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Pakistan And Aman-13: Building “Maritime Bridges” On Shifting Sands – Analysis
By Eurasia Review -- (March 15, 2013)
By Abhijit Singh
The Pakistan Navy’s recent multinational exercises, ‘Aman-13’, demonstrate its resolve to establish itself as an influential stakeholder in Indian Ocean security affairs. The four-day exercises – held between March 4 and 8 – brought together ships from 13 countries, including the U.S. and China, as well as observers from 20 other nations. Pakistan Navy sought to portray the exercises as an effort at promoting peace and stability in the region, but the real objective – that of boosting Pakistan’s regional standing and maritime profile – was more than evident.
The fourth in a biannual series of exercises, ‘Aman-13’ served to provide a platform for “collaborative and cooperative maritime endeavours”, a theme that Pakistan Navy has been publicly espousing for some time. Apart from the usual objectives of information sharing, development of tactics and boosting interoperability, the exercises sought to prepare navies to jointly combat larger irregular threats to regional peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, mainly terrorism and piracy. With so many navies agreeing to take part, the initiative generated a fair bit of curiosity among regional watchers.
While the eventual numbers of attendees may have been lower than initially expected – with invites reportedly extended to as many as 50 navies – Pakistan did make capital out of the fact that the engagement drew wide-ranging participation from the Western bloc, South Asia and South East Asia. The exercises saw participation by a broad and diverse set of naval forces, including Australia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK and the USA. This was also, as some Pakistani commentators pointed out, a rare occasion when the US and Chinese maritime forces came together to exercise for a regional cause.
More pertinent, however, is the enormous contribution of the ‘Aman’ series of exercises to the evolution of the Pakistan navy’s own maritime tactics and strategy. In its ‘constructive engagement’ with regional and extra-regional navies, the force has refined its operational and doctrinal understanding of maritime matters, improved interoperability and enhanced awareness of the maritime domain.
The Pakistan Navy is, without doubt, assisted in its biannual endeavour by its active membership of the Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) – the multi-national naval grouping formed to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Since it joined the U.S.-led Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) in the year 2004, the Pakistan Navy has contributed effectively to maritime operations, even going on the command task forces 150 and 151 on multiple occasions. Conceivably, some of the participating nations feel obliged to participate in ‘Aman-13’ out of a feeling of kinship with another member of the Combined Task Forces. It does not, however, detract from the fact that the Pakistan Navy is increasingly being perceived as a professional force, and a reliable and durable partner.
The participation of operational units this time was also qualitatively superior. Pakistan Navy fielded its top-of-the-line F-22P Zulfiquar-class frigates, while the U.S. Navy sent in an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer. There were frigates from Australia, Britain and Turkey; corvettes from Italy, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates; and pair of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft representing Japan. The exchange in ideas and techniques this time is said to have included ‘special operations’, with Indonesia, reportedly, sending a team of its KOPASKA navy seals, and the U.S. Navy dispatching an explosive ordnance unit for the sea phase of the exercise.
Needless to say, it was the Chinese participation that attracted the most attention. Fresh from the take-over of Gwadar port, China sent a strong message of support for Pakistan by fielding a three-ship strong contingent for the exercises. The participation of the 14th convoy fleet comprising of the missile destroyer Harbin, the frigate Mianyang and the supply ship Weishanhu – on its way to Somali waters for escort missions – displayed, unequivocally, the camaraderie and solidarity that China shares with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the Iranian navy was not invited to participate in the exercises, perhaps to avoid displeasing the U.S. Contrary, however, to what many commonly perceive this to be, the Pakistan navy has actually been expanding its engagement with Iran’s maritime forces. That it has done so without prejudice to its relations with other Arab states, is evidence of a new diplomatic component in its operational plans. In November 2012, Pakistani frigate PNS Shamsheer docked together with Iranian warships at Port Sudan, only a few weeks after the alleged Israeli bombing of an explosive factory in Khartoum1. Their joint operation, planned to be conducted in the Red Sea, was reportedly averted under strong pressure from US, the Arab bloc (principally Saudi Arabia) and Israel. However, only a few weeks later, in Jan this year, the Pakistan Navy carried out operational exercises with the Turkish and Saudi Arabian maritime forces, and had its ships visit Oman, displaying a propensity to maximize diplomatic gains by balancing competing interests.
Not surprisingly, India was absent from ‘Aman’. As the Pakistan Navy conducted its ‘magnum opus’ in the Northern Indian Ocean (Gulf of Aden and Oman), the Indian Navy was doing its own TROPEX series of theatre level operational readiness exercises in the Arabian Sea. The latter’s non-participation exposes the limits to what any form of regional maritime “bridge-building” can hope to achieve in the Indian Ocean, without the involvement of the most potent and influential maritime force in South Asia. But mistrust between the two forces runs deep. Against the backdrop of recent developments in South Asia, it is unlikely either will be reaching out to the other anytime in the near future.
In the shifting sands of regional geopolitics, pillars of security can only be erected on firm foundations. As long as political instability and mistrust exists in South Asia, there is only so much that tacit diplomatic maneuvers and military exercises in the Indian Ocean can help in achieving.
(Abhijit Singh is a research fellow at the National Maritime Foundation at New Delhi. He writes on political and strategic issues in West and South Asia)
http://www.eurasiareview.com/150320...-maritime-bridges-on-shifting-sands-analysis/
By Eurasia Review -- (March 15, 2013)
By Abhijit Singh
The Pakistan Navy’s recent multinational exercises, ‘Aman-13’, demonstrate its resolve to establish itself as an influential stakeholder in Indian Ocean security affairs. The four-day exercises – held between March 4 and 8 – brought together ships from 13 countries, including the U.S. and China, as well as observers from 20 other nations. Pakistan Navy sought to portray the exercises as an effort at promoting peace and stability in the region, but the real objective – that of boosting Pakistan’s regional standing and maritime profile – was more than evident.
The fourth in a biannual series of exercises, ‘Aman-13’ served to provide a platform for “collaborative and cooperative maritime endeavours”, a theme that Pakistan Navy has been publicly espousing for some time. Apart from the usual objectives of information sharing, development of tactics and boosting interoperability, the exercises sought to prepare navies to jointly combat larger irregular threats to regional peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, mainly terrorism and piracy. With so many navies agreeing to take part, the initiative generated a fair bit of curiosity among regional watchers.
While the eventual numbers of attendees may have been lower than initially expected – with invites reportedly extended to as many as 50 navies – Pakistan did make capital out of the fact that the engagement drew wide-ranging participation from the Western bloc, South Asia and South East Asia. The exercises saw participation by a broad and diverse set of naval forces, including Australia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK and the USA. This was also, as some Pakistani commentators pointed out, a rare occasion when the US and Chinese maritime forces came together to exercise for a regional cause.
More pertinent, however, is the enormous contribution of the ‘Aman’ series of exercises to the evolution of the Pakistan navy’s own maritime tactics and strategy. In its ‘constructive engagement’ with regional and extra-regional navies, the force has refined its operational and doctrinal understanding of maritime matters, improved interoperability and enhanced awareness of the maritime domain.
The Pakistan Navy is, without doubt, assisted in its biannual endeavour by its active membership of the Combined Task Force-150 (CTF-150) – the multi-national naval grouping formed to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Since it joined the U.S.-led Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) in the year 2004, the Pakistan Navy has contributed effectively to maritime operations, even going on the command task forces 150 and 151 on multiple occasions. Conceivably, some of the participating nations feel obliged to participate in ‘Aman-13’ out of a feeling of kinship with another member of the Combined Task Forces. It does not, however, detract from the fact that the Pakistan Navy is increasingly being perceived as a professional force, and a reliable and durable partner.
The participation of operational units this time was also qualitatively superior. Pakistan Navy fielded its top-of-the-line F-22P Zulfiquar-class frigates, while the U.S. Navy sent in an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer. There were frigates from Australia, Britain and Turkey; corvettes from Italy, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates; and pair of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft representing Japan. The exchange in ideas and techniques this time is said to have included ‘special operations’, with Indonesia, reportedly, sending a team of its KOPASKA navy seals, and the U.S. Navy dispatching an explosive ordnance unit for the sea phase of the exercise.
Needless to say, it was the Chinese participation that attracted the most attention. Fresh from the take-over of Gwadar port, China sent a strong message of support for Pakistan by fielding a three-ship strong contingent for the exercises. The participation of the 14th convoy fleet comprising of the missile destroyer Harbin, the frigate Mianyang and the supply ship Weishanhu – on its way to Somali waters for escort missions – displayed, unequivocally, the camaraderie and solidarity that China shares with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the Iranian navy was not invited to participate in the exercises, perhaps to avoid displeasing the U.S. Contrary, however, to what many commonly perceive this to be, the Pakistan navy has actually been expanding its engagement with Iran’s maritime forces. That it has done so without prejudice to its relations with other Arab states, is evidence of a new diplomatic component in its operational plans. In November 2012, Pakistani frigate PNS Shamsheer docked together with Iranian warships at Port Sudan, only a few weeks after the alleged Israeli bombing of an explosive factory in Khartoum1. Their joint operation, planned to be conducted in the Red Sea, was reportedly averted under strong pressure from US, the Arab bloc (principally Saudi Arabia) and Israel. However, only a few weeks later, in Jan this year, the Pakistan Navy carried out operational exercises with the Turkish and Saudi Arabian maritime forces, and had its ships visit Oman, displaying a propensity to maximize diplomatic gains by balancing competing interests.
Not surprisingly, India was absent from ‘Aman’. As the Pakistan Navy conducted its ‘magnum opus’ in the Northern Indian Ocean (Gulf of Aden and Oman), the Indian Navy was doing its own TROPEX series of theatre level operational readiness exercises in the Arabian Sea. The latter’s non-participation exposes the limits to what any form of regional maritime “bridge-building” can hope to achieve in the Indian Ocean, without the involvement of the most potent and influential maritime force in South Asia. But mistrust between the two forces runs deep. Against the backdrop of recent developments in South Asia, it is unlikely either will be reaching out to the other anytime in the near future.
In the shifting sands of regional geopolitics, pillars of security can only be erected on firm foundations. As long as political instability and mistrust exists in South Asia, there is only so much that tacit diplomatic maneuvers and military exercises in the Indian Ocean can help in achieving.
(Abhijit Singh is a research fellow at the National Maritime Foundation at New Delhi. He writes on political and strategic issues in West and South Asia)
http://www.eurasiareview.com/150320...-maritime-bridges-on-shifting-sands-analysis/
