another problem is Russia has a serious issue with C2 which many are ignoring is this:
Russia has a serious problem of communication - they are allegedly relying of unencrypted baofeng and Motorola hf radios which are notoriously unreliable in mission critical communication.
Baofeng UV 82HP
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Secondly the encrypted radios that Russia do have apparently rely of 4G enabled BTS (Base Tower Stations) - as Russians have targeted Ukrainian Teleco BTS - they have discovered they cannot use their shiny encrypted radios.
Russian Encrypted VHF/UHF Azart Radio:
Azart 187-P1
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The Azart a sixth-generation digital tactical SDR with built-in encryption designed to provide Russian troops with secure and jam-resistant communications.
It operates in the very high frequency (VHF)/ultra high frequency (UHF) bands, has a range of 18 km in ground communications depending on configuration, can be used as a repeater station and can utilise GLONASS or GPS to provide positioning.
R168-25UE:
The Russians also utilise the R168-25UE at a battalion level which can provide a range of up to 300km depending on configuration:
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The Russians and indeed the Ukrainians too have been utilising satellite phones and ordinary cellphones to communicate.
Videos from the Russian War Report Wargonzo shows Russian commanders using the Thurya Sat Seleve:
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So why is there such a lack of encrypted military grade communication kit in the Russian military? Reading some Russian radio forums shows that there is a case of rampant corruption in the delivery and procurement of the Azart family of radios in the Russian army:
Link the the forum for your own reading pleasure:
http://www.radioscanner.ru/forum/topic48460-2.html
An account provided by a captured Russian soldier states, ‘The officers started stationing themselves further and further away from the fighting … they are out of radio range at this point, and no one can contact them’.
The soldier proceeds to explain that a lack of long-range communications equipment was preventing anyone from contacting the Central Command of the deployed forces.
It follows that some Russian soldiers may have resorted to the use of mobile phones to communicate with officers and each other in order to gain some situational awareness.
Radios like the
BaoFeng UV-82HP will be relatively easy for electronic warfare (EW) practitioners to exploit. Firstly, their lack of discernible military-grade COMSEC/TRANSEC means the radios should be relatively susceptible to straightforward jamming.
Secondly, this lack of COMSEC/TRANSEC could make it easy to feed false or misleading traffic into networks depending on these radios. This could pay tactical dividends for the Ukrainians, allowing them to sow disorganisation, doubt and demoralisation into Russian units.
It is highly likely these radios are being used for squad communications at the tactical edge by dismounted infantry. Attacking networks at the tactical edge using these radios could help blunt or slow Russian manoeuvres.
Moreover, transmissions from these radios could be relatively easy to detect using rudimentary communications intelligence (COMINT) equipment.
Once these transmissions are detected, COMINT systems could be used to follow the movement of the transmissions, and hence the movements of troops.
The communication of the Russians is so vulnerable that I was able to pick up a Russian transmission using SDR software where Ukrainians had hijacked comms and played the Ukrainian National Anthem over their transmission:
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