On Iran, try backscratching, not blackmail

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How to Negotiate with Iran | Stephen M. Walt

If someone threatened to punish you unless you did something you didn't want to do, how would you respond? Unless the threatened punishment was really horrible you'd refuse, because giving into threats encourages the threatener to make more demands. But what if someone offered to pay you to do something you didn't want to do? If the price were right you'd agree, because that act of cooperation on your part sends a very different message. Instead of showing that you can be intimidated over and over, it simply lets people know that you're willing to cooperate if you are adequately compensated.

This simple logic has thus far escaped most of the people involved with U.S. policy towards Iran. Today, the conventional wisdom is that the only way to elicit cooperation from Iran is to keep making more and more potent threats, what Vice-President Joe Biden recently called "diplomacy backed by pressure." Even wise practitioners of diplomacy like my colleague Nicholas Burns maintain that the U.S. and its allies must combine engagement with sanctions and more credible threats to use force, even though the United States and its allies have been threatening Iran for over a decade without success.

As my opening paragraph suggests, this approach ignores some important scholarly work on how states can most easily elicit cooperation. Way back in the 1970s, MIT political scientist Kenneth Oye identified a crucial distinction between blackmail and what he called "backscratching" and showed why the latter approach is more likely to elicit cooperation. States (and people) tend to resist a blackmailer, because once you pay them off the first time, they can keep making more and more demands. And in international politics, giving in to one state's threats might convey weakness and invite demands by others. By contrast, states (and people) routinely engage in acts of "backscratching," where each adjusts its behavior to give the other something that it wants in exchange for getting something that it wants. Backscratching -- which is the essence of trade agreements, commercial transactions, and many other types of cooperation -- establishes a valuable precedent: it shows that if you'll do something for me, then I'll do something for you.

Not surprisingly, this is precisely what Iran's government has been trying to tell us. Their bottom line for years has been that they were not going to negotiate with a gun to their heads. Or as Supreme Leader Khameini said in rejecting the most recent proposals for direct talks:

"The ball, in fact, is in your court. Does it make sense to offer negotiations while issuing threats and putting pressure? You are holding a gun against Iran saying you want to talk. The Iranian nation will not be frightened by the threats."

Such statements are normally interpreted as just another sign of Iranian intransigence, but as just discussed, there is a sound strategic basis for Iran's position. It is, in fact, precisely the position we would take if somebody were threatening us in the same way.

The other problem with the Western approach, of course, is that threatening Iran reinforces their interest in having a latent nuclear weapons capability, and might eventually convince them that they need to get an actual bomb. Therefore, if our goal is to keep Iran as far away from the nuclear threshold as possible, imposing ever-harsher sanctions, constantly reiterating that "all options are on the table," and warning darkly of war should diplomacy fail is not a smart way to proceed.

And it's worked really, really well thus far, hasn't it?

It is also worth noting that the closest the US and Iran have come to deal was the aborted attempt to arrange a fuel swap of enriched uranium for the Tehran research reactor in 2009. The proposed deal nearly succeeded because it was a backscratching arrangement that didn't require Iran to capitulate to threats. (And by the way, the Turkish and Brazilian officials who helped mediate the arrangement blame its failure mostly on the United States, not Iran).

So why do so many smart people keep embracing an approach to Iran that is internally contradictory and has consistently failed for more than a decade? I'm not entirely sure, but I suspect it has a lot to do with maintaining credibility inside Washington. Because Iran has been demonized for so long, and absurdly cast as the Greatest National Security Threat we face, it has become largely impossible for anyone to speak openly of a different approach without becoming marginalized. Instead, you have to sound tough and hawkish even if you are in favor of negotiations, because that's the only way to be taken seriously in the funhouse world of official Washington (see under: the Armed Services Committee hearings on Chuck Hagel).

Finally, nothing I've written above should be interpreted as evidence of sympathy for Iran's current government. The Islamic Republic has done some pretty objectionable things at home and abroad, but then again, so have plenty of countries that we routinely think of as friends and allies. And it's not as though the United States is innocent of wrongdoing, as plenty of Iraqis, Pakistanis, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans, and others would be quick to tell us. My concern is simply with figuring out how to achieve a diplomatic outcome that would secure our primary objectives and avoid another pointless war in the Middle East.

It remains to be seen whether Obama will break out of the stale consensus that has hamstrung our approach to Iran thus far. For evidence that more sensible views can be found, see UK diplomat Peter Jenkins' views here and the informative exchange between former US diplomat Thomas Pickering and Iran's UN Ambassador Mohammed Khazaee here. The only question is whether the Obama administration can come up with a strategy that will convince Iran to remain on this side of the nuclear threshold and that will eventually open the door to a more positive relationship with that country. More than anything else, it will require tossing aside the confrontational approach that has been a consistent failure for more than a decade.
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'Unprecedented' Conversation Yields Proposals for US-Iran Negotiations

With the next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 world powers group just days away, Asia Society brought together Iran's highest-ranking official in the United States, Ambassador to the United Nations Mohammad Khazaee, and former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering to discuss breaking the nuclear impasse and the future of U.S.-Iran relations.
The result was an unprecedented public conversation between knowledgeable and influential individuals from Iran and the U.S., speaking in their official and personal capacities respectively, focused on arguably the most intractable foreign policy challenge today. Award-winning journalist and author David Ignatius moderated the discussion, which took place Wednesday night before a full auditorium at Asia Society in New York.
On the upcoming talks to be held on February 26 in Kazakhstan, Khazaee stated that Iran "does not oppose negotiation in any way," but cautioned that the U.S. approach to the process is undermining the chance for success. "As long as pressure is on Iran, as long as there is a sword on our neck to come to negotiations, this is not negotiations, therefore Iranians cannot accept that," he said.
While welcoming the suggestion put forward by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden for direct bilateral talks, Khazaee also expressed doubt over the seriousness of the offer as the United States continues to impose "new and harsher sanctions" against Iran.
Khazaee suggested a series of "ingredients" for successful negotiations, including "mutual respect, respect for Iran's national sovereignty, non-intervention in Iran's domestic affairs, and discarding the two-track policy of pressure and engagement."
In endorsing the idea of direct talks, Pickering said, "It's a serious mistake not to talk to people from whom we are estranged. And it's a serious mistake to believe that military force can solve diplomatic problems as we have found out most recently in Iraq."
Pickering outlined concerns that the United States and its friends and allies share over Iran's production of enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent, which is a short technical step away from the 90 percent purity needed for weaponization. He added, "We can find a way — on the one hand easing sanctions and on the other hand accepting limits on enrichment — which can begin to build trust and confidence."
Both speakers referred to the legacy of mistrust that exists between the two governments as a hurdle that must be addressed. "I believe that it's important to start small and to use small steps to build trust," Pickering said. Khazaee remarked, "The door is open for cooperation," specifically mentioning Afghanistan, Iraq, and security in the Persian Gulf as areas where both countries have common interests.
Asia Society's Vice President of Global Policy Programs Suzanne DiMaggio, who organized the event, said, "As we have seen over the years, when one side has been ready to negotiate, the other has balked. The Khazaee-Pickering dialogue was an opportunity to think through what a political solution might look like and the process to achieve it."
"The Obama administration has built a formidable international coalition against Iran, which has led to unprecedented sanctions and coercive measures," she added. "The start of a second term brings with it a window to pursue a political solution. This will require a shift from tactical maneuvers to a comprehensive strategy centered on step-by-step diplomacy, including direct bilateral talks. At the same time, Iranian decision makers must commit to working with their counterparts in Washington to reach a mutually acceptable approach for heading off a disastrous confrontation. This will require buy-in at the highest level of leadership in both countries."

http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/unprecedented-conversation-yields-proposals-us-iran-negotiations#3