What's new

Kargil was a poor test of India's air warfare capability

WASHINGTON: Kargil conflict was a "poor test" of India's air warfare capability, a prominent US thinktank has said, warning that with threats of future wars with Pakistan and China persisting, Indian defence establishment has to prepare accordingly.

"Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for manoeuvre," said the think-tank in a report released yesterday.
The Times of India - Indian Newspapers in English Language from six editions.
Yes, the IAF was restricted to go flat out due to the constraints imposed by the political leadership. The air support was highly constrained as opposed to the air warfare doctrine that the IAF has been trained for. This one was a very limited op in a limited area which was an off-the-handle restricted campaign. The IAF has hopefully learned its lessons on how to support the army in such a constrained battlefield scenario.
 
.
The prime minister of Pakistan was ordered by the president of the United States to withdraw his troops from a successful military operation.

Source: "War Drums are Beating" Brian Cloughley.

Shame on the country that takes orders from another country.

Pakistani citizens get killed by american drones, the pakistani prime minister takes orders from the US president, and yet they believe that they actually have a sovereign country of their own. And their people write it proudly in bold, red letters on internet forums, not even realising what a shameful admission it is.
 
.
WASHINGTON: Kargil conflict was a "poor test" of India's air warfare capability, a prominent US thinktank has said, warning that with threats of future wars with Pakistan and China persisting, Indian defence establishment has to prepare accordingly.

"Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for manoeuvre," said the think-tank in a report released yesterday.

The Kargil war, in which India emerged victorious over Pakistan, the 70-page report titles "Airpower At 18,000': the Indian Air Force in the Kargil War' further brought to light the initial near-total lack of transparency and open communication between Indian Army's top leaders and the IAF.

The report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said the covert Pakistani intrusion into Jammu and Kashmir had exposed a gaping hole in India's nationwide real-time intelligence.

"On a strategic level, the Kargil War vividly demonstrated that a stable bilateral nuclear deterrence relationship can markedly inhibit such regional conflicts in intensity and scale — if not preclude them altogether," it said.

"In the absence of the nuclear stabilizing factor, those flash points could erupt into open-ended conventional showdowns for the highest stakes. But the Kargil War also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea," the report said.

It said the possibility of future conventional wars of major consequence along India's borders with Pakistan and China persists, and the Indian defence establishment must plan and prepare accordingly.

The Times of India - Indian Newspapers in English Language from six editions.

Hope it is not garbage, created by you....

Please send the correct link.....your link open the main page of TOI.......
 
.
Kargil a bigger disaster than East Pakistan’

ISLAMABAD: The Kargil incursion was a far bigger tragedy for Pakistan than the civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh and damaged the country's Kashmir cause, a former general who quit army after being superseded by President Pervez Musharraf as chief of army has said.

Retired Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, who quit the army after the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed Musharraf as Army Chief in 1998 superseding him, said Kargil was flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution.

"It was an unprofessional decision by someone, who has served in the Pakistan Army for 40 years. As the architect of Kargil, he must answer critical questions for sacrificing so many soldiers. I am sure Kargil would continue to haunt him for the rest of his life," he said reacting to claims by Musharraf that Kargil was a successful operation.

He also challeged Musharraf's assertion that Kargil had revived the Kashmir issue. "I would say Kargil has damaged the Kashmir cause. It was a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy," he said, referring to the 1971 civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh.

"At that time, Pakistan at least had some friends but on Kargil we were friendless. There was no way we could defend this tactless move," he said in an interview to 'The News' newspaper.

Describing Musharraf as "Mr General U-turn," Khattak said his seven-year rule has been "characterized by U-turns on policy matters. This president cannot hold on to anything. He is impulsive. He took decisions on Kargil, Waziristan, Balochistan and a host of other issues and then backtracked on most of them."

He also accused Musharraf of mishandling the situation in Waziristan and Balochistan and "ordering the bombing and killing of our own people."

He was of the view that both issues ought to have been resolved politically. "I know from my sources that five to six military officers including colonels were court-martialled for refusing to fire on our people in Waziristan."

He also disputed claims by Musharraf in his book 'In the Line of Fire,' that he (Kuli) advocated imposition of martial law when then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif forced General Jehangir Karamat, army chief at the time, to resign.

Khattak said he never made a case for military rule.

"My view was that the Army should be firm and fair in dealing with all situations. I certainly advised General Jehangir Karamat, (who quit following differences with Sharif) not to resign as Army chief but I didn't ask him to stage a coup and impose martial law," he said.

Khattak and Musharraf were batchmates, having joined the 29th Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) course in Kakul and then becoming involved in an often bitter competition.

"I can say we were friends until I was made Chief of General Staff (CGS). Musharraf was very unhappy that he couldn't make it," he recalled.

Reached in Karachi for his reaction to observations made by Musharraf about him in the book, he argued it was a one-sided version of events in which facts have been misrepresented and half-truths inserted.


Kargil a bigger disaster than East Pakistan’

ISLAMABAD: The Kargil incursion was a far bigger tragedy for Pakistan than the civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh and damaged the country's Kashmir cause, a former general who quit army after being superseded by President Pervez Musharraf as chief of army has said.

Retired Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, who quit the army after the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed Musharraf as Army Chief in 1998 superseding him, said Kargil was flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution.

"It was an unprofessional decision by someone, who has served in the Pakistan Army for 40 years. As the architect of Kargil, he must answer critical questions for sacrificing so many soldiers. I am sure Kargil would continue to haunt him for the rest of his life," he said reacting to claims by Musharraf that Kargil was a successful operation.

He also challeged Musharraf's assertion that Kargil had revived the Kashmir issue. "I would say Kargil has damaged the Kashmir cause. It was a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy," he said, referring to the 1971 civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh.

"At that time, Pakistan at least had some friends but on Kargil we were friendless. There was no way we could defend this tactless move," he said in an interview to 'The News' newspaper.

Describing Musharraf as "Mr General U-turn," Khattak said his seven-year rule has been "characterized by U-turns on policy matters. This president cannot hold on to anything. He is impulsive. He took decisions on Kargil, Waziristan, Balochistan and a host of other issues and then backtracked on most of them."

He also accused Musharraf of mishandling the situation in Waziristan and Balochistan and "ordering the bombing and killing of our own people."

He was of the view that both issues ought to have been resolved politically. "I know from my sources that five to six military officers including colonels were court-martialled for refusing to fire on our people in Waziristan."

He also disputed claims by Musharraf in his book 'In the Line of Fire,' that he (Kuli) advocated imposition of martial law when then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif forced General Jehangir Karamat, army chief at the time, to resign.

Khattak said he never made a case for military rule.

"My view was that the Army should be firm and fair in dealing with all situations. I certainly advised General Jehangir Karamat, (who quit following differences with Sharif) not to resign as Army chief but I didn't ask him to stage a coup and impose martial law," he said.

Khattak and Musharraf were batchmates, having joined the 29th Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) course in Kakul and then becoming involved in an often bitter competition.

"I can say we were friends until I was made Chief of General Staff (CGS). Musharraf was very unhappy that he couldn't make it," he recalled.

Reached in Karachi for his reaction to observations made by Musharraf about him in the book, he argued it was a one-sided version of events in which facts have been misrepresented and half-truths inserted.
 
.
The PAF’s director of operations during the war was one of many who acknowledged afterward how the IAF “immediately went into a reappraisal mode [after its initial combat losses] and came out with GPS [Global Positioning System]-assisted high-altitude bombing by the MiG-21, MiG-23BN, and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution.” He further acknowledged the rapid reconfiguration of the Mirage 2000H with Litening pods to allow the option of day and night laser-guided bomb delivery. Once accurate target attacks by Mirage 2000Hs and Jaguars showed their ability to achieve significant combat effects, he added, around-the-clock operations by the IAF “had made retention of posts untenable by the Pakistani infiltrators.” In all, he concluded, although the Indian high command was completely surprised by the Kargil intrusion at the outset, “the IAF mobilized and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself.”102

Airpower at 18,000
 
.
Why would we do that? Din't you read the article you posted, below two lines says it all, why there is no reason for us to weep.

Nothing new here he is still weeping....thats never gonna change.
 
.
If you actually read this article in its entirity you will see it is full of praise for the IAF and states it achieved things few other AFs in the world could and that the Western AFs could learn a lot from the IAF.
 
.
If you actually read this article in its entirity you will see it is full of praise for the IAF and states it achieved things few other AFs in the world could and that the Western AFs could learn a lot from the IAF.

which western AF? :D
you mean west of india :D
 
.
^^^^^^^^

The battle in essence was being fought over Indian territory, so there was no question of PAF getting involved, however when the IAF transgressed into Pakistani air space, a decisive response was given.

haha, Try posting the full report instead of the part you like,

rest of the report:

According to the report, Pakistan's military leaders miscalculated badly in their apparent belief that the international community would press immediately for a cease-fire in Kashmir out of concern over a possible escalation of the fighting to the nuclear level, with the net result that Pakistan would be left with an easily acquired new slice of the terrain on the Indian side of the LoC.

Carnegie said the nuclear balance between the two countries did not deter a determined Indian conventional response, and the successful reaction that India ultimately mounted on the Kargil heights fell well short of being all out in scale.

"Furthermore, since the Vajpayee government scrupulously kept its combat operations confined to Indian-controlled Kashmir, the international community had no compelling reason to intervene," it said.

As a result, a remote but high-intensity and high-stakes showdown was allowed to run on for more than two months, something the Pakistan Army’s leaders all but certainly did not anticipate when they first conjured up their incursion plan.

The Kargil experience also suggested that if China and Pakistan came to appreciate that India possessed overwhelming conventional force preponderance in the region, that presence could act as a deterrent against such provocations in the future, it said.

According to the report, prudent Indian defence planners will likely find themselves shortchanged in their preparations for the full spectrum of possible challenges to their country’s security in years to come if they draw undue comfort from the happy ending of the Kargil experience and accept that conflict as their only planning baseline for hedging against future contingencies along the Line of Control.

Happy ending, since Pakistan under US pressure withdrew from the area.


According to and in the words of TOI.

again fail,

Not words of ToI but airpower at 18000 report
 
.
Thanks a bunch Windjammer for posting this article-it's a great read. Very kind to the IAF.



Of course I'm sure you heven't read the entire thing or else you wouldn't have posted it!
 
.
Najam Sethi on Kargil War!!

Najam Sethi is as eminent as my hiny

What's the point fighting over a decade old well discussed, well documentd event.

To me, this article looks more like an American sales pitch.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
.
Najam Sethi is as eminent as my hiny

What's the point fighting over a decade old well discussed, well documentd event.

To me, this article looks more like an American sales pitch.

Even in your history , myths of MM alam are too documented :) ...

who knows rest
 
.
The prime minister of Pakistan was ordered by the president of the United States to withdraw his troops from a successful military operation and this was done in time to save the Vajpayee government from the wave of criticism that would have swamped it had the confrontation not been stopped.

Source: "War Drums are Beating" Brian Cloughley.

This is what BeeCluff @Brian Cloughley had to say. Now was he condoning or lamenting the fact that the GoP has had to take orders from GOTUS??
So Pakistan's sovereignty issues have been around for a long time by the look of it.

Now about BeeCluff's belief that the military Op. was successful; people in Pakistan themselves felt differently. And mind you, they were people who were associated with Pakistan's Strategic Estt.
So they are likely to have credence rather than a Military Journalist/Historian. Lets see some of those opinions now:

In the eye of defence analysts Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin in his article “What Went Wrong” published in The News on July 14, 1999 said:
• The planners of Operation Kargil, as in the case of Operation Gibralter, did not expect that the Indians would raise the level of confrontation to a full-fledged war involving their helicopter gunships, airforce, navy and their nuclear tipped missiles. When they did so unsustainable. They had not planned for the worst scenario, which is what military colleges teach us. • The reaction of the international community was misjudged. Except for the toothless OIC, no other organization or country supported the actions of the contention that the Pakistan army was not part of the infiltration force. Pakistan was totally isolated as even China, our time-tested ally, is believed to have advised us to avoid a war and continue to seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir crisis.
• Holding of territory is not the fore of unconventional forces. They can do so only if they are reinforced by regular troops and supported by adequate ground and air power. Pakistan’s “moral, political and diplomatic support” was not enough for the mujahideen to have gained a decisive victory. Even Nawaz Sharif admits that for the mujahideen to reach Srinagar by this rout was a pipe dream.
• The time chosen to seek a military solution was inappropriate as world leaders were looking forward to the implementation of the Lahore Declaration by Pakistan, which upset the applecart. • Pakistan’s economy is still vulnerable to outside pressures. A proactive policy in Kashmir an only be sustained if the country is not too dependent on foreign assistance.”

And PA's retired Lt. Gen Talat Masood in his article “Lesson to learn from Kargil” published Dawn on July 17, 1999 said:
“Pakistan had to choose between reinforcing the Mujahideen and risking an all-out war, which it could ill afford except at its own peril, or opt for a withdrawal. The latter was considered a more prudent course, as it would avert a greater catastrophe. This was also what the Prime Minister said in his address to the nation to justify the Washington agreement. It will be erroneous to place blame on any one party, be it the politicians, armed forces or the Mujahideen for this debacle. Besides, when the armed forces have to rely heavily on foreign sources of supply for their critical weapon system, they cannot fight a war for a long duration without the backing and full support of major powers.

Defence analyst Dr Shireen Mazari said:
"In fact, the short-comings of Pakistan’s national security decision-making were revealed by the Kargil Conflict were not episodic but systemic.”

Admiral Fasih Bokhari, ex CNS PN who had resigned a week before the Oct 12 coup, in an interview with South Asia tribune on Oct 6, 2006 said:
“now I am free to speak because the minimum term to stay quiet after leaving the navy job had been completed. I resigned on October 5, 1999, a week before Musharraf’s coup of October 12 because I had come to know that he had decided to topple the Sharif government,” Adm Bokhari said in Islamabad after he had attended an SDPI seminar on the plight of the Okara tenants and the role of the Army in evicting them from their lands, the portal reported. Asked why in his view Gen Musharraf wanted to topple Nawaz Sharif, Adm Bokhari said: “Because he feared he will have to face a court martial for masterminding the Kargil debacle.”

The newspaper Daily Dawn’s editorial said:
“We could not agree more with the former Prime Minister when he says that a commission be set up to investigate the Kargil episode to let the nation know the facts that even after one year remain confined to the realm of secrecy. This nation has the right to know whose brainchild the Kargil operation was, who were the military and political personalities involved or not involved in the operation, and who should be held responsible.” (Editorial Dawn, June 14, 2000).

While the newspaper Nation opined while quoting American Gen.Anthony Zinni (ex Commander CENTCOM) from his book- "Battle Ready" where Anthony Zinni had spoken with (browbeat?) Pervez Musharraf about Kargil:
"The book exposes the truth plainly; the entire operation was planned and executed by the Pakistan Army.’ That the adventure ended in disaster for the country is no longer in question. The precipitous withdrawal led to the loss of precious lives of brave soldiers, reportedly heavier than that suffered during the 1965 war. When the operation was going ‘well’ it was being touted as a master stoke of strategic planning and execution that would internationalise the Kashmir dispute and put strong pressure on New Delhi to resolve it quickly. As the subsequent events proved, no such thing happened. Instead, Pakistan was made to eat humble pie and had a close shave with a nuclear conflagration. The simple lesson Kargil provides has been spelled out much before it was even dreamt of: war is too serious a business to be left to the General. Ironically, Kargil occurred even though an elected civilian government with an unprecedented mandate was supposedly in control of the Army. The sooner the lesson is learnt and the army accepts the supremacy of Parliament, the better for all.” –Nation, June 6, 2004.

The then Director Air Operations of the PAF, Air Cmde. Kaiser Tufail has written about Kargil giving what the PAF experience WRT to Kargil Ops in planning/execution was very lucidly and transparently.
About the Operation itself his opinion:
"From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms."

" It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were General Pervez Musharraf: Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed: Commander 10 Corps and, Maj Gen Javed Hasan: Commander Force Command Northern Areas. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio’s self-serving presentation.

In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating major strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly capture territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman’s attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.

Kargil, I suspect, like the ‘65 and ‘71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters."

"Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter."

None of the narratives outlined above, indicate the Military Victory that BeeCluff seems to find.
If that was really so all the Gentlemen and one Gentle-Lady quoted above would have collectively and resoundingly said "twas a Famous Victory!" or some other words to that effect.
They certainly didn't seem to.
 
. . .

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom