981, 29: Gerald Hickey, 1982b:15; Larry Jackson, 1969:320; Bernard Fall, 1963:152.

[5]N.C La Brie, 1971:60.

[6]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey, 1982b:50, read more on N.C. la Brie, 1971:61-62 and the U.S. Army, 1967:322.

[7]Gerald C. Hickey, 1982b: 51

[8]verify by Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a: 13; Gerals C. Hickey, 1982b:10

[9]Nghiem Dang, 1959:63-65; Gerald C. Hickey, 198b:9

[10]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:10

[11]Nguyen Trac Di, 1969a:13; Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:10

[12]Nguyen Trac Di 1969a:13-14

[13]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:61

[14]National Institute...1957-1958:273; Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:5

[15] Foreigner Operation...1967; Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:20

[16]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982:21

[17]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982:21

[18]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:12

[19]at the time, the Highlanders tradition were only the farm work After a harvest people will left the farm for a while until it became rich on fertile, but the Saigon admin. nationalization all those land (Jean Boulbet 1966: 77-98; P.B.Lafont 1967:37-50)

[20] Verify by Nguyen Trac Di 1969:14

[21]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:54

[22]Extraits de L'histore...1956:&-10; Verify by Nguyen Trac Di 1969a:14;N.C.La Brie 1971:64-67 and Gerald C. Hickey 1982:54

[23]Vinh Loc 1965:36-37; Nguyen Trac Di 1969a:5-10

[24]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:56

[25]Vinh Loc 1965:37-38; Jean Larteguy 1965:150-151;N.C.La Brie 1971:66

[26]Verify by Vinh Loc 1965:42

[27]Nguyen Trac Di 1969a:15

[28]Verify by N.C.La Brie 1971:66;Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:57

[29]verify by N.C La Brie 1971:66, and Vinh Loc 1965:43

[30]Vinh Loc 1965:43-44

[31]verify by Nguyen Trac Di 1969a:15;N.C. La Brie 1971:69, and Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58.

[32]Vinh Loc 1965:44

[33]verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[34]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[35]Fulro Doc:9-64. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[36]Fulro Doc: 9-64. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[37]Fulro Doc: 9-64. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[38]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:58

[39]Economy Dept....1959:18-2

[40]Fulro Doc: 9-64. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:9

[41]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:9

[42]Fulro Doc: 9-64. Verify by Vinh Loc1965:46 and Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:47

[43]No ones no the relationship between this front and the birth of The Kampuchea Liberation Front in 1955 form by a Monk Samouk Seng.

[44]Fulro Doc: 12-60. Verify by Nguyen Trac Di 1969b:19-20 and Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:62

[45]according to Ngon Vinh (1995:17), Abih Aleowas appointed to be deputy of The South Liberation Front

[46]Fulro Doc.:12-60. Verify by Nguyen Trac Di 1969b:19-20 and Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:62

[47]Vinh Loc 1965:45

[48]N.C. La Brie 1971:71-72;Gerals C. Hickey 1982b:74

[49]Ngon Vinh (1995:10) said that Chau Dera is a nick name of Gen.Um Savuth, a Kampuchea military officer.

[50]Fulro Doc.: 12-61. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:61

[51]Ngon Vinh 1995:9

[52]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:80-81

[53]Wilfred Burchett 1963:103-104

[54]Fulro Doc.:2-62

[55]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:83

[56]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:83

[57]Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:83

[58]Fulro Doc.:2-64. verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:84

[59]Fulro Doc.:1-64. Verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:86

[60]Fulro Doc.:2-63. verify by N.V. La Brie 1971:73-74 and Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:86

[61]Fulro Doc.:2-63.

[62]Fulro Doc.:2-63. verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:86

[63]Fulro Doc.:6-63. verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:88, 91

[64]Fulro Doc.:6-63.

[65]Charles Meyer 1971:263

[66]Fulro Doc.:8-63.

[67]Fulro Doc.:8-63. verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:89

[68]Robert Shaplen 1972:16-17, 40-56; Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:89

[69]Fulro Doc.:11-63

[70]Fulro Doc.:11-63. verify by Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:90, and Charles Myer 1971:269-271, The Nord Liberation Front is just a shadow, because Its has no member.

[71]Fulro Doc.:11-63.

[72]Fulro Doc.11-63.

[73]Dennis J. Duncanson 1966:342-354

[74]Y Bham Enoul 1965:12; Gerald C. Hickey 1982b: 91

[75]Gerald C. Hickey 1982b:91

[76]Fulro Doc.:11-63

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Post-FULRO Events (1975-2004)

Post-FULRO Events (1975-2004)
Written by Dominique Nguyen Translated by Sean Tu

Dominique Nguyen
(South East Asia-Malay Study Program)

FULRO stands for the Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees (the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races), an organization consisting of three sub-fronts: the Liberation Front of Southern Cambodia (former Cambodian territory extending from Saigon to the horn of Ca Mau), the Liberation Front of Northern Cambodia

(former Cambodian territory in Champasak, Laos), and the Liberation Front of Champa, which later became the Liberation Front of the Champa? Highlands. On page fifteen of “the uprising of tuon phaow” these are listed as the Kampuchea Krom Liberation Front, the Northern Kampuchea Liberation Front (based in Laos’ Champassak region, which had long ago been part of Champa) and the Champa Liberation Front

Speaking about FULRO, one immediately thinks of the Liberation Front of the Cham Highlands, an organization that for more than ten years (1964-1975) changed Indochina’s political atmosphere. This armed struggle was led by Y Bham Enuol (Rhade) and Lieutenant Major (in the tuon phaow file he was a general)Les Kosem (Cham), who lived in Cambodia. The organization was sponsored by Cambodia, especially during the reign of Prime Minister Lon Nol, and its headquarters was located in Mondulkiri province, Cambodia.[1]

After ten years of armed struggle to transform the Cham highlands (Central Highlands?) into an area that could govern itself and was self-sufficient (the tuon phaow file indicates that the French were trying to do this, not fulro), FULRO became a mortal enemy of the Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge finally took over Cambodia on 17 April 1975, most or all of FULRO’s officers, with the exception of Les Kosem, retreated to the French Embassy’s consulate for protection. But this supposedly powerful office did nothing when the Khmer Rouge broke all of the rules of engagement and international protocols by entering the embassy (said above to be the consulate) in pursuit of every senior and minor FULRO officer. Each one caught was executed, including third-in-command Y Bham Enuol (I thought he was the leader), and such senior officers as Y Bun Sur, Y Nham, Kpa Doh, and Ksor Duot. Their execution on 20 April 1975 marked the organization’s complete destruction.[2]

From an historical point of view, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia and the North Vietnamese took over South Vietnam twelve days later, FULRO lost all of its legitimacy. However, it remained active under different forms and shapes. Since we cannot find a suitable word to describe this phenomenon, we use the term post-FULRO events to describe the ongoing struggle associated with or related to FULRO after 1975. In this thesis, we only present information related to these events, whether inside or outside of Vietnam, by means of news broadcasts, newspapers, or magazines in chronological order for reader to follow.

Everyone is aware that these events are historical facts. Therefore, the information conveyed could contain misinformation or conflicting information due to possible hidden political motives designed to promote or protect the agendas of their proponents. For example, Hanoi’s version of a post-FULRO event will differ from that presented by an external media outlet. This is a classic problem for someone who wants to study social or political event taking place in Southeast Asia nowadays.[3]

Year 1975

After South Vietnam fell to North Vietnam, Hanoi started to pursue and capture those intellectuals from the Central Highlands and various Champa peoples who had worked for Saigon. They were placed in re-education camps. Next, Hanoi transformed the demographic makeup of the Central Highlands and the plain of Phan Rang and Phan Ri by resettling millions of northern Vietnamese there under the guidelines of its new economic development plans.[4]

While “liberating” the south, Hanoi captured Buon Me Thuot, which occupies a strategic location in the middle of Vietnam, on 10 March 1975, with the support of the FULRO organization led by Kpa Koi (Rhade). Once in full control of the Central Highlands, Hanoi had second thoughts about the minority individuals whoe had worked with Saigon, even those who had helped them capture Buon Me Thuot (e.g., Kpa Koi) and who had joined the communists in their quest to liberate the country (e.g., Y Bloc Eban and Y Bih Aleo). Those who had joined the communists also belonged to the Highland Autonomy Front; they suddenly found themselves powerless under the Communist party’s line. After Saigon’s fall, all special powers that had been granted to the Highland Autonomy Front were buried and forgotten by time. No one dared to bring the issue up again, even Y Bih Aleo, the front’s president.[5]

Once they realized that they are only a pawn of Hanoi and that they would fall, sooner or later, into Hanoi’s cat and mouse game, Kpa Koi decided to separate FULRO from Hanoi. In July 1975, his group retreated to its headquarters in order to continue the struggle for independence and self-rule - this time against the communists.[6] At the same time, the FULRO organization of Jaya Mrang (known by the Vietnamese as Huynh Ngoc Son) rose up and encouraged the Cham of Phan Rang and Phan Ri to join him. In a few months, his force fell apart due to the lack of support and supplies.[7]

Year 1976

On 10 April 1976, the government-controlled radio in Hanoi started to broadcast news that rebels in the Central Highlands were still creating social unrest and warned the people about the danger lurking in those areas. The rebels called themselves the FULRO of Kpa Koi. This is the first time that a post-FULRO event took place in the region.[8]

During the same month, the United Nations reported that Hanoi planned to move eight million Vietnamese into the Central Highlands, as well as into Phan Rang and Phan Ri, to participate in its new economic development plans. However, in reality this policy was designed to rob and steal the local people’s land. The sheer number of new settlers changed the two regions’ entire social fabric. In addition, the new economic development policy reduced the minority peoples to poverty and engendered social upheaval due to the lack of sufficient land for raising cattle and farming.[9]

Year 1979

On 2 July 1976, northern and southern Vietnam officially reunited after so many years fighting. Everyone thought that FULRO would cease to exist once and for all. However, its ghost all of a sudden reappeared in the political arena during June. Ieng Sary, a senior officer belong to the Khmer Rouge’s inner circle, admitted that an organization known as FULRO-Dega was fighting side-by-side with the Khmer Rouge against Vietnamese aggression. [Editor’s Note: At this point, the war between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was in full swing.] He further stated that FULRO-Dega had eliminated over 200 troops who had been embedded in this area. However, he did not mention the leader’s name.[10]

About eight months later, on 14 November 1979, a Khmer Rouge radio station received a letter from someone named Anak N’Gram. According to this station, Anak N’Gam was a Cham who had participated in the 1964 Buon Sarpa uprising. The president of FULRO-Dega-Cham was Ndrang Hmuol, and Anak N’Gam was his prime minister.

Year 1980

According to the Khmer Rouge radio station’s broadcast of 23 January 1980, it had received another letter from FULRO-Dega stating that Hanoi was implementing a genocidal policy toward the minority peoples in the upper Central Highlands. This letter informed the station that since 1975, Hanoi had imprisoned almost 150,000 ethnic minority people for the purpose of re-education. On 18 October 1980, the Washington Post reported that Beijing was thinking about arming the Central Highlanders, especially the FULRO-Dega, to counteract Hanoi’s tyranny.

Year 1982

Is there any more text?

Some fulro members have been resettled in usa. See MODERN HISTORY, Asia Times Online :: Southeast Asia news and business from Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, Montagnard Asylum-Seekers, and other sites.


[1] See Champaka, vol. 5 for detail history of FULRO

[2] Ponchaud, 1977:15-16; Hickey, 1982b:283.

[3] We are indebted to professor Po Dharma and Nicolas Weber who have generously provided materials for the completion of this study.

[4] Hickey, 1982b:285.

[5] Hickey, 1982b:283.Mr. Y Chon Mlo who belongs to Kpa Koi organization worked for the Ethnic Development Department under South government decided to quit his post to join with the Communist since May 1974. See Hickey, 1982b:268; Ngon Vinh, FULRO:238-239.

[6] Hickey, 1982b:285.

[7] Ngon Vinh, 1982, page 272.

[8] Butterfield, 1976; Hickey, 1982b:288.

[9] U.N. 1976.

[10] Nayan, 1979:10-11; Chandra, 1979:10-11.

The Uprising of the Central Highlanders in February 2001

The Uprising of the Central Highlanders in February 2001
Written by By Nguyen Van Huy (Ph.D.) and Translated by Sean Tu

Từ Công Nhượng
For the first time in the Vietnamese history, a post-1975 event caught the international media’s attention with great passion and speed: the uprising in the Central Highlands.

In the beginning of February 2001, about 500 Central Highlanders from Chu Prong county started a protest to demand that Hanoi free two Protestants imprisoned by its security agents.

The international media, as well as the Vietnamese media abroad, provided immediate and vivid information of this event. Representatives of Western countries in Hanoi also demanded an explanation and warned it not to use force to suppress these minority people.

Vietnamese officials paid close attention to this event as it unfolded, for they did not dare to treat it lightly. As a result, the government’s reaction was well calculated and to the point. On the one hand, Hanoi released the two prisoners immediately in order to ease the tension between it and the Central Highlanders, court-marshaled the five officers involved in the case, and sent a special envoy to whom? to explain its policy on minority peoples. Thus, it sought to resolve the conflict at early stage. On the other hand, the official media outlets broadcast information designed to associate the uprising with a few individuals seeking to create social unrest. In addition, they labeled these people as criminals trying to destroy the bond of brotherhood existing between the Vietnamese and the Central Highlanders, and who are trying to create an autonomous Dega state within Vietnam.[1]

Not content with presenting the uprising in a negative light to counteract international pressure, Hanoi ordered the military headquarters at Region 5 to deploy a division of troops, including helicopters, cannons, and tanks, to the Central Highlands. This was done to ensure that the uprising would not spread to neighboring Laos? Cambodia?, for Hanoi feared that they (the countries or the highlanders)would demand the return of lands belonging to the Central Highlanders. The minority peoples living in Kon Tum, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa provinces were ordered to limit their movements, the main roads leading to these areas (e.g., Route 14 and Route 19) were rigorously checked, and the telephone lines were cut. However, much of what was going on was relayed to the outside world, and the clashes were being recorded in vivid detail.

According to the weekly magazine World Security (An Ninh The Gioi) for 7-14 March 2001, published in Vietnam,[2] and news appearing in such Vietnamese newspapers as Lao Dong, Nhan Dan, and Quan Doi Nhan Dan:

Next two paragraphs are bloc quotes – both sides indented, no quotation marks

On January 29, 2001, Security Force 729, which patrols the borders, captured the following individuals red-handed, Ro Lan Bon and Ro Lan Duianh, who belong to the Raglai tribe and currently live in Ia Pla and Ia Mo, subdivision Ia Pia, Cu Prong county, with secret documents from Ksor Kok[3] intended to create social unrest, drive a wedge into the bond of brotherhood of the Highlands and the Kinh who are they?. Afterward, Ksor Kok contacted international organizations to pressure the Vietnamese government to release two prisoners…

During the commotion on February 2 [2001] at Pleiku, Buon Me Thuot province, the extremists seriously violated national laws… In a few counties of Dac Lac province, leaders of the gang pursuit accused? government officers of their own tribe of not actively campaigning for the minority against the government. … These men [the leaders] forced their emotional young men to stay at a central location so they could mobilize their force, as needed. However, on February 5 [2001], when the government officers explained the situation to the masses in the meeting held to help calm the situation and call? their sons home, those who returned realized that they had been tricked into the uprising and so took revenge on the leaders. In some cases, the masses capture the culprits and delivered them to the government. Our brother security forces then once again explained to the mass not to take revenge on the culprits and advised everyone to protect, and not destroy, their property. From February 7, almost all of the culprits came out, admitted their wrong-doing, and apologized to the government…

What about the media abroad? What did these outlets say about this ongoing event that lasted from 31 January 2001 until 28 September 28 2001?

Some of the news reported that on 31 January 2001, about 500 Raglai people marched toward the government building at Chu Prong county to protest the capture arrest? detention? of two of their fellow Protestants, Rahlan Pon and Rahlan Djan, who had been captured and imprisoned by the border security forces two days earlier. The angry crowd demanded their immediate release, but their demands fell on deaf ears.

On 2 February, about 6,000 Raglai Protestants living in Gia Lai province marched toward two main government buildings in Pleiku province (in the newspaper article above, this seems to be a city), City Hall and People Hall, demanding freedom for these two who had been imprisoned unjustly. The protest turned into a wider demand for religious freedom and the return of their ancestral lands. Within two days, the crowd swelled to 20,000 participants, including the Bahnar, a Christian tribe that lives in northern Gia Lai. They also demanded that the government return the land stolen by the Vietnamese to its rightful owners. Between 3-11 February, thousands of Raglai and Mnong people living in Ea Sup, Ea H’Leo, Buon Don, Krong Nang, Krong Buk counties in Dac Lac province marched in huge numbers toward City Hall, thereby showing their support of the Raglai. At the same time, they demanded the return of all of their confiscated land.

In light of this ongoing protest and call for the return of tribal lands, Hanoi approached the crowd determined not to meet their demands, fearing that it might loose the battle. The government dispatched security and anti-riot forces to disperse the protesters. The protest began to turn violent, for the security forces clashed with the protesters. The police (are these the same people in Vietnam?)used batons and electric guns (what are these? Machine guns?)to suppress the crowds, and were met with flying stones and long sticks. After a few days of clashes, about 600 Highlanders were beaten during a brutal attack conducted by the security forces; 200 bystanders and 20 security men were injured. Many government buildings were damaged, hundreds of Central Highlanders were detained, and thousands escaped to Cambodia (and to Laos?)as the protest escalated.

On 26 September, the court of Dac Lac province issued heavy-hand sentences for those it deemed “guilty” of provoking social unrest in the areas: prison terms ranging from six months to eleven years. Two days later, the court at Gia Lai sentenced the so-called “gang leaders” to seven years in prison; those it considered the “master minds” revived twelve years in prison and a further five years of probation. The following year, many individuals were sentenced from two to eight years in prison.

After the riot of January-February 2001, the entire Central Highlands was placed under military rule. One division of military troops was stationed there, and a combination of the 15th and 16th divisions were put in charge of patrolling and maintaining security. Every entrance to the city was strictly monitored. Until now, the situation seems to be normal, at least on the surface, for Hanoi has not decided upon a permanent solution as regards the minority peoples’ exact social and/or political status .

It is important to emphasize that this uprising was not spontaneous; rather, it was the result of careful planning and cooperation among the Raglai, Rhade, and Bahnar tribes. There were no drums, trumpets, violence, or leaders, but somehow the crowd gathered steam day by day. No one led the protesters, but they kept marching toward the city’s center in an orderly fashion to make their voices heard. Coming from large and small surrounding villages, from every corner of the city (which one?), they marched toward City Hall and government buildings equipped with nothing but determination. Undeterred by the possibility of death and not cowed by the security forces, they came to show to the world the desperation to which they had been driven by living in a society where they, their children, and grandchildren that made no place for them. Their determination and bravery finally caught the world’s attention.

This is one of the largest protests of the minority peoples since the fall of Saigon in 1975. These people had shown their valor, inside and outside the country, by working together in a very determined manner to confront Hanoi through a campaign of nonviolence. After South Vietnam had collapsed, taking with it Southeast Asia’s most powerful army, no one (a neighboring country or a group within Vietnam?) had dared to form another army to confront Hanoi. But the Central Highlanders, consisting of only a small but determined band, equipped themselves with abandoned guns left behind by the South Vietnamese troops as they abandoned their posts during March 1975. Despite the overwhelming odds, these ill-equipped groups stood up to the Hanoi’s military might for seven years without any external support. Due to their desire to live as free people, with dignity and free from oppression, they rose up to demand their rights as equal citizens of Vietnam.

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE UPRISING

There are, perhaps, three underlying reasons that led to this phenomenal uprising. When mixed together, all of them culminated in a single explosion. The first and immediate reason seems to be the imprisonment and torture (this was not mentioned above. You should document it) of two leading Raglai Protestants, whom we mentioned above. The government stated that they sought to “incite disunity between different races, create social unrest in society” by preaching Protestant belief through “Chan Troi Moi” (The New Dawn) radio broadcasts from the Philippines that Hanoi has been trying to block. Moreover, these two individuals are highly respected among the Raglai and neighboring tribes.

Imprisoning and persecuting those who preach Christianity in the upper Highlands has been occurring since 19 March 1975, the day Buon Me Thuot province fell to the communists. Since then, Protestant communities have almost come to a stand-still: eighty seven churches were closed, and countless ministers and followers belonging to the Rhade, Raglai, Churu, and Kaho tribes have been imprisoned in re-education camps. Many have died from hunger and diseases; others are still in prison today.

Only after 1999, when the United Nations and Washington applied pressure, did Hanoi allow Protestant communities to resume their activities. Since then, their followers have increased manifold. Today, there are over 200,000 Protestants, fully 12 percent of all Central Highlanders. This number is expected to increase in the coming years. However, the majority of them can only practice their faith at home, for the few permitted churches are located in certain areas and in large cities. Some of them remain closed, because they cannot open before obtaining the proper licenses. Furthermore, the area’s Protestants routinely incur government suspicion and thus are forbidden to attend large meetings or gatherings.

So, one may ask, why do the Central Highlanders follow Protestantism? Perhaps there are two reasons. The first and most important one is that they find peace and security in their spiritual life while living their harsh lives. They never have enough food or comfort in their lives. Besides, Protestant teachings are fairly simple: just believe in Christ’s love and that is enough. Another reason is more practical: Protestants help them improve their living standards by providing foods and different commodities, as they did before 1975. In other words, Protestants do not treat them like second-class citizens, cast aside or forgotten by the outside world.

In principle, Protestants are not against the communist regime. However, the government is afraid of their growing power, worrying that one day it might be unable to control them. Only recently, on 8 February 2001, the government sought to establish one central Christian organization that would gather all local churches under its umbrella in order to eliminate “family practices” that Hanoi cannot control.

As a world faith, Christianity is highly organized and has a tremendous amount of support from the Western, especially the United States. When Hanoi can extend its control over the country’s Christians, it will have less to worry about, rather than wondering whether it will be able to deal with them successfully in the future. Another problem is that Christianity has many denominations, each of which operates almost independently. Therefore, Christians would be very hard to control even if they were “united” under one central entity. In reality, Hanoi only controls the main Christian organizations to which Vietnamese Christians in the nation’s large cities belong. Meanwhile, those who live far from the main cities are harassed and discriminated against, just like those Central Highlanders who profess the same faith in their own region.

In the Central Highlands, Hanoi targets the Christian ministers and their flocks, as well as new leaders rising from the people, to such an extent that they no longer exist. Then why is Hanoi afraid of them? Those who belong to FULRO are almost extinct; some were killed, others are still in prison, and others have escaped abroad. The new leaders appointed by Hanoi are, in reality, not respected by the Central Highlanders. These “leaders” live apart from the communities and have no voice or authority, for Hanoi’s Vietnamese officers make all of the community’s decisions. Therefore minority officers, whether senior or junior members of the Communist party, can neither advocate nor protect their own people for fear of reprimand. And so they lend a hand to their master’s further subjugation of their people to countless atrocities. These opportunistic officers buy power and various benefits in exchange for doing Hanoi’s dirty work among their own people so that they may claim a degree of fame and enjoy petty positions. They are despised by their own communities and not respected by their master.

Since the Central Highlanders live according to the tribal code, leaders are extremely important in their communities. Their leaders are those people (only men, or are there women leaders as well, since cham society is matriarchal?) who possess the excellent morality, good knowledge, and experience needed to guide their communities effectively. In their tradition, they were the chiefs or village headmen before the French came; those who were trained by the French colonialists; the learned and officers educated in South Vietnam (1954-75); and the Protestant ministers and pastors after 1975. In addition, they are the elders of their communities and shining examples for the younger generations to emulate.

This being the case, Hanoi violated their tribal code when it imprisoned and tortured Rahlan Pon and Rahlan Djan, two of their respected leaders. Moreover, these two men were from the largest Raglai tribe, which consists of the Rchom, Siu, R’o, Rahlan, Rmah, Nay, Hieu, Kpa, and Pui peoples. In the past, Hanoi had provoked another huge anti-government uproar by imprisoning the leaders of a large tribal branch of the Rhade, which consists of the Mie, Mlo, Eme, Jdrong, Eban, Lo, and Eman peoples. Therefore, respecting the Central Highlanders’ elders and tribal chiefs is, at least, the minimum requirement when dealing with the country’s minority peoples. Saigon never understood this fact; Hanoi still does not understand it.

However, protesting Hanoi’s decision to imprison their leaders was only the effect, not the real root cause: living standards that are declining day by day, which is driving the minority peoples to the point of hopelessness. Living standards in Vietnam are very low when compared to those of neighboring countries, but the Central Highlanders are even poorer than the Vietnamese. On the average, a minority person makes only about USD $50 per year; the national standard is US $400 per year. source needed.

Every year, after a huge rainy storm or a typhoon, the Central Highlanders suffer extreme famine. Many are reduced to eating tree roots or insects. Those who live along the Truong Son range, west of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien provinces (viz., the Paco, Ktu, Bru, Dje Tieng, and R’man peoples), live under the constant threat of disease and famine. Since they live deep in the jungle, very few outsiders are even aware of their existence. Thus every time there is a disaster, the relief supplies never reach them. The media calls for help, but no one responds or cares about their well being.

On the other hand, after 1986, when the government decided to produce coffee for export, many companies did their best to steal the minority peoples’ fertile lands to establish coffee plantations. The Vietnamese from the Hong river plain and different ethnic groups from the North were brought in by the thousands to clear the land for these plantations. The Central Highlanders lose more of their ancestral lands each time a new wave of Vietnamese settles comes to exploit a new-found economic opportunity by gradually taking the land located along the main freeways, rivers, or corridors. Losing the land that they need to cultivate for their agriculture-based livelihoods, the Central Highlanders are forced to retreat deeper into the jungles or further up the mountainsides.

In 1993, Hanoi decreed a new law that hit the Central Highlanders’ long-time tradition the hardest: Each family can only cultivate three hecta.? This is not enough land to produce the harvest needed to feed their families, especially since the traditional methods of cultivation do not produce large harvests. Only families who live near the boundary of large cities, Central Highlander officers, or those who work in the coffee plantations can acquire a better standard of living when compared with their fellow tribes people who live deep in the jungle. However, their standard is still lower than that of their Vietnamese counterparts who live in the same area.

For example, after ten years of producing Robusta coffee (1986-96), Vietnam became one of the world’s top coffee producers: over 210,000 tons per year. Robusta exports coffee at the rate of 190,000 tons per year, second only to Indonesia. Here, we note that Robusta coffee owns almost 25 percent of market share in the world, second only to Arabica. During the 1990s, the profit margins were quite lucrative. Not only did they cover all operating costs, but they also brought substantial wealth to many owners. However, from 1997 onward, production has stagnated. Its price continues its downward spiral (from 20,000 Dong to 4,000 Dong per kilogram), and so its profits continues to decline.

In order to compensate for this, the mostly Vietnamese workers look for more land upon which they can grow their vegetables and other edible plants. Since 1997, newcomers have found ways to grab even more land, thereby driving the minority peoples’ almost to the point of rage. They buy, bribe, steal, and do anything they can to trick the unsophisticated Central Highlanders; sometimes they force them out in order to take over their lands. The result is obvious: Many villagers have to move further into the jungle, to less fertile land, or further up into the mountains to protect their traditions and livelihoods.

Despite the waves of land-grabbing Vietnamese settlers, Hanoi remains indifferent. In fact, its officials create roadblocks, bureaucratic red tape, and even confiscate land to build new roads without consulting or compensating the property owners. Such behavior indirectly encourages more Vietnamese settlers to come and establish villages wherever roads are being built, and so the original inhabitants are pushed even deeper into the jungle. But even there they are bombarded with noisy machines from lumber companies that never stop cutting trees for their lucrative business, regardless of the resulting environmental damage and protests.

Hanoi’s annual budgets, which contain official pledges to raise the Central Highlanders’ living standards, are, in reality, used to strengthen their control the minority peoples and support the coffee plantations, lumber companies, and other large businesses. Only a few large tribes, such as the Raglai, Rhade, or Bahnar, can withstand this pressure; smaller tribes living along these corridors or scattered along the mountainsides can only accept their unfortunate fate: gradual disappearance.

Confronted with this loosing battle, minority communities have been reduced to relying on support and help from non-profit or religious organizations based outside Vietnam. However, Hanoi discourages such help through red tape and bureaucracy. By the time the relief reaches its destination, the huge amounts given have become no more than drops of water, for most of it has fallen into the hands of local government officials. Many western non-profit organizations are targeted because they only want to help the Central Highlanders. Thus, many offices are shut down and the only real losers are the minority peoples. Many local government officials do not care whether these people survive or not; their only concern is for their own positions and their families’ well-being.

On 8 August 2000, the Central Highlanders’ suffering reached a breaking point: Over 150 Rhade living in Dac Lac province, who had been forced to relocate, came back and attacked the Vietnamese settlers who had taken over their village (Buon Xer). The subsequent protest in February 2001 is only the beginning of a mass campaign of people who demand justice from a government that has ignored them and that has no clear policy to end the waves of land-grabbing Vietnamese settlers. There are two possible solutions: open the door for non-profit organizations that want to support the Central Highlanders AND return their land. Even if Hanoi accepts this solution, the problem is only half solved, for the continued lack of a clear policy, respect for the Central Highlanders’ concern, and a recognition of their position as a long-standing citizens of the country will only cause more unrest.

CONCLUSION

These are the reasons that lead me to portray the current situation as a volcano on the verge of explosion. Another fundamental reason is that the Vietnamese have abused the Central Highlanders’ integrity for many years. After fifty years of mutual interaction, beginning in 1954, no Vietnamese government has seriously tried to improve the Central Highlanders’ living standards. They continue to be treated as second-class citizens who are looked down upon and cast aside because they do not share the same race and culture as the Vietnamese.

To ensure that Hanoi hears their voices and recognizes their positions, the Central Highlanders employ every available means, from armed struggle to political settlement, from accepting their fate to demanding their rights on the streets. They have suffered more than other races and have experienced every possible reprimand from the government, from torture to imprisonment and even death. Due to their refusal to become extinct, they continue to look for support from France, the United States, and other governments and individuals who are willing to help them. Under such previous protection, they had enjoyed a much better status in their own country. But their golden time only lasted from 1964 to 1975.

Under the communist regime, the majority of Central Highlander leaders who had worked Saigon and the United States were captured, killed, or imprisoned. The rest escaped abroad or retreated deeper into the jungles and spent the rest of their lives silently. Those who followed the communists, such as Y Bih Aleo (former? (does this organization still exist?) vice president of the Liberation Front of South Vietnam), Y Blok Eban (former president of the Buon Me Thuot committee, March 1975 what is the relation of this date to the committee?) Y Nie Thuot (lt. general, commander division, Dac Lac), Ksor Phuoc (party chief, Gia Lai; general secretary of the environment; and president of ethnic minorities), Y Venh (director, People’s Congress of Kontum), proved to be ineffective or dumbfounded by the massive invasion of Vietnamese settlers. They now live in the shadows, forced into silence by their Vietnamese counterparts. When Vietnamese officers commit a crime, they are not called to account; rather, the minority officer in charge of those areas are demoted, as happened to Ksor Phuoc during late 2003.explain this case in a footnote with proper documentation.

All Central Highlanders have the right to be angry at the continued waves of Vietnamese settlers who steal their land in broad daylight. Even though they were the first settlers in this area and had been the undisputed owners of these lands for many generations, nowadays they have become a minority in their own land and have no voice in their own birthplace. Before 1940, only 1% of all Vietnamese lived in the Central Highlands. In 1945, they were 5%; in 1954, they were 15%; and in 1975, they were 32% of the region’s total population. In 2000, the Vietnamese became the majority: 4 million out of a total 5.8 million people. Today, they are 72% of the region’s entire population; the original people now only represent 28%.

The indigenous peoples can accept that the majority-minority ratio has flipped. However, they cannot accept the fact that the Vietnamese came to take their land and, at the same time, impose policies of discrimination and second-class citizenship. One does not need to look very far or wide to witness this injustice in the making. With only one glance at any place or time, the level of Vietnamese discrimination against the minority peoples in daily life is clear. For example, at the outpatient post or medical facilities, Vietnamese always receive first-class treatment and never have to wait in line behind indigenous people. In the public school system, Vietnamese children do not want to mingle with indigenous children. In the market place, Vietnamese businessmen or women never want to sit next to their indigenous counterparts. When indigenous people are stopped for security checks, the discrimination is even more obvious: Vietnamese officers will laugh loudly at the indigenous people’s clumsiness or confusion. All of these charges should be documented.

Those Vietnamese who really care about the indigenous people are rare indeed. Mainly, they are Christian ministers and pastors, Buddhist monks, and researchers, teachers, and young physicians. These people face a lot of hardship and red tape when they want to help the indigenous people. In order to help, non-profit organizations have had to organize some sort of “stealth” or “black” programs, such as carrying or transporting relief supplies at night to avoid being stopped by security forces or border patrols. This is the only way that relief supplies can actually reach the intended beneficiaries. However, those who are found out are captured, tortured, and interrogated regardless of whether they are ministers, workers for the church, or regular citizens. Any actual cases? Such unsubstantiated charges can be easily dismissed as anti-government propaganda.

In the sphere of education, Hanoi does not seek to inform or educate the Vietnamese about other ethnicities with any degree of accuracy or honesty. Central Highlanders are always considered “savage” or “backward.” Such words must be erased from the Vietnamese consciousness. Two thousands years ago, the Vietnamese launched an armed struggle against their Chinese overlords because of such discrimination that, at that time, was directed against them. Due to their own historical experience, they should not employ the same attitude toward different races who have always lived in what is now Vietnam. Moreover, Hanoi must utilize the term indigenous people (nguoi dan toc) when talking about the Central Highlanders or other non-Vietnamese races. Unfortunately, such an attitude remains rare.

As long as this discrimination and second-class citizenship remains embedded in Vietnamese culture, no one can predict what the future holds. If the Central Highlanders accept the fate being imposed upon them by the Vietnamese, they may continue to retreat even deeper in the jungle, disappear, or spend the rest of their lives there. If they decide to reject this fate, one day they will take up arms against Hanoi in yet another attempt to solve the matter. If the latter solution is employed, then the government’s stated agenda of promoting the “unity of all races” or “the races of Vietnam” will have no real meaning. We all know that the stronger races have always annihilated the culture and members of the weaker races.

In conclusion, the issue of the Central Highlands requires a solution based upon resolving all of its related aspects at the same time, as opposed to resolving one aspect at a time.


[1] Dega, Rade language, meaning “people of the high-lands”.

[2] “The Truth of the uprising with political agenda at high-lands”, publish on March 7, 2001 and March 14, 2001.

[3] Ksor Kok is a former member of Fulro, currently lives in US.

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Vietnam religious minorities face persecution says activist < Swiss news | Expatica Switzerland

20/02/2012Vietnam religious minorities face persecution says activist

Authorities in Vietnam deliberately persecute and discriminate against religious minorities, a Vietnamese human rights campaigner told the UN on Monday.
"The indigenous Montagnards and the Hmongs are among the ethnic groups who have borne the brunt of the Vietnamese governments discriminatory policies," Vo Van Ai, president of the Vietnam Committee on Human Rights said.
He cited the cases of members of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), the Hoa Hao -- a Chinese minority --, the Cao Dai and Buddhist Khmer Krom who face persecution.
Ai told the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Geneva that these minorities "are subject to imprisonment, torture, house arrest, police surveillance, intimidation and harassment in their daily lives."
The head of the UBCV, Thich Quang Go, is "still under house arrest at Thanh Minhh Zen monastery after nearly 30 years in various forms of detention for the peaceful advocacy of religious freedom".
"Ethnic and religious minorities in Vietnam suffer serious violations of their political and economic rights, such as expropriation from ancestral lands, population displacement," said Ai.
He cited also "state-sponsored migration of Kinh people into minority regions, religious persecution, arbitrary arrest and disappearances."

© 2012 AFP

http://montagnard-foundation.org/wp/2011/07/08/1458

Luke Simpkins sheds light on the discriminatory practices of the Vietnamese government against the Montagnards and asks that the Hanoi return land to the indigenous people and free Montagnard political prisoners.
Below is a speech published by Montagnard Foundation:
Today [6 July 2011] I speak of the oppression and the persecution of the Montagnard people who live in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Prior to the Vietnam War, the Montagnards lived in hill tribe societies existing primarily through agriculture, hunting and gathering. Today, however, the Montagnards have found themselves marginalised minorities and in the words of Human Rights Watch 'have been repressed for decades'. This is due to an increasing program of ethnic relocations, beginning in the mid-1950s after the withdrawal of the French with groups being moved from the north as the Communist government in North Vietnam began to assert control over the region. The current government of Vietnam continues with this land confiscation and forced relocations as well as targeting Christian Montagnards with religious persecution.
There is a long history of issues between the Vietnamese and the Montagnard people because, while the Vietnamese are racially diverse themselves, they do share language and culture but the Montagnard do not share that commonality. The Montagnards have for several decades sensed that their language and culture were under threat, including land ownership, education, resources and political domination. Formal opposition to the domination by the Vietnamese began in 1958 as the tribes united and even formed a military force, known as the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races.
[…]
I am fortunate to have as a constituent a leading Western human rights activist, the Australian lawyer and writer Scott Johnson. Scott has been to the Central Highlands and he has seen the terrible conditions of poverty under which the Montagnards live. Scott has told me that there is no evidence whatsoever of Montagnard resistance movements that advocates armed opposition and violence. Yet there is paranoia from the Vietnamese government who choose to see the refusal of Montagnards to worship in the state controlled churches as a cover for an independence movement.

A report from Human Rights Watch released in March this year reported that since 2001 more than 350 Montagnards have been sentenced to long prison sentences, all based on vague national security charges, because of their involvement in public protests and in unregistered house churches, the only way to worship if you refuse to be in a state controlled church. I find it incredible that such nebulous charges as undermining national solidarity or disrupting security can result in a person being jailed, but that is the reality in Vietnam. I also note that Human Rights Watch report that some 25 Montagnard prisoners have died while in custody or shortly after release.
I really do wonder how the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam think on these matters. They confiscate land and give it to non-Montagnard people. They oppress those who wish to worship freely and then, when there is resentment and protest, the Communist officials actually wonder why. It seems that this is a case of delusional paranoia. If the Vietnamese government left the Montagnards alone, they would not have such problems.

I thank Scott Johnson for his assistance to me and of course I thank him for his great work toward achieving justice for the Montagnards. I conclude by calling upon the government of Vietnam to restore the ancestral lands they have taken from the Montagnards, to release the hundreds of Montagnard religious and political prisoners currently held in Vietnam and to allow religious freedom across Vietnam. At the moment, that does not exist.