Everyone needs to take a couple steps back here...
The word 'automatic' is loaded and I can see it is misleading the discussion.
In any complex system where there are certain 'automatic' actions, such as responses to stimuli or commanded by a previous condition or combinations of conditions, they are different than when actions occurred because of some errors.
I will use the F-111's terrain following (TF) radar and flight control system (FLCS) tie-in as example. The TF radar scans ground terrain at a certain distance ahead of the jet's flight path. Ground returns are calculated, including the Doppler component of those echoes, as a rising/declining analog voltage curve. Once the FLCS tie-in is engaged, the jet will automatically follows that curve.
In this situation, everything works as designed....
- The TF radar is in a physically moving, actually a 'nodding' motion.
- The TF antenna is actually transmitting.
- The TF antenna is actually receiving.
- The TF computer is actually 'computing'.
- The FLCS computer recognized the pilot's command to initiate tie-in.
- The FLCS computer then query the TF radar computer if it is active.
- The FLCS computer received a response from the TF radar computer that the TF radar computer is active.
- The FLCS computer then query the TF radar computer for that analog voltage.
- The FLCS computer then compute that signal to calculate pitch up/down commands for the rear horizontal stabs.
What if this chain is broken
AFTER tie-in and the jet is under computer control ? There is an automatic response for that: immediate pitch up. The reasoning is that sky is safer than the ground and if I am in TF flight, any component missing in that chain could mean I would be flying straight instead of climb, so it is better to immediately climb to save the aircrew and possibly the mission.
So here we have two automatic responses:
- A successful TFR-FLCS tie-in and flight that looks for the
EXISTENCE of many things.
- A pitch-up command that looks for the
ABSENCE of even just one thing.
If the Su-30 have an automatic pilot ejection system, which I doubt it does, what is the architecture of that system ? When is it engaged ? Does it actively look for the existences of many things ? Or does the system assume that those things already exists and only looks for the absence of one or a few things, then kicks the pilot out ? The pilot leaving his aircraft is a serious matter. To date, I know of no avionics system that will automatically eject the aircrew.
For the F-111...If there is an error in the TFR-FLCS tie-in and the F-111 does that automatic pitch-up command, the jet and aircrew are saved. The mission may be in jeopardy, but at least there is a chance of continuing the mission. The conditions for that automatic response are quite narrow: missing something in that chain.
But for an automatic ejection system ? There are many factors to consider if we are to automatically eject the pilot(s). Combat damage ? To what degree and to what components ? From what altitude ? From what attitude ? From what airspeed ? The F-111's TFR-FLCS tie-in chain is linear and internal to the avionics. But how are we to design a reliable automatic ejection system when there are external influences like battle damage ? What are the logic paths for this ? What if he wants to fly at low altitude ? What altitude is considered 'low' ? What if he forgot to disable this automatic ejection system ? The jet would kick him out the second his altimeter reached that threshold. Where would the altitude threshold for automatic ejection came from, raw air data, computed air data, the altimeter, or radar altimeter ?
What this mean is that when the pilots reported of an 'automatic' ejection, they mean
'UNCOMMANDED'. If a pilot accidentally pulled the ejection handle, then that event would be commanded but
UNINTENTIONAL. The ejection handle was pulled, so as far as the ejection system was concerned, it was a legitimate command. But for the pilot, he did not
WANT or
INTEND to leave his jet. If the jet was worked on and the maintainers left a tool that somehow activated the ejection process, that event would still be legitimately commanded but unintentional.
Yes, the word 'automatic' was used, but it does not mean the ejection was purposely designed to remove the pilot from the equation. The word 'automatic' was used casually. Exact terminologies
MUST be used in order for investigators to do their jobs correctly. If these events were human caused, then the Indian Air Force have a serious training problem on its hands.
If you guys, for the sake of laymen's interests, really want to know what happened, you guys need to contact someone and/or do research on the technical aspects of the Su-30 ejection system. But if there truly is an automatic pilot ejection system for the Su-30, I would be very surprised and will stand corrected.
Mig-25 can shoot down an SR-71.
SR-71 can just take photos of the Mig-25.
Those are even better jokes.
