India vs Pakistan – A conflict like no other

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The most recent conflict over Kashmir took place ten years ago in May-July 1999 in its Kargil sector. This was also the first time that both countries fought against each other after their nuclear tests, conducted a year earlier, which caused acute concern amongst the international community.4 Nevertheless, it was precisely this nuclear dimension that largely confined the Kargil conflict to infantry and artillery operations by both sides, along with limited combat ground support air missions.

When Pakistan's clandestine military operation to occupy a series of high features along a 200 km trans-Himalayan front across the LoC was discovered in May 1999, India reacted strongly by putting its forces on alert and deploying troops and artillery guns to dislodge Pakistani troops and militants.5 Pakistan's intrusion across the LoC came as a surprise to India; India's determination and resolve to force the withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the LoC was a surprise to Pakistan. Following several weeks of intense fighting and subsequent mediation by the US, Pakistan announced the withdrawal of its forces from across the LoC in mid-July. India exercised restraint by ensuring that its own forces did not cross the LoC at any time of the conflict. Indian casualties included 474 men killed and over a thousand wounded; on the Pakistani side an estimated 700 troops were killed, including seventy-one officers, and 243 militants.6

Clearly, the Kashmir dispute is not just about conflicting territorial claims but ideological compulsions as well. For Pakistan, created on the basis of the two nation theory that Muslims of the Indian sub-continent could not live alongside the majority Hindu population, the incorporation of Kashmir legitimises its claim as a Muslim state. This became even more important after having suffered the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. For India, the incorporation of Kashmir legitimises its own claim as a secular state for both Hindus and Muslims alike (since 1972 it has possessed the second largest Muslim population after Indonesia). Then there is the future of the Kashmiri people themselves.

With both countries now possessing nuclear weapons and delivery systems to deter each other, conventional major war seems unlikely; the risks associated with escalation are too grave. Indeed, the Kargil conflict was deliberately limited in scale and operation by both sides to prevent such an escalation. To mitigate the possibility of another Kargil-type conflict taking place in the future and to ensure peace and stability in Kashmir, however, both countries have for the first time been engaged in a comprehensive dialogue (begun in 2004) on the Kashmir dispute.

 

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The joint statement of 6 January 2004 ensured the resumption of official-level bilateral talks after a three-year hiatus. For the first time, New Delhi formally recognised that the Kashmir dispute was to be settled 'to the satisfaction of both sides' and Islamabad pledged it would 'not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner'.7 The bilateral 'composite dialogue' that followed tackled eight key disputes and issues: peace and security; Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen;8 the Wular barrage/Tulbul navigation project;9 Sir Creek;10 terrorism and drugtrafficking; economic and commercial co-operation; and the promotion of friendly exchanges.11

These talks have resulted in important confidence-building measures in Kashmir, including for the first time the opening of routes across the LoC for both passenger and trade traffic. The 2003 ceasefire on the LoC and Siachen has also held despite allegations of violations by both sides. But, even as India feels emboldened by the 60 per cent turnout in provincial elections in Kashmir in December 2008, it clearly needs to do more to ensure peace and security in Kashmir.

To be sure, a final resolution of the Kashmir dispute involves a host of complexities. Pakistan's preferred solution is the independence or control of the Kashmir valley which is not acceptable to India, which currently exercises control. At the same time, India's preferred solution is to legitimise the LoC as the de jure international border, which is not acceptable to Pakistan as it sees the LoC as part of the problem not the solution. However, in a significant development in 2005-06, both the then president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put forward important proposals and counterproposals short of these maximalist national positions. In essence, they focused on making the LoC a soft border, or making it 'irrelevant', while ensuring cross-border economic and people-to-people links among the Kashmiri inhabitants.12 Special representatives of both countries have been working hard to further develop these ideas.

But the Mumbai terror attack last November stalled these talks. Despite the renewed tension, India seeks to reengage with Pakistan. Singh, at a meeting with current Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on the sidelines of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation's summit in Russia in June 2009, made it clear that he was willing to talk to Pakistan on terrorism if it cracked down on groups targeting India. In the joint statement at Sharm-el- Sheikh in Egypt on 16 July 2009, Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani agreed that 'action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed'.13 Although this appeared to imply that India was no longer prepared to halt official-level talks in the wake of another terror attack emanating from Pakistani territory, it was given another interpretation: namely, that Pakistan's actions to counter terrorism should take place regardless of whether the bilateral peace process was suspended or not. The 'composite dialogue' remains stalled.

 

[desiman]

Terrorism and Tensions


Even as the prospect of a major Indo-Pakistani 'state versus state' war has receded, the prospect of a repeat of the December 2001 and November 2008 terrorist attacks is high.

Following the terror attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, blamed on two Pakistan-based Islamist militant groups, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), India attempted to coerce Pakistan into complying with its demands to extradite the terrorist leaders and end cross-border infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir and other parts of India. As part of its 'coercive diplomacy' against Pakistan, India launched Operation Parakram [Valour] on 19 December 2001 and mobilised its armed forces in preparation for warfare. This was a deliberate move, taking place amidst the global campaign against terror, to threaten the use of force against Pakistan. It included the deployment of India's three strike corps at forward positions on the international border with Pakistan.

This ten-month military confrontation was the longest period of military mobilisation by both countries since independence in 1947.14 At the height of the crisis (between December 2001 and January 2002) over a million Indian and Pakistani armed troops stood virtually 'eyeball to eyeball' across the border for several months. Facilitation by the British and American governments eased the situation.15

Tensions rose again after the devastating terror attack in Mumbai on 26-28 November 2008, blamed on the Pakistan-based LeT and its front organisation Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD). Although the LeT was formed as a group opposing Indian sovereignty in the disputed territory of Kashmir, it later acquired a broader Islamist agenda. Ten men armed with guns and bombs attacked multiple sites in a globally televised sixty-hour siege that killed 163 people and wounded over 300. Nine terrorists were killed and one captured. While much of the killing was indiscriminate, foreign nationals were specifically targeted and twenty-two were killed. While India initially blamed 'elements in Pakistan' for the attack, Singh raised the ante in January 2009 by stating that the attack had the 'support of some official agencies in Pakistan'.16 Though officially banned in Pakistan, the LeT has been widely alleged to have links with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

 

[desiman]

There was no military mobilisation by either side in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack, even as both countries put their armed forces on alert. There was intense media speculation that India would mount a 'surgical' strike or carry out a 'limited' military operation against LeT/JuD camps and infrastructure in Pakistan; neither of which took place. While India and the international community continue to press Pakistan to take action against the LeT/JuD, Pakistan has taken some steps in this direction. However, India believes that large parts of the LeT/JuD terror network remains untouched, and views as a major setback the release of JuD chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed from house arrest in early June on the orders of the Lahore High Court.17

Even though the Mumbai attack was the most spectacular in India last year, there has been a spurt in religious violence by both Indian Muslim and Hindu extremist groups. For the first time, India formally acknowledged the existence of 'homegrown' jihadi groups following the simultaneous bomb blasts in the major cities of Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and New Delhi in the past year, killing over 150 people. In addition, six people were killed in bomb blasts in two western Indian cities last September. Eleven Hindu extremists of the radical group Abhinav Bharat were subsequently arrested and charged for these attacks, including a serving middle-ranking army officer.

At the same time, terror attacks in Pakistan occur on a weekly basis, if not more frequently; and they continue to spread from the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and other parts of the country. Most of these attacks have been attributed to the leader of the Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), otherwise known as the Pakistan Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, reportedly killed in an American drone attack. The most prominent terror attack destroyed the landmark Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September 2008, killing fifty-four people.

The Sharm-el-Sheikh joint declaration referred to Pakistan's information on 'threats in Balochistan and other areas',18 but India has denied it is linked to terror attacks in Pakistan. Terror attacks in both India and Pakistan are expected to continue, despite the strengthening of their national security structures. The likelihood of a Pakistan-based militant group carrying out another Mumbai-type terror attack in India to disrupt peace talks and provoke another India- Pakistan confrontation is high. This may not only fatally disrupt the peace process, but would also generate considerable domestic pressure - in an already delicate nuclear weapons environment - for India to toughen its stance. The lack of mutual trust, along with possible misperceptions and misunderstandings, could result in inadvertent military escalation by both countries.

 

[desiman]

Nuclear Weapons and Threats


Since their May 1998 nuclear tests - when India's five tests built on its first in 1974 and Pakistan equalised with six of its own - both countries have announced voluntary unilateral moratoriums on further testing even as they continue to expand their nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons and forces now serve as an integral part of both India and Pakistan's national security strategies and are expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.

India's rationale for testing was a mix of factors, including Pakistan's nuclear-capable missile and weapons programme as well as China's nuclear capabilities (the latter made clear in an official letter to then US President Bill Clinton in 1998), along with issues of national prestige. Pakistan's rationale was simply India's nuclear tests. India is currently estimated to possess 70-120 nuclear weapons to Pakistan's 60-120 weapons.19

India's 2003 nuclear doctrine formally enunciated a No First Use (NFU) posture with second-strike massive retaliation. It contains two important caveats. First, in terms of a nuclear response against a nuclear attack 'on Indian forces anywhere', although this remains undefined; and second, in terms of a nuclear response to an attack by 'biological or chemical weapons'. There is also speculation that by referring to a 'first strike' designed to inflict unacceptable damage, India was actually conveying a 'flexible response' rather than a massive retaliation posture.20

 

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India also aims to build a credible minimum nuclear deterrent 'triad' with aircraft, missiles and sea-based capabilities. Testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with longer ranges as well as cruise missiles takes place regularly. While parts of its land and air-based assets are deployed, the first step towards its sea-based deterrent took place with the launch of its first ballistic-missile capable nuclear-powered submarine on 26 July 2009. A Nuclear Command Authority has been established with the prime minister responsible for authorising the use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has not formally published its nuclear doctrine, but in view of its relative conventional arms inferiority with India, it can best be described as a 'non-NFU policy'. It reportedly focuses on building a minimum nuclear deterrent and has had a National Command Authority since 2000. The head of its secretariat, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is an able three-star general, who recently retired from the army.

In an attempt to stabilise their nuclear relationship, both countries agreed in June 2004 that their nuclear capabilities 'constitute a factor for stability'. Since then, several nuclear confidence-building measures have been agreed and implemented. These include the June 2004 agreement to establish a dedicated hotline between the two foreign secretaries to reduce nuclear risks; the October 2005 agreement on the advanced notification of ballistic missile flight tests; and the February 2007 agreement on reducing risks from accidents relating to nuclear weapons. On 1 January 2009 both countries exchanged their lists of nuclear installations for the eighteenth successive year, in relation to their 1998 agreement on prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities. Yet, these nuclear confidence-building measures need to be bolstered and institutionalised to ensure that misperceptions and misunderstandings are reduced during periods of tension.

 

[desiman]

Mutual trust is in short supply

Hostile nuclear signalling has been carried out by both countries during past conflicts and crises. In the Kargil conflict Pakistan conveyed only 'veiled' nuclear signals to India, even as a former senior Clinton administration official claimed in May 2002 that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles for possible deployment at the height of the conflict in July 1999.21 In contrast, the 2001-02 military confrontation demonstrated unprecedented nuclear signalling - in the form of forceful public pronouncements and flight-tests of ballistic missiles - between the two countries, amidst the disruption of normal diplomatic channels of communication for much of the time. Both countries sent signals on nuclear as well as conventional matters with their public statements or deafening silences, with the issuance of provocative and inflammatory statements, and with subsequent denials or clarifications. These signals were multiple in nature; carried out at multiple levels, and addressed to multiple constituencies - to their domestic audiences, to each other and to the US and UK. Whereas New Delhi wanted the US and the UK to help pressure Pakistan to cease cross-border infiltration of militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir, Islamabad wanted the US and the UK to restrain New Delhi from taking military action. But it was not always clear that these signals, which were often confusing and ambiguous, were ever fully or even partially ascertained by either India or Pakistan.22

Some key concerns over the future of regional nuclear stability remain. These include, for Pakistan, the acquisition of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by India, the first of three having arrived in India in May 2009. They have the potential to identify nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16 combat aircraft and therefore erode Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Another concern of Islamabad is the development of a ballistic missile defence system by India. In addition, Pakistan is concerned that the landmark India-US civil nuclear deal of October 2008 could provide India with additional stocks of weapon-grade fissile material from indigenous sources.

For India, its key concerns remain the clandestine spread of nuclear weapon technologies from Pakistan in the wake of the AQ Khan proliferation scandal, along with the related possibility of nuclear terrorism. There is also alarm about the possible infiltration of Pakistan's nuclear weapons establishment by Islamic extremists, despite the high priority Pakistan's SPD has given to countering this threat, and the more general fear that the Pakistani Taliban will be able to extend their power-base across the country. There are also questions over effective civilian oversight and command and control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons which have traditionally been controlled by the military; the key question being whether or not President Zardari has control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This uncertainty makes the nuclear environment considerably more fragile.

 

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Conclusion


Mutual trust is in short supply between South Asia's two major rivals, India and Pakistan. Traditional rivalries and antagonisms have been exacerbated by the issues highlighted above. Peace efforts by civil society/non-governmental organisations in both countries have not had much impact in times of tension, even though people-to-people contacts have dramatically increased. India continues to hold Pakistan responsible for the use of its territory by the LeT/JuD to carry out terror acts against India; it has also alleged official Pakistani links to last November's Mumbai attack, which Islamabad denies. India urges Pakistan to act against the LeT/JuD in the same tough manner that it is currently doing against the Pakistan Taliban in the Swat valley and the Malakand division of the NWFP, which Islamabad appears unable or unwilling to do perhaps due to concern over provoking an LeT terror 'backlash' in Pakistan itself.

For its part, Pakistan continues to seek additional evidence from India on the Mumbai attack which it describes as insufficient for its own investigations into the attack, even as it has made several arrests. Pakistan alleges that India is involved in the insurgency in Balochistan, which New Delhi denies, and claims that India's diplomatic and economic activities in Afghanistan are aimed at decreasing its own influence in the region.

The 'composite dialogue' remains stalled

The key issue remains the ability of both countries to co-operate with each other to deter non-state actors from carrying out terrorist 'spectaculars' like Mumbai. Both India and Pakistan have signed the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) framework on the suppression of terrorism, as well as its additional protocol. It is therefore in the interests of both countries to ensure that terror organisations aiming to disrupt their peaceful bilateral relations are effectively prevented from doing so.

 

[desiman]

India and Pakistan: deadlines for dialogue

Every impending deadline, coupled with the window of opportunity for talks in Kashmir, underscores the need for a new line of engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad.


As a slew of new track-2 and track-3 initiatives try to build a 'roadmap' for a new India-Pakistan dialogue, it may be time to look at some of the circumstances in which dialogue has been derailed in the past - and hunt clues for the future. In the parlance of India-Pakistan ties, specifically in the past decade, it is the top leadership that has proposed new initiatives for peace, and it is terrorists and those who direct them who have been most easily a ble to dispose of them.


On the night of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 26, 2008, just an hour before the attackers fired the first shot, the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers were holding a press conference in New Delhi. The tension between the two countries at the time was over the Indian cricket team's hesitation to go play a series in Pakistan after the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad. Coincidentally, India's Home Secretary was in Islamabad, where the two countries had issued a comprehensive Joint Statement on fighting Terror and Drug Trafficking. India and Pakistan had agreed to 'fast-track' the 5th round of the Composite Dialogue. Hours later all dialogue was suspended, and history was written once again by the terrorist's gun.


While the Mumbai attacks led to what's become the most prolonged suspension of talks since the year 2000, it is part of a distinct pattern. In May 2006, negotiators were close to a breakthrough on demilitarising the Siachen glacier, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had hoped to make a "mountain of peace." According to those who knew, talks with Pakistani officials had entered an advanced stage, due to be taken forward that summer. But first deadly attacks at the Congress party rally in Srinagar on the eve of the Prime Minister's roundtable conference, and another brutal attack on tourists pushed Siachen talks to July, when the Foreign Secretaries were due to meet. In July 2006, just nine days before that meeting, the Mumbai train bombings left more than 200 dead and with them buried all talk of talks for months.


In 2007, revived talks made strides on the Wullar dispute. On Sir Creek they had all but agreed on a settlement, when the Samjhauta blasts took place. Again and again, the dialogue was buffeted in a series of blasts, in Hyderabad, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Delhi, where more than a hundred were killed.


In 2008, it was the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul and then the Mumbai attacks that finally halted all talks. Through these brutalities, the composite dialogue has lurched from event to event, sustaining itself on the oxygen of meetings on the sidelines of international summits - Havana, Colombo, New York, L'Aguilla, Yekaterinburg and Sharm El Sheikh - and always going into dialogue-ICU after the next big attack. Closer home, the attack on Fazl Haq Qureshi in Srinagar and the fidayeen hotel siege at Lal Chowk have followed reports of dialogue being initiated between the Central government and separatists.


The Mumbai attacks, however, cannot be clubbed with the rest because of the deep scar they left on our nation. Even Islamabad seemed to get the message from India's pain and the international community's outrage - that there would be no going back after 26/11. In the months that followed, Pakistan took unparalleled action, beginning with the reluctant admission that the attackers were Pakistani, to the investigation it undertook on the basis of Indian dossiers. And then in October, the pressure on Pakistan seemed to double. The revelations from the Headley investigation and subsequent indictment by US officials for the Mumbai attacks brought his handler, a former Pakistani army Major, into focus and with it fresh impetus for Islamabad to act. Within a month, Islamabad charged seven men with 26/11. While Indian statements have kept up a steady focus on Hafiz Saeed, they have failed to acknowledge that the men now awaiting trial at a Lahore court are far from 'small fry.' LeT operational commander Zaki Ur Rahman Lakhvi, for one, known as the 'Imam of jihadis,' Abu Al Qama (wanted for the Red Fort and Akshardham attacks), and computer expert Zarar Shah. If shutting down the LeT and the JuD and arresting Hafiz Saeed are impossible tasks for those in Islamabad who created them, these indictments could at least be considered a start.


But the gains from keeping the pressure on Pakistan have now hit the law of diminishing returns - and diminishing sympathy from the pro-peace constituency in Pakistan, which believes India should show more concern about the terror attacks that paralyse ordinary Pakistanis every day.


At least the first decade of the 21st century gave our leaders many opportunities to kickstart and restart the dialogue process. The next decade, however, is unlikely to afford that leeway for at least three distinct reasons. In fact, the next 18 months may be all the time for flexibility they have.


For one thing, the next 18 months are the only space the United Progressive Alliance government and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have for any bold foreign policy initiatives. Uttar Pradesh and other key States will head for Legislative Assembly elections in 2012. If he so chooses, Dr Singh will also be able to counter the sizeable strategic community opposed to talks with the lowered threat perception that has arisen amongst the larger national community after the past 13 months of relative freedom from major terror attacks. Already, several people-to-people, and media-to-media initiatives are starting without the public outcry they would have faced a year ago.


Another deadline is the one announced to the American people by President Barack Obama, to begin the pullout of US troops from Afghanistan by mid-2011. If this is met, it will certainly change the power structure in that embattled South Asian nation. As American troops thin out on the ground, India, with its consistent refusal to be part of peacekeeping forces, may find Pakistan, the US's ally in the 'war on terror,' gaining leverage and perhaps less willing to yield in talks.


Finally, the unspoken deadline that looms before Pakistan and is an equal threat to India is the time changes will occur within the Pakistan army structure. India has always seen the Pakistani army as its biggest enemy, one that has raised and pushed militants over the LoC. Paradoxically as a cohesive, centrally commanded force, it is also best placed to protect India from the jihadi terror that savages Pakistan's cities today.


But many inside the Pakistani establishment point to a timeline 18 months hence: when some of the army recruits enlisted during General Zia-ul-Haq's 'Islamicisation' drive in the mid-1980s (1984-1988) would reach Brigadier rank and above. In his widely acclaimed book, Crossed Swords, Shuja Nawaz, whose brother Gen. Asif Nawaz was Army Chief from 1991-1993, describes the former military dictator's efforts: "Zia tried hard to change the ethos of the army, making Islamic ritual and teachings part of the army's day to day activities, changing its motto to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabeelilah' (Faith, obedience, struggle in the path of Allah). The Jamaat-e-Islaami took advantage of the changing demographics and nature of the army by sending out directives to its members to sign up for the army by taking the Inter services selection board examinations."


It is those army recruits who could soon reach the highest levels. The fear, of course, is that some will answer not to the military high command - but to a 'higher' one. During the recent 18-hour siege of the GHQ in Rawalpindi, the generals were reportedly worried during the first few hours that the fidayeen attack had been engineered by 'Talibanised' elements of the army itself. The fears turned out to be unfounded. But the GHQ attack established a different pattern of worry for the country - that of the South Punjabi Lashkar, trained in ***, carrying out an attack for the Taliban in Waziristan, Pakistan's triangle of terror, quite literally closing in on its central command structure, and putting both Pakistan, and India on notice. All those in India who today wonder, "Yes, talk - but who to talk to?' may find the current lack of options nothing compared to what may follow.


All these impending deadlines, coupled with the window of opportunity for talks in Kashmir hasten the need for a new line of engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad, an engagement that understands that agencies that have unleashed terror attacks to derail the process in the past will shadow the next round too.


Finally, the question most often asked, 'Why talk at all?' may well find its answer in George Mallory's response to the question, 'Why climb Everest?' 'Because it's there,' the mountaineer replied. Why talk to Pakistan? Because it will always be there. And we still can.

 

[desiman]

Fehmida Riaz
Feminist poet, short story writer and author of Badan Dareeda.

Purva Anchal

How beautiful is this land!
Beautiful and long-suffering.
A shawl of buckwheat green
Flutters in the wake
Of this train speeding
Through the East.
As far as eye can see,
Green fields and granaries.
This land is a peasant woman
Coming home from the fields
With a bundle on her head.

Home?
Where angry vultures wheel
Over the rooftops and threaten to lunge,
Any minute, in any direction?
The grass is wet with dew,
Unless my tear-glazed eyes
See only tears.

Brick and stone
Reduced to rubble.
Mosque and temple still locked
In the same old squabble.
Every brow disfigured
By a frown.

A son of this land,
Laid long ago to rest,
Wakens now,
To bring you peace.

Listen to Kabir,
Who pleads with you:
Wars of hatred
Do no honour to God.
Ram and Rahim both
Will shun a loveless land.

Near a bamboo grove
Across the unruffled River Sarju,
By a lotus pond thick with blooms,
Stands a Buddha tablet
With a message from the wise.

"When two are locked in conflict and ready to lose their lives,
neither can win in the end,
unless both do -- and equally.

A battle lost by either
Will be fought and refought
Until both are destroyed
And both are equal losers".

Such are the paradigms of war,
Such the insight of the Buddha.
Why are we, his heirs, so blind?

The Pandit and the Mullah
Are flattered and hung with garlands
And feasted and housed like lords,
While you, dear people of the land,
Are drowned every time
In the bloodbaths they inspire.

(Translated into English by Patricia L. Sharpe and Salman Tariq Qureshi)

Truly amazing, and a must read for everyone

 

[desiman]

F.S. Aijazuddin
Poet and Author of several books including Lahore Recollected: An Album and The Bark of the Pen.

Surely we can talk again

Surely we can talk again, without using cloven tongues that lisp and hiss cleft meanings, disguising our true intent.
Surely we can smile again, with teeth washed clean of each other's blood, mould lips into forgiving kiss Jesus gave to Judas Iscariot.
Surely we can touch each other's palms without losing caste, hold fast in an embrace that will keep us face to face as future friends, not yester-foes.
Surely we can age together, teach your youth and mine, what they need to know, about how close we came to committing joint infanticide.
Surely we can offer a common prayer in our separate dialects to our separate, equal Gods.
Have we not proof enough that my God is no stronger than yours, nor yours any stronger than mine?

 

[desiman]

India Pakistan- Time to Talk?



The year has begun on a bloody note for Pakistan. The almost daily cycle of violence didn't stop long enough for Pakistanis to wish each other a peaceful 2010. Terrorists struck on New Year's Day during a volleyball tournament, killing over 90 people. And the spiral of death and terror continues into the new decade, leaving the ordinary Pakistani beleaguered by violence, just 2 years after an election that promised them relief from dictatorship, and a return to the ideals of democracy, justice and human rights.

Today, as Pakistan readies to mark the second anniversary of that election, perhaps the big plus is that the government hasn't fallen under the pressure of its own political intrigue, a once again assertive military and Taliban sponsored chaos. But in the current climate their survival alone, means little. As Pakistani soldiers die fighting their own countrymen in the lawless frontier province, the army and the government in Islamabad can't shake off the growing criticism of being seen as errand boys fighting America's war.

A record number of Pakistani civilians have died in last year's fighting. A total of 12,600 people have died violent deaths in Pakistan last year according to Pakistan's Institute for Peace Studies. Over 3000 of them in terrorist attacks. These numbers will only rise. As casualties grow, and a massive internal refugee crisis confronts Islamabad, its increasingly clear that the military establishment in Rawalpindi is looking for ways to divert attention to age-old, more uniting ideas in this climate of conflict within its own borders. What better way than raising the rhetoric, and the violence against India? As radicalization takes root in the backdrop of the war in the frontier, they have a large audience.

The home minister, P Chidambaram confirmed that 2 terrorists killed in a 22 hour- long encounter in the heart of Srinagar last week, were in touch with their Pakistani handlers. President Zardari, kicked off the new year by abandoning his own stated policy of focusing on improving trade ties with India rather than being bogged down by Kashmir, and returned to a sharper pitch. Pakistani media has begun reporting the ongoing stalemate between India and Pakistan as a sign of "increased hostility" from Delhi, using comments made in a closed session by Army chief General Deepak Kapoor of India's need for military preparedness on the western and eastern fronts as a sign of this. Even though technically, for a military man General Kapoor was stating a given. If anything, it was the idea of preparing the eastern front (the India-China border) that should have been more attention worthy.

As advocates of bilateral peace gathered in Delhi this week the challenge for them was to navigate through this heightened pitch and the year long deadlock. 2009 has seen a concerted effort to bring diplomatic pressure upon Islamabad to deliver justice against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks. The result so far- Hafez Sayed may still be roaming free, making incendiary sermons against India, but seven men are facing trial in an anti terror court in Rawalpindi for their role in masterminding the attacks. Delhi is watching the trial keenly, and waiting for a guilty verdict that's delivered swiftly. Such an outcome will not only be seen as a positive development in Delhi, but should also be a trigger to restart some kind of talks.

Quite apart from the slow movement on the Mumbai investigations and trials, the other major dilemma confronting Delhi is simply the question of who to talk to in Islamabad. The democratic government is weak, and the tussle for authority between President Zardari- still unwilling to give up sweeping presidential powers in spite of pledging to do so when he took office- and Parliament, is wide open for all to see. In this atmosphere within Pakistan, international pressure has clearly achieved just about all it can vis a vis the Mumbai investigations, and the law of diminishing returns seems to have already set in.

But in all this, there could be reason to hope. The latest campaign by the Times of India and the Jang Group, Pakistan's largest newspaper and TV outfit (the News, Jang, Geo TV) is perhaps a sign of the times. While some feel Aman ki Asha, or Desire for Peace was a great marketing gimmick on New Year's Day, it is as much a reflection of the fact that there are constituencies for peace on both sides, waiting to break the ice that has stayed frozen in spite of Ekaterinburg and Sharm al Sheikh. After all, India had committed then to keeping lines of communication open at the Foreign Secretary level, at least. The challenge is to build on and expand this constituency across the border so that attempts to deflect attention from the war against the Taliban by raising the pitch against India are mitigated.

With memories of Mumbai still raw, many may flinch at this idea, arguing that the year-long stalemate hasn't affected India negatively in any way, even asking what is to gain by seeking peace. Many even point to Pakistan's track record so far- all breakthroughs towards peace have been followed by increased hostility (Kargil in 1999, the parliament attack in 2001, Mumbai train attacks in 2006). But even so, given the state of Pakistan internally, with Afghanistan on the boil after America's latest troop surge, and the very real threat of the Taliban linking up with anti India terror groups, like the Lashkar, the dangers of conflict come with a heavy price tag.

Within Pakistan, it's the very real possibility of democracy being subverted again that's at stake. As Pakistan's civil society looks to India's progress and stability in spite of the pulls and pressures, and feels increasingly weighed under by their own political and economic chaos, they are reaching out. India must realize it is their hand that needs to be strengthened. Doing this will yield its own returns, there-in will lie the gains.

And so, even if better ties with Pakistan make no significant difference to Delhi, and the violence may continue, as a senior, now retired, diplomat told me, for the sake of the region's wider well being, improving relations with Pakistan is going to be a test of India's humanity. So, sooner rather than later, talk we must.

 

[53fd]

A lot of people in my opinion, exaggerate the ‘Islamic threat’ posed by Pakistan. A lot of people sneer and look disparagingly at Pakistan’s Islamization. A lot of people think extremists will 'take over the central government of Pakistan.' In my opinion, yes extremism has increased in Pakistan, but it is MORE to do with the current events post 2001 in our western neighbor and its effects being felt here than Pakistan's 'policy of Islamization' (which obviously plays a role as well, but not as much as Afghanistan's destabilization contributes). I believe the Islamization of Pakistan served as a mere tool of unification than 'the actual implementation of Shariah Law'. Although the Blasphemy Law and the Hadood Ordinance were brought in by Zia (parts of Hadood Ordinance were amended, hopefully Blasphemy Law too will undergo that in the future), Pakistan has never really been an 'Islamic society' on any kind of level in any part of its history.

A lot of people also think it started from Zia-ul-Haq’s time. It reached an all-time peak in Zia’s time, but the seeds were sowed in the 1950’s in the 1956 Constitution for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It was really brought into action during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s time, where Ahmedis were declared non-Muslims constitutionally in 1973 and Pakistan started working on the ‘Muslim nuclear bomb’. It reached an all-time high during Zia’s time, when Saudi Arabia and USA along with Pakistan hosted ‘Wahabi’ Mujahideen camps that fought the Soviets: but the seeds of ‘Islamization’ were sowed in earlier.


Was Pakistan wrong to ‘Islamize’? Should it have embraced a secular democracy, a model India did? The answer could be yes or no. Pakistan and India are ‘artificial’ countries. Before 1947, many states of India were ruled by their separate rulers, had separate languages, customs. Pakistan and India formed very fragmented countries in 1947. A lot of Indians and Western people sneer at Pakistan’s Islamization, and look up to India’s secular democracy. Both were right and wrong in their own ways. Pakistan and India took two very different paths in governance, and are seeing different results today.


Why did Pakistan Islamize? Because Pakistan felt it had to unify the Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis, Muhajirs in some way. They were culturally and ethnically different in every way, religion was the glue that stuck them together. Afghanistan and Afghani Pashtuns have always looked down on Pakistan and Pakistani Pakhtuns in a dream for ‘Pashtunistan’, Pakistani Balochis have always been dreaming of reuniting with their Iranian Balochi brothers, the Muhajirs & other immigrants always had a complex leaving their Indian homeland in 1947. Both Pakhtuns and Balochis are considered to be ‘puppets’ of the Punjabis, the people that ‘actually rule Pakistan’. Religion (and the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan&#8217 was a means of homogenization, the glue that stuck these different ethnicities together.


After 1971, with Pakistan losing its huge chunk of territory, I believe the Pakistani establishment started used Islam as a unification tool (& a means to get back at India), as a means to appease and unify the different ethnicities together, seeing that Balochistan and NWFP might follow East Pakistan to form independent nations from ‘Punjabized’ Pakistan. And despite a lot of problems Pakistan faces today, a recent Gallup poll in Pakistan conducted over various parts of Pakistan concluded that “The nation-state is of great significance to Pakistanis, and despite important ethnic and regional differences, national identity is strong throughout the country. Overall, 89% say they think of themselves first as Pakistani, rather than as a member of their ethnic group.” I believe that in India, most (or a lot) people consider their ethnic identity over their national identity.


India took a riskier and bolder approach of a secular democracy, which caused (and is still causing) it great distress in terms of unification and uneven ‘fortunes’ in its different states (for e.g, compare Gujarat with UP, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa etc), but it is also reaping its rewards. But despite its economic boom, it still has over 450 million people living below the Indian poverty line of $1.25. It still has over 130 separatist insurgency movements, while Pakistan has 4, coming from Balochistan. The separatist movements in the 7 sister states, the rise of Maoists from Orissa-West Bengal all the way to Maharashtra-Andhra Pradesh and even parts of Tamil Nadu shows the risks of the ‘lack of homogenization and unification’ India has implemented by following the secular democracy model. Pakistan has in the past even managed to cause havoc in Indian administered Kashmir by using Islam and Muslim identity. Bangladesh is said to be causing havoc in NE India with its 'Islamization' as well.


Pakistan has (rightly or wrongly) appeased to the wishes of the Pakhtuns, giving them the right to self governance in FATA (which is now a huge problem for Pakistan), and even renamed NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwan, which has hurt the sentiments of other minority groups in the province (such as Hazaras, Tajiks, Kalashas, Chitralis) to say the least. But as a result, there are no separatist movements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwan at the moment. But there is a problem of Islamic terrorism in the FATA region, as well as the risk of increasing extremism across the other parts of Pakistan; which is not really seen as much in India.


By adopting the secular democratic model, India is less prone to religious Islamic extremism, despite it having a whooping 130+ million Muslims in the country. It also results in a more diverse, free society accepting to minorities that focuses on development (a work in progress). But it also results in a more fragmented society in my opinion. India might have taken the riskier approach, but the greater risks one takes, the more rewards they get. Time will tell what the fate of Pakistan and India is.


Pakistani Public Opinion | Pew Global Attitudes Project

 

[anoop]

@ offtopic but i found a difference of opinon here as most of india who have visited pakistan mentions that pakistani hospitality is uncomparable , even local vendors offer goods/service free when he founds out that his/her guest an indian. if thats true then how come same population hold india as their major threat


source Pakistani Public Opinion | Pew Global Attitudes Project same as above