Iranian Air Defense Systems
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Aramagedon
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Myself
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Please don’t use Wikipedia for technical topics, buddy. Dubna has a range of 300 km, 60 km more than Vega. The question is how much is the range of the recently delivered version to Syria? Russians called it advanced S-200M, which apparently has a range of 300 km, way more than their S-300!
T-72B
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Well my bad
TheImmortal
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Yes and it has failed to intercept a single Israeli aircraft. Well actually One happened to explode near one forcing the pilot to eject. So in hundreds of israeli air raids and it failed to hit a single F-16.
So obviously the S-200 Syria has is not “advanced.”
PeeD
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Note:
The Najm-804 beside its role as 15th Khordad radar is also the enabling system for the Talash-3 capability level of Iranian S-200 sites.
The reason is the cooling requirements for the AESA array: They ~ doubled compared to the Najm-802B.
The Najm-802B with the SD-2A is the IRGCASF equivalent to the IRIADF 15th Khordad and has the same 45km range.
However the IRIADF requirements also requested a capability to support S-200 sites upgraded to Talash-2 level.
Hence the increased the AESA power output that required more cooling.
Its main role would be to support 120km SD-3 engagements of S-200 Talash-2 sites. Drastically increasing the EW warfare robustness of the Talash-2 sites.
It can most likely also supports the S-200 in its most effective engagement envelope of 100-200km. Increasing EW robustness.
As for the S-200's performance: Its job is to keep the enemy out of the 10-25km altitude envelope at the 100-200km range.
There need to be other, more cost effective systems to cover the lower altitudes at more forward placed regions.
S-200 will never impact directly, but explode its directed frag-warhead at a effective kill distance. Even a small SD-2 is designed for proximity fusing at a pre-determined distance where max. fragmentation damage is expected.
So Israelis normally dive down behind the Golan or Lebanese mountains once the get a S-200 warning. Syrians can't forward deploy their Buk, too risky and easily masked by the mountains (possible due to Israeli hit and run tactics).
However the point here is that the 1960's vintage S-200 seeker should be jammable by newest Israeli self defense ECM system, chaff, decoys ect.
However that S-200 somehow managed to hit the Israeli F-16. No dive/masking maneuver, no notching/beaming, no ECM, no decoy, no chaff. Israelis were surprised by the kill.
Hence it's possible that it was a Talash related test by Iran. It clearly showed the potential of 1960's S-200 in near 2020 (50-60 years).
The Najm-804 beside its role as 15th Khordad radar is also the enabling system for the Talash-3 capability level of Iranian S-200 sites.
The reason is the cooling requirements for the AESA array: They ~ doubled compared to the Najm-802B.
The Najm-802B with the SD-2A is the IRGCASF equivalent to the IRIADF 15th Khordad and has the same 45km range.
However the IRIADF requirements also requested a capability to support S-200 sites upgraded to Talash-2 level.
Hence the increased the AESA power output that required more cooling.
Its main role would be to support 120km SD-3 engagements of S-200 Talash-2 sites. Drastically increasing the EW warfare robustness of the Talash-2 sites.
It can most likely also supports the S-200 in its most effective engagement envelope of 100-200km. Increasing EW robustness.
As for the S-200's performance: Its job is to keep the enemy out of the 10-25km altitude envelope at the 100-200km range.
There need to be other, more cost effective systems to cover the lower altitudes at more forward placed regions.
S-200 will never impact directly, but explode its directed frag-warhead at a effective kill distance. Even a small SD-2 is designed for proximity fusing at a pre-determined distance where max. fragmentation damage is expected.
So Israelis normally dive down behind the Golan or Lebanese mountains once the get a S-200 warning. Syrians can't forward deploy their Buk, too risky and easily masked by the mountains (possible due to Israeli hit and run tactics).
However the point here is that the 1960's vintage S-200 seeker should be jammable by newest Israeli self defense ECM system, chaff, decoys ect.
However that S-200 somehow managed to hit the Israeli F-16. No dive/masking maneuver, no notching/beaming, no ECM, no decoy, no chaff. Israelis were surprised by the kill.
Hence it's possible that it was a Talash related test by Iran. It clearly showed the potential of 1960's S-200 in near 2020 (50-60 years).
TheImmortal
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@PeeD
Your thoughts on the following published article on War Is Boring. Is this pure propaganda ment to diminish Iran’s domestic production capability or is there some truth to this?
China and Iran: Joining Forces to Beat U.S. Stealth Fighters?
The rapid development of Iranian air defenses over the last few years raises some big questions. How much are China and Iran cooperating? Why is China’s involvement a mystery to so many observers?
In recent years, the Chinese defense sector has provided its export customers with top-notch products. Several well-known Chinese corporations are active on the international market for air-defense systems. The best-known are the China Electronic Technology Group Corporation, the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation.
(This article originally appeared at War is Boring in 2017.)
But there could be another. “The Chinese company deepest involved in cooperation with us is named Poly Technologies,” an engineer working for the Iranian Electronic Industries told War Is Boring.
Unlikely to ring many bells in the public, Poly Technologies is renown among air-defense specialists for maintaining much closer ties to the top ranks of the People’s Liberation Army of China than any other company does.
This state-owned firm is a subsidiary – but also the backbone – of the China Poly Group Corporation, and has established business relations with hundreds of enterprises around the world. One of its better-known foreign trader partners is the Italian car-designer Ferrari.
Indeed, much of trade involving Poly Technologies is for civilian applications. However, another of its primary duties is the acquisition and import of equipment and technology to China for military use.
Curiously, for its export business in the air-defense sector, Poly Technologies partners with the 14th Institute of China Electronic Technology Group Corporation.
The 14th Institute is the founding company in China’s radar industry. Established in the 1950s with Soviet help, it employs around 9,000 people. In working with Poly Technologies, the Iranians gain access to the best of the Chinese air-defense industry.
Not that that’s obvious. “The Chinese are very open to modify their own product – and at least as skillful in giving you the illusion that all of what they do is coming from you,” the same IEI engineer said.
“Actually, many of the systems we now claim to be ours have existed in China for many years. All the necessary research and development for them was done even before we requested them. But they pay great attention to provide us with the illusion of everything being of our design, coming from us.”
This is why even most of people working for IEI don’t know that various radar systems they manufacture were at least designed in China – if not entirely manufactured there, too. On the contrary, nearly everybody interviewed in the course of research for this article is firmly convinced that everything is designed and manufactured in Iran.
The majority of “Iranian-developed” air-defense systems of Chinese origin are based on various Chinese or Russian designs. Some Chinese systems are themselves practically clones of Russian designs. For example, the missile-transport and launch-containers for the Bavar-373 system bear strong resemblances to those on the Chinese KS-1A missile system.
The origins of various other “Iranian” designs are at least as obvious. The Miraj-4 radar is a development of the Chinese JYL-1. The Iranian Bashir comes from the JY-11B. The Kashef derives from the YLC-6M. And so on.
Iran’s air-defense systems include roughly two dozen different radars. While certainly representing a maintenance nightmare, such a network is extremely hard to fight because any opponent must find a solution for facing multiple radars at once.
Although many of the radars fielded in Iran appear less flexible than their Russian or Chinese originals, the availability of multiple systems means redundancy. Should one system prove ineffective or easy to jam or even knock out in combat, there are two or more systems that can take its place.
Some of Iran’s radars possess very advanced capabilities. One example is the Qadir early-warning system. This Sino-Iranian variant of the Russian-made Rezonans is a fixed installation providing 360-degree coverage.
In 2015 the United Arab Emirates demonstrated its own variant of the same system. Developed with help of Ukrainian experts and named Rannen, the radar managed to detect and track a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth fighter while it was arriving for the Dubai Air Show – all without the U.S. plane using a transponder or any kind of radar reflector.
As far is known, this test was undertaken without U.S. consent.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-and-iran-joining-forces-beat-us-stealth-fighters-62647
While Syria might not deploy its Pantsir or Buk systems it still has the older Kub, S-125, and S-75 systems it can forward deploy to allow for multiple missiles per target. Furthermore, a S-300 could also hit an F-16 during a dive maneuver.
Obviously the issue here is the close proximity between Israel and Damascus which allows for launches of stand off missiles but Israel before Damascus has proper time to locate and engage (ie a fighter jet striking Syria vs a Normal Israeli fighter jet patrolling through lebanon).
Nonetheless, the attacks on T-4 show israel reach into Syria and subquently the lack of Iran in being able to stop them. I do believe Iran has tried to bring in systems to protect their own assets but they are probably quickly destroyed as the only way to bring them into Syria is via easy to track massive cargo jets.
Once the Iranian port in Syria gets up and running, Iran can use closeness to Russian bases as a shield proximity to start moving in air defense systems for the strategic future.
Your thoughts on the following published article on War Is Boring. Is this pure propaganda ment to diminish Iran’s domestic production capability or is there some truth to this?
China and Iran: Joining Forces to Beat U.S. Stealth Fighters?
The rapid development of Iranian air defenses over the last few years raises some big questions. How much are China and Iran cooperating? Why is China’s involvement a mystery to so many observers?
In recent years, the Chinese defense sector has provided its export customers with top-notch products. Several well-known Chinese corporations are active on the international market for air-defense systems. The best-known are the China Electronic Technology Group Corporation, the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation.
(This article originally appeared at War is Boring in 2017.)
But there could be another. “The Chinese company deepest involved in cooperation with us is named Poly Technologies,” an engineer working for the Iranian Electronic Industries told War Is Boring.
Unlikely to ring many bells in the public, Poly Technologies is renown among air-defense specialists for maintaining much closer ties to the top ranks of the People’s Liberation Army of China than any other company does.
This state-owned firm is a subsidiary – but also the backbone – of the China Poly Group Corporation, and has established business relations with hundreds of enterprises around the world. One of its better-known foreign trader partners is the Italian car-designer Ferrari.
Indeed, much of trade involving Poly Technologies is for civilian applications. However, another of its primary duties is the acquisition and import of equipment and technology to China for military use.
Curiously, for its export business in the air-defense sector, Poly Technologies partners with the 14th Institute of China Electronic Technology Group Corporation.
The 14th Institute is the founding company in China’s radar industry. Established in the 1950s with Soviet help, it employs around 9,000 people. In working with Poly Technologies, the Iranians gain access to the best of the Chinese air-defense industry.
Not that that’s obvious. “The Chinese are very open to modify their own product – and at least as skillful in giving you the illusion that all of what they do is coming from you,” the same IEI engineer said.
“Actually, many of the systems we now claim to be ours have existed in China for many years. All the necessary research and development for them was done even before we requested them. But they pay great attention to provide us with the illusion of everything being of our design, coming from us.”
This is why even most of people working for IEI don’t know that various radar systems they manufacture were at least designed in China – if not entirely manufactured there, too. On the contrary, nearly everybody interviewed in the course of research for this article is firmly convinced that everything is designed and manufactured in Iran.
The majority of “Iranian-developed” air-defense systems of Chinese origin are based on various Chinese or Russian designs. Some Chinese systems are themselves practically clones of Russian designs. For example, the missile-transport and launch-containers for the Bavar-373 system bear strong resemblances to those on the Chinese KS-1A missile system.
The origins of various other “Iranian” designs are at least as obvious. The Miraj-4 radar is a development of the Chinese JYL-1. The Iranian Bashir comes from the JY-11B. The Kashef derives from the YLC-6M. And so on.
Iran’s air-defense systems include roughly two dozen different radars. While certainly representing a maintenance nightmare, such a network is extremely hard to fight because any opponent must find a solution for facing multiple radars at once.
Although many of the radars fielded in Iran appear less flexible than their Russian or Chinese originals, the availability of multiple systems means redundancy. Should one system prove ineffective or easy to jam or even knock out in combat, there are two or more systems that can take its place.
Some of Iran’s radars possess very advanced capabilities. One example is the Qadir early-warning system. This Sino-Iranian variant of the Russian-made Rezonans is a fixed installation providing 360-degree coverage.
In 2015 the United Arab Emirates demonstrated its own variant of the same system. Developed with help of Ukrainian experts and named Rannen, the radar managed to detect and track a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth fighter while it was arriving for the Dubai Air Show – all without the U.S. plane using a transponder or any kind of radar reflector.
As far is known, this test was undertaken without U.S. consent.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-and-iran-joining-forces-beat-us-stealth-fighters-62647
While Syria might not deploy its Pantsir or Buk systems it still has the older Kub, S-125, and S-75 systems it can forward deploy to allow for multiple missiles per target. Furthermore, a S-300 could also hit an F-16 during a dive maneuver.
Obviously the issue here is the close proximity between Israel and Damascus which allows for launches of stand off missiles but Israel before Damascus has proper time to locate and engage (ie a fighter jet striking Syria vs a Normal Israeli fighter jet patrolling through lebanon).
Nonetheless, the attacks on T-4 show israel reach into Syria and subquently the lack of Iran in being able to stop them. I do believe Iran has tried to bring in systems to protect their own assets but they are probably quickly destroyed as the only way to bring them into Syria is via easy to track massive cargo jets.
Once the Iranian port in Syria gets up and running, Iran can use closeness to Russian bases as a shield proximity to start moving in air defense systems for the strategic future.
PeeD
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@Navigator was the first to reveal here from where all started for Irans S-band AESAs.It was not China.
Someone feed Tom Cooper with a 1-dimensional information in regards to the Bashir/JY-11. It had some truth for this single case but is absolutely not applicable to the rest.
Many countries contributed to Irans initial jump in radar technology, I won't call any names or any details.
Chinas approach in total is very different to Irans today. Iran has become mature and created its own design signature.
So no: Irans systems are not Chinese, like described in the article, everyone should be sure about that. Some approaches are even pioneered by Iran today, without analogues.
Iran is not in Syria to provide its air defense. Israel does not do devastating strikes that endanger the overall objective to provide Iran-connected forces with weapons.
If one day Iran would feel the need to do that, it would first make sure no PGMs can hit the SAM: Seraj passive detection system + 100mm Sarir, 35mm (AHEAD) Samavat and 23mm Mesbah-2 would make sure nothing hit the system. With those small, low footprint and passive systems in place something like the 15th Khordad + Talash-2 + SD-3 could be set up. More deadly would be 3rd Khordad systems protected by mobile variants of those automatic AAA protection systems or some kind of Iranian Pantsir (not as cost effective against saturation strikes) or Crotale.
Iran feel no need to deploy such systems in Syria, there may be already such systems there, waiting for the right time to be activated.
mohsen
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Iran to supply Indonesia with radar technology
State level cooperations isn't based on claims but detailed understanding of capabilities.
Sina-1
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Reminds me of the time the military “experts” tried to denounce Iranian missile and rocket achievements during the early 2000s as North Korean knock off. Or even the cruise missiles as having Chinese origin. Discrediting Iran as a barbaric and illiterate “mullah” nation has always been their main propagandist approach.
SubWater
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https://www.telewebion.com/episode/2054630
air defense training
air defense training
mohsen
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General Bagheri visiting Army air defense achievements:
http://www.iribnews.ir/files/fa/news/1398/3/22/3610672_422.mp4
http://www.iribnews.ir/files/fa/news/1398/3/22/3610672_422.mp4
aryobarzan
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Thank you exactly my thoughts... It is a general theme in all military publications to undermine and ridicule Iran's achievements (started with grand father of them all "Janes Defense")..if you did not know any better and only read these publications you will arrive the following conclusion:
1- Iranians are a bunch dumbass copycats....the brains belong to European, Russians,Koreans China man and of course the mighty Israelis...lol...To them Arabs only sign the cheques (which is true) and Persians just copy...
2- Iranians in Syria are a bunch of morons who keep their assets (which of course they copied)..in plain view of Satellites and the smart Israelis swoop down from the heavens and destroy them every once in awhile..and because Iranians are morons the next day they re supply and force the mighty ones to destroy them again!.....It reminds me of the words of one Israeli politician... "we hate Palestinians for forcing us to kill them"...We live in funny times!.
So why do they do this ..the answer is coordinated Propaganda ...to discourage independence of nations...and to ensure Iran is not being used as a model for that....
PeeD
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Sina-1
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In long term it’s a lousy strategy to label your opponent as incompetent.
When the opponent has achievements then it serves to undermine your propaganda. The opponent gets boasted and your camp discouraged.
The “evil” opponent is a much better approach since it’s independent of opponent achievements. Evil is always evil no matter the outcome of battle/war.
Essentially it’s their loss to have picked such a lousy strategy.
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