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US had stopped Jordan from sending jets to Pakistan in 1971 war

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History is judge to resolves of lots of nations, men and countries. USSR would never have dared attack the 7th Fleet, no way whatsoever, especially not for India.

Pakistan had signed a treaty with the US much before the USSR signed any treaty with India. The US could have used that treaty against India as India had crossed the international border and because India was breaking international LAW. Even the treaties of CENTO and SEATO could have been invoked upon direct involvement of the USSR upon which the USSR would have had to face a number of super powers.

Again, the USSR could never engage the US in any of their earlier deadlocks either and always backed down unilaterally from engagements.
Again, you are second guessing what they did.
Your not presenting arguments. You simply giving conjecture that 'USSR would not have attacked'. You say this today based on what?
While USA came to this conclusion based on the billions of resources they had globally.
Kissinger and lot tried their damndest hard to prevent Bangladesh from forming. This is very evident in the transcripts of their conversations and a numerous other files which have been declassified.

I dont understand why you refuse to acknowledge this.
Your sole point is conjecture, they could have done - this, this, this.
US and Pakistan got check mated at every possible corner.

To start off, PA could have handled India without much ado. The real issue was internal unrest, the real threat was always Mukti Bahini, infiltrators and traitors amongst the ranks.

I dont know how PA could have handled IA considering that Pakistan was not even able to make a dent on the Western front against India.
They lost land in the Western front as well, do you know that?
Despite India focusing on Bangladesh, Pakistan could not make a dent in Western border. All this despite launching initial air attacks from West Pakistan.

That apart, Karachi was successfully blockaded and put out of operation by IN.

Thing is, even this side had no real intention to hold on to Bangladesh as otherwise they would have prolonged the war with survival on the Bangladeshi front and full scale war at this side,
There was a full scale war on the Pakistani side, and Pakistan couldnt do much there either.
So where exactly do you see Pakistan 'handling India' even when India was more committed to East Pakistan frontier.
The word 'repression' and alike are highly debatable especially when there was unrest being fuelled by India. India was training, arming and financing Mukti Bahini, just like they are doing with TTP and BLA etc. I am sure that Pakistan Army may have been heavy handed.....but how else do you crush a foreign financed and doctored rebellion?
You dont want to take an Indian/Bengali source, thats understandable.
What about Blood telegram?
What about the reports US Government recieved and declassified later?

Lets call a repression as a repression Sir. You dont kill Mukti Bahini by killing professors at Universities.

Furthermore, the US 'sacrificed' a massive number of her citizens in Vietnam, what was that about? They were the world's strongest super power, they had the backing of many other super powers and they had the responsibility to come to the aid of their ally!
Yeah. They tried to. They were successfully stopped from doing so by the other Super power of that time.

Because Pakistan is an ally of US, does not mean US would be willing to start the next war of the Century with USSR over Pakistan.

Just like how USSR blinked in Cuban crisis, USA blinked during the Indo-Pak war.

Winter would have been a fact that could have made it harder for the Chinese Army to intervene directly, however it could not make it impossible.
I dont know how aware you are of the geography and topography of the Indo-China border.
But no, no substantial army can cross the Passes in the peak of winter. And their ingress would be very slow.
Therefore, in such a case, when a trickle of military can come, at a very slow pace from those passes, the purpose of PLA coming is defeated as the objective would have been to tie down substantial resources of IA in the East by them. Something that would not be achieved in those circumstances.

The timing was chosen by Manekshaw very carefully for exactly this purpose.
 
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Rubbish :lol:

Any official document to back-up your claim? Or Is that some sort of a way-out strategy to shun @FaujHistorian's wisdom from revealing the bright side of you!
its actually well known, there is a reason @FaujHistorian doesn't want to talk about it.
@Yzd Khalifa for once man let me not insult you, so just stay out of it.
Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan | Brookings Institution

I'm not going to warn you again yazid, you already know how i feel about big headed people.

Apart from your other childish, teen age rants, the bold part made my day. I laughed a lot. Thanks for the entertainment bro.:lol:
its been proven through a study, an average pakistani male is twice the man an average indian is:woot:
you know what I'm talking about.
 
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well im an indian but i feel bad, disghust and offensive when pakistanies abuse indians for there tolrence but ignoare there very own ummah nations doing much much worse to them but in the end when every thing fails dont hesitste to raise bogey of ummah and jihad to get things right and think being a muslim is the hieght of goodness and all that blah blah but abuse and degrade indians when it is not even required

peace

Sweet heart ...
it's not like that .. we hate the ummah and we hate Hindu-stanis.
However you have nothing to worry Guru ... you will always get love.

One thing you might want to think about is, all Pakistani leader who got stuck into Hindu-stan were
actually Indian born.

Gen Musharraf.
Gen Zia.
Hafiz saeed belong to a family which migrated from India.

Nawaz Sharif is also with Hindu-stani roots.
 
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Bangladesh was bound to be seperated be it in 71 or 1-2 decades later.

The partition was done wrong,

Bangladesh from start should had become a New country


I agree with the sentiments for sure. and I thank you for that.

However this view may be partly untrue in light of our region's history from 1900-1947.

Will elaborate on this later time permitting.

peace
 
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Jordan did provide PAF about 4 104f jets, during 1971 war, this was in fact mentioned in the book The history of PAF 1988, I happened to buy this book in London during my visit to England that year. I will dig it from my library and see if I can post the pages !!
 
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Jordan did provide PAF about 4 104f jets, during 1971 war, this was in fact mentioned in the book The history of PAF 1988, I happened to buy this book in London during my visit to England that year. I will dig it from my library and see if I can post the pages !!


When you do please find out the following

1. Dates on which the planes got to Pakistan
2. Who flew them from Jordan to Pakistan (or were they sent via ships, etc.)
3. The names of the airbase in jordan (source) and the name of Pakistani airbase(s) aka destination(s)
4. Date of their deployment
5. Squadron assignment
6. Pilot assignment
7. Combat / sorties carried out by these.
8. Tail sign (Jordan Air vs. PAF)


Thank you.
 
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Muslim countries supporting a fellow muslim country against a predominantly Hindu country which is trying to liberate a muslim country! :what: :undecided:

Whatever it is...The more I read about 1971 war, the more I feel great about my armed forces. What a great victory it was!!! Some nations can only dream of victories like this.
 
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Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51am.

A week later the war is not going very well for Pakistan, as Indian armour scythes through East Pakistan and the Pakistan Air Force is blown out of the subcontinent’s sky. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military in the west is demoralised and on the verge of collapse as the Indian Army and Air Force attack round the clock.

Nixon: Our desire is to save West Pakistan. That's all.

Kissinger: That's right. That is exactly right.

Nixon: All right. Keep those carriers moving now.

Kissinger: The carriers—everything is moving. Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan, 22 more are coming. We're talking to the Saudis, the Turks we've now found are willing to give five. So we're going to keep that moving until there's a settlement.


Nixon: Could you tell the Chinese it would be very helpful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: They've got to threaten or they've got to move, one of the two. You know what I mean?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: How about getting the French to sell some planes to the Paks?

Kissinger: Yeah. They're already doing it.

Nixon: This should have been done long ago. The Chinese have not warned the Indians.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: All they've got to do is move something. Move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act. We're not doing a goddamn thing, Henry, you know that.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But these Indians are cowards. Right?

Kissinger: Right. But with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them. The Russians have played a miserable game.

If the two American leaders were calling Indians cowards, a few months earlier the Indians were a different breed altogether. This phone call is from May 1971.

Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—

Kissinger: They’re such bastards.

Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that…But if they're not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war.

Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there

The 1971 war is considered to be modern India’s finest hour, in military terms. The clinical professionalism of the Indian army, navy and air force; a charismatic brass led by the legendary Sam Maneckshaw; and ceaseless international lobbying by the political leadership worked brilliantly to set up a famous victory. After two weeks of vicious land, air and sea battles, nearly 100,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered before India's rampaging army, the largest such capitulation since General Paulus' surrender at Stalingrad in 1943. However, it could all have come unstuck without help from veto-wielding Moscow, with which New Delhi had the foresight to sign a security treaty in 1970.

As Nixon’s conversations with the wily Kissinger show, the forces arrayed against India were formidable. The Pakistani military was being bolstered by aircraft from Jordan, Iran, Turkey and France. Moral and military support was amply provided by the US, China and the UK. Though not mentioned in the conversations here, the UAE sent in half a squadron of fighter aircraft and the Indonesians dispatched at least one naval vessel to fight alongside the Pakistani Navy.

However, Russia’s entry thwarted a scenario that could have led to multiple pincer movements against India.

it was pure victory of Indian leadership, defence wings and assurance from Russia/SU....... there is more to it, if you wish to read check out the below link.........
1971 War: How Russia sank Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy | Russia & India Report
 
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When you do please find out the following

1. Dates on which the planes got to Pakistan
2. Who flew them from Jordan to Pakistan (or were they sent via ships, etc.)
3. The names of the airbase in jordan (source) and the name of Pakistani airbase(s) aka destination(s)
4. Date of their deployment
5. Squadron assignment
6. Pilot assignment
7. Combat / sorties carried out by these.
8. Tail sign (Jordan Air vs. PAF)


Thank you.


Fauji;

I have given the information in an earlier post in this thread with the relevant info available. But anyway, here it goes again.
"Royal Jordanian Air Force assistance during the 1971 war:
Nine F-104As of the RJAF arrived at Masroor (Mauripur) Air Base on December 13, 1971. The Jordanian pilots who ferried them were all operational pilots and they flew many air defense missions on these fighters within the Pakistani air space. The PAF did not allow them to fly cross-border offensive missions over the Indian territory.
Royal Jordanian AF F-104A in Pakistan: 56-767, 56-774, 56-775, 56-777, 56-789, 56-799, 56-839, 56-843, 56-845."

"The Pakistan AF lost three F-104 during the 1971 war including a RJAF F-104A with tail number 56-767 on December 17, 1971."

"The casualty was: F/L Samad Changezi was shot down (KIA) by F/L Aruna K. Datta flying a MiG-21FL".

So that makes 9 RJAF F-104As transferred to the PAF's No.9 Sqdn. of which one was lost in the conflict.

Actually from US records declassified now; 17 aircraft were to be transferred from Jordan as recorded in a telcon between Nixon and Kissinger.

In addition; at least 3 F-5s were transferred from the US Stocks (they were destined for the Libyan AF) via Teheran. Its estimated that the IrAF also transferred aircraft to the PAF, that happened just across the border.
 
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Fauji;

I have given the information in an earlier post in this thread with the relevant info available. But anyway, here it goes again.
"Royal Jordanian Air Force assistance during the 1971 war:
Nine F-104As of the RJAF arrived at Masroor (Mauripur) Air Base on December 13, 1971. The Jordanian pilots who ferried them were all operational pilots and they flew many air defense missions on these fighters within the Pakistani air space. The PAF did not allow them to fly cross-border offensive missions over the Indian territory.
Royal Jordanian AF F-104A in Pakistan: 56-767, 56-774, 56-775, 56-777, 56-789, 56-799, 56-839, 56-843, 56-845."

"The Pakistan AF lost three F-104 during the 1971 war including a RJAF F-104A with tail number 56-767 on December 17, 1971."

"The casualty was: F/L Samad Changezi was shot down (KIA) by F/L Aruna K. Datta flying a MiG-21FL".

So that makes 9 RJAF F-104As transferred to the PAF's No.9 Sqdn. of which one was lost in the conflict.

Actually from US records declassified now; 17 aircraft were to be transferred from Jordan as recorded in a telcon between Nixon and Kissinger.

In addition; at least 3 F-5s were transferred from the US Stocks (they were destined for the Libyan AF) via Teheran. Its estimated that the IrAF also transferred aircraft to the PAF, that happened just across the border.


Will check out the source. Thanks.

So what you are saying is that USA pushed others to send fighter planes to Pakistan.

Correct?
 
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 256

256. Editorial Note
President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met at 12:44 p.m. on December 9, 1971, in the Oval Office of the White House for another discussion of the crisis in South Asia. Kissinger began by repeating his warning of the dangers of allowing India to dismember Pakistan. Kissinger felt that the impact of the dismemberment of a United States ally would “be severe in Iran, in Indonesia, and in the Middle East.” He concluded “there is no good deal possible any more at this stage. And if the Russians want to press it to a brutal conclusion, we're going to lose.” He saw possibilities, however, in the “conciliatory” letter fromBrezhnev (Document 253). The Soviets wanted a Middle East settlement, a European security conference, trade with the United States, and a summit meeting.Kissinger added that they were also concerned about pushing the United States and China closer together. “So we are not without assets.”

Kissinger felt that the United States was in a position to “warn the Russians and the Indians that if this continues we could leak out or in some way make clear thatKennedy made a commitment to Pakistan against aggression from India.” “Secondly,” he added, “we should move that helicopter ship & and some escort into the Bay of Bengal” ostensibly to evacuate U.S. citizens. He was not, at this point, recommending introduction of the carrier. “From the Chinese angle, I would like to move the carrier. From the public opinion angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up there.” Nixon asked: “Can't the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation?” Kissinger responded: “But against whom are we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in?” Nixon asked what good it would do to move a helicopter ship into the area. Kissinger said it would be “a token that something else will come afterward.” He also recommended letting “the Jordanians move some of their planes. And I'd get the Indian Ambassador in and demand assurances that India doesn't want to annex territory.”

Kissinger again highlighted what he saw as the differing approaches to the crisis adopted by the Department of State and the White House. The Department, he said, “would propose a cease-fire in the west in return for in effect our recognition of Bangladesh.” Kissinger argued that such an approach would constitute “a total collapse” and “it would hurt us with the Chinese.” Nixon, however, felt it was necessary to take account of the “realities” of the situation. “The partition of Pakistan is a fact” he said. “You see those people welcoming the Indian troops when they come in.” “Why then,” he asked, “are we going through all of this agony?”Kissinger replied: “We are going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed. And secondly, to retain our Chinese arm. And thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world's psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not insignificant country without anybody doing anything.”

Kissinger felt that if the United States would “put enough chips into the pot” it could persuade the Soviets “for their own reasons, for the other considerations, to call a halt to it.” “What are we going to ask the Russians to do,” Nixon asked. “Cease-fire, negotiation, and subsequent withdrawal,” Kissinger responded. “But,” he added, “we'd have to clear it with Yahya first.” “Cease-fire and negotiation on what basis,”Nixon wanted to know. “Between the Awami League and Islamabad,” Kissinger said, “on the basis of the December 1970 election,” and “within the framework of a united Pakistan.” Withdrawal, he anticipated, would occur after the negotiations.

The time to effect such an agreement was clearly limited. Kissinger said that Pakistan's army would run out of ammunition and oil within 2 weeks. In response toNixon's question about what the United States could do to influence the outcome,Kissinger replied: “I would keep open the possibility that we'll pour arms into Pakistan.” If the Soviet Union could ship arms to India, Kissinger did not see why the United States could not supply arms to Pakistan. “I don't understand the theory of non-involvement,” he said. “I don't see where we will be as a country. I have to tell you honestly I consider this our Rhineland.” He warned: “If the Russians come out of it totally cocky, we may have a Middle East war in the spring.”

Nixon was concerned about the implications of taking a hard line. “We have to know what we are jeopardizing,” he said. Kissinger responded: “You are jeopardizing your relationship with the Soviets, but that is also your card, your willingness to jeopardize it.” Not to play that card, Kissinger suggested, would be to concede the Soviet Union a dangerous victory. Nixon observed that opponents of his policy toward South Asia were also concerned about jeopardizing United States relations with India. Kissinger said: “You could argue that it will help us in the long-term with the Indians.” Nixon replied: “I don't give a damn about the Indians.”

Reverting to the question of introducing U.S. Naval forces into the area, Kissingersaid he had discussed the matter with Connally and Connally had favored using a helicopter ship rather than a carrier. Connally felt that using a carrier would be interpreted by the American public as a threat to intervene militarily. It was a tough decision, Kissinger said, “I go back and forth on it myself.” He noted that there were some 200 U.S. citizens in East Pakistan. Nixon said: “Goddamn it, I've got a responsibility to protect American lives. I'm going to do it.” The tape is difficult to understand at this point, but Nixon apparently said he was prepared to use the carrier force to protect U.S. citizens in East Pakistan. “Nobody will believe it,”Kissinger warned. “The Indians will scream we're threatening them.” “Why are we doing it anyway,” Nixon asked. “Aren't we going in for the purpose of strength?”

Kissinger shifted ground in the face of Nixon's apparent determination to use the carrier: “I'd move the carrier so that we can tell the Chinese tomorrow to move their forces to the frontier.” He advised that a decision to move the carrier group into the Bay of Bengal meant that “we'd have to do a lot of things, and we'd have to do them toughly.” “I understand,” Nixon agreed. Kissinger continued: “We'd have to get the Indian Ambassador called in and demand assurances against annexation. We'd have to leak at that moment that secret understanding to protect the Indians [Pakistanis] against aggression.” Nixon responded: “I understand,” and he authorized Kissinger “to get the whole thing together.”

Nixon asked how the transfer of planes from Jordan to Pakistan could be facilitated. Kissinger said: “The way we would do that is & to tell the King to move his planes and inform us that he has done it & and then we would tell State to shut up. We would have to tell him it is illegal, but if he does it we'll keep things under control.” “All right,” Nixon said, “that's the way we play that.”

Some discussion followed concerning a meeting scheduled later that day with senior administration officials involved in managing the crisis. Kissinger recommended that Nixon express himself firmly with them regarding the policy line he wanted them to follow. Nixon wondered if he should tell them about his decision to use the carrier. Kissinger said: “If you've decided to do this game plan, I think it is more important to see the Russian today because his cable would go back.” (See
Document 257.) He added that the others could be informed later.

Turning to the political impact of using the carrier, Kissinger noted that it would take 6 days to move the carrier from Southeast Asia to the Bay of Bengal by which time Congress would be out of session. He said he would talk to Admiral Moorer “to see whether we can keep the carrier back of the Bay of Bengal.” Nixon asked: “Then can we move the other helicopter thing in?” Kissinger said yes.

Nixon reviewed the other decisions reached during the discussion: to encourage the transfer of Jordanian planes to Pakistan, to notify the Chinese of about what they had decided to do, to leak the Kennedy commitment to protect Pakistan, and to ask India for assurances that there would be no annexations as a result of the crisis. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, December 9, 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 633–11) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. A transcript of this conversation is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 168.


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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976
VOLUME XI, SOUTH ASIA CRISIS, 1971, DOCUMENT 310

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Washington, December 15, 1971.

  • SUBJECT
  • Information Items
India-Pakistan Situation: The proposal of the Pakistani commander in Dacca for a ceasefire2 was passed to Delhi last night, but we are aware of no Indian response yet (8:00 a.m.). Consultations on the UK-French draft Security Council resolution are scheduled to continue this morning.

Foreign Minister Bhutto declined to pass General Niazi's ceasefire proposal to the Indians in New York, so our UN mission was instructed to communicate it to Foreign Minister Singh, and subsequently Ambassador Keating was instructed to pass its text to Mrs. Gandhi's secretary, Haksar. In this as in the negotiations on the Security Council resolution, Bhutto is apparently being careful to sidestep onus for the surrender of East Pakistan. Meanwhile, latest Indian reports indicate that Dacca is receiving heavy artillery fire, and three Indian columns have advanced to within a few miles of Dacca where they are preparing for attack.

Despite initially favorable reactions to the first UK draft Security Council resolution, positions on both sides hardened as they became aware of the rapid deterioration of the Pakistani military position in Dacca.

—The Indians are being tough on aspects of the transfer of East Pakistan governmental functions to a new civilian government. They have submitted their own draft which includes the following: “Recognizes that simultaneously with the ceasefire in East Pakistan power shall be transferred to the representatives of the majority party elected in December 1970.”

—The Pakistanis have shown a new turn of attitude. They now seem to feel that, since East Pakistan is lost, a UN resolution which “legitimizes” the Indian seizure may be unacceptable. His [Bhutto's?] greatest concern now is a ceasefire in the West.

British consultations will continue this morning, but these views may set the stage for a simple ceasefire resolution which also calls on all parties to safeguard the lives of civilians and captured soldiers.

On the West Pakistan military front, heavy fighting continues in Kashmir, but the principal Pakistani drive appears to have been blunted. According to a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report, one Indian reserve division was airlifted from the Calcutta area to an undetermined location on the western front.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a Chinese delivery of additional MIG–19's to West Pakistan may be underway. An undetermined number of MIG's were noted flying in the direction of an airfield that has been used in the past as a base for onward flight to Pakistan. In a separate development, [1 line of source text not declassified] the Pakistani UN representative has said that China would make “an important military move” on December 15. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] no evidence of Chinese troop deployments in preparation for military moves.

Since late November, there have been numerous reports that other Moslum countries had sent or were planning to send military equipment to Pakistan. The countries involved include Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt. Most of the reports concern shipments of jet fighters and spare parts for these and Pakistani aircraft. There is no firm evidence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to corroborate any of the reports that this equipment has actually been transferred.

Our carrier task force is transiting the Straits of Malacca and should arrive at a point near the center of the base of the Bay of Bengal this (15 Dec) evening. Rumors about this move are already widespread in the area where they are being combined with stories that the US is considering military assistance to Pakistan. In this connection, Ambassador Keating reports that these stories are spuring increasingly anti-US rallies and press attacks. The Ambassador says that he would be “deeply concerned and anxious” about the lives and welfare of Americans in India if the USwere directly or indirectly to support Pakistan with US arms or equipment and would want to recommend at least partial evacuation if this is under serious consideration.3

3

The British are also moving some naval vessels into the area—a commando carrier and a frigate off the southern coast of Ceylon. Soviet task force, consisting of a guided missile cruiser, an oiler and a diesel powered submarine continues to steam through the South China Sea toward the Indian Ocean where if it continues on that course it 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 37, President's Daily Briefs, Dec 1–Dec 16, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. A stamp on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 See Document 300.

3 In expressing his concern, Keating also asked for an assurance that the United States did not intend to support Pakistan with U.S. arms or equipment. (Telegram 19203 from New Delhi, December 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71)
 
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Will check out the source. Thanks.

So what you are saying is that USA pushed others to send fighter planes to Pakistan.

Correct?

That is correct.
Because 'Dick' Nixon and his "Sancho Panza" were caught in a desperate bind. They could not break the American Law prohibiting the transfer of Arms to Pakistan. So they used all the methods at their command including subterfuge to transfer the weaponry; after all methods of threats and coercion on India had failed.
They had held up USD 123 Million dollars worth of Wheat purchased by India as well as other Commercial Trade all of which had already been paid for by India to browbeat India.

Read the earlier post by @JD_In where Tricky Dick says: What the Indians really need is a famine......
Remember that India was food-deficient in those days PLUS India had the burden of having to feed 10 million refugees from East Bengal.

Its another story that Dick himself got dumped into the dust-bin of American History as the "Crook who was President of the USA".

Karma can be a bitch.........
 
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thats the most sensible post i had seen on this thread by a pksiatnai member so far ...Hats off to you brother :yahoo:
What @farhan_9909 says is actually true....The Lahore resolution does mentions multiple states for Muslims.....the creation of a single state was a blunder..specially while there was no connection between the two wings!
 
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