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Pakistan Army's T-129 ATAK Helicopter Deal | Updates & Discussions.

Down low, an A-10 would do about 500 km per hour max. The SABA design would do 400. Marginally less.
Cost - $5 to $7 million, armed with standoff precision weapons. Meaning, they will fly low, at speed, pop up at a distance, deliver munitions, and then scoot.

This is the SOP for low level CAS.

An A-10 doesn't even have the needed avionics for low level nap of the earth flight. This aircraft would.

Even the JF-17 doesn't have true nap of the earth capability. Down low, in military power, a JF-17 would do about 700 km / hour.

Cost of an enemy tank - $2 to $3 million. Cost of a SABA - $5 to $7 million. A single pass would pay for it in equivalence.

Since the budget for the SABA and its basing and training will come from the Army, just like the AH-1s and T-129s, PAF would be able to focus its resources on air combat and SEAD / DEAD.

This isn't an Air Tractor flying at 5000 feet at 200 km / hour. Its a dedicated CAS platform with armor, flying at 400 km / hour on the deck with an automated nap of the earth flight capability. It pops up - knocks out enemy armor - artillery - infantry - and scoots, often before the enemy has even seen it - as its munitions are standoff.

The SABA was designed to survive the European theater against Russian invasion. Its designed for the role that's needed exactly.

CPFH would be tiny - somewhere in the sub 1000 range. The design is inherently survivable with the wings positioned to protect the engines and critical areas armored.
The A-10 does the same speed as this SABA design and is much more armoured than the SABA. In addition, the A-10 pilots consistently flew NOE using both NVG's and LANTRIN pods.

The SABA designs were focused on the 150- 400kt range and providing Agile CAS provided air superiority was secured, in the case of Pakistan that is never going to be the case it will be a hotly contested airspace with the IAF likely holding air superiority in many theaters. What possible useful load would a SABA class aircraft bring that would stop a well established IBG column , avoid its well layered air defense and then survive against any air cover that the IBG would have?
The interesting thing is that even with properly agile HOBS missiles, AGM's and protection a SABA type design will easily exceed the $7-8 million you are proposing by at least $2-3 million while not really providing much over the JF-17 in terms of battlefield CAS.

What about the cost of the pilot? A pilot is $150000 worth of training an intangible cost of value of life and experience. In addition, the pilot is then restricted to CAS operations .

We are a 350 Aircraft airforce at best and can end up at 250 at worst. There is no room or budget for platforms that are dedicated to a single role.

The SABA was designed to fill a gap where attack helicopters and Faster Jets like the A-10 in terms of capability, loiter time and survivability. For us, the T-129 and Ah-1Z offer have pushed that longer range punch a couple of Km's. Is there room for a SABA type aircraft in today's MALE world with increased loiter times?
All of this then comes down to looking at the budget and analyzing alternatives available to provide the most cost effective solution.

A dedicated Slower CAS platform simply isnt one of those options for Pakistan.

For the GCC troops fighting in Yemen with their ample pockets? Yes, it is a great fit for their needs.
 
The A-10 does the same speed as this SABA design and is much more armoured than the SABA. In addition, the A-10 pilots consistently flew NOE using both NVG's and LANTRIN pods.

The A-10 will be a bit faster than the SABA based design I am specifically proposing.
Word from people in the know is that the A-10 is not able to do true nap of the earth flight with the necessary upgrades having been cancelled.

What possible useful load would a SABA class aircraft bring that would stop a well established IBG column , avoid its well layered air defense and then survive against any air cover that the IBG would have?

One could use precision standoff munitions depending on the mix you are looking for. You could use similar munitions as on the T-129 if you wished. I've a number of possible weapons load out ideas, but really, its a matter of having a reasonable load out and being low cost. Value for money.

The interesting thing is that even with properly agile HOBS missiles, AGM's and protection a SABA type design will easily exceed the $7-8 million you are proposing by at least $2-3 million while not really providing much over the JF-17 in terms of battlefield CAS.

I don't believe we should put HOBS AAMs on such a design. Let PAF deal with the top cover issue. Would be armed just enough to have a clear advantage over enemy helicopters and UAVs. No need to bring expensive HOBS into the picture. Personally, there is no reason we could not bring in local MMW or laser based standoff munitions into the mix but that's a different discussion.

One of the ways we can lower the costs beyond anything seen so far is to use radial engines. I can discuss with you extensively how such engines can give broadly equivalent performance at the low altitudes they will be operating in, and how they can cost a whole lot less, not only to buy but to operate.

I believe 4 million to 7 million is easily possible, and we can go through the numbers if you like.

What about the cost of the pilot? A pilot is $150000 worth of training an intangible cost of value of life and experience. In addition, the pilot is then restricted to CAS operations .

If you hit just 2 Indian tanks, you're killing 6 people. So the human equivalency cost is on the side of the SABA. Since this will be done on the edge of the battlefield where these tanks will be worth so much more tactically to India, the military calculus is clearly in our favor.

About pilot training costs - very high for two reasons 1) fast jet training 2) officer pilots
We will use enlisted pilots. Since these are rugged, simple aircraft, this should be even easier to do. Pilots could get off the Mushaq and go straight to the SABA type.

The SABA was designed to fill a gap where attack helicopters and Faster Jets like the A-10 in terms of capability, loiter time and survivability. For us, the T-129 and Ah-1Z offer have pushed that longer range punch a couple of Km's. Is there room for a SABA type aircraft in today's MALE world with increased loiter times?
All of this then comes down to looking at the budget and analyzing alternatives available to provide the most cost effective solution.

There simply is no more cost effective, value solution than this. PA just bought T-129s for 50 million USD per helicopter. The cost of maintaining a helicopter is considerably greater than a rugged CAS aircraft. Availability for the CAS fixed wing is also going to be better. Cost and value are the biggest advantage of the SABA based proposal.

100 of these would completely free up the PAF from needing to do CAS, increasing their effectiveness, efficiency and specialization advantages. Employed effectively (more on that in the future), they would be devastating for the IA.

Even when IDF-AF had complete air superiority, a handful of lighly armed and lightly armored Gazelles ran amok and created serious trouble for the IDF. Imagine what 100 CAS aircraft, armed with standoff precision munition and with supporting air cover, could do to the large, concentrated formations of the IA.

A comment on another forum that explains the issues with the A-10 nicely:

You lost me somewhere between 'A-10 and great airplanes'...

The A-10 came out of the A/X program efforts which were specifically an attempt by the USAF to undermine the AAFSS AH-56 Cheyenne and thus keep 'deep CAS' which is to say BAI/OBAS out of the hands of the Army (they'd already destroyed the effort to weaponize the OV-1 Mohawk).

As such, it was little more than a dumb bomb truck with limited survivability and weather penetration capabilities suitable for the 'best days' (65-68) in SEA. Before the SA-7 came south. Once that happened, the A-10 was little more than a fast Skyraider and would have been butchered, even in CAVU (keeping in mind that 3 months in Vietnam you can't fly anything without blind letdown capabilities because of the monsoons and the VC moved at night with something like 12,000 trucks and 2,500 miles of roadways).

When we moved to Europe after leaving that wonderful region to it's denizens, the A-10 was -not- upgraded to include such basics as low altitude radalt and terrain attitude avoidance, INS, autopilot, moving map or even TISL (the first 2 years). It had lousy cockpit integration with no UFC and a HUD was little more than an ironsight. All this in weather conditions which, in winter, make the B Maverick all but useless (the seeker contrast 'assured target lock' for the vidicon overlaps the gun _rmin_) and makes acquisition of targets from low level all but impossible without a FAC/TACP spot marking. D Maverick was nice but the LAU-88 was not and we didn't get it until 1986, after 'The Window Of Vulnerability' was two years shut.

The jet doesn't operate well at altitude, having always been short of thrust trust with lousy spool up times and a sharp power curve that leaves it positively gutless over 12,000ft and with a further big fat conical camber wing that rides the stall margin anywhere above about 15K. With the LAU-88 on the jet, drag was terrible and you could not make disengagement turns before crossing into the zip gun engagement envelope while the option to popup slow to a gunbunt and then apply power to hold energy coming off wasn't an option because of spool up lag. Pilots for awhile were running around full throttle with the boards part open and then snapping them closed to bring power on the jet. Needless to say, this burned out the cores on the TF34 and greatly fatigued the wings to the point where over half the jets were in need of Hog Up/CUPID type work similar to the early F-16A/C aircraft before DS with less than 10 years on them. They retired most of them to serve as parts donors instead.

The A-10 was a natural for replacing the OA-37 and OV-10 in the FFAC mission and as a night intruder followon to the B-57 but desperately needed to have the mission suite and backseater that the N/AW brought with it. The USAF didn't like the competition with the completely worthless LANTIRN system and so axed what was a cheap and functional pairing of the WX-50 (weather radar) and AAR-42 FLIR with Ferranti LRMTS for about 2 million per plane. On it's own, in daylight, in Europe, the A-10 was utterly worthless, not least because the FOLs were all within about 50 miles of the front and as DS showed (without the wonderful German road net, in the middle of a desert) that's about 3hrs before the T-72s are running over your Nikes.

Incidentally, the same author also goes by the pseudonym of GLAAAR believes the SABA is a sound proposition and is survivable, efficient and cost effective. Unfortunately his comments about the SABA are blocked behind a paywall (Aviationweek changed its settings so you can't see the comments on their articles without a subscription anymore).

https://aviationweek.com/users/glaaar

A big fan of the SABA design.
 
IMO the best way to offset the T129 is to buy parts and maybe some subassemblies from Pakistan. This will help lower the ATAK's cost while also let Turkish Aerospace devote more internal resources to the Hurjet, ATAK 2, T625, etc.

Isn't Stavatti trying to make a similar plane right now - i.e. Machete? IIRC the goal is to produce them in Serbia.

T-129 is made up of 3,500 parts of which 3,200 are made in Turkey. Transfering production of some of the Turkish parts would not be an issue, knowing Turkish business model which is centered around a 'Win-Win' policy.
 
T-129 is made up of 3,500 parts of which 3,200 are made in Turkey. Transfering production of some of the Turkish parts would not be an issue, knowing Turkish business model which is centered around a 'Win-Win' policy.
For Pakistan, I think the main priority would be spare parts and those necessary for overhauling and repair. Yes, the engine, dynamic components and transmission will likely need to come from outside, but if PAC can handle most of the support (via local d-level MRO and parts manufacturing) that would be good (commercially and militarily).
 
The A-10 will be a bit faster than the SABA based design I am specifically proposing.
Word from people in the know is that the A-10 is not able to do true nap of the earth flight with the necessary upgrades having been cancelled.



One could use precision standoff munitions depending on the mix you are looking for. You could use similar munitions as on the T-129 if you wished. I've a number of possible weapons load out ideas, but really, its a matter of having a reasonable load out and being low cost. Value for money.



I don't believe we should put HOBS AAMs on such a design. Let PAF deal with the top cover issue. Would be armed just enough to have a clear advantage over enemy helicopters and UAVs. No need to bring expensive HOBS into the picture. Personally, there is no reason we could not bring in local MMW or laser based standoff munitions into the mix but that's a different discussion.

One of the ways we can lower the costs beyond anything seen so far is to use radial engines. I can discuss with you extensively how such engines can give broadly equivalent performance at the low altitudes they will be operating in, and how they can cost a whole lot less, not only to buy but to operate.

I believe 4 million to 7 million is easily possible, and we can go through the numbers if you like.



If you hit just 2 Indian tanks, you're killing 6 people. So the human equivalency cost is on the side of the SABA. Since this will be done on the edge of the battlefield where these tanks will be worth so much more tactically to India, the military calculus is clearly in our favor.

About pilot training costs - very high for two reasons 1) fast jet training 2) officer pilots
We will use enlisted pilots. Since these are rugged, simple aircraft, this should be even easier to do. Pilots could get off the Mushaq and go straight to the SABA type.



There simply is no more cost effective, value solution than this. PA just bought T-129s for 50 million USD per helicopter. The cost of maintaining a helicopter is considerably greater than a rugged CAS aircraft. Availability for the CAS fixed wing is also going to be better. Cost and value are the biggest advantage of the SABA based proposal.

100 of these would completely free up the PAF from needing to do CAS, increasing their effectiveness, efficiency and specialization advantages. Employed effectively (more on that in the future), they would be devastating for the IA.

Even when IDF-AF had complete air superiority, a handful of lighly armed and lightly armored Gazelles ran amok and created serious trouble for the IDF. Imagine what 100 CAS aircraft, armed with standoff precision munition and with supporting air cover, could do to the large, concentrated formations of the IA.

A comment on another forum that explains the issues with the A-10 nicely:



Incidentally, the same author also goes by the pseudonym of GLAAAR believes the SABA is a sound proposition and is survivable, efficient and cost effective. Unfortunately his comments about the SABA are blocked behind a paywall (Aviationweek changed its settings so you can't see the comments on their articles without a subscription anymore).

https://aviationweek.com/users/glaaar

A big fan of the SABA design.
The A-10 has its detractors and supporters, I know a former warthog pilot who was my neighbor and he testified to the use of AGM-65G seekers to fly at 200 feet off the deck.

Radial engines arent the issue in terms of cost but in terms of reliability and power. As an example, the Merlin used on the Bearcat weighs about a 1250kg and gives about 2200HP(so far there is no current off the shelf solution available for a powerful piston engine as they all went out of fashion versus turboprops)in the low level environment you are referring to...giving you a power to weight ratio of By contrast the PT-6A-68 which powers the PC-21.. delivers 1300shp but weighs only 270kg.

Aircraft rely on weight savings and thrust to weight ratios factor into those; you can have a very powerful radial that will proper the aircraft to 400 knots but then leave it incapable of mounting anything more than two rocket pods.

Moreover, at this point it is actually cheaper to procure a PT-6A with its associated logistics instead of a radial. After all, the idea is to look at something realistic, not just aircraft cost but an actual serious cost of program R&D that could actually be doable rather than what-ifs.

Moving to enlisted pilots, the issue has been debated by the USAF as well. You cannot have ill trained monkeys in the air so the requisite costs of flight training come in which then put the same strain on economics. The PAF currently has a pilot to aircraft ratio of about 1:1.5 so it makes no sense to put additional "Half-pilots" into what is essentially a near suicidal mission just to halve JF-17 costs.

A helicopter isnt just an attack platform, its ability to land right behind the battlefield to rearm and refuel, along with the ability to hide and evade is unmatched by any fixed wing even one capable of 150 degrees a second since a fixed wing aircraft cannot duck behind a hill and stay there.

Then moving onto the author's opinion.. it seems he is talking about the Vanilla A-10A which was introduced in the 70's. Even the A-10A during the cold war had a HUD and systems so I doubt the veracity of timeframe and validity of his assertion about today's A-10C and A-10A modernized.

As for the Gazelle's and IDF superiority during the 82 Beka Valley situation, when the IAF pushed the SAMs back the Gazelle's were duck shoot.

I still maintain that your proposal is a nice what if clean sheet idea that will take a reasonable investment much like the AHLRAC is for Paramount but could recoup its costs with some rich Arab nation facing lots of technicals or a highly advanced airforce holding air superiority over the frontline... ironically, the Indian Air Force is more of a candidate for this type of asset versus their truckload that is the Tejas and would suit their low intensity eastern fronts and a western front scenario whenever they eventually knock or ground the PAF out of the sky and start picking out whatever remains of the PA regrouping.

But in the limited week long scenario of the PAF trying to force a detente against a much more powerful and equally well trained IAF; I will disagree on both the utility and cost effectiveness of this concept.
 
Just a point on the PAA ATAK timeframe. Reuters is reporting that the PAA will receive the 30 helicopters in around 5 years. So the end of the PAA program seems to coincide with around the time I'd expect Turkish Aerospace (TA) to start its transition to the ATAK-2 (and basically end T129 production). IMO, if the PAA chooses to stick with Turkish attack helicopters, then I think incremental purchases of the ATAK-2 could be on the horizon.

In fact, @Oscar the added armour of the ATAK-2 (6 ton MTOW vs. 5 ton of the ATAK) would make it better suited for Thar (with the ATAK-1s assigned to NA and LOC, where it's better suited for high-altitude ops).
 
Just a point on the PAA ATAK timeframe. Reuters is reporting that the PAA will receive the 30 helicopters in around 5 years. So the end of the PAA program seems to coincide with around the time I'd expect Turkish Aerospace (TA) to start its transition to the ATAK-2 (and basically end T129 production). IMO, if the PAA chooses to stick with Turkish attack helicopters, then I think incremental purchases of the ATAK-2 could be on the horizon.

In fact, @Oscar the added armour of the ATAK-2 (6 ton MTOW vs. 5 ton of the ATAK) would make it better suited for Thar (with the ATAK-1s assigned to NA and LOC, where it's better suited for high-altitude ops).

Temel Kotil stated that Atak-II will have a weight around 8 tons. If It is a 8 tons class helo instead of 6tons, A new and powerfull turboshaft engine will be imminent and I think TEI will be charged to develop ~1700shp variant of TS-1400 engine. Addition 3 tons includes DIRCM, EW sensors, MMW radars and armour protection. 3rd generation EO sensor called CATS will be 1/2 lighter than 2nd generation 300T. Bullet capacity will also be increased (750-1000) inside of an armour protected box under the cockpit.

img_-2niidp.jpg
 
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Radial engines arent the issue in terms of cost but in terms of reliability and power. As an example, the Merlin used on the Bearcat weighs about a 1250kg and gives about 2200HP(so far there is no current off the shelf solution available for a powerful piston engine as they all went out of fashion versus turboprops)in the low level environment you are referring to.

The engine on the Bearcat (PW R-2800) had two layers of radials, this is known to cause heating issues as the second layer is insufficiently cooled. The bearcat ws. There are Chinese, Polish and Ukrainian solutions, for instance the HS-5 which can easily be uprated to 1500 hp (depending on the variant, this series of Soviet / Chinese / Eastern European radial engines give 900 - 1200 hp as is).

China in the 1990s stopped producing this engine but is known to have all the tooling. One could potentially by the tooling and blue prints from China / Ukraine / Poland, all of whom still produce parts for the IL-2 and related crop dusters.

We don't really need a very high thrust to weight ratio as its a simple CAS aircraft, or so I would argue. Nor do we need a heavy weapons load, with the presence of precision munitions in the class of Brimstone, Cirit.

Moreover, at this point it is actually cheaper to procure a PT-6A with its associated logistics instead of a radial. After all, the idea is to look at something realistic, not just aircraft cost but an actual serious cost of program R&D that could actually be doable rather than what-ifs.

The reason I want to avoid a PT-6A or related turbo props are the costs, not only of acquisition but of maintenance, which is complex and expensive, specially if you look at the hot section issues.

For instance, in the civilian market, a comparable aircraft with a piston engine versus a P&W turboprop usually costs twice the amount - in one instance, it was $1 million with the piston engine, very similar in capability aircraft with a turboprop was twice the cost at $2 million.

Here is an interesting technical bit - the advantage of the turboprop is above 100 FL. At loiter and below 5000 feet there is no meaningful fuel efficiency difference, and that is against simpler pistons, not the radials where the gap is even narrower.

While the radial would take more frequent maintenance, it costs a lot less and can most often be repaired on the field by mechanics. Something not possible for turboprops.

The reason I support radials, in summary are:
1. much lower costs of acquisition and maintenance (remember my price point for the product)
2. considerably easier to maintain
3. Rugged and can be maintained by lower skilled mechanics
4. Gives very comparable performances in real-world scenarios and not theoretical high altitude cruise where turboprops excel and win the powerpoint game.

However, if I had to compromise to make the design a reality, I'd be happy to let go of this requirement. But it is intrinsically tied to the low cost - large scale strategy that I'm looking at. $4 to $7 million per plane, 100 units. moment the price goes up, quantity comes down, destroying economies of scale, further increasing the price, which further decreases units, and the vicious spiral continues.

Moving to enlisted pilots, the issue has been debated by the USAF as well. You cannot have ill trained monkeys in the air so the requisite costs of flight training come in which then put the same strain on economics. The PAF currently has a pilot to aircraft ratio of about 1:1.5 so it makes no sense to put additional "Half-pilots" into what is essentially a near suicidal mission just to halve JF-17 costs.

CAS is all about practice. And there is no reason enlisted pilots cannot perform. For a long time in the 2000s, the best Predator pilot was a 19 year old who had no USAF training, let alone officer training. You don't need an officer to be a tank driver, why have one for a simple rugged CAS aircraft?

Bahrain takes the CAS cake in Gulf competitions with their F-5, not because their pilots are amazing, or that their aircraft is - its simply practicing one thing alone - CAS is all those F-5 pilots practice. So, I think that having enlisted pilots focused on a single role would do amazing wonders and surprise us all.

USAF has become a fighter pilot trade union and many within mourn this. It is what kept them from adapting to UAVs properly until the CIA showed them the way. Even today they are grudgingly accepting UAVs and doing it in a very wrong-footed way. Do we really need the USAF to be the model?

Also notice how Marine pilots do so much better at CAS because of their better frequency, and how they do so much worse at A2A. Leaving CAS to a specialized group of enlisted pilots will give you not only excellent CAS, but it will help PAF pilots do their A2A and SEAD / DEAD job better.

PAF has always had a high pilot to aircraft ratio, this is to maintain tempo of operations during war, and because aircraft from friendly countries / reserves are expected. Its not an unplanned surplus of pilots. These pilots are also very expensive to train.

So, if you added 100 CAS aircraft to the mix, PAF would need to plan for that and add 150 pilots. My solution takes PAF out of the equation rather than forcing it to expend valuable resources on a secondary mission. And it does so at a very good cost / fast pace. It also allows the PA to integrate the pilot training and mix it with its army training - just like the US Marines, allowing the pilot to understand ground operations better. Something valuable for CAS.

A helicopter isnt just an attack platform, its ability to land right behind the battlefield to rearm and refuel, along with the ability to hide and evade is unmatched by any fixed wing even one capable of 150 degrees a second since a fixed wing aircraft cannot duck behind a hill and stay there.

This has been an unrealized hope as mostly, it has not been logistically possible to arm and refuel helicopters just behind the battlefield. Because of their complexity and other logistics issues, attack helicopters have most frequently been based from FABs alongside fixed wing.

However, with the SABA-type, you can actually base these aircrafts alongside the moving Corps HQ. Because of their simple, rugged nature, their STOL and rough field performance, and their long loiter time, they can be more easily integrated than most aircraft out there with the exception of UAVs.

While a helicopter can duck behind a hill, that ability sacrifices kinetic performance. Meaning in the mode of hiding behind a hill or trees, a helicopter actually has very little kinetic energy. It can easily be seen by airborne assets because of those large rotating blades. With the advent of thermal sights, hiding behind a clump of trees has become meaningless.

The SOP of CAS is to stay low, fly fast, pop up from a flank at range, deliver munitions, duck back low and get out. The SABA-inspired can do this perfectly well. Niche issues exists where the attack helicopter does better, but that's the niche. The bread and butter is covered best by the SABA-type fixed wing.

I still maintain that your proposal is a nice what if clean sheet idea that will take a reasonable investment much like the AHLRAC is for Paramount but could recoup its costs with some rich Arab nation facing lots of technicals or a highly advanced airforce holding air superiority over the frontline... ironically, the Indian Air Force is more of a candidate for this type of asset versus their truckload that is the Tejas and would suit their low intensity eastern fronts and a western front scenario whenever they eventually knock or ground the PAF out of the sky and start picking out whatever remains of the PA regrouping.

But in the limited week long scenario of the PAF trying to force a detente against a much more powerful and equally well trained IAF; I will disagree on both the utility and cost effectiveness of this concept.

Thanks for the assessment. Its always good to have a solid assessment even if one doesn't like its conclusion. I think the IAF squadron strength has seriously suffered and is likely to continue to be an issue going forward. PAF has closed the gap in leaps and bounds.
It can close the gap even further if it:

1. Invests in UCAV strike platforms
2. Looks at SEAD / DEAD more innovatively (Harpy)
3. Creates a better IADS
4. Focuses on its core mission of knocking out IAF

For #4 to happen, it needs to spend maximum time training on those competencies and not on CAS. This is where the SABA type helps. It also helps because it diverts and distracts IAF, who now have to spend resources and its fighters to try to hunt down decentralized, terrain hugging CAS aircraft while trying to deal with the very strong PAF.

With the IA mainly focusing on creating massive concentrations of its forces, a CAS aircraft can do real damage in just a few passes. Just a few canisters of cluster munition can cause havoc. Deployed behind PA armored divisions, they would hardly need to even enter Indian airspace to cause such damage.

There are a host of other auxillary benefits - like hunting down enemy artillery batteries. Or acting as a wifi hub to the ground forces. Or recon. Or jamming enemy comms. Or taking out enemy UAVs and helicopters.

100 CAS aircraft at the price of 500 million to 700 million. Built locally with the ability to run production during war. Compare that to any other weapons purchase. Like the 1.5 Billion USD for 30 odd T-129s...

The proposal closely mirrors the 80 - 20 rule - 80 percent of the capability costs 20 percent of the cost. I'm proposing that 80% in a situation where there is no other choice other than 1) expensive foreign import in insignificant numbers and 2) superweapons that seek that 90% or 100% of the capability and sacrifices reality to the detriment of all.
 
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Isn't Stavatti trying to make a similar plane right now - i.e. Machete? IIRC the goal is to produce them in Serbia.

I seriously have no idea why the hell did Yugoimport signed some kind of agreement with Savatti. Those guys are obviously bunch of charlatans, led by a fraud who watched too much Star war and Star track movies. They have never developed anything, they dont have a single prototype of any of the products they are offering, and i highly doubt that they are ever gonna produce anything in Utva.
 
ATAK-2 is completely another class. The issue is not just the extended main body and MTOW.

Radar and laser warning systems, RF Jammer and all of its ED suits, advanced data and radio links, and probably with a + 15km maximum engagement range (Temren project), ATAK-II will have both a very sophisticated self-defense and Network-centric combat capability. It is a concept with a few examples in the world.
 
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ATAK-2 is completely another class. The issue is not just the extended main body and MTOW.

Radar and laser warning systems, RF Jammer and all of its ED suits, advanced data and radio links, and probably with a + 15km maximum engagement range (Temren project), ATAK-II will have both a very sophisticated self-defense and Network-centric combat capability. It is a concept with a few examples in the world.
If so then the ATAK 2 should have a long production run, e.g. 10-15 years. That's good because Pakistan can consider incremental batch purchases (e.g. 6 a year) without forcing TA into worrying about maintaining its production line (just add to Turkish Army orders).
 
If so then the ATAK 2 should have a long production run, e.g. 10-15 years. That's good because Pakistan can consider incremental batch purchases (e.g. 6 a year) without forcing TA into worrying about maintaining its production line (just add to Turkish Army orders).
Or, if an order is placed above 30, a final assembly line can be established in Pakistan.

30 helicopters not a tiny contract..
And it must happen that Pakistan will eventually reach an industrial capacity that can integrate its attack helicopter after these purchases.

But qualified producers are few, technology-sharing partners are fewer, but market demand is high. Turkey is 4th or 5th country which export attack helicopter to another country. (Most probably this group will soon expand with China.) For this reason, the integration of the two countries in the aviation sector should deepen in production planning.
 
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