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The Pakistani Versus the Indian Fighter Pilot
By Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam
Great pilots are made not born A man may possess good eyesight, sensitive hands and perfect coordination, but the end product is only fashioned by steady coaching, much practice and experience.
Air Vice Marshal J.E. Johnson, RAF
There seems to be a general consensus of opinion today that in a comparison of strength between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, the Indian advantage in numbers is counterbalanced by the Pakistani advantage in personnel, training, and tactics. Since India has been successful in narrowing the technology gap, which Pakistan possessed over India for three decades from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, some Pakistani defence policymakers have put even more emphasis on the perceived Pakistani advantage in personnel. In fact, some would argue that the Pakistani fighter pilot, his training, and his tactics are so superior that even though the Indians have now caught up in technology, the Pakistan Air Force still has an overall edge in combat capability as long as the quantitative edge does not proceed more than 3:1 in Indias favour.
This article examines that argument and provides some answers to difficult questions surfaced by this issue. Is it true that the Pakistani fighter pilot is inherently better than his Indian counterpart? Are Pakistani training programmes and tactics better? If the comparisons are true, how much of an advantage does the Pakistani pilot maintain, and how does one measure the difference? Is this advantage widening or narrowing? Finally, and most importantly, once the advantage is determined, how does one go about improving the PAF to ensure an even greater advantage?
To begin a comparison of the two countries' fighter pilots' capabilities is not an easy task. While it is quite common for a defence analyst to compare air forces based on the quantity and quality of weapons systems, it is very rare to find an objective study of pilot capabilities. In fact, most analyses quantify combat capability as a product of numerous factors, such as aircraft, logistics, maintenance, munitions, etc. But the human factor (pilot ability, training, and tactics) is rarely included because its measurement is very subjective and its impact on the equation so little understood. Few will argue, however, that differences in pilot capability do exist, and some aspects of the human factor should be included in the equation if we are to achieve accurate comparisons in combat capability.
The human factor, as it relates to Indian and Pakistani air combat capability, constitutes three main variables (i) the inherent ability of the individual pilot, (ii) his training, and (iii) his tactics. These three variables, when added together, produce a pilot or "human factor" input to the overall effectiveness of a sortie or mission.
Let us now briefly look at each of these variables in turn
Inherent Ability
The first variable is the inherent ability of the pilot, or put another way, the quality of the individual as a fighter pilot, given equal training and tactics. The pilot's inherent ability is a product of the pilot selection process and the personnel assessment system that assigns and maintains the fighter pilot force. Compared to the Indian Air Force, the Pakistan Air Force does more pre-selection testing of personnel prior to their entering pilot training. Numerous and very difficult psychological, motor skills and other screening tests are given to measure inherent fighter pilot ability prior to selection for pilot training. Also, the Pakistan Air Force pilot selection is based on academic grades, officer-like qualities (OLQs), physical fitness and health and 20/20 vision. The pilot selection process, however, does not differentiate between skills necessary for fighter pilots and other pilots such as tactical transport or bomber pilots. This distinction made much later in the training cycle, is usually subjective, and can only select from those who have already been admitted into the programme. The PAF pilot selection system still suffers from the "universally assignable pilot" concept that has been around for years, known as the General Duties Pilot or GDP in PAF parlance.
When comparing the Pakistani pilot selection system with the Indians, one could safely say that Indias competition for pilot training slots is less competitive than Pakistans. The benefits after attaining the status of a fighter pilot in the Pakistan Air Force are some of the highest in the society. The PAF cadet colleges are considered among the best schools in the country, and military aviation is a highly sought-after and prestigious profession in Pakistan. According to the 1988 official history of the PAF, less than 1% of 6,500 (approximately 110) applicants are admitted into the PAF Academy, Risalpur every 6 months to train as fighter pilots (1). The significance of this input can also appreciated when one realizes that only the most academically sound and healthy candidates apply in the first place. Such is the stiff level of competition.
When PAF pilots graduate, they are assigned to specific unit aircraft and are managed by an officer personnel assessment system for subsequent assignments. The personnel system attempts to maintain the fighter pilot rated force at a level based on many factors, such as unit manning levels, training levels, and unit experience levels. Many reasons are used for moving fighter pilots from one air base to another, from one aircraft type to another, or from operational duties to a staff position. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the "fairness" of personnel moves, task assignment eligibility, career broadening, manning levels, and career progression. Rarely has the personnel system explained a move by stating that it is in the best interest of increased combat capability. In fact, this personnel assessment system would be hard pressed to move individuals based on pilot capability since there is no formal system that rates pilots according to their relative individual capabilities. Promotions are not made on pilot capabilities, but rather on officer effectiveness reports, and most assignments are made on professional career progression rather than combat capability.
If it is generally accepted then that the PAF has better pilots than the IAF, it certainly is not just due to pre-selection criteria, screening, competitive testing, or a personnel assessment system. In fact, the individual Indian pilot, when compared to Indian society as a whole, is probably one of the better educated and capable individuals in India. Even though the Indian fighter pilot is not as capable in inherent abilities with his Pakistani counterpart - due to lower quality human resource input - it seems safe to assume that any advantage which we maintain is not just due to the inherent abilities of our fighter pilots. However, if one were to get serious about upgrading the pilot force and in gaining or increasing an advantage in the human factor, the pilot selection and assessment areas would certainly be good starting points.
Training
The second main variable affecting the human factor is training. If there is one area where the Pakistan Air Force leads most countries except perhaps Israel and the United States it is in fighter training. In the past 30 years with the advent of the Combat Commanders School (CCS), air combat exercises, aggressor training, and Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT), the PAF has made gigantic strides towards realistic fighter training. From the lessons learned in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India and the 11-year war in Afghanistan with the Soviet Union between 1979-1988, even lessons from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars in which PAF pilots successfully participated, the Pakistan Air Force has developed one of the most realistic and ambitious training programmes in the world. However, these "new" training programmes are more than ten years old now, and they have reached a plateau in progress with stagnation setting in.
The Indians, on the other hand, were late in realizing that new generation fighters need new generation training philosophies. The Indians have recently made significant changes in their air combat tactics and training programmes. Pilot independence and initiatives are now stressed. The continual, technological upgrading of equipment and increasing proficiency in combat employment of that equipment have resulted in greatly increased Indian military aviation capabilities. Thus, even in the area of training where the PAF fighter pilots have always excelled, recent Indian initiatives demand new and more aggressive PAF training initiatives if Pakistan is to maintain its present advantage in the training variable.
The number of hours flown is part of this training variable. The average fighter pilot in the PAF logs approximately 220 flying hours a year, which is the second highest in the world, the highest being that of the United States Air Force (USAF) with 230 hours flying time per annum. This is higher than the number of hours logged by the Israeli Air Force pilots who log 180 hours per year and 80 hours more than the Indian Air Force pilots who log only 130 hours a year (2).
The number of hours flown in a year is extremely important, almost critical to making a good fighter pilot. Former USAF test pilot and US Defense Representative to Pakistan (1971-1973) and advisor to the Pakistan Air Force, Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Chuck E. Yeager, who was the first man to break the sound barrier, once commented, "it is the experience of the man in the cockpit that matters most" and the man who wins in air combat on any given day is invariably "the man with the most experience".
Training and experience are one in the same thing. If you have combat experience that would bestow an even greater advantage. However, it is the type of combat experience which matters. Not all combat experience confers any advantage to an air force. Actual combat experience is useless if it is not teaching you anything which may be of use in future. Thus, a Pakistani pilot who was training in an exercise at the PAF's Combat Commander School would have been gaining more experience than an Indian Air Force pilot who was flying a mission during the Kargil conflict in Jammu & Kashmir against a few hundred lightly armed Mujahideen. In this example the PAF pilot is not engaged in actual combat whereas the IAF pilot is. However, whereas the IAF pilot gaining actual combat experience, that experience is deceptive because it is not the type of experience which the IAF would have to confront in a full-scale war against Pakistan. In fact, fighting an air force against a few hundred lightly armed guerrilla freedom fighters is no achievement and would in fact, bestow an air force with a false sense of achievement in its capabilities. This is because the IAF was engaged in high altitude ground attack without air opposition (since it was fighting a civil war) in which the rebels were not possessed of an air force nor were they equipped with radar or even medium altitude surface-to-air missiles.
Tactics
The third variable in the human factor to be discussed is tactics. Although tactics are not a specific human quality, they are designed and employed by the pilot and therefore impact upon how well the pilot can employ his aircraft. In 1976, the Combat Commanders School (CCS), the PAFs elite fighter weapons and tactics school at Sargodha began experimenting with new fighter formations and tactics. These formations and tactics were a composite of lessons learned in air-to-air combat in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Although the formation was different from the old tactics, the most significant difference was the philosophical change in the wingman's duties. CCS detached the wingman from a very restrictive cover position ("fighting wing") on the leader to a more active role, manoeuvring independently, yet in co-ordination, with the leader. For the past 25 years, the PAF has been training with and refining such fluid attack tactics. In principle, Pakistani fighter pilots are free to design, test, and fly almost any variation of formations and tactics that they or their squadron wish to try. However, in practice, due to limited sorties, safety restrictions and a system that always requires training to the lowest denominator, tactics development today is in fact spotty and often neglected.
As noted earlier, the Indians are attempting to improve their tactics with each new generation of aircraft, and they are just beginning to give their pilots more independence. On the surface this appears to be a ten-year lag in tactical development. However, when one considers the Indian historical doctrine of mass, breakthrough, and strict command and control, the idea of large, inflexible, and slow manoeuvring formations may be more design than simple lack of progress. What may look to the Pakistani fighter pilot as an unimaginative tactic may to the Indian fighter commander be as sophisticated and advanced as his doctrines, force structure, and mission would dictate. And who is to say that fluid attack and independent manoeuvring would work better than regimental control in their battle schemes? In either case, suffice it to say that both the Pakistani and Indian tactics will change with the advent of new aircraft, missiles, and radar. What worked yesterday in the F-86 will not work in the F-16. The tactic used to defeat the Hawker Hunter or the MiG-21 will probably not be the best tactic to defeat the Su-30 or the MiG-29. The PAF has always been willing to change tactics, however, tactical development, evaluation, and implementation seem to be taking more time, money, and effort these days. And the Indians are not standing still. With their new equipment, most notably their Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s and Su-30s, they are experimenting with new tactics. So even in the tactics variable, the PAF advantage is no longer as significant as it used to be 15 years ago.
Thus, in a brief examination of the main variables that make up the human factor, it can be seen that although in each case no quantitative measurement can be made, there is reason to believe that the Pakistanis are slightly ahead of the Indians. However, whereas 10 or 15 years ago this advantage may have been quite large, the Indians seem to be narrowing the gap in all cases. PAF pilot selection and personnel management policies have not changed, and training and tactics initiatives, while dynamic after Afghanistan, have pretty much stagnated. In the meantime, the Indians have been plodding along in their inimitable way, slowly increasing their training realism and testing new tactical philosophies to match their weapons improvements. If Pakistan is to maintain any advantage that it may have in the human factor, drastic steps need to be taken soon.
We can increase tactical combat capability vis-à-vis India in a number of ways: buy more aircraft, buy better aircraft, build new aircraft, radar, and missiles, increase the spares, etc. The one factor, however, that could have the greatest impact, and yet is probably the least expensive and most easily changed, is the human factor. By launching an aggressive and dynamic programme to upgrade the fighter pilot force, the PAF could drastically alter the combat equation in its favour for years. Simple initiatives and policy changes affecting the human factor variables could make PAF fighter combat capability increase exponentially.
The inherent ability of the fighter pilot is one of the most important variables in the human factor, the easiest to change, and yet the most neglected. As an old fighter pilot once eloquently remarked, "You can train a hamburger, but when you're through, you still get a hamburger." Fighter pilot training today is a demanding process and without a good product to start with, no amount of excellent training will produce a quality fighter pilot. Therefore, the selection process must be changed to be more aggressive, more competitive, and even more selective than it already is. Large groups of candidates should be screened with sophisticated, modern testing procedures High academic grades and a perfectly healthy body and perfect vision should not be a qualification but a prerequisite for entry into the PAF. Additional factors should be present: commitment and dedication; perseverance; quick-thinking and quick-reflexes; an obsession with flying; and the pursuit of excellence. Large pilot attrition rates should be experienced in the early phases of training. Needless to say, specialized fighter training should begin early. At every stage of training, competition, and ratings based on fighter pilot performance should be used for selection to top fighter pilot positions.
The PAF personnel management and rating system needs a thorough review. Personnel assignment policies need to be changed so they can respond to the needs of combat capability and not to an arbitrary "good deal/bad deal" list. In other words, if an F-7 instructor job needs filling, you don't take the best F-16 pilot to fill it just because he's due a "bad deal." More sensitivity needs to be paid to the policies that force early rotations and create turbulence in the units. In today's fighter force, it takes two to three years to upgrade a flight lead and another two to three years to get good at it. Most new fighter pilots don't stay in their first squadron more than two to three years, and many don't remain in their first assignment aircraft longer than five years. The result is that most operational fighter squadrons are continually upgrading new pilots, and very few squadrons reach a level of high combat capability. What is required is a conscious effort to keep good fighter pilots in the same aircraft, same mission, same unit for longer periods of time. Gone are the days when we can afford a universally assignable pilot, or even a "generic fighter pilot."
To make these changes in the pilot selection process and personnel rating system requires major policy changes but should cost relatively little. When it comes to improving the training variable, however, costs do enter into the picture. Quality training is expensive, but expensive training is usually cheaper in the long run due to increased combat capability and a more efficient and effective fighting force. Yet nothing is more expensive than a lost war. New, innovative methods of training need to be developed to stay ahead of the Indians. State-of-the art combat simulators that rival the most advanced air-to-air training are available today. More air combat manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) and electronic combat ranges are needed. More flying time, range time, realistic scenarios, and composite force training are all high priorities. Actual combat is not the time to discover that you need more training.
At first glance, one would assume that tactics, unlike training, would be very cheap to change and would simply require a tactics manual change. However, tactics like the other variables are very difficult to measure, and in order to quantify the advantage of one tactic over another, testing is required. In-depth tactics testing is very time-consuming and costly. Conducting a valid tactics evaluation may take up to two years and hundreds of sorties. Here again "state-of-the-art" combat simulators can be extremely helpful in speeding up this process. The PAFs Thomson Training & Simulation (TT&S) F-16 combat simulator is a prime example of how combat simulators can be used to simulate realistic combat engagements better than could have been done in the real aircraft because of range, safety restrictions and costs. Tactics development, testing, and evaluation are too important to continue in the slow pace of only live-mission testing. A realistic state-of-the-art combat simulator similar to the one used for the F-16 should be devoted full time to tactics testing and evaluations. Like training, tactics development is expensive, but it needs to be improved if the PAF is to increase its advantage over the Indians.
An important fact which needs to be understood is that the quality of the human factor and training are intrinsically linked. Although the inherent human qualities are important, much can be achieved by training. In this sense, training is the crucial ingredient which distinguishes a good pilot from an average one.
In addition to the above three variables, there are nine other sub-variables which are part of the elements mentioned above but can be distinctly categorized. These sub-variables are: (i) intelligence, (ii) quick reflexes, (iii) quick decision-making abilities, (iv) psyche and attitude, (v) aggressiveness, (vi) training equipment, (vii) pilot age, (viii) pilot-to-cockpit ratio and (ix) situational awareness. While the first two are more general and self-explanatory and more a part of inherent ability, the latter seven are more distinct and need some explaining. So we shall ignore the first two and look at the remaining seven.
Quick Decision-Making Abilities
This is a human trait which is grossly underestimated and overlooked, especially in the context of fighter flying, whereas it is this trait which, in the heat of combat, can make the difference between life and death and between success and failure. The ability to make quick decisions has gained more importance with the advent of the jet age which has reduced time variables many times. Time-on-Target (TOT) has become shorter and combat aircraft reach each other sooner rather than later.
A PAF F-7 pilot who makes the right decision quickly is more likely to defeat an IAF pilot in a superior aircraft like the MiG-29 or the Su-30 who doesnt make the right decision or makes the right decision by taking too long to make it or worst still takes too long a time to make a decision and ends up with the wrong decision. Likewise, an IAF pilot flying a MiG-21 will be able to do the same with a PAF F-16 pilot if the latter was to commit the same mistake.
There are more than a thousand and one scenarios which could be cited in support of this. To go into detail here is beyond the purview of this article and it is the responsibility of three institutions within the PAF to cater to this subject; No. 37 (Combat Training) Wing, Mianwali, the Combat Commanders School (CCS), Sargodha and the Air War College, Karachi. These institutions are responsible for imparting air defence (and offence) theory and doctrine and fighter combat tactics and manoeuvring to their students.
Psyche & Attitude
The attitude of the fighter pilot and his goal orientation are critical factors. For example, the Project AIR FORCE report of the RAND Corporation on the Indian Air Force made the following observation:
Although all aspects of training are important, pilot training is critical and has attracted much attention recently. Apparently some difficulty has arisen in recruiting pilots, even though the yearly quota of 100 is relatively small. Many of those recruited do not wish to become fighter pilots, as transport pilots have a better future in the commercial aviation world.
This type of thinking is non-existent in the PAF. The last thing on the mind of PAF pilots is what they will do when they leave the Air Force. For Pakistani pilots, the Air Force is the destination, not a waypoint. If a pilot is flying combat planes for bread hes had it. The last thing you want is your pilots going into combat with the thought of better remuneration, retirement and pension plans occupying their minds.
Aggressiveness
A good fighter pilot must have one outstanding trait aggressiveness. As Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight - it's the size of the fight in the dog." Aggressiveness is fundamental to success in air combat, especially in air-to-air combat, and the fighter pilot who goes on the defensive is usually the first one to be shot down. PAF pilots never go into the air thinking they will lose. This is part of the PAF psyche and this is how Pakistani fighter pilots are trained to think. In air combat tactics, aggressiveness is the keynote of success. The principle is simple, the enemy on the defensive gives you the advantage, as he is trying to evade you and not to shoot you down.
Aggressiveness is not to be confused with recklessness and downright stupidity. Aggressiveness must be weighed in with the chances of success. This is an art and the Pakistanis and Israelis do it very well. This calculated aggressiveness is very different from plain raw aggressiveness. If simple aggressiveness were the key to success then many of the worlds air forces would enjoy the same reputation as the Pakistani and Israeli air forces.
PAF pilots are more aggressive in the air than their Indian counterparts and this is primarily due to what is termed the cornered cat syndrome. Pakistan is a country which lacks strategic depth. The term tactical retreat does not exist in the PAF vocabulary, nor for that matter in the vocabulary of any other branch of the Pakistan Armed Forces. For a tactical retreat over Pakistan would be suicidal for the PAF. It could well mean having an air base to land on and not having one to land on. The Indian Air Force can afford to lose its airfields at Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Halwara, Ambala, Hindan, Jaiselmer, Jodhpur and Jamnagar. All these IAF airfields are located within 300 km of the Pakistan border. Even in the likelihood of the IAF losing these airfields, it would still have 10 other major airfields to utilize located further afield. On the other hand, the majority of the PAFs major operational bases all come within 300 km of the Indian border, including PAF Base, Sargodha.
Training Equipment
The tools of training are also important in improving the quality of the human factor. Training is one field in which the PAF still maintains a significant advantage over the Indian Air Force even in technological terms. The PAFs primary flying trainer has for long been the Swedish-designed but Pakistani-manufactured MFI-17 Mushshak, built by the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF) of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra whereas the basic trainer has been the T-37 jet trainer. Both these trainers have served the PAF well over the past 25 years and both these trainers have been superior to the IAF trainers, namely the Kiran Mark II, the HPT-32 and the Polish Iskra. The IAF is still flying the HPT-32 and it has no advanced jet trainer (AJT). It uses the MiG-21U as an advanced jet trainer, which is one of the reasons that the IAF continues to have one of the worlds highest aircraft attrition rates.
The PAF, on the other hand, has moved on to better aircraft. A new and much improved version of the indigenously manufactured Mushshak, the Super Mushshak, is now being inducted into the PAF Primary Flying Training Wing (PFTW) to replace the former as the PAFs primary trainer. As for the basic and intermediate flying training, the PAF has now begun replacing the ageing T-37s in its Basic Flying Training Wing (BFTW) with the PAC-NAMC K-8 Karakorum basic and intermediate jet trainer. The K-8 is today ranked as one of the worlds ten best jet trainers for basic and intermediate flying training along with the British BAe Hawk 100, the French Dassault Dornier Alpha Jet, the Italian Aermacchi MB-339, the Czech Aero L-59, the Russian MiG-AT and the Russian/Italian Yakovlev-Aermacchi Yak-AT.
However, this technological edge in training which the PAF possesses is temporary at best as the Indians are considering inducting an AJT in their training programme as well. Though the Indians will not be able to indigenously produce an AJT until 2015 at the earliest (and this is being optimistic), nevertheless, they are looking at three foreign-built jet trainers that may be assembled in India, if not bought off-the-shelf. These are the Russian MiG-AT, the most likely contender, the French Dassault Dornier Alpha Jet and the British BAe Hawk 100. The induction of any three of these AJTs will significantly improve IAF training standards and will, resultantly, improve the human factor in the IAF.
Good training equipment such as primary, basic and advanced jet trainers, flight simulators and ACMI are not affected by the human factor rather it is these elements that may in turn improve the human factor, sometimes even decisively. Good trainers, good instructors and a good training programme can make the difference between ace pilots and mediocre pilots, they can even transform a bad pilot into a good pilot. Of course, if you have a hamburger, it will always will be a hamburger.
Pilot Age
Interestingly, the average age of the pilots is also a factor, albeit a lessor one, in determining the overall human factor in the performance of an air force. Pushpinder Singh, Ravi Rikhye and Peter Steinemen, in their book, Fizaya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force (5), have done an interesting comparison between the respective ages of PAF and IAF pilots and the impact of age on performance. In their book they write:
In the PAF the squadron commander, a Wing Commander, and therefore the seniormost pilot, is around 35 years of age. In the IAF, a Squadron Leader is not considered for promotion to Wing Commander till he has put in 18 years of service. So IAF squadron commanders are a good 4 to 6 years older than their PAF counterparts. This age gap is manifest all the way down: an IAF fighter Squadron Leader is a minimum of 33 years old, as he is given this task after 11 years service. In other words, he is the same age as the PAF Wing Commander leading a fighter squadron! Whether the PAF pilots are in-country or out with other air forces is not particularly germane: the point is that they are available, and this has serious implications for the capabilities of the two air forces Mainly, however, the PAF can sustain a higher sortie rate than the IAF, which to some extent, offsets its smaller numbers.
They go on to observe:
It has been noted earlier that a PAF squadron commander takes charge at around age 34-35, typically 5 to 6 years earlier than his counterpart in the IAF. The differential in age will grow because, in the IAF, retirement age has now been extended by two years and there is an increasing pressure for Group Captains to assume command of squadrons. There are already some Group Captains commanding combat squadrons and some commanding helicopter units which used to be the province of a Squadron Leader. Group Captains have been in command of transport squadrons for some years. War in the air is to be fought by younger men, and here the PAF has an obvious advantage.
Age is not a decisive factor but it is, nevertheless, an important one contributing to the overall human factor input in any air force.
Pilot-to-Cockpit Ratio
The pilot-to-cockpit ratio is the number of pilots divided by the number of aircraft in an air force. This gives us the average number of pilots available to fly each aircraft at any given time. The pilot-to-cockpit ratio is dependent on both the quantity of pilots as well as the quantity of aircraft. It is, as such, not too important an ingredient in deciding the quality of the human factor. However, this is not to say it has no bearing on the human factor at all. Its contribution as a minor ingredient towards assessing the human factor qualifies it to be included in any analysis of the same.
Again, a quote from Fizaya would be useful:
Till 1971, the PAF graduated about 50 pilots/annually. After 1971 the number was increased we have arbitrarily assumed to 65/annually. In the late 1970s the number was increased again, to about 80. The IAF by contrast has graduated 110 pilots annually in each of the last 18 years [1971-1990] Assume the average graduating age is 23, then the number of IAF pilots aged 40 and below will be about 2000; whereas for the PAF it will be about 1400.
The authors go on to conclude that keeping in mind that transport aircraft and helicopters require two pilots to fly them the number of pilots required by the PAF were 420 whereas the IAF would require 1800 pilots. This was done on the basis that the PAF had a total of 360 aircraft, whereas the IAF had a total of 1300 aircraft. The ratio came to around 3:1 for the PAF and 1:1 for the IAF. This meant that whereas the PAF had 3 pilots to fly each aircraft in its inventory, the IAF had only 1 pilot to fly each aircraft in its inventory.
Since Fizaya was published in 1991, these statistics have now become outdated. The IAF has lost approximately 200 aircraft between 1991 and 1999 mainly due to attrition and a about half a dozen shot down by Pakistan and the Kashmiri Mujahideen in Jammu & Kashmir in 1999. Whereas the PAF lost approximately 35 aircraft to attrition in the same period. Also, whereas the PAF has inducted approximately 100 combat aircraft since 1991, the IAF has received only 16 combat aircraft in the same time-frame. However, the pilot-to-cockpit ratio remains roughly the same, i.e. 3:1 for the PAF and 1:1 for the IAF.
What bearing then does the pilot-to-cockpit ratio have on the human factor? In combat, a higher pilot-to-cockpit ratio would enable the PAF to generate more sorties, thus counterbalancing the IAF advantage in aircraft quantity to some extent. However, the main impact on the human factor would be that the PAF pilots would be able to get more rest and be fresh for successive missions. A pilot who has been given time to rest in between sorties and is fresh for the new mission will be able to perform much more efficiently and effectively in combat compared to a pilot who is fatigued and tired and has not received much sleep and rest. PAF pilots will be replaced at the end of each sortie and a fresh pilot would be ready to fly the next mission. IAF pilots would be forced to fly one sortie after another. Thus, they are more likely to become more fatigued than their PAF counterparts. Physical and mental fatigue reduces combat effectiveness by impairing the reflexes and mental alertness of the pilots. On the other hand, if the IAF rests its pilots by putting two pilots on one aircraft or uses fewer aircraft, it would be reducing its current 2:1 quantitative combat aircraft edge over the PAF.
Situational Awareness
Situational awareness is the ability of the pilot to keep track of events and foresee occurrences in the dynamic, fast-moving, three dimensional scenario of air combat, i.e. being aware of the situation around him while in the midst of air combat.
The fighter pilot of today is becoming more and more reliant on electronic force multipliers such as early warning radar (EWR), electronic counter measures (ECM), track-while-scan (TWS) and the ability of his aircraft to track, engage and shoot down multiple targets simultaneously. This means that he has more information available to let him know what is going on around him and his situational awareness lies mainly in his ability to make use of the presented information. How effectively a fighter pilot makes use of these tools depends on his personal traits of quick-thinking, quick-reflexes, intelligence and the ability to interpret large and swiftly emerging data into an overall picture of the situation around him. Thus, no matter how sophisticated the aircraft, it will not be able to help the pilot if he does not know to use and employ all this equipment and data to his advantage.
Conclusion
Some may argue that these kinds of human factors are irrelevant. It is fashionable nowadays to point to the importance and advancement of technology of warfare and argue that the nature of combat has changed. The emphasis now is on technology rather than human capability. If this argument is valid, any comparisons between modern warfare and warfare of the past are meaningless. In the slanted logic of this line of reasoning, machines are more important in war than men.
However, this view is not supported by eyewitness evidence from contemporary battlefields or air combat engagements. Admittedly, many things have changed in air combat since the First and Second World Wars and even since the Korean, Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan Wars. The recent 1991 US-Iraq Gulf War is touted as the prime example of the success of machine over man. Nobody realizes that the Iraqi Air Force was neither machine nor man. It simply did not put up a fight. The result of the Gulf War would have been much different had the Iraqi Air Force turned up in good numbers to put up a stiff fight. A US advantage in technology would not have prevented the Iraqi AF from inflicting unacceptable losses on the USAF and US Marines.
The physical factors of battle are different. The size and composition of forces vary greatly. Spatial and geometric relationships are altogether different, as are terrain and logistical factors. All these aside, several noted experts would agree that the combat psychology of participants in both eras remains essentially the same. Lt. Col. Barry D. Watts, USAF in his important book, The Foundations of U.S. Air Force Doctrine, commented:
Combat psychology constitutes the most stable, most timeless dimension of war. While the political goals of a particular conflict, weapons technologies, and above all else, the tactics appropriate against a given adversary on a given day can all change virtually overnight, "combat is combat and a combatant is a combatant."
On this basis, combat comparisons from any era and any form of warfare remain valid. Short of experiencing combat or spending a great deal of time with combat veterans, about the only way to learn of the nature of war is to study firsthand human experiences.
The importance which the PAF has always placed in improving the quality of its fighter pilot force has paid off through dividends in the form of highly skilled pilots. This can be guaged by the following statement of Gen. Chuck Horner of the United States Air Force (USAF) and Commander of Allied Forces in the 1991 Gulf War in his biography by Tom Clancy, Every Man A Tiger:
"Iraqi pilot training came from three sources: France, Pakistan and the former Soviet Union. Lucky for us, Soviet training proved dominant, with their emphasis on rigid rules, strict command arrangements and standardized tactics. Coupled with this centralized approach, the Soviets were suspicious of non-Russians and disliked Arabs . . . There was, however, a wild card. Not all training came from the Russians. Iraqi pilots were trained well by their French and Pakistani instructors . . . Pakistan has one of the best, most combat ready air forces in the world. They have to, their neighbour to the east is huge, and the two nations have a long history of hostilities. For Indian war planners, the Pakistan Air Force is their worst fear. Pakistani pilots are respected throughout the world, especially the Islamic world, because they know how to fly and fight. On one or two occasions, I had the opportunity to talk with Pakistani instructor pilots, who had served in Iraq. These discussions, didn't give me great cause to worry. The Russian domination of training prevented the Pakistanis from having any real influence on the Iraqi aircrew training program. Still, there had to be a few Iraqi pilots, who had observed and listened to their mentors from France and Pakistan . . . It was those few, I was concerned about."
The PAF fighter pilot community is at a critical junction. While the Indians outnumber the Pakistanis and have caught up in technology, our one remaining advantage is our fighter pilots. As has been shown, however, that human advantage is very fragile and even here the Indians show signs of progress. Unfortunately, the human factor is one of the factors of the combat capability equation that has gained little attention in the budget battles, the emphasis being more on equipment. I believe that with some renewed high-level interest and a moderate infusion of money, the human factor can be significantly altered in the proper direction. It seems only natural that a fighter force with good aircraft, missiles, and radar should also have pilots to fly them who are second to none. In air combat there are no points for second place.
http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/azam1.html
By Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam
Great pilots are made not born A man may possess good eyesight, sensitive hands and perfect coordination, but the end product is only fashioned by steady coaching, much practice and experience.
Air Vice Marshal J.E. Johnson, RAF
There seems to be a general consensus of opinion today that in a comparison of strength between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, the Indian advantage in numbers is counterbalanced by the Pakistani advantage in personnel, training, and tactics. Since India has been successful in narrowing the technology gap, which Pakistan possessed over India for three decades from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, some Pakistani defence policymakers have put even more emphasis on the perceived Pakistani advantage in personnel. In fact, some would argue that the Pakistani fighter pilot, his training, and his tactics are so superior that even though the Indians have now caught up in technology, the Pakistan Air Force still has an overall edge in combat capability as long as the quantitative edge does not proceed more than 3:1 in Indias favour.
This article examines that argument and provides some answers to difficult questions surfaced by this issue. Is it true that the Pakistani fighter pilot is inherently better than his Indian counterpart? Are Pakistani training programmes and tactics better? If the comparisons are true, how much of an advantage does the Pakistani pilot maintain, and how does one measure the difference? Is this advantage widening or narrowing? Finally, and most importantly, once the advantage is determined, how does one go about improving the PAF to ensure an even greater advantage?
To begin a comparison of the two countries' fighter pilots' capabilities is not an easy task. While it is quite common for a defence analyst to compare air forces based on the quantity and quality of weapons systems, it is very rare to find an objective study of pilot capabilities. In fact, most analyses quantify combat capability as a product of numerous factors, such as aircraft, logistics, maintenance, munitions, etc. But the human factor (pilot ability, training, and tactics) is rarely included because its measurement is very subjective and its impact on the equation so little understood. Few will argue, however, that differences in pilot capability do exist, and some aspects of the human factor should be included in the equation if we are to achieve accurate comparisons in combat capability.
The human factor, as it relates to Indian and Pakistani air combat capability, constitutes three main variables (i) the inherent ability of the individual pilot, (ii) his training, and (iii) his tactics. These three variables, when added together, produce a pilot or "human factor" input to the overall effectiveness of a sortie or mission.
Let us now briefly look at each of these variables in turn
Inherent Ability
The first variable is the inherent ability of the pilot, or put another way, the quality of the individual as a fighter pilot, given equal training and tactics. The pilot's inherent ability is a product of the pilot selection process and the personnel assessment system that assigns and maintains the fighter pilot force. Compared to the Indian Air Force, the Pakistan Air Force does more pre-selection testing of personnel prior to their entering pilot training. Numerous and very difficult psychological, motor skills and other screening tests are given to measure inherent fighter pilot ability prior to selection for pilot training. Also, the Pakistan Air Force pilot selection is based on academic grades, officer-like qualities (OLQs), physical fitness and health and 20/20 vision. The pilot selection process, however, does not differentiate between skills necessary for fighter pilots and other pilots such as tactical transport or bomber pilots. This distinction made much later in the training cycle, is usually subjective, and can only select from those who have already been admitted into the programme. The PAF pilot selection system still suffers from the "universally assignable pilot" concept that has been around for years, known as the General Duties Pilot or GDP in PAF parlance.
When comparing the Pakistani pilot selection system with the Indians, one could safely say that Indias competition for pilot training slots is less competitive than Pakistans. The benefits after attaining the status of a fighter pilot in the Pakistan Air Force are some of the highest in the society. The PAF cadet colleges are considered among the best schools in the country, and military aviation is a highly sought-after and prestigious profession in Pakistan. According to the 1988 official history of the PAF, less than 1% of 6,500 (approximately 110) applicants are admitted into the PAF Academy, Risalpur every 6 months to train as fighter pilots (1). The significance of this input can also appreciated when one realizes that only the most academically sound and healthy candidates apply in the first place. Such is the stiff level of competition.
When PAF pilots graduate, they are assigned to specific unit aircraft and are managed by an officer personnel assessment system for subsequent assignments. The personnel system attempts to maintain the fighter pilot rated force at a level based on many factors, such as unit manning levels, training levels, and unit experience levels. Many reasons are used for moving fighter pilots from one air base to another, from one aircraft type to another, or from operational duties to a staff position. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the "fairness" of personnel moves, task assignment eligibility, career broadening, manning levels, and career progression. Rarely has the personnel system explained a move by stating that it is in the best interest of increased combat capability. In fact, this personnel assessment system would be hard pressed to move individuals based on pilot capability since there is no formal system that rates pilots according to their relative individual capabilities. Promotions are not made on pilot capabilities, but rather on officer effectiveness reports, and most assignments are made on professional career progression rather than combat capability.
If it is generally accepted then that the PAF has better pilots than the IAF, it certainly is not just due to pre-selection criteria, screening, competitive testing, or a personnel assessment system. In fact, the individual Indian pilot, when compared to Indian society as a whole, is probably one of the better educated and capable individuals in India. Even though the Indian fighter pilot is not as capable in inherent abilities with his Pakistani counterpart - due to lower quality human resource input - it seems safe to assume that any advantage which we maintain is not just due to the inherent abilities of our fighter pilots. However, if one were to get serious about upgrading the pilot force and in gaining or increasing an advantage in the human factor, the pilot selection and assessment areas would certainly be good starting points.
Training
The second main variable affecting the human factor is training. If there is one area where the Pakistan Air Force leads most countries except perhaps Israel and the United States it is in fighter training. In the past 30 years with the advent of the Combat Commanders School (CCS), air combat exercises, aggressor training, and Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT), the PAF has made gigantic strides towards realistic fighter training. From the lessons learned in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India and the 11-year war in Afghanistan with the Soviet Union between 1979-1988, even lessons from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars in which PAF pilots successfully participated, the Pakistan Air Force has developed one of the most realistic and ambitious training programmes in the world. However, these "new" training programmes are more than ten years old now, and they have reached a plateau in progress with stagnation setting in.
The Indians, on the other hand, were late in realizing that new generation fighters need new generation training philosophies. The Indians have recently made significant changes in their air combat tactics and training programmes. Pilot independence and initiatives are now stressed. The continual, technological upgrading of equipment and increasing proficiency in combat employment of that equipment have resulted in greatly increased Indian military aviation capabilities. Thus, even in the area of training where the PAF fighter pilots have always excelled, recent Indian initiatives demand new and more aggressive PAF training initiatives if Pakistan is to maintain its present advantage in the training variable.
The number of hours flown is part of this training variable. The average fighter pilot in the PAF logs approximately 220 flying hours a year, which is the second highest in the world, the highest being that of the United States Air Force (USAF) with 230 hours flying time per annum. This is higher than the number of hours logged by the Israeli Air Force pilots who log 180 hours per year and 80 hours more than the Indian Air Force pilots who log only 130 hours a year (2).
The number of hours flown in a year is extremely important, almost critical to making a good fighter pilot. Former USAF test pilot and US Defense Representative to Pakistan (1971-1973) and advisor to the Pakistan Air Force, Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Chuck E. Yeager, who was the first man to break the sound barrier, once commented, "it is the experience of the man in the cockpit that matters most" and the man who wins in air combat on any given day is invariably "the man with the most experience".
Training and experience are one in the same thing. If you have combat experience that would bestow an even greater advantage. However, it is the type of combat experience which matters. Not all combat experience confers any advantage to an air force. Actual combat experience is useless if it is not teaching you anything which may be of use in future. Thus, a Pakistani pilot who was training in an exercise at the PAF's Combat Commander School would have been gaining more experience than an Indian Air Force pilot who was flying a mission during the Kargil conflict in Jammu & Kashmir against a few hundred lightly armed Mujahideen. In this example the PAF pilot is not engaged in actual combat whereas the IAF pilot is. However, whereas the IAF pilot gaining actual combat experience, that experience is deceptive because it is not the type of experience which the IAF would have to confront in a full-scale war against Pakistan. In fact, fighting an air force against a few hundred lightly armed guerrilla freedom fighters is no achievement and would in fact, bestow an air force with a false sense of achievement in its capabilities. This is because the IAF was engaged in high altitude ground attack without air opposition (since it was fighting a civil war) in which the rebels were not possessed of an air force nor were they equipped with radar or even medium altitude surface-to-air missiles.
Tactics
The third variable in the human factor to be discussed is tactics. Although tactics are not a specific human quality, they are designed and employed by the pilot and therefore impact upon how well the pilot can employ his aircraft. In 1976, the Combat Commanders School (CCS), the PAFs elite fighter weapons and tactics school at Sargodha began experimenting with new fighter formations and tactics. These formations and tactics were a composite of lessons learned in air-to-air combat in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Although the formation was different from the old tactics, the most significant difference was the philosophical change in the wingman's duties. CCS detached the wingman from a very restrictive cover position ("fighting wing") on the leader to a more active role, manoeuvring independently, yet in co-ordination, with the leader. For the past 25 years, the PAF has been training with and refining such fluid attack tactics. In principle, Pakistani fighter pilots are free to design, test, and fly almost any variation of formations and tactics that they or their squadron wish to try. However, in practice, due to limited sorties, safety restrictions and a system that always requires training to the lowest denominator, tactics development today is in fact spotty and often neglected.
As noted earlier, the Indians are attempting to improve their tactics with each new generation of aircraft, and they are just beginning to give their pilots more independence. On the surface this appears to be a ten-year lag in tactical development. However, when one considers the Indian historical doctrine of mass, breakthrough, and strict command and control, the idea of large, inflexible, and slow manoeuvring formations may be more design than simple lack of progress. What may look to the Pakistani fighter pilot as an unimaginative tactic may to the Indian fighter commander be as sophisticated and advanced as his doctrines, force structure, and mission would dictate. And who is to say that fluid attack and independent manoeuvring would work better than regimental control in their battle schemes? In either case, suffice it to say that both the Pakistani and Indian tactics will change with the advent of new aircraft, missiles, and radar. What worked yesterday in the F-86 will not work in the F-16. The tactic used to defeat the Hawker Hunter or the MiG-21 will probably not be the best tactic to defeat the Su-30 or the MiG-29. The PAF has always been willing to change tactics, however, tactical development, evaluation, and implementation seem to be taking more time, money, and effort these days. And the Indians are not standing still. With their new equipment, most notably their Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s and Su-30s, they are experimenting with new tactics. So even in the tactics variable, the PAF advantage is no longer as significant as it used to be 15 years ago.
Thus, in a brief examination of the main variables that make up the human factor, it can be seen that although in each case no quantitative measurement can be made, there is reason to believe that the Pakistanis are slightly ahead of the Indians. However, whereas 10 or 15 years ago this advantage may have been quite large, the Indians seem to be narrowing the gap in all cases. PAF pilot selection and personnel management policies have not changed, and training and tactics initiatives, while dynamic after Afghanistan, have pretty much stagnated. In the meantime, the Indians have been plodding along in their inimitable way, slowly increasing their training realism and testing new tactical philosophies to match their weapons improvements. If Pakistan is to maintain any advantage that it may have in the human factor, drastic steps need to be taken soon.
We can increase tactical combat capability vis-à-vis India in a number of ways: buy more aircraft, buy better aircraft, build new aircraft, radar, and missiles, increase the spares, etc. The one factor, however, that could have the greatest impact, and yet is probably the least expensive and most easily changed, is the human factor. By launching an aggressive and dynamic programme to upgrade the fighter pilot force, the PAF could drastically alter the combat equation in its favour for years. Simple initiatives and policy changes affecting the human factor variables could make PAF fighter combat capability increase exponentially.
The inherent ability of the fighter pilot is one of the most important variables in the human factor, the easiest to change, and yet the most neglected. As an old fighter pilot once eloquently remarked, "You can train a hamburger, but when you're through, you still get a hamburger." Fighter pilot training today is a demanding process and without a good product to start with, no amount of excellent training will produce a quality fighter pilot. Therefore, the selection process must be changed to be more aggressive, more competitive, and even more selective than it already is. Large groups of candidates should be screened with sophisticated, modern testing procedures High academic grades and a perfectly healthy body and perfect vision should not be a qualification but a prerequisite for entry into the PAF. Additional factors should be present: commitment and dedication; perseverance; quick-thinking and quick-reflexes; an obsession with flying; and the pursuit of excellence. Large pilot attrition rates should be experienced in the early phases of training. Needless to say, specialized fighter training should begin early. At every stage of training, competition, and ratings based on fighter pilot performance should be used for selection to top fighter pilot positions.
The PAF personnel management and rating system needs a thorough review. Personnel assignment policies need to be changed so they can respond to the needs of combat capability and not to an arbitrary "good deal/bad deal" list. In other words, if an F-7 instructor job needs filling, you don't take the best F-16 pilot to fill it just because he's due a "bad deal." More sensitivity needs to be paid to the policies that force early rotations and create turbulence in the units. In today's fighter force, it takes two to three years to upgrade a flight lead and another two to three years to get good at it. Most new fighter pilots don't stay in their first squadron more than two to three years, and many don't remain in their first assignment aircraft longer than five years. The result is that most operational fighter squadrons are continually upgrading new pilots, and very few squadrons reach a level of high combat capability. What is required is a conscious effort to keep good fighter pilots in the same aircraft, same mission, same unit for longer periods of time. Gone are the days when we can afford a universally assignable pilot, or even a "generic fighter pilot."
To make these changes in the pilot selection process and personnel rating system requires major policy changes but should cost relatively little. When it comes to improving the training variable, however, costs do enter into the picture. Quality training is expensive, but expensive training is usually cheaper in the long run due to increased combat capability and a more efficient and effective fighting force. Yet nothing is more expensive than a lost war. New, innovative methods of training need to be developed to stay ahead of the Indians. State-of-the art combat simulators that rival the most advanced air-to-air training are available today. More air combat manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) and electronic combat ranges are needed. More flying time, range time, realistic scenarios, and composite force training are all high priorities. Actual combat is not the time to discover that you need more training.
At first glance, one would assume that tactics, unlike training, would be very cheap to change and would simply require a tactics manual change. However, tactics like the other variables are very difficult to measure, and in order to quantify the advantage of one tactic over another, testing is required. In-depth tactics testing is very time-consuming and costly. Conducting a valid tactics evaluation may take up to two years and hundreds of sorties. Here again "state-of-the-art" combat simulators can be extremely helpful in speeding up this process. The PAFs Thomson Training & Simulation (TT&S) F-16 combat simulator is a prime example of how combat simulators can be used to simulate realistic combat engagements better than could have been done in the real aircraft because of range, safety restrictions and costs. Tactics development, testing, and evaluation are too important to continue in the slow pace of only live-mission testing. A realistic state-of-the-art combat simulator similar to the one used for the F-16 should be devoted full time to tactics testing and evaluations. Like training, tactics development is expensive, but it needs to be improved if the PAF is to increase its advantage over the Indians.
An important fact which needs to be understood is that the quality of the human factor and training are intrinsically linked. Although the inherent human qualities are important, much can be achieved by training. In this sense, training is the crucial ingredient which distinguishes a good pilot from an average one.
In addition to the above three variables, there are nine other sub-variables which are part of the elements mentioned above but can be distinctly categorized. These sub-variables are: (i) intelligence, (ii) quick reflexes, (iii) quick decision-making abilities, (iv) psyche and attitude, (v) aggressiveness, (vi) training equipment, (vii) pilot age, (viii) pilot-to-cockpit ratio and (ix) situational awareness. While the first two are more general and self-explanatory and more a part of inherent ability, the latter seven are more distinct and need some explaining. So we shall ignore the first two and look at the remaining seven.
Quick Decision-Making Abilities
This is a human trait which is grossly underestimated and overlooked, especially in the context of fighter flying, whereas it is this trait which, in the heat of combat, can make the difference between life and death and between success and failure. The ability to make quick decisions has gained more importance with the advent of the jet age which has reduced time variables many times. Time-on-Target (TOT) has become shorter and combat aircraft reach each other sooner rather than later.
A PAF F-7 pilot who makes the right decision quickly is more likely to defeat an IAF pilot in a superior aircraft like the MiG-29 or the Su-30 who doesnt make the right decision or makes the right decision by taking too long to make it or worst still takes too long a time to make a decision and ends up with the wrong decision. Likewise, an IAF pilot flying a MiG-21 will be able to do the same with a PAF F-16 pilot if the latter was to commit the same mistake.
There are more than a thousand and one scenarios which could be cited in support of this. To go into detail here is beyond the purview of this article and it is the responsibility of three institutions within the PAF to cater to this subject; No. 37 (Combat Training) Wing, Mianwali, the Combat Commanders School (CCS), Sargodha and the Air War College, Karachi. These institutions are responsible for imparting air defence (and offence) theory and doctrine and fighter combat tactics and manoeuvring to their students.
Psyche & Attitude
The attitude of the fighter pilot and his goal orientation are critical factors. For example, the Project AIR FORCE report of the RAND Corporation on the Indian Air Force made the following observation:
Although all aspects of training are important, pilot training is critical and has attracted much attention recently. Apparently some difficulty has arisen in recruiting pilots, even though the yearly quota of 100 is relatively small. Many of those recruited do not wish to become fighter pilots, as transport pilots have a better future in the commercial aviation world.
This type of thinking is non-existent in the PAF. The last thing on the mind of PAF pilots is what they will do when they leave the Air Force. For Pakistani pilots, the Air Force is the destination, not a waypoint. If a pilot is flying combat planes for bread hes had it. The last thing you want is your pilots going into combat with the thought of better remuneration, retirement and pension plans occupying their minds.
Aggressiveness
A good fighter pilot must have one outstanding trait aggressiveness. As Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight - it's the size of the fight in the dog." Aggressiveness is fundamental to success in air combat, especially in air-to-air combat, and the fighter pilot who goes on the defensive is usually the first one to be shot down. PAF pilots never go into the air thinking they will lose. This is part of the PAF psyche and this is how Pakistani fighter pilots are trained to think. In air combat tactics, aggressiveness is the keynote of success. The principle is simple, the enemy on the defensive gives you the advantage, as he is trying to evade you and not to shoot you down.
Aggressiveness is not to be confused with recklessness and downright stupidity. Aggressiveness must be weighed in with the chances of success. This is an art and the Pakistanis and Israelis do it very well. This calculated aggressiveness is very different from plain raw aggressiveness. If simple aggressiveness were the key to success then many of the worlds air forces would enjoy the same reputation as the Pakistani and Israeli air forces.
PAF pilots are more aggressive in the air than their Indian counterparts and this is primarily due to what is termed the cornered cat syndrome. Pakistan is a country which lacks strategic depth. The term tactical retreat does not exist in the PAF vocabulary, nor for that matter in the vocabulary of any other branch of the Pakistan Armed Forces. For a tactical retreat over Pakistan would be suicidal for the PAF. It could well mean having an air base to land on and not having one to land on. The Indian Air Force can afford to lose its airfields at Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Halwara, Ambala, Hindan, Jaiselmer, Jodhpur and Jamnagar. All these IAF airfields are located within 300 km of the Pakistan border. Even in the likelihood of the IAF losing these airfields, it would still have 10 other major airfields to utilize located further afield. On the other hand, the majority of the PAFs major operational bases all come within 300 km of the Indian border, including PAF Base, Sargodha.
Training Equipment
The tools of training are also important in improving the quality of the human factor. Training is one field in which the PAF still maintains a significant advantage over the Indian Air Force even in technological terms. The PAFs primary flying trainer has for long been the Swedish-designed but Pakistani-manufactured MFI-17 Mushshak, built by the Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF) of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra whereas the basic trainer has been the T-37 jet trainer. Both these trainers have served the PAF well over the past 25 years and both these trainers have been superior to the IAF trainers, namely the Kiran Mark II, the HPT-32 and the Polish Iskra. The IAF is still flying the HPT-32 and it has no advanced jet trainer (AJT). It uses the MiG-21U as an advanced jet trainer, which is one of the reasons that the IAF continues to have one of the worlds highest aircraft attrition rates.
The PAF, on the other hand, has moved on to better aircraft. A new and much improved version of the indigenously manufactured Mushshak, the Super Mushshak, is now being inducted into the PAF Primary Flying Training Wing (PFTW) to replace the former as the PAFs primary trainer. As for the basic and intermediate flying training, the PAF has now begun replacing the ageing T-37s in its Basic Flying Training Wing (BFTW) with the PAC-NAMC K-8 Karakorum basic and intermediate jet trainer. The K-8 is today ranked as one of the worlds ten best jet trainers for basic and intermediate flying training along with the British BAe Hawk 100, the French Dassault Dornier Alpha Jet, the Italian Aermacchi MB-339, the Czech Aero L-59, the Russian MiG-AT and the Russian/Italian Yakovlev-Aermacchi Yak-AT.
However, this technological edge in training which the PAF possesses is temporary at best as the Indians are considering inducting an AJT in their training programme as well. Though the Indians will not be able to indigenously produce an AJT until 2015 at the earliest (and this is being optimistic), nevertheless, they are looking at three foreign-built jet trainers that may be assembled in India, if not bought off-the-shelf. These are the Russian MiG-AT, the most likely contender, the French Dassault Dornier Alpha Jet and the British BAe Hawk 100. The induction of any three of these AJTs will significantly improve IAF training standards and will, resultantly, improve the human factor in the IAF.
Good training equipment such as primary, basic and advanced jet trainers, flight simulators and ACMI are not affected by the human factor rather it is these elements that may in turn improve the human factor, sometimes even decisively. Good trainers, good instructors and a good training programme can make the difference between ace pilots and mediocre pilots, they can even transform a bad pilot into a good pilot. Of course, if you have a hamburger, it will always will be a hamburger.
Pilot Age
Interestingly, the average age of the pilots is also a factor, albeit a lessor one, in determining the overall human factor in the performance of an air force. Pushpinder Singh, Ravi Rikhye and Peter Steinemen, in their book, Fizaya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force (5), have done an interesting comparison between the respective ages of PAF and IAF pilots and the impact of age on performance. In their book they write:
In the PAF the squadron commander, a Wing Commander, and therefore the seniormost pilot, is around 35 years of age. In the IAF, a Squadron Leader is not considered for promotion to Wing Commander till he has put in 18 years of service. So IAF squadron commanders are a good 4 to 6 years older than their PAF counterparts. This age gap is manifest all the way down: an IAF fighter Squadron Leader is a minimum of 33 years old, as he is given this task after 11 years service. In other words, he is the same age as the PAF Wing Commander leading a fighter squadron! Whether the PAF pilots are in-country or out with other air forces is not particularly germane: the point is that they are available, and this has serious implications for the capabilities of the two air forces Mainly, however, the PAF can sustain a higher sortie rate than the IAF, which to some extent, offsets its smaller numbers.
They go on to observe:
It has been noted earlier that a PAF squadron commander takes charge at around age 34-35, typically 5 to 6 years earlier than his counterpart in the IAF. The differential in age will grow because, in the IAF, retirement age has now been extended by two years and there is an increasing pressure for Group Captains to assume command of squadrons. There are already some Group Captains commanding combat squadrons and some commanding helicopter units which used to be the province of a Squadron Leader. Group Captains have been in command of transport squadrons for some years. War in the air is to be fought by younger men, and here the PAF has an obvious advantage.
Age is not a decisive factor but it is, nevertheless, an important one contributing to the overall human factor input in any air force.
Pilot-to-Cockpit Ratio
The pilot-to-cockpit ratio is the number of pilots divided by the number of aircraft in an air force. This gives us the average number of pilots available to fly each aircraft at any given time. The pilot-to-cockpit ratio is dependent on both the quantity of pilots as well as the quantity of aircraft. It is, as such, not too important an ingredient in deciding the quality of the human factor. However, this is not to say it has no bearing on the human factor at all. Its contribution as a minor ingredient towards assessing the human factor qualifies it to be included in any analysis of the same.
Again, a quote from Fizaya would be useful:
Till 1971, the PAF graduated about 50 pilots/annually. After 1971 the number was increased we have arbitrarily assumed to 65/annually. In the late 1970s the number was increased again, to about 80. The IAF by contrast has graduated 110 pilots annually in each of the last 18 years [1971-1990] Assume the average graduating age is 23, then the number of IAF pilots aged 40 and below will be about 2000; whereas for the PAF it will be about 1400.
The authors go on to conclude that keeping in mind that transport aircraft and helicopters require two pilots to fly them the number of pilots required by the PAF were 420 whereas the IAF would require 1800 pilots. This was done on the basis that the PAF had a total of 360 aircraft, whereas the IAF had a total of 1300 aircraft. The ratio came to around 3:1 for the PAF and 1:1 for the IAF. This meant that whereas the PAF had 3 pilots to fly each aircraft in its inventory, the IAF had only 1 pilot to fly each aircraft in its inventory.
Since Fizaya was published in 1991, these statistics have now become outdated. The IAF has lost approximately 200 aircraft between 1991 and 1999 mainly due to attrition and a about half a dozen shot down by Pakistan and the Kashmiri Mujahideen in Jammu & Kashmir in 1999. Whereas the PAF lost approximately 35 aircraft to attrition in the same period. Also, whereas the PAF has inducted approximately 100 combat aircraft since 1991, the IAF has received only 16 combat aircraft in the same time-frame. However, the pilot-to-cockpit ratio remains roughly the same, i.e. 3:1 for the PAF and 1:1 for the IAF.
What bearing then does the pilot-to-cockpit ratio have on the human factor? In combat, a higher pilot-to-cockpit ratio would enable the PAF to generate more sorties, thus counterbalancing the IAF advantage in aircraft quantity to some extent. However, the main impact on the human factor would be that the PAF pilots would be able to get more rest and be fresh for successive missions. A pilot who has been given time to rest in between sorties and is fresh for the new mission will be able to perform much more efficiently and effectively in combat compared to a pilot who is fatigued and tired and has not received much sleep and rest. PAF pilots will be replaced at the end of each sortie and a fresh pilot would be ready to fly the next mission. IAF pilots would be forced to fly one sortie after another. Thus, they are more likely to become more fatigued than their PAF counterparts. Physical and mental fatigue reduces combat effectiveness by impairing the reflexes and mental alertness of the pilots. On the other hand, if the IAF rests its pilots by putting two pilots on one aircraft or uses fewer aircraft, it would be reducing its current 2:1 quantitative combat aircraft edge over the PAF.
Situational Awareness
Situational awareness is the ability of the pilot to keep track of events and foresee occurrences in the dynamic, fast-moving, three dimensional scenario of air combat, i.e. being aware of the situation around him while in the midst of air combat.
The fighter pilot of today is becoming more and more reliant on electronic force multipliers such as early warning radar (EWR), electronic counter measures (ECM), track-while-scan (TWS) and the ability of his aircraft to track, engage and shoot down multiple targets simultaneously. This means that he has more information available to let him know what is going on around him and his situational awareness lies mainly in his ability to make use of the presented information. How effectively a fighter pilot makes use of these tools depends on his personal traits of quick-thinking, quick-reflexes, intelligence and the ability to interpret large and swiftly emerging data into an overall picture of the situation around him. Thus, no matter how sophisticated the aircraft, it will not be able to help the pilot if he does not know to use and employ all this equipment and data to his advantage.
Conclusion
Some may argue that these kinds of human factors are irrelevant. It is fashionable nowadays to point to the importance and advancement of technology of warfare and argue that the nature of combat has changed. The emphasis now is on technology rather than human capability. If this argument is valid, any comparisons between modern warfare and warfare of the past are meaningless. In the slanted logic of this line of reasoning, machines are more important in war than men.
However, this view is not supported by eyewitness evidence from contemporary battlefields or air combat engagements. Admittedly, many things have changed in air combat since the First and Second World Wars and even since the Korean, Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan Wars. The recent 1991 US-Iraq Gulf War is touted as the prime example of the success of machine over man. Nobody realizes that the Iraqi Air Force was neither machine nor man. It simply did not put up a fight. The result of the Gulf War would have been much different had the Iraqi Air Force turned up in good numbers to put up a stiff fight. A US advantage in technology would not have prevented the Iraqi AF from inflicting unacceptable losses on the USAF and US Marines.
The physical factors of battle are different. The size and composition of forces vary greatly. Spatial and geometric relationships are altogether different, as are terrain and logistical factors. All these aside, several noted experts would agree that the combat psychology of participants in both eras remains essentially the same. Lt. Col. Barry D. Watts, USAF in his important book, The Foundations of U.S. Air Force Doctrine, commented:
Combat psychology constitutes the most stable, most timeless dimension of war. While the political goals of a particular conflict, weapons technologies, and above all else, the tactics appropriate against a given adversary on a given day can all change virtually overnight, "combat is combat and a combatant is a combatant."
On this basis, combat comparisons from any era and any form of warfare remain valid. Short of experiencing combat or spending a great deal of time with combat veterans, about the only way to learn of the nature of war is to study firsthand human experiences.
The importance which the PAF has always placed in improving the quality of its fighter pilot force has paid off through dividends in the form of highly skilled pilots. This can be guaged by the following statement of Gen. Chuck Horner of the United States Air Force (USAF) and Commander of Allied Forces in the 1991 Gulf War in his biography by Tom Clancy, Every Man A Tiger:
"Iraqi pilot training came from three sources: France, Pakistan and the former Soviet Union. Lucky for us, Soviet training proved dominant, with their emphasis on rigid rules, strict command arrangements and standardized tactics. Coupled with this centralized approach, the Soviets were suspicious of non-Russians and disliked Arabs . . . There was, however, a wild card. Not all training came from the Russians. Iraqi pilots were trained well by their French and Pakistani instructors . . . Pakistan has one of the best, most combat ready air forces in the world. They have to, their neighbour to the east is huge, and the two nations have a long history of hostilities. For Indian war planners, the Pakistan Air Force is their worst fear. Pakistani pilots are respected throughout the world, especially the Islamic world, because they know how to fly and fight. On one or two occasions, I had the opportunity to talk with Pakistani instructor pilots, who had served in Iraq. These discussions, didn't give me great cause to worry. The Russian domination of training prevented the Pakistanis from having any real influence on the Iraqi aircrew training program. Still, there had to be a few Iraqi pilots, who had observed and listened to their mentors from France and Pakistan . . . It was those few, I was concerned about."
The PAF fighter pilot community is at a critical junction. While the Indians outnumber the Pakistanis and have caught up in technology, our one remaining advantage is our fighter pilots. As has been shown, however, that human advantage is very fragile and even here the Indians show signs of progress. Unfortunately, the human factor is one of the factors of the combat capability equation that has gained little attention in the budget battles, the emphasis being more on equipment. I believe that with some renewed high-level interest and a moderate infusion of money, the human factor can be significantly altered in the proper direction. It seems only natural that a fighter force with good aircraft, missiles, and radar should also have pilots to fly them who are second to none. In air combat there are no points for second place.
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