Wonder, Where would that tall claim stand today, when after a decade so many skeletons are rattling in the cupboards......Pakistan still occupies strategic heights.....Indian army falsified Kargil records etc......it can open a can of worms. !!
Funny guy.
The PA occupied some heights, and the vacated them on the orders of the American Master IF Mr.BeeCluff is to be believed! While the Indian Army was just watching the telly.
Same is the case Siachen area below the Saltoro Ridge occupied by India, hence the grave concern about getting smothered by avalanches. That is the real reason for wanting to vacate Siachen.
About Lt.Gen. Krishan Pal the initial occupation of the vacant Indian posts "happened during his watch", so he has an axe to grind. But you have not listened to or understood exactly what he is saying.
About Brig. Singh; his grouse is different. He first raised the "Red-Flag" about the intruders, which his superiors including Gen.Krishan Pal in Northern Command
FAILED to appreciate. That his appreciation was suppressed and even sought to be altered by his higher command i.e. Krishan Pal is what Brig. Singh has been talking about all the time. So it is easy to understand what level of standing Krishan Pal has. People will be well-advised to read/see and understand before posting anything like chronic "Quick-Gun Murugans".
In short Gen.Krishan Pal comes out as shakily as Maj.Gen.Javed Hasan then Commander Force Command Northern Areas who actually commanded the Op. or Lt. Gen. Mehmud Ahmed then Commander 10 Corps who made that hal-baked plan. Of course Gen. Parvez Musharraf whose "brain-wave" was seminal to the mis-adventure cannot be overlooked!
In the words of then Director Air Operations,PAF; Air Cmde. Kaiser Tufail the plan was so full of holes to be patently unworkable, in his words:
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating major strategic effects.
Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly capture territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a laymans attention during a cursory examination.
which in Kaiser Tufail's own words only led to this:
Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
Where does the Indian Army stand post-Kargil? Back in the posts where they used to be.
However, it is diplomatically and strategically that India made the biggest gains post-Kargil. Since 1947, India had to struggle with the "baggage of hyphenation" with Pakistan; because for some peculiar reasons Pakistan was some-how seen as some kind of (maybe smaller) sibling of India. So in the world's eyes Pakistan had to be some-way or the other equated or given parity with India. That concept was just ground into the dust finally after Kargil.
For Example- How on Earth did India get the '123 Agreement' or Civilian Nuclear Deal?
Actually, in my view: India ought to thank Musharraf and the few odd
Jernails of the PA for "cooking up the Kargil Stew"!!! Though sadly, those left in the stew-pot of the Kargil heights were only the hapless soldiers of the NLI and a few from the SSG.
