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Does Iran truly have the ability to extend its reach into the Arab world?
The notion of “Shi’a crescent” was first articulated in late 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan in an interview he gave a few weeks before the first parliamentary elections in Iraq, in which he expressed his fears about the growing influence of Iran in the Arab Middle East. Since then, the “Shi’a crescent” has been used extensively in the media in its analysis of the reshaping of Middle Eastern politics. Several developments in the region have fed into this narrative: the ongoing role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its more recent involvement in the Syrian civil war, the fact that Bashar Al-Assad’s regime draws much of its support from Alawites (an offshoot of Shi’a Islam), and accusations of an alliance between Iran and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, to name just a few.
The success of this expression reveals some of the preconceptions that circulate, in the Middle East and elsewhere, about the Arab Shi’a and their relations with Iran. First, the Shi’a are seen as constituting a unified body that crosses national borders that puts obedience to religious authority higher than loyalty to nation and political rulers. Secondly, the Shi’a are considered inherently tied to Iran, a state that would command both their religious and political loyalty. These views are not only distorting the reality: They lead to dangerous domestic and foreign policies that undermine social integration and political stability, and feed the rhetoric of the radical Salafists who are doing so much to create sectarian discord.
The notion of “Shi’a crescent” was first articulated in late 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan in an interview he gave a few weeks before the first parliamentary elections in Iraq, in which he expressed his fears about the growing influence of Iran in the Arab Middle East. Since then, the “Shi’a crescent” has been used extensively in the media in its analysis of the reshaping of Middle Eastern politics. Several developments in the region have fed into this narrative: the ongoing role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its more recent involvement in the Syrian civil war, the fact that Bashar Al-Assad’s regime draws much of its support from Alawites (an offshoot of Shi’a Islam), and accusations of an alliance between Iran and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, to name just a few.
The success of this expression reveals some of the preconceptions that circulate, in the Middle East and elsewhere, about the Arab Shi’a and their relations with Iran. First, the Shi’a are seen as constituting a unified body that crosses national borders that puts obedience to religious authority higher than loyalty to nation and political rulers. Secondly, the Shi’a are considered inherently tied to Iran, a state that would command both their religious and political loyalty. These views are not only distorting the reality: They lead to dangerous domestic and foreign policies that undermine social integration and political stability, and feed the rhetoric of the radical Salafists who are doing so much to create sectarian discord.
