Pure Han people is in minority in China now, it is right
Han people don't considered all the kind of bai Yue, Xionu, Xiang etc are Han. we tell you the truth only. In fact true Han look don at you.
[Request] Source of Sprartly Islands Belonging to China
- Thread starter theniubt
- Start date
Pure Han people is in minority in China now, it is right
Han people don't considered all the kind of bai Yue, Xionu, Xiang etc are Han. we tell you the truth only. In fact true Han look don at you.
Kyle Sun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2014
- Messages
- 2,689
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Viet and PHi were colonized for many years.
No way for you to claim islands far away from your mainland, and when Mr Jiang claimed 9-dash lines , no one said "No"
Including Viet and Phi .
Now US and the other western accuse us just because we are communist country but not those island do not belong to us.
You are not a country before we claim those island ,Viet !
We how ourselves , no thanks.
terranMarine
BANNED
- Joined
- May 3, 2012
- Messages
- 7,597
- Reaction score
- -18
- Country
- Location
Welcome back Kyle 
Kyle Sun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2014
- Messages
- 2,689
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
No one said "No" when we declared 9 or 11 dashed line.
Damn , I was banned for a week !!!Welcome back Kyle
Situation changed after 8/15/1945.
Qing Gov does not have surveying and mapping tech to create so precise map.China's territory is finished at Hainan Island. no more.
Such kind of precise map must be created by foreign engineer ,and this map look like at the time of 1900 around.
Last edited:
Sonyuke_Songpaisan
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 6, 2011
- Messages
- 1,751
- Reaction score
- 1
- Country
- Location
so you have the bad experience of being facked by kmt
EastSea
BANNED
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2011
- Messages
- 3,787
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
This map is official map of Man Qing China. This Atlas stated that last point of China is Hannan Island.
BoQ77
BANNED
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2012
- Messages
- 8,704
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
May 18, 2014
Beijing’s dangerous arrogance in the South China Sea
Philip Bowring says Beijing’s superiority complex and selective reading of Southeast Asian history have become the toxic brew fuelling tensions in the South China Sea
China’s current behaviour vis-à-vis its South China Sea neighbours is aggressive, arrogant and smacks of Han chauvinism and ethnocentrism. Far from being an expression of national pride, it is giving patriotism a bad name. Patriotic Hongkongers should recognise it for what it is: a dangerous ploy.
Not only has Beijing bared expansionist teeth to Vietnam and the Philippines, it has now succeeded in shifting Indonesia from a position of trying to act as a moderator between China and the other South China Sea states to opponent. Twice in recent months, Indonesia has accused China of claiming part of its Natuna island archipelago. So much for a “peaceful rise” when you rile neighbours with populations of more than 400 million, who you assume to be weak.
All China’s sea claims are wrapped up in that nine-dash line which extends more than 1,000 nautical miles from the coasts of Guangdong and Hainan to close to Borneo, the island shared by Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, and includes almost all the sea between Vietnam and the Philippines. This claim encompasses more than 90 per cent of the sea, even though China (including Taiwan) has only about 20 per cent of the coastline.
All this on the basis of claims to history that conveniently ignore the very existence of other peoples and their histories of seafaring and trading going back 2,000 years, and pre-dating China’s ventures in the south sea and beyond. Indonesians got to Africa and colonised Madagascar more than 500 years before Zheng He. In turn, the peoples of Southeast Asia absorbed more from India and the Islamic world than China.
In the case of the current issue with Vietnam, brought about by China’s movement of a drillship into waters due east of Danang, China has a small case, in that it does now own the Paracel Islands, which are closer to the drill location than to Vietnam. But the islands themselves have long been in dispute between the two, a matter settled for now by China’s unprovoked invasion of them in 1974.
But as they have never had permanent settlement, they make a very weak case for enjoying a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone compared with Vietnam. History also tells us that this coast was the heart of the Cham mercantile state, which for 1,000 years was the leading player in regional trade.
There should surely anyway be a case for compromise between China and Vietnam. Malaysia and Thailand managed one over a gas-rich area between them in the Gulf of Thailand. Other regional states – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia – have put island ownership issues to the International Court of Justice and accepted the result. But China remains unwilling either to compromise or submit to arbitration. Meanwhile, joint development is impossible because China makes it conditional on acceptance of its sovereignty.
In the case of shoals off the Philippines, China’s case rests on a mix of invented history and the fact that it filed claims first, a poor basis given that it had no continuous presence there and the Philippines initially inherited a treaty between two Western colonial powers. These shoals and other features claimed by China are so obviously within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and in waters long sailed by the peoples of that country that there should be no argument.
Scarborough Shoal is about 200km from Luzon, 650km from China. The claim to Half Moon Shoal is even more outrageous. That is the reef where the Philippines arrested Chinese fishermen allegedly with a catch of giant turtles, a protected species. Knee-jerk protests have erupted from Beijing. The reef is 110km from Palawan, nearly 1,500km from China.
The fact that the absurd claims go back to the Kuomintang era is neither here nor there. Nor is the fact that previous states may have occasionally paid tribute to Beijing. For these trading states, tribute was a tax, the cost of doing business with China, which did not imply Chinese sovereignty. And if China occasionally acted as an imperial power in the region, that is surely cause for concern, not a basis for overlordship of a predominantly Malay sea. Otherwise, Turkey could claim Egypt and the Russians all of central Asia.
A revived China wants to flex its muscles and show who is boss in the region – just as it tried with Vietnam in 1979 – and remind the US of its own weakness. But there is also a basic reluctance to treat the non-Han neighbours as equals, people with their own history and cultures which, except for Vietnam, have never been subject to major Chinese influence.
China’s history of assuming superiority, most especially over those with darker skins, is long. Belief in eugenics and the need to protect and enhance Han genetic characteristics was strong in the Republican era and found echoes in the opinions and social policies of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. It has long been rejected in the West and was condemned under Mao Zedong . But it has been making a comeback on the mainland, where some academics find it hard to accept that modern man spread out of Africa and that China is thus not a separate and unique source of mankind.
China–Vietnam Oil Rig Confrontation: An Opportunity in Crisis
Written by Khanh Vu Duc and Duvien Tran
THU,15 MAY 2014
Violence ensues
The establishment of CNOOC’s oil rig within Vietnam’s 200-mile EEZ represents an opportunity for Vietnam to establish itself anew in the international community.
In a bid to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea and gauge international response, China may have overplayed its hand.
On May 2, the oil rig HD-981, owned and operated by the state-owned enterprise China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), protected by about 80 vessels and aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese coast guard, was moved inside Vietnam’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (waters disputed by China, claiming much of the South China as its territory).
The oil rig move was uniformly condemned by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom in separate statements. However, none of this appears to much bother Beijing, which has plans to keep HD-981 in place at least until August. If moving HD-981 into Vietnam’s EEZ was an attempt to gauge Vietnamese and international reaction, China most certainly succeeded.
Discouraging though this event appears, definitive action against China will unlikely be taken by the US, EU, or UK, who have all, for now, expressed their disapproval of the move and reiterated the importance of respecting international law. Contrasted against the crisis in Syria and political developments in Ukraine, CNOOC’s oil rig ranks somewhere at the bottom of the list in terms of urgency.
Not so for Vietnam’s leaders, of course, who must contend with the drillship within its EEZ. It may be that the Communist parties of Vietnam and China share a familial background. However, this has not prevented either country from trading blows in the past. Yet relations between the two countries have never been seriously acrimonious. Cable-cutting, ramming, and turning on water cannons against opposing vessels, although provocative, have until now largely represented the extent to which either side will engage the other.
However, moving HD-981 inside Vietnam’s EEZ, accompanied by warships, airplanes and Chinese coast guard vessels, represents a serious escalation of force and tensions. The move is undoubtedly being seen by Hanoi as an armed incursion and threat to its territorial integrity. Even if the oil rig is only temporary and used to measure Vietnam’s response, Vietnam cannot be expected to be seen as impotent in the matter.
While China may expect Hanoi to rattle its sabres and heighten rhetoric rather than respond with force, China cannot have taken into account any and all unintended consequences as a result of this maneuver.
Challenges and opportunities
The Communist Party of Vietnam may be divided by those who desire closer relations with the West and those who desire relations with China. If so, however, this latest episode might simply have given the former reason to distance itself from its much larger neighbor as well as give the latter group a moment of pause. If nothing else, this oil rig incident may have exacerbated any friction and fractures between personalities and/or factions within the CPV, all to the detriment of future Sino–Vietnamese relations.
Certainly, the current situation in Vietnam remains fluid and somewhat volatile. Thousands of Vietnamese across the country, but especially those at Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks 1 and 2, have begun protesting against China’s oil rig. Vietnamese authorities have yet to shut down these protests, and one must wonder whether they can or should.
Vietnam’s leadership will have its ear to the ground, sensing the anger of its people against China and, if the Communists are not careful, against Hanoi. This is not the first time that Vietnamese authorities have had to manage and control anti-China protests; however, one cannot help but sense this situation is different. The Vietnamese government is already held in low regard by its citizens over corruption and economic mismanagement, and so to quash these protests will be seen as favoring China over its citizens.
The legitimacy and survival of the Communist Paty of Vietnam as the sole authority may hinge on its ability to manage the current dispute and the passions of its citizens. It is therefore somewhat ironic that China may prove to be the catalyst to political reform.
In the days, weeks, and perhaps months ahead, the party will find itself at a crossroads on how best to address the situation. Clearly China has little regard for the fate of Vietnam’s Communist leaders. The US, although concerned by the developments, is unlikely to step in on behalf of a Communist government. Vietnam is very much alone in this matter, despite whatever words of support and sympathy it might receive from the international community.
For any forward-thinker and reformer within Vietnam’s government, China’s oil rig maneuver has provided an opportunity for Hanoi to change course. The CPV has grown long in the tooth with signs of decay. Vietnam deserves a responsible and responsive government.
The form of such a government, and whether the CPV will remain a part of the government, remains to be seen. The thousands of protesters who are now demonstrating have in their crosshairs China, but it will not take much for them to focus their sights on their government, either. Any would-be reformer residing in Hanoi would do well to understand that the CPV is running out of room and time.
China has been able to get away with asserting its territorial ambitions and claims over Vietnam because Vietnam has isolated itself from the international community. Vietnam may be part of the United Nations, but it lacks any real dependable ally, unlike the Philippines. This path, set forth by the CPV, has forced Vietnam to face its challenges alone. Vietnam cannot remain on this path, and it cannot chart a new one under the same flawed leadership and authority. Political reform is the first step, but it is only a first step.
Vietnam would do well to lodge a formal complaint to any Tribunals under Chapter XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 287, UNCLOS). Resolving this dispute peacefully and within the boundaries of international law will best serve everyone. However, Vietnam should avoid doing so until China removes the oil rig. China may assert that the waters are theirs, but until this claim is recognized as true, the rig remains within Vietnam’s 200-mile EEZ. Negotiation over the removal of HD-981 is pointless given that the oil rig should not be there in the first place.
If China should fail to remove the oil rig after August and Vietnam has exhausted all diplomatic means to remove it, the question for Hanoi then becomes “what now?” Certainly Hanoi cannot allow China to maintain an oil rig within its EEZ indefinitely. Discussions on self-defense will inevitably be entertained as a measure of last resort. Article 51 under the UN Charter allows for this possibility, but is the presence of an oil rig enough to warrant the use of force?
The oil rig in and of itself may not justify the use of force. However, the incursion and continued presence of warships in Vietnamese waters without Hanoi’s permission may be argued as an act of aggression. Whether Vietnam elects to use force to expel CNOOC is another question entirely – one that must consider the possibility of open conflict between Vietnam and China, and potentially the region at large.
Of course, all of this is a long way off, if it should even occur at all. Regardless of China’s motives with the oil rig, any forward-thinkers within Vietnam’s government should not overlook this opportunity to enact some much needed change to the country. Time has come to past for Vietnam to modernize. Change does not come easy, but when the dust has settled, it will have been well and truly earned.
Beijing’s dangerous arrogance in the South China Sea
Philip Bowring says Beijing’s superiority complex and selective reading of Southeast Asian history have become the toxic brew fuelling tensions in the South China Sea
China’s current behaviour vis-à-vis its South China Sea neighbours is aggressive, arrogant and smacks of Han chauvinism and ethnocentrism. Far from being an expression of national pride, it is giving patriotism a bad name. Patriotic Hongkongers should recognise it for what it is: a dangerous ploy.
Not only has Beijing bared expansionist teeth to Vietnam and the Philippines, it has now succeeded in shifting Indonesia from a position of trying to act as a moderator between China and the other South China Sea states to opponent. Twice in recent months, Indonesia has accused China of claiming part of its Natuna island archipelago. So much for a “peaceful rise” when you rile neighbours with populations of more than 400 million, who you assume to be weak.
All China’s sea claims are wrapped up in that nine-dash line which extends more than 1,000 nautical miles from the coasts of Guangdong and Hainan to close to Borneo, the island shared by Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, and includes almost all the sea between Vietnam and the Philippines. This claim encompasses more than 90 per cent of the sea, even though China (including Taiwan) has only about 20 per cent of the coastline.
All this on the basis of claims to history that conveniently ignore the very existence of other peoples and their histories of seafaring and trading going back 2,000 years, and pre-dating China’s ventures in the south sea and beyond. Indonesians got to Africa and colonised Madagascar more than 500 years before Zheng He. In turn, the peoples of Southeast Asia absorbed more from India and the Islamic world than China.
In the case of the current issue with Vietnam, brought about by China’s movement of a drillship into waters due east of Danang, China has a small case, in that it does now own the Paracel Islands, which are closer to the drill location than to Vietnam. But the islands themselves have long been in dispute between the two, a matter settled for now by China’s unprovoked invasion of them in 1974.
But as they have never had permanent settlement, they make a very weak case for enjoying a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone compared with Vietnam. History also tells us that this coast was the heart of the Cham mercantile state, which for 1,000 years was the leading player in regional trade.
There should surely anyway be a case for compromise between China and Vietnam. Malaysia and Thailand managed one over a gas-rich area between them in the Gulf of Thailand. Other regional states – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia – have put island ownership issues to the International Court of Justice and accepted the result. But China remains unwilling either to compromise or submit to arbitration. Meanwhile, joint development is impossible because China makes it conditional on acceptance of its sovereignty.
In the case of shoals off the Philippines, China’s case rests on a mix of invented history and the fact that it filed claims first, a poor basis given that it had no continuous presence there and the Philippines initially inherited a treaty between two Western colonial powers. These shoals and other features claimed by China are so obviously within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and in waters long sailed by the peoples of that country that there should be no argument.
Scarborough Shoal is about 200km from Luzon, 650km from China. The claim to Half Moon Shoal is even more outrageous. That is the reef where the Philippines arrested Chinese fishermen allegedly with a catch of giant turtles, a protected species. Knee-jerk protests have erupted from Beijing. The reef is 110km from Palawan, nearly 1,500km from China.
The fact that the absurd claims go back to the Kuomintang era is neither here nor there. Nor is the fact that previous states may have occasionally paid tribute to Beijing. For these trading states, tribute was a tax, the cost of doing business with China, which did not imply Chinese sovereignty. And if China occasionally acted as an imperial power in the region, that is surely cause for concern, not a basis for overlordship of a predominantly Malay sea. Otherwise, Turkey could claim Egypt and the Russians all of central Asia.
A revived China wants to flex its muscles and show who is boss in the region – just as it tried with Vietnam in 1979 – and remind the US of its own weakness. But there is also a basic reluctance to treat the non-Han neighbours as equals, people with their own history and cultures which, except for Vietnam, have never been subject to major Chinese influence.
China’s history of assuming superiority, most especially over those with darker skins, is long. Belief in eugenics and the need to protect and enhance Han genetic characteristics was strong in the Republican era and found echoes in the opinions and social policies of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. It has long been rejected in the West and was condemned under Mao Zedong . But it has been making a comeback on the mainland, where some academics find it hard to accept that modern man spread out of Africa and that China is thus not a separate and unique source of mankind.
China–Vietnam Oil Rig Confrontation: An Opportunity in Crisis
Written by Khanh Vu Duc and Duvien Tran
THU,15 MAY 2014
Violence ensues
The establishment of CNOOC’s oil rig within Vietnam’s 200-mile EEZ represents an opportunity for Vietnam to establish itself anew in the international community.
In a bid to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea and gauge international response, China may have overplayed its hand.
On May 2, the oil rig HD-981, owned and operated by the state-owned enterprise China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), protected by about 80 vessels and aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese coast guard, was moved inside Vietnam’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (waters disputed by China, claiming much of the South China as its territory).
The oil rig move was uniformly condemned by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom in separate statements. However, none of this appears to much bother Beijing, which has plans to keep HD-981 in place at least until August. If moving HD-981 into Vietnam’s EEZ was an attempt to gauge Vietnamese and international reaction, China most certainly succeeded.
Discouraging though this event appears, definitive action against China will unlikely be taken by the US, EU, or UK, who have all, for now, expressed their disapproval of the move and reiterated the importance of respecting international law. Contrasted against the crisis in Syria and political developments in Ukraine, CNOOC’s oil rig ranks somewhere at the bottom of the list in terms of urgency.
Not so for Vietnam’s leaders, of course, who must contend with the drillship within its EEZ. It may be that the Communist parties of Vietnam and China share a familial background. However, this has not prevented either country from trading blows in the past. Yet relations between the two countries have never been seriously acrimonious. Cable-cutting, ramming, and turning on water cannons against opposing vessels, although provocative, have until now largely represented the extent to which either side will engage the other.
However, moving HD-981 inside Vietnam’s EEZ, accompanied by warships, airplanes and Chinese coast guard vessels, represents a serious escalation of force and tensions. The move is undoubtedly being seen by Hanoi as an armed incursion and threat to its territorial integrity. Even if the oil rig is only temporary and used to measure Vietnam’s response, Vietnam cannot be expected to be seen as impotent in the matter.
While China may expect Hanoi to rattle its sabres and heighten rhetoric rather than respond with force, China cannot have taken into account any and all unintended consequences as a result of this maneuver.
Challenges and opportunities
The Communist Party of Vietnam may be divided by those who desire closer relations with the West and those who desire relations with China. If so, however, this latest episode might simply have given the former reason to distance itself from its much larger neighbor as well as give the latter group a moment of pause. If nothing else, this oil rig incident may have exacerbated any friction and fractures between personalities and/or factions within the CPV, all to the detriment of future Sino–Vietnamese relations.
Certainly, the current situation in Vietnam remains fluid and somewhat volatile. Thousands of Vietnamese across the country, but especially those at Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks 1 and 2, have begun protesting against China’s oil rig. Vietnamese authorities have yet to shut down these protests, and one must wonder whether they can or should.
Vietnam’s leadership will have its ear to the ground, sensing the anger of its people against China and, if the Communists are not careful, against Hanoi. This is not the first time that Vietnamese authorities have had to manage and control anti-China protests; however, one cannot help but sense this situation is different. The Vietnamese government is already held in low regard by its citizens over corruption and economic mismanagement, and so to quash these protests will be seen as favoring China over its citizens.
The legitimacy and survival of the Communist Paty of Vietnam as the sole authority may hinge on its ability to manage the current dispute and the passions of its citizens. It is therefore somewhat ironic that China may prove to be the catalyst to political reform.
In the days, weeks, and perhaps months ahead, the party will find itself at a crossroads on how best to address the situation. Clearly China has little regard for the fate of Vietnam’s Communist leaders. The US, although concerned by the developments, is unlikely to step in on behalf of a Communist government. Vietnam is very much alone in this matter, despite whatever words of support and sympathy it might receive from the international community.
For any forward-thinker and reformer within Vietnam’s government, China’s oil rig maneuver has provided an opportunity for Hanoi to change course. The CPV has grown long in the tooth with signs of decay. Vietnam deserves a responsible and responsive government.
The form of such a government, and whether the CPV will remain a part of the government, remains to be seen. The thousands of protesters who are now demonstrating have in their crosshairs China, but it will not take much for them to focus their sights on their government, either. Any would-be reformer residing in Hanoi would do well to understand that the CPV is running out of room and time.
China has been able to get away with asserting its territorial ambitions and claims over Vietnam because Vietnam has isolated itself from the international community. Vietnam may be part of the United Nations, but it lacks any real dependable ally, unlike the Philippines. This path, set forth by the CPV, has forced Vietnam to face its challenges alone. Vietnam cannot remain on this path, and it cannot chart a new one under the same flawed leadership and authority. Political reform is the first step, but it is only a first step.
Vietnam would do well to lodge a formal complaint to any Tribunals under Chapter XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 287, UNCLOS). Resolving this dispute peacefully and within the boundaries of international law will best serve everyone. However, Vietnam should avoid doing so until China removes the oil rig. China may assert that the waters are theirs, but until this claim is recognized as true, the rig remains within Vietnam’s 200-mile EEZ. Negotiation over the removal of HD-981 is pointless given that the oil rig should not be there in the first place.
If China should fail to remove the oil rig after August and Vietnam has exhausted all diplomatic means to remove it, the question for Hanoi then becomes “what now?” Certainly Hanoi cannot allow China to maintain an oil rig within its EEZ indefinitely. Discussions on self-defense will inevitably be entertained as a measure of last resort. Article 51 under the UN Charter allows for this possibility, but is the presence of an oil rig enough to warrant the use of force?
The oil rig in and of itself may not justify the use of force. However, the incursion and continued presence of warships in Vietnamese waters without Hanoi’s permission may be argued as an act of aggression. Whether Vietnam elects to use force to expel CNOOC is another question entirely – one that must consider the possibility of open conflict between Vietnam and China, and potentially the region at large.
Of course, all of this is a long way off, if it should even occur at all. Regardless of China’s motives with the oil rig, any forward-thinkers within Vietnam’s government should not overlook this opportunity to enact some much needed change to the country. Time has come to past for Vietnam to modernize. Change does not come easy, but when the dust has settled, it will have been well and truly earned.
ChineseTiger1986
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 27, 2010
- Messages
- 23,530
- Reaction score
- 12
- Country
- Location
You guys suck, we are wiping for your sorry a$$ right now.
Maybe you will lose the control of the Taiping Island again.
Kyle Sun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2014
- Messages
- 2,689
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Grand had posted many different versions of China Map which indicated those islands belong to us
Why this one is the right one ?
And why you said this one is the official map ? Date ? Publisher ?
EastSea
BANNED
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2011
- Messages
- 3,787
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
you have to study more about such maps printed in China by Chinese, no where stated that Island belong to China. What you said is official map printed 1909 in Time of Man Qing China.
Grand posted the map is the map for all region in East and South East Asia. it included Japan, Vietnam and Philippine too. The Islands wahli changse and Wanlisitang is located near by "Jiao Zhi Dong pu" (Vietnam). Its Islands of Jiao Zhi Guo (Vietnam today). No where in map stated that Islands belong to China.
In ancient time your ancestors called our East Sea was " Jiao Zhi Sea" or in Chinese 交趾洋.
Look at the map printed in China below. Its clear.
Kyle Sun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2014
- Messages
- 2,689
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
you have to study more about such maps printed in China by Chinese, no where stated that Island belong to China.
Grand posted the map is the map for all region in East and South East Asia. it included Japan, Vietnam and Philippine too. The Islands wahli changse and Wanlisitang is located near by "Jiao Zhi Dong pu" (Vietnam). Its Islands of Jiao Zhi Guo (Vietnam today). No where in map stated that Islands belong to China.
In ancient time your ancestors called our East Sea was " Jiao Zhi Sea" or in Chinese 交趾洋.
Look at the map printed in China below. Its clear.
When did we print this map ? Qing dynasty ?
it looks like a pirate treasure map .
It is too simple and crude. I can not find Viet in it .
GR!FF!N
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 11, 2012
- Messages
- 8,706
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
would that make any change??plus,UNCLOS was nowhere near then.by the way,even China don't know how to explain about the "9 dashed Line" after ratifying UNCLOS and DOC.thats why they never fought any case in International court.Taiwan is much clever than China,who never signed UNCLOS.
Kyle Sun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2014
- Messages
- 2,689
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
We have told you for many times :We signed UNCLOS with additional provisions which said very clear that the disputed area are not included .
you have to study more about such maps printed in China by Chinese, no where stated that Island belong to China. What you said is official map printed 1909 in Time of Man Qing China.
Grand posted the map is the map for all region in East and South East Asia. it included Japan, Vietnam and Philippine too. The Islands wahli changse and Wanlisitang is located near by "Jiao Zhi Dong pu" (Vietnam). Its Islands of Jiao Zhi Guo (Vietnam today). No where in map stated that Islands belong to China.
In ancient time your ancestors called our East Sea was " Jiao Zhi Sea" or in Chinese 交趾洋.
Look at the map printed in China below. Its clear.
chinese boy never read history book printed in China. You dont know about it, but troll and troll again. stupid !
Grand Historian
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Dec 17, 2013
- Messages
- 668
- Reaction score
- 1
- Country
- Location
What the hell is true Han?
Again,no population would stay "pure" after 2,000 years unless they are isolated groups such as the Andaman Islanders.
Vietnam certainly had contact with outsiders and had considerable Chinese influence.
PDF Vietnamese can't even read Hanzi and they think they can understand the concept of Han better than Han Chinese themselves
Again you don't even understand the title so how can this be Qing's full territorial claims?
Similar threads
