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The Kurdish Kaleidoscope
Global Village Space|
Andrew Korybko |
The Kurdish “nation” is as diverse as the colors of a kaleidoscope and stands little chance at ever coming together into a unified political entity, but that hasn’t stopped some external powers from trying to bring this about in order to advance their own geostrategic goals.
There’s plenty of talk nowadays about the future of a transnational entity that is popularly referred to as “Kurdistan”, particularly as it relates to the upcoming independence referendum of the Kurdish Regional Government (“Southern Kurdistan”) next month in Northern Iraq. The subject of conversation isn’t just about the future of this autonomous and de-facto independent territory, but about what awaits the Kurdish-inhabited areas of Turkey, Syria, and Iran afterward. Kurdish “nationalists” advocate the formation of a transnational unified “Kurdistan”, while its opponents point out just how destabilizing of an event this would be for a Mideast already shaken by years of war and rivalry. What both sides do agree on, however, is that that next month’s independence vote in Iraq will have profound implications for the entire region, with the question coming down to what degree it’ll succeed in emboldening separatist Kurds in the other three aforementioned states, the reaction that their host governments will have to these developments, and the role of foreign forces amidst all of this.
The Contradictions Of “Kurdistan”
Before analyzing the situation any further, a few important words need to be said about “Kurdistan” and the very concept of a Kurdish “nation”. Barely anyone sensible denies that the transnational population which calls itself “Kurds” has acquired a subjective sense of “otherness” over the years by which they view themselves as different from the majority ethnic group in the states they reside in. Moreover, it just so happens that these individuals reside in a contiguous area at the confluence of the Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian states, but it’s here where the similarities between them end. The people who identify as “Kurds” have never had their own state at any point in history, and they’ve lived either as nomads or soldiers for most of their existence. They don’t even speak the same language, and there are fierce rivalries both between the two closest pairs of Kurds in Syria & Turkey and Iran & Iraq and within their respective subcategories. The best example of this centrifugal dynamics at play is the 1990s Kurdish “civil war” in Northern Iraq.
All of this makes it extremely difficult to even speak of a “Kurdistan”, so it’s much more accurate to instead refer to this quad-state pivot region as the “Kurdish Cultural Space” (KCS) except when discussing the specific geopolitical project of “Kurdistan”.
The diversity of the Kurdish population justifies comparing it to a “kaleidoscope” because it’s essentially a mishmash of separate identities which attempt to form some sort of semi-cohesive composite whole. Therein, however, lays another subject of debate because it’s questionable whether the broad “Kurdish” population even collectively satisfies the criteria for being referred to as a “nation” given their historical, cultural, linguistic, and other differences, let alone their lack of a sincere grassroots desire to politically unite together across state boundaries. The argument can be made that the transnational “Kurdistan” project is the unpopular mission of extreme militant organizations which have hijacked a slew of originally civil society causes in order to advance their radical ideological visions, and that these groups are now being used as the vanguards of foreign forces in order to geopolitically re-engineer the Mideast along the lines of Ralph Peters’ “Blood Borders”. Given their social diversity, however, these militant organizations need a shared ideological rallying cry to unite themselves and their followers at least for the time being, ergo the promotion of “Neo-Marxism” within their ranks.
Read more: The Kurds Are Ethnically Cleansing Arabs From Raqqa, And The World…
From “Kurdistan” To The “Kurdish Cultural Space”
At this moment in time, not all Kurdish militant-separatist groups embrace this ideology, with the most salient example being the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Northern Iraq, so this represents yet another internal fault line within the transnational “Kurdistan” movement, one which importantly affects the key geopolitical driver of such developments and puts it at odds with the Turkish-based PKK and its PYD-YPG (the first is the political wing, the second is the military one) Syrian offshoot. The core of the Iranian Kurdish separatist movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), is leftist-inclined but not to the zealously dogmatic extent that the other two is that it won’t cooperate with the KDP. On the topic of the KDP, it should also be said that it’s facing a tough “internal” challenge from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran “opposition” parties, which further underlines the political diversity prevalent within the transnational Kurdish community. All of this makes it extremely difficult to even speak of a “Kurdistan”, so it’s much more accurate to instead refer to this quad-state pivot region as the “Kurdish Cultural Space” (KCS) except when discussing the specific geopolitical project of “Kurdistan”.
The “Second Geopolitical ‘Israel”
Proceeding from the earlier statement that the transnational “Kurdistan” movement within the KCS is being fostered and weaponized by external powers, it’s now relevant to describe exactly what was meant by that. The KCS strategically sits at the nexus of the Turkish, Arab, and Persian civilizations and represents their shared periphery, thereby making it the pivot region between them. Moreover, seeing as how the Mideast is already widely recognized as the most pivotal location in Afro-Eurasia because of its location between Europe, Russia, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Africa, it’s possible to speak of the KCS being the “pivot region’s pivot” and accordingly the most strategic piece of real estate in the Eastern Hemisphere. From the perspective of the US, it is absolutely indispensable to the preservation of its fading unipolar hegemony in the world to acquire control over the KCS in order to multi-manage the four states that it’s a part of, which in turn would give Washington unparalleled influence over this part of Afro-Eurasia and beyond.
The first argument against the formation of an anti-“Kurdistan” coalition is that there’s too much distrust between some of the states of this prospective entity and that they don’t want the armed forces of their neighbors involved in combat operations on their territory. This is certainly the case with Turkey and Iran, and it also – at least “officially” – applies to Turkey and Syria as well.
This helps explain why there are active efforts underway to coordinate simultaneous anti-state insurgencies in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. What the US wants to do is carve out a “second geopolitical ‘Israel’” in the sense of having a minority group militantly form a new “nation” from the existing territory of others and then use this “country” as the launching pad for furthering its geostrategic ambitions in the region. Just like with “Israel’s” “founding”, however, there’s a very high chance that the regional states will band together to oppose this shared threat, but it’s uncertain what their “tripwire” for collective action will be, or whether the three separate and historically feuding civilizations (Arabs, Persians, and Turks) can successfully unite in a coordinated enough manner to prevent his threat from materializing. It already seems to be a certainty that the Kurds of Northern Iraq will vote for independence by the end of next month, but nobody knows whether the formalization of their years-long de-facto independence is a pressing enough geopolitical development to form a coalition or not.
Read more: How America’s missile stop Syria’s dash for Deir az-Zor
The Case Against The Anti-“Kurdistan” Coalition
Prevailing Distrust:
From an external state-to-state standpoint, it makes sense for the four countries within the KCS to come together at this crucial time and preempt the creation of a geopolitical center of gravity which could eventually serve as the nucleus for transnational destabilization in the name of “Kurdistan”, but there are also many reasons to doubt that they’ll do so aside from the historic absence of coordinated military action between them. The first argument against the formation of an anti-“Kurdistan” coalition is that there’s too much distrust between some of the states of this prospective entity and that they don’t want the armed forces of their neighbors involved in combat operations on their territory. This is certainly the case with Turkey and Iran, and it also – at least “officially” – applies to Turkey and Syria as well.
Read full article.......
The Kurdish Kaleidoscope
Global Village Space|
Andrew Korybko |
The Kurdish “nation” is as diverse as the colors of a kaleidoscope and stands little chance at ever coming together into a unified political entity, but that hasn’t stopped some external powers from trying to bring this about in order to advance their own geostrategic goals.
There’s plenty of talk nowadays about the future of a transnational entity that is popularly referred to as “Kurdistan”, particularly as it relates to the upcoming independence referendum of the Kurdish Regional Government (“Southern Kurdistan”) next month in Northern Iraq. The subject of conversation isn’t just about the future of this autonomous and de-facto independent territory, but about what awaits the Kurdish-inhabited areas of Turkey, Syria, and Iran afterward. Kurdish “nationalists” advocate the formation of a transnational unified “Kurdistan”, while its opponents point out just how destabilizing of an event this would be for a Mideast already shaken by years of war and rivalry. What both sides do agree on, however, is that that next month’s independence vote in Iraq will have profound implications for the entire region, with the question coming down to what degree it’ll succeed in emboldening separatist Kurds in the other three aforementioned states, the reaction that their host governments will have to these developments, and the role of foreign forces amidst all of this.
The Contradictions Of “Kurdistan”
Before analyzing the situation any further, a few important words need to be said about “Kurdistan” and the very concept of a Kurdish “nation”. Barely anyone sensible denies that the transnational population which calls itself “Kurds” has acquired a subjective sense of “otherness” over the years by which they view themselves as different from the majority ethnic group in the states they reside in. Moreover, it just so happens that these individuals reside in a contiguous area at the confluence of the Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian states, but it’s here where the similarities between them end. The people who identify as “Kurds” have never had their own state at any point in history, and they’ve lived either as nomads or soldiers for most of their existence. They don’t even speak the same language, and there are fierce rivalries both between the two closest pairs of Kurds in Syria & Turkey and Iran & Iraq and within their respective subcategories. The best example of this centrifugal dynamics at play is the 1990s Kurdish “civil war” in Northern Iraq.
All of this makes it extremely difficult to even speak of a “Kurdistan”, so it’s much more accurate to instead refer to this quad-state pivot region as the “Kurdish Cultural Space” (KCS) except when discussing the specific geopolitical project of “Kurdistan”.
The diversity of the Kurdish population justifies comparing it to a “kaleidoscope” because it’s essentially a mishmash of separate identities which attempt to form some sort of semi-cohesive composite whole. Therein, however, lays another subject of debate because it’s questionable whether the broad “Kurdish” population even collectively satisfies the criteria for being referred to as a “nation” given their historical, cultural, linguistic, and other differences, let alone their lack of a sincere grassroots desire to politically unite together across state boundaries. The argument can be made that the transnational “Kurdistan” project is the unpopular mission of extreme militant organizations which have hijacked a slew of originally civil society causes in order to advance their radical ideological visions, and that these groups are now being used as the vanguards of foreign forces in order to geopolitically re-engineer the Mideast along the lines of Ralph Peters’ “Blood Borders”. Given their social diversity, however, these militant organizations need a shared ideological rallying cry to unite themselves and their followers at least for the time being, ergo the promotion of “Neo-Marxism” within their ranks.
Read more: The Kurds Are Ethnically Cleansing Arabs From Raqqa, And The World…
From “Kurdistan” To The “Kurdish Cultural Space”
At this moment in time, not all Kurdish militant-separatist groups embrace this ideology, with the most salient example being the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Northern Iraq, so this represents yet another internal fault line within the transnational “Kurdistan” movement, one which importantly affects the key geopolitical driver of such developments and puts it at odds with the Turkish-based PKK and its PYD-YPG (the first is the political wing, the second is the military one) Syrian offshoot. The core of the Iranian Kurdish separatist movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), is leftist-inclined but not to the zealously dogmatic extent that the other two is that it won’t cooperate with the KDP. On the topic of the KDP, it should also be said that it’s facing a tough “internal” challenge from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran “opposition” parties, which further underlines the political diversity prevalent within the transnational Kurdish community. All of this makes it extremely difficult to even speak of a “Kurdistan”, so it’s much more accurate to instead refer to this quad-state pivot region as the “Kurdish Cultural Space” (KCS) except when discussing the specific geopolitical project of “Kurdistan”.
The “Second Geopolitical ‘Israel”
Proceeding from the earlier statement that the transnational “Kurdistan” movement within the KCS is being fostered and weaponized by external powers, it’s now relevant to describe exactly what was meant by that. The KCS strategically sits at the nexus of the Turkish, Arab, and Persian civilizations and represents their shared periphery, thereby making it the pivot region between them. Moreover, seeing as how the Mideast is already widely recognized as the most pivotal location in Afro-Eurasia because of its location between Europe, Russia, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Africa, it’s possible to speak of the KCS being the “pivot region’s pivot” and accordingly the most strategic piece of real estate in the Eastern Hemisphere. From the perspective of the US, it is absolutely indispensable to the preservation of its fading unipolar hegemony in the world to acquire control over the KCS in order to multi-manage the four states that it’s a part of, which in turn would give Washington unparalleled influence over this part of Afro-Eurasia and beyond.
The first argument against the formation of an anti-“Kurdistan” coalition is that there’s too much distrust between some of the states of this prospective entity and that they don’t want the armed forces of their neighbors involved in combat operations on their territory. This is certainly the case with Turkey and Iran, and it also – at least “officially” – applies to Turkey and Syria as well.
This helps explain why there are active efforts underway to coordinate simultaneous anti-state insurgencies in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. What the US wants to do is carve out a “second geopolitical ‘Israel’” in the sense of having a minority group militantly form a new “nation” from the existing territory of others and then use this “country” as the launching pad for furthering its geostrategic ambitions in the region. Just like with “Israel’s” “founding”, however, there’s a very high chance that the regional states will band together to oppose this shared threat, but it’s uncertain what their “tripwire” for collective action will be, or whether the three separate and historically feuding civilizations (Arabs, Persians, and Turks) can successfully unite in a coordinated enough manner to prevent his threat from materializing. It already seems to be a certainty that the Kurds of Northern Iraq will vote for independence by the end of next month, but nobody knows whether the formalization of their years-long de-facto independence is a pressing enough geopolitical development to form a coalition or not.
Read more: How America’s missile stop Syria’s dash for Deir az-Zor
The Case Against The Anti-“Kurdistan” Coalition
Prevailing Distrust:
From an external state-to-state standpoint, it makes sense for the four countries within the KCS to come together at this crucial time and preempt the creation of a geopolitical center of gravity which could eventually serve as the nucleus for transnational destabilization in the name of “Kurdistan”, but there are also many reasons to doubt that they’ll do so aside from the historic absence of coordinated military action between them. The first argument against the formation of an anti-“Kurdistan” coalition is that there’s too much distrust between some of the states of this prospective entity and that they don’t want the armed forces of their neighbors involved in combat operations on their territory. This is certainly the case with Turkey and Iran, and it also – at least “officially” – applies to Turkey and Syria as well.
Read full article.......
The Kurdish Kaleidoscope
