National Air Defense Command (NADCOM) - Updates & Discussions.

[shehbazi2001]

All true, however I believe the PAF have still been neglectful in aquisition of SAM's. As of now neither high altitude SAM's which can potentially double up as ABM's or capable mobile SAM's been aquired in meaningful numbers. For a "defensive" forcesuch as the PAF where air denial is the main objective SAM's could be your best friend. Static sites of strategic importance need SAM's period. Also a defensive force creates "SAM Corridors" whereby you force your opposition into SAM traps which they might not have prior knowledge of.

Imagine an Indian strike package consisting of say mirages with SU-30 cover. They should be picked up by PAF ground radar and AWACS, but the question is how to engage? especially in lieu of the Sukhoi's impressive ability to punch from distance given it's powerful BAR's and associated BVR's. Incoming PAF aircraft will be detected by the Indians however, approach must be done in order to force IAF aircraft into these SAM zones. This way Indian's will either engage directly - which no Strike Package wants to do -be forced into SAM zone - which ultimately causes abortion of mission - wastage of fuel/countermeasures and leaves fleeing aircraft vulnerable - or abortion of mission which effectively is victory for the PAF.

It's not as if SAM's arn't part of the PAF's agenda - we've been hearing from Musharraf's time Pakistan being keen on acquiring high altitude SAM's. Though finance and "politics has become a hurdle"

The difficulty is that its hard to hide the radars of SAM batteries. ELINT aircraft and drones are on the constant watch to locate these radars through their radio and radar emissions. One way to get around this problem is to integrate these SAM sites with AWACS or AEW. AEW shall replace the surveillance radar of the SAM battery and order it to switch on its fire-control radar at a suitable moment. Also each SAM battery shall need a call-sign so that AEW can individually communicate with each battery.

But it should be kept in mind that first waves of air attack involve SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence) aircraft and SAM battery showing itself to SEAD aircraft means destruction by AGM-88 HARMs and other standoff missiles and guided bombs. This can be avoided to some extent by using laser radar or an intelligent coordination with AWACS/AEW with SAM battery switching its radar on only when aggressor aircraft are within the range of its missiles and aggressor aircraft have already overflown the SAM site. SAM battery can then engage the enemy from behind and be safe itself from their attack.

Alternatively the fire-control radar can be separated from the missile launchers for example the Crotale SAM launcher has its missiles loaded around the fire-control/engagement radar which is not safe. Anti-radar missiles home on these radars and missiles themselves should be separated from them so that a quick change of antenna can bring back the battery to action.

Despite all these measures, it would remain difficult to decide about the placement and positioning of SAM batteries when faced with standoff missiles like APACHE and Storm Shadow, long-range guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and hovering attack drones like FireShadow.

 

[MastanKhan]

Shehbazi,

You are right---but your modern radar and surveillance system should be able to set them apart as well.

 

[Rajput_Pakistani]

The difficulty is that its hard to hide the radars of SAM batteries. ELINT aircraft and drones are on the constant watch to locate these radars through their radio and radar emissions. One way to get around this problem is to integrate these SAM sites with AWACS or AEW. AEW shall replace the surveillance radar of the SAM battery and order it to switch on its fire-control radar at a suitable moment. Also each SAM battery shall need a call-sign so that AEW can individually communicate with each battery.

But it should be kept in mind that first waves of air attack involve SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence) aircraft and SAM battery showing itself to SEAD aircraft means destruction by AGM-88 HARMs and other standoff missiles and guided bombs. This can be avoided to some extent by using laser radar or an intelligent coordination with AWACS/AEW with SAM battery switching its radar on only when aggressor aircraft are within the range of its missiles and aggressor aircraft have already overflown the SAM site. SAM battery can then engage the enemy from behind and be safe itself from their attack.

Alternatively the fire-control radar can be separated from the missile launchers for example the Crotale SAM launcher has its missiles loaded around the fire-control/engagement radar which is not safe. Anti-radar missiles home on these radars and missiles themselves should be separated from them so that a quick change of antenna can bring back the battery to action.

Despite all these measures, it would remain difficult to decide about the placement and positioning of SAM batteries when faced with standoff missiles like APACHE and Storm Shadow, long-range guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and hovering attack drones like FireShadow.

Quite agreed with your assessments Sir, but my question is what is the efficiency of SEAD/DEAD missions? Can our neighboring adversary has or will have in near future the capability to completely neutralize Pakistan air defenses? After all in Kosovo war, NATO was out of PGMs and HARMs against a much smaller adversary Serbia. Here is a very insight article about SEAD/DEAD and SAM challenges.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21141.pdf

An excerpt from above article

A variety of new technologies and military systems could exacerbate the “double
digit” SAM challenge. First, commercial information and communications technologies
are enabling adversaries to better network the elements of their air defense systems. This
allows them to disperse radars, SAM launchers and other associated platforms throughout
the battlespace, and to share targeting information between launchers. This, in turn,
suggests that radars may be used less frequently and for shorter periods of time,
complicating U.S. SEAD efforts. Second, terminal defenses are being marketed by a
number of international defense companies. These radar-guided Gatling guns are designed
to protect “double digit” SAMs or other high value air defense assets, by shooting 3,000
to 4,500 rounds per minute into the sky. These systems could prove quite effective in
shooting down HARM or other missiles aimed at enemy air defenses. Third, Russia and
other countries have developed and are selling GPS jammers. Over varying distances,
these low-watt jammers degrade or totally disrupt the GPS guidance signals used by many
U.S. PGMs to augment inertial guidance systems, reducing their accuracy.

 

[shehbazi2001]

Quite agreed with your assessments Sir, but my question is what is the efficiency of SEAD/DEAD missions? Can our neighboring adversary has or will have in near future the capability to completely neutralize Pakistan air defenses? After all in Kosovo war, NATO was out of PGMs and HARMs against a much smaller adversary Serbia. Here is a very insight article about SEAD/DEAD and SAM challenges.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21141.pdf

The outcome of a conflict shall obviously depend on who is well-prepared, well-equipped and well-trained. Now our neighbour has gone into space with its spy satellites. These satellites can potentially locate radars and air defence units through optical means, ELINT and space-based radars. Pakistan lacks this capability. Other than that our neighbour is buying every high-tech weapon that money can buy.

If not well-equipped, Pakistan can try to be well-prepared. Pakistan can try to maximize the efficiency of its air defences through ISI by implanting trained mobile observers in the vicinity of enemy air bases. These agents should be able to safely communicate the type and numbers of aircrafts that took off from that specific air base at a specific time. Thus air defence units can prepare themselves in advance. Serbia used this strategy in Balkans war.

During the 1st Gulf war, we put the blame of Iraqi defeat on stealth aircrafts and relieved ourselves of doing any study but the Libyan conflict was dominated by conventional fighters like Rafale and Eurofighter which means thats its not just Stealth than can degrade and destroy your air defence and command structure.

 

[Mian H Amin.]

lol such an old post ... how come it came on top ?

 

[imiakhtar]

The difficulty is that its hard to hide the radars of SAM batteries. ELINT aircraft and drones are on the constant watch to locate these radars through their radio and radar emissions. One way to get around this problem is to integrate these SAM sites with AWACS or AEW. AEW shall replace the surveillance radar of the SAM battery and order it to switch on its fire-control radar at a suitable moment. Also each SAM battery shall need a call-sign so that AEW can individually communicate with each battery.

But it should be kept in mind that first waves of air attack involve SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence) aircraft and SAM battery showing itself to SEAD aircraft means destruction by AGM-88 HARMs and other standoff missiles and guided bombs. This can be avoided to some extent by using laser radar or an intelligent coordination with AWACS/AEW with SAM battery switching its radar on only when aggressor aircraft are within the range of its missiles and aggressor aircraft have already overflown the SAM site. SAM battery can then engage the enemy from behind and be safe itself from their attack.

Alternatively the fire-control radar can be separated from the missile launchers for example the Crotale SAM launcher has its missiles loaded around the fire-control/engagement radar which is not safe. Anti-radar missiles home on these radars and missiles themselves should be separated from them so that a quick change of antenna can bring back the battery to action.

Despite all these measures, it would remain difficult to decide about the placement and positioning of SAM batteries when faced with standoff missiles like APACHE and Storm Shadow, long-range guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and hovering attack drones like FireShadow.

The outcome of a conflict shall obviously depend on who is well-prepared, well-equipped and well-trained. Now our neighbour has gone into space with its spy satellites. These satellites can potentially locate radars and air defence units through optical means, ELINT and space-based radars. Pakistan lacks this capability. Other than that our neighbour is buying every high-tech weapon that money can buy.

If not well-equipped, Pakistan can try to be well-prepared. Pakistan can try to maximize the efficiency of its air defences through ISI by implanting trained mobile observers in the vicinity of enemy air bases. These agents should be able to safely communicate the type and numbers of aircrafts that took off from that specific air base at a specific time. Thus air defence units can prepare themselves in advance. Serbia used this strategy in Balkans war.

Excellent posts.

There are many lessons to be learnt from the NATO air campaigns over Serbia. There is a youtube vid somewhere which explains how a Serbian SAM commander, using shoot and scoot tactics (and a little ingenuity) shot down an F-117.

 

[shehbazi2001]

Excellent posts.

There are many lessons to be learnt from the NATO air campaigns over Serbia. There is a youtube vid somewhere which explains how a Serbian SAM commander, using shoot and scoot tactics (and a little ingenuity) shot down an F-117.

Yes the Serb agents were reporting the take-off and landing activities from far-away airbases like in Italy from where the F-117s were operating.

 

[Rajput_Pakistani]

^^^ Yes sir, we can have many valuable lessons from Operation Desert Storm (I & II) and NATO's air campaign against Serbia. Pakistan can not match India in numbers and also due to poor economic, political constraints, we may not get state of the art systems. So to counter aggressive Indian doctrines like CSD (where air cover will be the survival and death situation for Indian IBGs), we need to invest smartly & efficiently. What i have read about Serbian conflict and SAMs in particular, the following points are the important lessons.

1. SAMs are the game changer, where adversary have superior air power.
2. Mobile SAMs have double survivability as compared to fixed ones.
3. GPRS jammers, decoys are cheap solutions to effectively put the enemy in an awkward situation. Consider a US$20000 PGM being wasted. We have seen such example where Indians ran out of all their stocks of LGB in Kargil war.
4. Medium and short range mobile SAMs for battlefield and LRSAM for strategic points.
5. Passive Electro-optical systems have not those deficiencies of traditional radars. Radars can detect the threats at longer ranges but while doing so they themselves become exposed, and so become a victim of HARM. Whereas EO systems have no such problems and can also detect Stealth fighters and UAVs too.
6. More then 1000 state of the art NATO fighters, after 100+ days of air campaigns were only able to destroy about 60% of the Serbian air defenses. The size of Serbia is not more then our Sindh province. This is probably the most important lesson for us to learn and capitalize while we plan to counter Indian CSD.
7. Networking, networking and Networking

Regards and please continue this discussion and contribute / correct more to my knowledge.

 

[GURU DUTT]

The outcome of a conflict shall obviously depend on who is well-prepared, well-equipped and well-trained. Now our neighbour has gone into space with its spy satellites. These satellites can potentially locate radars and air defence units through optical means, ELINT and space-based radars. Pakistan lacks this capability. Other than that our neighbour is buying every high-tech weapon that money can buy.

If not well-equipped, Pakistan can try to be well-prepared. Pakistan can try to maximize the efficiency of its air defences through ISI by implanting trained mobile observers in the vicinity of enemy air bases. These agents should be able to safely communicate the type and numbers of aircrafts that took off from that specific air base at a specific time. Thus air defence units can prepare themselves in advance. Serbia used this strategy in Balkans war.

During the 1st Gulf war, we put the blame of Iraqi defeat on stealth aircrafts and relieved ourselves of doing any study but the Libyan conflict was dominated by conventional fighters like Rafale and Eurofighter which means thats its not just Stealth than can degrade and destroy your air defence and command structure.

now now sir well here in India owr bases dont have to run shadee halls and bakeries anywhere near it let alone to let some so called highly trained foreign assets do the snooping job we have a dedicated force just for that as we learned and experienced the same in 1965 and paid heavily for it aswell so in short we have learned owr lessons the hard way and after kandhar & Kargill episode things did showed us the same weakness= your over zelous strategick assets doing the damage this time around we are prepared where as we have a very very potent 3D & ASEA based ground , aerostat & airborn Radar coverage backed by latest and very very leathel short , medium & long range multi layered SAM coverage + SAT cover & a big inoventory of Drone's to keep your strategikk assets & AIR Force at bay but can the same be said about you

for SEAD deptt. we have a dedicatet force aswell now please care to tell me how will pakistan overcome all of them in case of war and very soon Rafales , FGFA's will join IAF for the same with already a potent force with Upgraded M2K's ,Jaguar's & Mig 27 for the same job

 

[ejaz007]

now now sir well here in India owr bases dont have to run shadee halls and bakeries anywhere near it let alone to let some so called highly trained foreign assets do the snooping job we have a dedicated force just for that as we learned and experienced the same in 1965 and paid heavily for it aswell so in short we have learned owr lessons the hard way and after kandhar & Kargill episode things did showed us the same weakness= your over zelous strategick assets doing the damage this time around we are prepared where as we have a very very potent 3D & ASEA based ground , aerostat & airborn Radar coverage backed by latest and very very leathel short , medium & long range multi layered SAM coverage + SAT cover & a big inoventory of Drone's to keep your strategikk assets & AIR Force at bay but can the same be said about you

for SEAD deptt. we have a dedicatet force aswell now please care to tell me how will pakistan overcome all of them in case of war and very soon Rafales , FGFA's will join IAF for the same with already a potent force with Upgraded M2K's ,Jaguar's & Mig 27 for the same job

IAF at the moment does not have rafaels. Rafael was selected in 2012 as the winner and it is 2013 and you have not signed any contract. Delivery shall commence after three to four years once you sign the contract. Going by the way Indian procurement is done don't consider Rafael as an IAF fighter till the contract is signed and aircraft delivered.

FGFA is also a future potential fighter which shall join at the earliest in 2018. No need to mention that fighter as well.

Mirage 2000's have not been upgraded as yet and already some questions are being asked about the cost of the project. A similar thread is there on the forum.

In short lot of what you tried to scare PAF of is not in IAF inventory. Let us get scared once you have the stuff.

 

[ice_man]

well a lesson must be learnt from the Gulf War of 1991 where the HARM missiles litreally took out all the Radars of the Iraqis within the first 24 hours! & all the SEAD operations were succesful. blinding the Iraqi airforce from then on it was a case of how quickly the allies could totally take control.

 

[notorious_eagle]

well a lesson must be learnt from the Gulf War of 1991 where the HARM missiles litreally took out all the Radars of the Iraqis within the first 24 hours! & all the SEAD operations were succesful. blinding the Iraqi airforce from then on it was a case of how quickly the allies could totally take control.

Actually, if you study the first Gulf War in more detail, you will realize that Iraq C&C was intact. Before the commencement of Desert Storm, NATO conducted 30 days of intense bombing sorties. Despite these intense punitive strikes, Iraqi C&C was intact and still able to command and coordinate. It was only the ground operations that delivered the final punch to the Iraqi War Machine. Without an effective ground based operation, air strikes are at best punitive and don't degrade the ability of the enemy to reground and fightback.

 

[rockstarIN]

IAF at the moment does not have rafaels. Rafael was selected in 2012 as the winner and it is 2013 and you have not signed any contract. Delivery shall commence after three to four years once you sign the contract. Going by the way Indian procurement is done don't consider Rafael as an IAF fighter till the contract is signed and aircraft delivered.

FGFA is also a future potential fighter which shall join at the earliest in 2018. No need to mention that fighter as well.

Mirage 2000's have not been upgraded as yet and already some questions are being asked about the cost of the project. A similar thread is there on the forum.

In short lot of what you tried to scare PAF of is not in IAF inventory. Let us get scared once you have the stuff.

The deal is signed and the jets are getting upgraded one by one.

 

[ice_man]

Actually, if you study the first Gulf War in more detail, you will realize that Iraq C&C was intact. Before the commencement of Desert Storm, NATO conducted 30 days of intense bombing sorties. Despite these intense punitive strikes, Iraqi C&C was intact and still able to command and coordinate. It was only the ground operations that delivered the final punch to the Iraqi War Machine. Without an effective ground based operation, air strikes are at best punitive and don't degrade the ability of the enemy to reground and fightback.

true however, due to the succesful SEAD operations against Iraqi Sams & radar instalations the iraqis could not see or predict where will the enemy hit next. the main aim of the Allies was to blind the iraqis. this lead to the allies have a complete air superiority which was the main diffrence once the ground operations started.

and this was proven in the iraqi pullout of kuwait and the so called "highway to hell". where 2,000 armed vehicles were destroyed by air power of the Allies.

The Massacre of Withdrawing Soldiers on "The Highway of Death"

 

[Zarbe Momin]

Some body can give me a satisfied answer why pakistan is not going to develop its own air defence missle system. If the task given to NESCOM is not a difficult job.