It's ironic that the sanction proof nature of the jf-17 was a major selling point for Pakistan. What we didn't account for was the complete incompetence of our economic planners. As it stands today, the jf-17 is sanctioned for all intents and purposes. We are unable to procure it at a rate we would like and we are unable to upgrade it at the pace the circumstances necessitate.
That is not to say it isn't a valuable fighter. It is a welcomed replacement for our vintage aircraft. But it's relative value moving forward only diminishes if we are unable to produce it and replace aircraft that are falling out of the sky and costing the lives of valuable pilots. It's leap in capabilities is less important if it is unable to maintain its technological advantages relative to other aircraft in the future. The regional scenario requires the PAF workhorse to be upgraded constantly, keeping it in line with a growing IAF arsenal. It also requires the workhorse to be present in the kind of numbers that make it a workhorse in the first place. Neither of which seems guaranteed.
As it stands, the jf-17 program is at a crossroads, whether we like to admit it or not. At some point potential and future capabilities must translate into the here and now. Without funding and the slightest hope for a sizable economic recovery, we have to consider the possibility that the jf-17 may never deliver on its promise. If we aren't even able to maintain our current disadvantaged situation relative to the IAF and fall further behind, then it has failed. It is unfortunate because the potential is there and always has been. But if there is anything to be learned from successive Pakistani governments, it's their ability to take the greatest of advantages and accomplishments, and run them into the ground.
