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US THAAD could take down Chinese missiles from SK

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US THAAD could take down Chinese missiles from SK

THAAD-173353_copy1.jpg

The launch of a THAAD missile.


Intercepting potential Chinese missile attacks over the East China Sea is one of the capabilities the US would gain if it successfully deploys its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System to South Korea, according to the party mouthpiece Global Times.

The defense system, also known as THAAD, is an air missile designed by Lockheed Martin as part of the US Theater Missile Defense system in the Asia-Pacific Region. With the help of the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, the THAAD is able to detect and intercept ballistic missiles launched more than 1,000km away. Its range would extend over the East China Sea and could be used to intercept missiles from China.

Last year, the United States tried to convince South Korea to join the Theater Missile Defense system through allowing the deployment of the X-band radar to the island of Baengnyeongdo, which sits on the border between the North and South Korea.

The idea was turned down by South Korea's defense minister Kim Kwan-jin over concerns that the deployment would irritate Beijing and lead it to believe that the country was trying to contain China in an alliance with Japan and the US, according to the Seoul Shinmun.

The range of the air defense system fars exceeds North Korean territory, leading professor Kim Hung-gyu from Seoul's Sungshin Womens University to believe the US is trying to provoke South Korea into conflict with Beijing. This would make South Korea a pawn in a US-Japan crusade against China, according to Kim.
 
The terminal-based THAAD would find it difficult to intercept warheads with terminal-maneuver capabilities (MaRV) though.
 
The terminal-based THAAD would find it difficult to intercept warheads with terminal-maneuver capabilities (MaRV) though.
Grossly simplistic. Maneuverability is dependent upon speed and time to target based upon said speed. If the approach speed is double digit Mach, at best one course trajectory change, not like the often put out cartoonish zig-zag drawing designed to mislead the gullible.
 
US THAAD could take down Chinese missiles from SK

THAAD-173353_copy1.jpg

The launch of a THAAD missile.


Intercepting potential Chinese missile attacks over the East China Sea is one of the capabilities the US would gain if it successfully deploys its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System to South Korea, according to the party mouthpiece Global Times.

The defense system, also known as THAAD, is an air missile designed by Lockheed Martin as part of the US Theater Missile Defense system in the Asia-Pacific Region. With the help of the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, the THAAD is able to detect and intercept ballistic missiles launched more than 1,000km away. Its range would extend over the East China Sea and could be used to intercept missiles from China.

Last year, the United States tried to convince South Korea to join the Theater Missile Defense system through allowing the deployment of the X-band radar to the island of Baengnyeongdo, which sits on the border between the North and South Korea.

The idea was turned down by South Korea's defense minister Kim Kwan-jin over concerns that the deployment would irritate Beijing and lead it to believe that the country was trying to contain China in an alliance with Japan and the US, according to the Seoul Shinmun.

The range of the air defense system fars exceeds North Korean territory, leading professor Kim Hung-gyu from Seoul's Sungshin Womens University to believe the US is trying to provoke South Korea into conflict with Beijing. This would make South Korea a pawn in a US-Japan crusade against China, according to Kim.

Taiwan should not get into US China conflicts.
 
Grossly simplistic. Maneuverability is dependent upon speed and time to target based upon said speed. If the approach speed is double digit Mach, at best one course trajectory change, not like the often put out cartoonish zig-zag drawing designed to mislead the gullible.

probably, but would you agree, that even if this deal does go through, which it won't, but if it does, the US can't deploy enough to intercept the massive number of missiles that we have.

Also given the fact that intercepting a missile is not even close to 100%, would you agree that the number of missiles it could intercept would be minimal?

We are not a backward country anymore, we can make most of our own equipments, and missiles is one of them. So we won't run out of missiles like some other countries.

So how effective could this be?
 
Grossly simplistic. Maneuverability is dependent upon speed and time to target based upon said speed. If the approach speed is double digit Mach, at best one course trajectory change, not like the often put out cartoonish zig-zag drawing designed to mislead the gullible.
What about the MIRVs ?
 
probably, but would you agree, that even if this deal does go through, which it won't, but if it does, the US can't deploy enough to intercept the massive number of missiles that we have.

Also given the fact that intercepting a missile is not even close to 100%, would you agree that the number of missiles it could intercept would be minimal?

We are not a backward country anymore, we can make most of our own equipments, and missiles is one of them. So we won't run out of missiles like some other countries.

So how effective could this be?
Here is why you are mistaken...

The reason we have saturation, or 'carpet', bombing method is because the bombs were unsophisticated and EACH bomb have at best 50% odds of hitting the intended target. No different with artillery or ground to ground missiles or even with the infantry. Look at the sniper. If we have 100,000 snipers in the US Army, any war we engaged in would be over in days with the opposing armies completely decimated. One shot, one kill. One hundred thousand shots, one hundred thousands killed.

The point I am trying put across here is that you do not simply fire a missile and do not care where it lands. You MUST care where it lands because where it lands make a direct impact to the outcome of the war. One hundred missiles in the water does nothing to the war while one missile at the opposing air force base's main runway paralyzed the entire unit.

b-2_jdam_obvra_runway.jpg


In 'the old days' it would required hundreds, if not thousands, of bombers over days and who know how many bombs to paralyze this air base. For US today, it took one pass with six bombs.

For what we are discussing, we do not need to intercept 100 inbounds. Just a few. Terrorize the local animals in the woods and in the hills. We do not care. If countermeasures deceived one or two of those few that will be even better. Countermeasures includes moving vital resources, from humans to hardware, to other places less detectable. So if out of the 100 inbounds, 90 of them either missed because of being sh1tty missiles or deceived or hit the right location but not the right target because the general and his super duper computer moved one hundred meters away, we only need to focus on those 10 or even fewer.

What about the MIRVs ?
MIRVs are usually for different targets, not the same target.
 
Here is why you are mistaken...

The reason we have saturation, or 'carpet', bombing method is because the bombs were unsophisticated and EACH bomb have at best 50% odds of hitting the intended target. No different with artillery or ground to ground missiles or even with the infantry. Look at the sniper. If we have 100,000 snipers in the US Army, any war we engaged in would be over in days with the opposing armies completely decimated. One shot, one kill. One hundred thousand shots, one hundred thousands killed.

The point I am trying put across here is that you do not simply fire a missile and do not care where it lands. You MUST care where it lands because where it lands make a direct impact to the outcome of the war. One hundred missiles in the water does nothing to the war while one missile at the opposing air force base's main runway paralyzed the entire unit.

b-2_jdam_obvra_runway.jpg


In 'the old days' it would required hundreds, if not thousands, of bombers over days and who know how many bombs to paralyze this air base. For US today, it took one pass with six bombs.

For what we are discussing, we do not need to intercept 100 inbounds. Just a few. Terrorize the local animals in the woods and in the hills. We do not care. If countermeasures deceived one or two of those few that will be even better. Countermeasures includes moving vital resources, from humans to hardware, to other places less detectable. So if out of the 100 inbounds, 90 of them either missed because of being sh1tty missiles or deceived or hit the right location but not the right target because the general and his super duper computer moved one hundred meters away, we only need to focus on those 10 or even fewer.


MIRVs are usually for different targets, not the same target.

oh I don't mean fire a million at once with no aim, I mean we fire one after the other, depending on if hit, then decide the next.

Just because it is a few missiles at once aiming at different targets, doesn't mean it will be 100% intercepted, so at least a few will hit in one day, and with the destructive power of modern missiles, only a few needs to hit.
 
oh I don't mean fire a million at once with no aim, I mean we fire one after the other, depending on if hit, then decide the next.

Just because it is a few missiles at once aiming at different targets, doesn't mean it will be 100% intercepted, so at least a few will hit in one day, and with the destructive power of modern missiles, only a few needs to hit.

...you don't expect the US to retaliate? Or, at the very least act to neutralize the threat? The weakness in your theory is that you do not expect the US to act quickly to take away or significantly degrade China's capability.
 
oh I don't mean fire a million at once with no aim, I mean we fire one after the other, depending on if hit, then decide the next.

Just because it is a few missiles at once aiming at different targets, doesn't mean it will be 100% intercepted, so at least a few will hit in one day, and with the destructive power of modern missiles, only a few needs to hit.
Take a look at this...

accu_prec.jpg


It does not matter if you fire 100 missiles at once or 100 missiles spread over 100 days. Depending on the quality of your missiles, the distribution will be the same on day 1 or day 100 with the last missile fired/landed.

With 'High accuracy, High precision' you need only a few, assuming the enemy does not employ countermeasures. If the quality of your missiles is questionable, then you want 'High accuracy, Low precision' and you should engage in saturation attacks as this will increase your odds of hitting the target and again, this is assuming the enemy does not employ countermeasures.

Against countermeasures, it depends on the quality of those countermeasures and against US, you can bet the PLA generals' overprices limos that those countermeasures will be formidable. Simply put, we are the best at it but I do not expect any one to take my opinion on it. Seduction, distraction, or deception countermeasures, however labeled, preserves one's defense resources for the one or the few that managed to retain its original target view.

Electronic countermeasures are not 'sexy' enough for the media. The (test) attacker is launched or dropped from a high altitude, it is deceived, and it landed with a thud. How can anyone tell if it was successfully deceived? Booooooooorinnnnnnng...:sick:...But inside the control room, where I once used to be, smiles abounds, coffee and soda toasts are offered, and backs slapped. Another one bit the dust.

It does not matter if the (test) attacker was traveling at double digits Mach or not. It only matter if the attacker, assuming it has maneuvering capability of some kind, was deceived/seduced/distracted and changed its descent path. In fact, the greater the descent speed, the less the odds of the attacker being able to self correct. Once the descent path is assessed to be to a different ground location we can refocus to a new attacker.

It does not matter if it missed the ground X marker by one meter or by one hundred. If it was seduced/deceived/distracted to miss by one meter, we can tweak the countermeasure parameters to increase the odds of the next (test) attacker to miss by one hundred meter. We know it was seduced/deceived/distracted because the test vehicle gave us real time feeds on its responses. We have even corrected the (test) attacker's descent path to true to see if it can be seduced/deceived/distracted again. And again. And again...

So it is self deceiving for people to take it for granted that the US defensive methods are confined to physical interceptors simply because these devices just happened to be the du jour news item that give either a spectacular failure or spectacular success for the cameras to record.
 
...you don't expect the US to retaliate? Or, at the very least act to neutralize the threat? The weakness in your theory is that you do not expect the US to act quickly to take away or significantly degrade China's capability.

Who do you think China is? Iraq? You can just come in and start giving orders?

We may not be as strong as the US, but near China we have ease of supply, against China an army of several million is needed, that would take time.

Even then it would still be a long war.


in the end this is simply not going to happen and these posts are just discussing the missile defense system for fun.
 
Who do you think China is? Iraq? You can just come in and start giving orders?

We may not be as strong as the US, but near China we have ease of supply, against China an army of several million is needed, that would take time.

Even then it would still be a long war.


in the end this is simply not going to happen and these posts are just discussing the missile defense system for fun.

Your response is emotional, believe it or not the US has the ability to quickly and effectively neutralize the threat of missiles. And I don't mean destroy the missiles, I mean render the whole system ineffective for as long as it is necessary.
 
Let me know where your loyalty lies? You claim to be an American but you do not want Taiwan to be aligned with US?

Nope. Taiwan would just cause trouble between US and China. US Taiwan relationship consist of economic relationships, but not much political relationship.
 
Let me know where your loyalty lies? You claim to be an American but you do not want Taiwan to be aligned with US?

Nope. Taiwan would just cause trouble between US and China. US Taiwan relationship consist of economic relationships, but not much political relationship.
 
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