Some thoughts about China's nuclear expansion

[ZeEa5KPul]

I usually don't read very long posts but your comment prompted me to it. However, frankly I am a bit disappointed. the post is largely filled with materials mostly from somewhere on Internet and touted by typical armchair strategists. The statement like this

You shouldn't have wasted your time, clearly what I write isn't for you. I'm sure there's an Ayn Rand book near you you'd enjoy.

 

[nang2]

You shouldn't have wasted your time, clearly what I write isn't for you. I'm sure there's an Ayn Rand book near you you'd enjoy.

I do enjoy Ayn Rand's books. Thanks for reminding me. However, if you couldn't engage in any rational debates, then, clearly what I wrote wasn't for you, either.

 

[Shotgunner51]

China needs an open and unambiguous superiority in quantity, quality and delivery system of nukes

Absolutely agree with you. First of all China has already built a sizable 2nd strike capability, though it's ''missing" entirely from any NTI/ICNND/FAS reports for some mysterious reason. This capability is expected to further develop say next gen SSBN/SLBM (096/JL-3), upgrade early warning system (orbital/ground), next gen small/MIRV strategic warheads, more variety of HGV after DF-17 for different ranges, further improved DF-41, and H20/ALCM, etc.

As regarding the decades old "few hundred warheads" story, it refers to the 1990's stockpile of 1st generation 3.3 megaton thermonuclear warheads mounted on those "old fashion" silo-based ICBM. This stockpile has an enormous firepower of at least 294 megatons, however they maybe deem unfit for 2nd strike, but China retains them in active duty as the 1st strike option whenever situation calls for it. In fact with techs like next gen small/MIRV strategic warheads, FOBS, HGV, etc, "old fashion" silo-based ICBM can become effective strike weapon once again. Recently we are calling for NFU from US side, so all Sino-US wars shall be kept conventional, they are not the only country with a massive 1st strike force.

Other than strike forces, China has built a comprehensive infra to support strategic offence/defence under PLASSF command. Like IR early warning, EW, recon, Beidou, satcom, tracking, ABM (land based HQ-19; sea based HQ-26) and ASAT (DN-2/3 for high orbits like MEO/HEO), etc. Other than a whole fleet of CZ rockets, there is also quick-reaction orbital launch system like Kuaizhou to fast replenish damaged assets, and CZ-7 sea-based launch platform to be deployed soon.

 

[Viet]

The recent news about China's nuclear advancements has encouraged me to collect some thoughts on these developments and put them into a broader strategic framework. I think many of us here felt that this expansion was long overdue, but I didn't appreciate just how much it would improve China's overall position until I thought more deeply about the matter.

First, I'd like to stress that this buildup is very real. Any talk about "wind farms" (other than East Wind farms) or "the Pentagon is just lying to fundraise" and you can see yourself out of my thread. That's useful disinformation to spread around social media, but it has no place in a serious analysis. To anyone who thinks otherwise, I can only recommend that you follow the ethos of the successful drug dealer: never get high on your own supply.

With that out of the way, I'd like to examine the first and most obvious strategic implication: The impossibility of a large American first strike that relies on missile defense to neutralize the surviving remnants launched in retaliation. Having three large fields of missile silos ready to launch at a moment's notice and completing the necessary early warning systems - primarily ground-based radars and infra-red monitoring satellites - means that any first strike won't have the chance to land before China launches a retaliation so obliterating that it deletes the US from existence. If we are thinking about the escalation ladder in a conflict, China has just matched the US at the highest rung of that ladder and removed any option America had of climbing to that rung.

This in and of itself is a very salutary development; by expanding and improving its arsenal, China has stopped the US from posing an existential threat to it. But there are far subtler benefits to be had than just securing China's survival - as I just mentioned, by filling the gap at the highest rung of the escalation ladder, China has removed from the US the option of climbing to that rung. Let's extend that idea and fill the gaps China has in its escalation ladder from the top down...

While the ICBM silos and Mach 20+ hypersonic glide vehicle tests are well-attested, what follows is mostly my own speculation (although still backed by evidence). Suppose China doesn't just improve its strategic arsenal, but expands and improves its tactical nuclear weapons as well. There have been some indications that it's doing this already - namely the dual nuclear/conventional precision strike role for the DF-26 IRBM. This would match the US's tactical nuclear weapons rung of the escalation ladder, which it would be tempted to escalate to if it's losing a conventional conflict. Having a robust tactical nuclear weapons arsenal gives symmetric responses to China should the US escalate to that level, which precisely ensures that it won't.

An important principle to note here is that freezing the US out from escalation to a certain level on the ladder actually opens up coercive options for China at the levels below it. Having a robust, numerous, and diverse nuclear arsenal allows China freedom of action at the conventional level of conflict, free from the fear that the US might escalate to a nuclear level where China would have no response. This technological advancement would even allow China to deter purely conventional attacks on its homeland (for example, bombardment of its military-industrial infrastructure) by threatening asymmetric tactical nuclear strikes on similar US targets. For example, a very accurate HGV armed with a one kiloton nuclear device (very small by nuclear weapons' standards) fired at a US shipyard following a US attack on a Chinese shipyard would destroy the US shipyard without annihilating the city it's in. I foresee a much expanded role for such tactical nuclear warfighting in Chinese military doctrine in the decades to come.

Now, I imagine that at least some readers would have their hackles raised by this. A (albeit small) nuclear first strike on the US homeland? My response to this objection is that we ought not to be too fixated on the physics of the weapons involved and instead look at the more pertinent factor: the scale of devastation. A one kiloton detonation is around the scale of the Beirut Explosion; do you know how many people died in the Beirut Explosion? 218. By contrast, consider how many people would die in a conventional attack that destroyed the Three Gorges Dam. The relevant principle that should guide China's decision on striking the continental US is a simple one: equality of devastation. If the US wants its homeland untouched, what it must do is very simple - extend China the same courtesy.

While operationally extremely provocative, such a doctrine is (perhaps paradoxically) strategically reactive.

Another mission to consider for the ostensible tac-nuke armed HGV (and future Chinese systems like the H-20 stealth bomber) is strikes against the US's missile defense infrastructure. It's often noted that the test record of missile defense systems against ICBMs is spotty at best and that a sophisticated adversary could easily overcome it. Be that as it may, US decisionmakers believe that their missile defense works and so might contemplate escalation based on the false assumption that they are protected from retaliation. That delusion is a dangerous one for them to entertain, hence they should be promptly disabused of it in a serious crisis.

What would the cumulative effect of China closing the gaps in its escalation ladder from the top down as I've outlined be? First, as I've already mentioned, greatly expanded freedom of action at the conventional level. Second, the psychological impact of such a stark change in the balance of power on US allies will be wrenching. The decision a country like Japan would make in joining the US in a conflict (or even maintaining a formal alliance) depends ultimately on considerations of its own survival - nobody is going to tag along with the US on a suicide mission. A US ally like Japan understands that if the US can't escalate to the nuclear level to protect it, China could maul it solely with conventional weapons and the US would have no response. Countries throughout the western Pacific would start to see a security relationship with the US as an ever increasing liability, and it would not escape their notice that the US can ultimately leave the region while they can't. Third, China's conventional buildup has reached such a point that the US is seriously contemplating losing a conflict. What usually happened historically when a state perceived its position so dramatically weakening was it launched a war out of desperation and "now or never" thinking. An expanded Chinese nuclear arsenal and the credible threat of its use prevents the US from launching such a war.

Having said this, I don't believe that a war with Taiwan is imminent or even likely in the next decade or two. The primary reason is that while a nuclear expansion solves the problems of vertical escalation China has, it doesn't address the problems of horizontal escalation. The US has options beyond direct military attacks against China - for instance, it can blockade Chinese shipping or disconnect China from the dollar trading system. These problems require different (and much slower) solutions that I'll touch on here. China can neutralize the threat of blockades by expanding the PLAN (most crucially, the nuclear attack submarine fleet) and basing it in friendly countries along its sea lanes. I have in mind specifically Cambodia and Pakistan, and perhaps others like Myanmar, Iran, and Syria. The problem of trade sanctions can be resolved by developing China's interbank payment system CIPS and its central bank digital currency. More importantly, strategies like dual circulation would reduce and eventually eliminate China's vulnerability to foreign technology, and carbon neutrality would obviate the need for hydrocarbon imports.

Overall, a very significant development that augurs greater things to come.

The question is whether or not you feel more safer with more nuclear weapons? How many is enough? The USSR had 35,000 per NTI in 1991 before it collapsed. Making 1,000 nukes is not more difficult than making 100.
Just a fraction of the arsenal would push humanity to extinction.
Sometimes it’s good in life to step back from the brink and think again if it’s worth of.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The question is whether or not you feel more safer with more nuclear weapons? How many is enough? The USSR had 35,000 per NTI in 1991 before it collapsed. Making 1,000 nukes is not more difficult than making 100.
Just a fraction of the arsenal would push humanity to extinction.
Sometimes it’s good in life to step back from the brink and think again if it’s worth of.

you should ask that question of others, not China. They started this game. They said it's OK for the world to burn. No problem, then we'll fight to see who reigns in hell.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

The question is whether or not you feel more safer with more nuclear weapons? How many is enough? The USSR had 35,000 per NTI in 1991 before it collapsed. Making 1,000 nukes is not more difficult than making 100.
Just a fraction of the arsenal would push humanity to extinction.
Sometimes it’s good in life to step back from the brink and think again if it’s worth of.

As many as the US has. As for stepping back from the brink, China will do it right after the US does. By the way, you have some role to play in this as well - after all, China has to make sure all the little countries in the region know who the boss is.

However, if you couldn't engage in any rational debates

Oh, but I can and regularly do. Just not with Randroids.

They said it's OK for the world to burn. No problem, then we'll fight to see who reigns in hell.

 

[nang2]

Oh, but I can and regularly do. Just not with Randroids.

By calling names, you are no different from Karl Marx who simply refused to engage in debates and just claimed the opponent was a bourgeois. That is cowardice.

 

[retaxis]

Even if it is just to make the West forget about messing with China, it is still worth it to develop 5k nukes.

 

[Oldman1]

You need to take the word "contain" out of your vocabulary. The best you can hope for in the future is that you have some means of self defence for a place like Guam. If you base nuclear weapons there then prepare to have it turned into a puddle of molten glass.

Don't need to take it out of my vocabulary just because you beg for it. LOL considering your proclaimed Guam killer missiles, wouldn't matter if we placed nuclear weapons or not, your intentions to glass the island because of its strategic location tells me its better to place the nukes to deter China's aggression and show Guam can hit back and CONTAIN PLAN.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Don't need to take it out of my vocabulary just because you beg for it.

Beg? I wanted to spare you the embarrassment of your delusional idea - but if you want to embarrass yourself, have at it.

LOL considering your proclaimed Guam killer missiles, wouldn't matter if we placed nuclear weapons or not, your intentions to glass the island

Don't impute motives onto China, that's just something you'll never get right. You're underestimating China's magnanimity and grace; if America behaves itself, China will let it keep Guam. But it will have to be demilitarized.

its better to place the nukes to deter China's aggression and show Guam can hit back and CONTAIN PLAN.

Horribly misguided and doomed to end in failure, but that's been every adventure the US has involved itself in since WWII (and we all know the Soviet Union was the real hero of that war). I suppose America is much like its people, it just never learns.

 

[Nan Yang]

The recent news about China's nuclear advancements has encouraged me to collect some thoughts on these developments and put them into a broader strategic framework. I think many of us here felt that this expansion was long overdue, but I didn't appreciate just how much it would improve China's overall position until I thought more deeply about the matter.

First, I'd like to stress that this buildup is very real. Any talk about "wind farms" (other than East Wind farms) or "the Pentagon is just lying to fundraise" and you can see yourself out of my thread. That's useful disinformation to spread around social media, but it has no place in a serious analysis. To anyone who thinks otherwise, I can only recommend that you follow the ethos of the successful drug dealer: never get high on your own supply.

With that out of the way, I'd like to examine the first and most obvious strategic implication: The impossibility of a large American first strike that relies on missile defense to neutralize the surviving remnants launched in retaliation. Having three large fields of missile silos ready to launch at a moment's notice and completing the necessary early warning systems - primarily ground-based radars and infra-red monitoring satellites - means that any first strike won't have the chance to land before China launches a retaliation so obliterating that it deletes the US from existence. If we are thinking about the escalation ladder in a conflict, China has just matched the US at the highest rung of that ladder and removed any option America had of climbing to that rung.

This in and of itself is a very salutary development; by expanding and improving its arsenal, China has stopped the US from posing an existential threat to it. But there are far subtler benefits to be had than just securing China's survival - as I just mentioned, by filling the gap at the highest rung of the escalation ladder, China has removed from the US the option of climbing to that rung. Let's extend that idea and fill the gaps China has in its escalation ladder from the top down...

While the ICBM silos and Mach 20+ hypersonic glide vehicle tests are well-attested, what follows is mostly my own speculation (although still backed by evidence). Suppose China doesn't just improve its strategic arsenal, but expands and improves its tactical nuclear weapons as well. There have been some indications that it's doing this already - namely the dual nuclear/conventional precision strike role for the DF-26 IRBM. This would match the US's tactical nuclear weapons rung of the escalation ladder, which it would be tempted to escalate to if it's losing a conventional conflict. Having a robust tactical nuclear weapons arsenal gives symmetric responses to China should the US escalate to that level, which precisely ensures that it won't.

An important principle to note here is that freezing the US out from escalation to a certain level on the ladder actually opens up coercive options for China at the levels below it. Having a robust, numerous, and diverse nuclear arsenal allows China freedom of action at the conventional level of conflict, free from the fear that the US might escalate to a nuclear level where China would have no response. This technological advancement would even allow China to deter purely conventional attacks on its homeland (for example, bombardment of its military-industrial infrastructure) by threatening asymmetric tactical nuclear strikes on similar US targets. For example, a very accurate HGV armed with a one kiloton nuclear device (very small by nuclear weapons' standards) fired at a US shipyard following a US attack on a Chinese shipyard would destroy the US shipyard without annihilating the city it's in. I foresee a much expanded role for such tactical nuclear warfighting in Chinese military doctrine in the decades to come.

Now, I imagine that at least some readers would have their hackles raised by this. A (albeit small) nuclear first strike on the US homeland? My response to this objection is that we ought not to be too fixated on the physics of the weapons involved and instead look at the more pertinent factor: the scale of devastation. A one kiloton detonation is around the scale of the Beirut Explosion; do you know how many people died in the Beirut Explosion? 218. By contrast, consider how many people would die in a conventional attack that destroyed the Three Gorges Dam. The relevant principle that should guide China's decision on striking the continental US is a simple one: equality of devastation. If the US wants its homeland untouched, what it must do is very simple - extend China the same courtesy.

While operationally extremely provocative, such a doctrine is (perhaps paradoxically) strategically reactive.

Another mission to consider for the ostensible tac-nuke armed HGV (and future Chinese systems like the H-20 stealth bomber) is strikes against the US's missile defense infrastructure. It's often noted that the test record of missile defense systems against ICBMs is spotty at best and that a sophisticated adversary could easily overcome it. Be that as it may, US decisionmakers believe that their missile defense works and so might contemplate escalation based on the false assumption that they are protected from retaliation. That delusion is a dangerous one for them to entertain, hence they should be promptly disabused of it in a serious crisis.

What would the cumulative effect of China closing the gaps in its escalation ladder from the top down as I've outlined be? First, as I've already mentioned, greatly expanded freedom of action at the conventional level. Second, the psychological impact of such a stark change in the balance of power on US allies will be wrenching. The decision a country like Japan would make in joining the US in a conflict (or even maintaining a formal alliance) depends ultimately on considerations of its own survival - nobody is going to tag along with the US on a suicide mission. A US ally like Japan understands that if the US can't escalate to the nuclear level to protect it, China could maul it solely with conventional weapons and the US would have no response. Countries throughout the western Pacific would start to see a security relationship with the US as an ever increasing liability, and it would not escape their notice that the US can ultimately leave the region while they can't. Third, China's conventional buildup has reached such a point that the US is seriously contemplating losing a conflict. What usually happened historically when a state perceived its position so dramatically weakening was it launched a war out of desperation and "now or never" thinking. An expanded Chinese nuclear arsenal and the credible threat of its use prevents the US from launching such a war.

Having said this, I don't believe that a war with Taiwan is imminent or even likely in the next decade or two. The primary reason is that while a nuclear expansion solves the problems of vertical escalation China has, it doesn't address the problems of horizontal escalation. The US has options beyond direct military attacks against China - for instance, it can blockade Chinese shipping or disconnect China from the dollar trading system. These problems require different (and much slower) solutions that I'll touch on here. China can neutralize the threat of blockades by expanding the PLAN (most crucially, the nuclear attack submarine fleet) and basing it in friendly countries along its sea lanes. I have in mind specifically Cambodia and Pakistan, and perhaps others like Myanmar, Iran, and Syria. The problem of trade sanctions can be resolved by developing China's interbank payment system CIPS and its central bank digital currency. More importantly, strategies like dual circulation would reduce and eventually eliminate China's vulnerability to foreign technology, and carbon neutrality would obviate the need for hydrocarbon imports.

Overall, a very significant development that augurs greater things to come.

There's only two strategies for nuclear weapons.

Preemptive strike - ie to destroy every single of your opponent's nuclear weapons. You cannot afford to miss even one.
This is a very very expensive strategy.

First. You will need tens of thousands of accurate nuclear weapons. And you will have a logistics nightmare trying to keep track of each and every one. Imagine losing one or have one fall into the wrong hands.

Second. You will need lots of satellite to track every single one of your opponent's nuclear weapons. An impossible task in the case of a country like Russia or China.

The second strategy is No First Use.
For this strategy the key is to be able to survive the first strike by your opponent and still to be able to mount a retaliatory respond. This will deter any opponent.

This is a much smarter and cheaper strategy. You do not need to match nuclear weapons one to one. Cheap decoys, Mobile launchers and sheath submarine can make it impossible for the opponent. You will have a small and manageable size of nuclear weapons.

 

[Viet]

As many as the US has. As for stepping back from the brink, China will do it right after the US does. By the way, you have some role to play in this as well - after all, China has to make sure all the little countries in the region know who the boss is.

Oh, but I can and regularly do. Just not with Randroids.

Well if that’s the case you successfully beat the US in battle or by peaceful means then ok. Viet people respect the strongest. We will pay tribute to China as the case in the past thousand year. Xi Jingping will receive tributes while his wife Peng will receive birthday gifts and other nice things from Vietnam. Should there are any concubines we will send them gifts too. That’s not a joke.
As long as we can keep our independence, our art of living then everything fine.

 

[IblinI]

Well if that’s the case you successfully beat the US in battle then ok. Viet people respect the strongest. We will pay tribute to China as the case in the past thousand year. Xi Jingping will receive tributes while his wife Peng will receive birthday gifts and other nice things from Vietnam. Should there are any concubines we will send them gifts too. That’s not a joke.
As long as we can keep our independence, our art of living then ok.

oh, mr viet..long time no see.

 

[Viet]

There's only two strategies for nuclear weapons.

Preemptive strike - ie to destroy every single of your opponent's nuclear weapons. You cannot afford to miss even one.
This is a very very expensive strategy.

First. You will need tens of thousands of accurate nuclear weapons. And you will have a logistics nightmare trying to keep track of each and every one. Imagine losing one or have one fall into the wrong hands.

Second. You will need lots of satellite to track every single one of your opponent's nuclear weapons. An impossible task in the case of a country like Russia or China.

The second strategy is No First Use.
For this strategy the key is to be able to survive the first strike by your opponent and still to be able to mount a retaliatory respond. This will deter any opponent.

This is a much smarter and cheaper strategy. You do not need to match nuclear weapons one to one. Cheap decoys, Mobile launchers and sheath submarine can make it impossible for the opponent. You will have a small and manageable size of nuclear weapons.

If you want to destroy a country of the size of the US, Russia or China you would need estimated 10,000 nuclear bombs.
Too impractical too expensive
You have to use different weapon.
Nuclear explosion bases on fusion and fission of nucleus. Energy is released by the difference of masses during the process. E=mc^2.
If you could make anti/proton, and anti/neutron in considerable amounts,
The nucleus proton and neutron would convert to pure energy by merging.
then voila the explosion would be thousands times larger than by fission and fusion.

Instead of 10,000 you would probably need 100.
The most effective way to end humanity.

 

[Oldman1]

Beg? I wanted to spare you the embarrassment of your delusional idea - but if you want to embarrass yourself, have at it.

Don't impute motives onto China, that's just something you'll never get right. You're underestimating China's magnanimity and grace; if America behaves itself, China will let it keep Guam. But it will have to be demilitarized.

Horribly misguided and doomed to end in failure, but that's been every adventure the US has involved itself in since WWII (and we all know the Soviet Union was the real hero of that war). I suppose America is much like its people, it just never learns.

LOL! You won't demilitarized Guam, just like U.S. telling China to demilitarize your artificial islands. China won't do it. And if China behaves itself, Guam won't punish China.