India’s interest compromised in Siachen

[Fireurimagination]

It never happened when India was vulnerable, how will it happen now when all the cards are with India, only a single way is extend the LOC, validate the positions and the de-militarize the Glaciers

I do believe the same was on the cards (extending the LOC and validating the positions) with right noises made by Kiyani (uni-lateral withdrawal) and MMS (visiting Pakistan should yield substantial results) but now I guess Pakistan has backed out and the deal is well dead and buried

 

[ajtr]

It never happened when India was vulnerable, how will it happen now when all the cards are with India, only a single way is extend the LOC, validate the positions and the de-militarize the Glaciers

I do believe the same was on the cards (extending the LOC and validating the positions) with right noises made by Kiyani (uni-lateral withdrawal) and MMS (visiting Pakistan should yield substantial results) but now I guess Pakistan has backed out and the deal is well dead and buried

Haji pir pass.
Sharm el Sheikh

 

[ajtr]

Siachen was accepted as Indian Territory in 1949!
Claude Arpi

The Boss of Pakistan says: “It’s time to resolve the Siachen issue”, but what General Kayani forgets is that the Siachen issue was ‘solved’ long ago, in fact, in July 1949.
I reproduced here an article that I published 7 years ago on the subject.

Where wild roses bloom
Once upon a time, a small Yarkandi village stood guarding the entrance of a mighty glacier of the Karakoram range. It was a meeting place for Balti traders to barter their goods with Central Asian merchants.
One day the Yarkandis decided to visit their southern neighbours; they descended from the glacier, but before returning north, they could not resist taking away a beautiful Balti girl. The offense could not remain unpunished; the Yarkandi village had to pay for its crime.
The Baltis contacted a local cleric, who gave them a taweez (amulet) to be placed on summit of the Bilafond-la pass. The villagers were told to strictly follow the priest’s instructions and come back via Nubra valley. However, the Baltis performed only the first part of the ritual. After leaving the taweez on the pass, they did not use the Nubra track to return. Legend says that a terrible storm destroyed the Yarkandi village; only a few stones and wild roses remained.
The priest later explained why the roses did not disappear; his instructions had not been fully followed. Result: Wild roses could still grow in the area. This glacier is known as the Siachen (‘Sia’ is rose, ‘chen’ is place)-the place where roses bloom. This is one of the many myths around the area. But there are also political myths anchored to the 72 km long glacier.
One such legend is that Pakistani troops are occupying the glacier. If you regularly read the Pakistani press, you are informed that Islamabad is ready to “withdraw its troops from the glacier” if New Delhi accepts to reciprocate. According to Islamabad, “demilitarisation” is the solution. General Pervez Musharraf has even declared that he finds the issue “actually troublesome for both sides and it is an unnecessary irritant which can be resolved”. But the point is that Pakistan does not occupy the glacier and never did (though it did try in 1983-84). Later in 1984, India took full control of the area as well as most of the peaks of the Saltoro range.

Today, the legend of Pakistan occupying the glacier is even less credible than the Balti girl’s story, but the disinformation continues. The Pakistani President (and his predecessors as well) has been able to spread false propaganda travelling far and wide. Take, for example, a paper published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Library of Congress. Titled, ‘Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments’, which was updated on February 14, 2005.
It shows a map of Pakistan with the entire glacier as occupied by that country. The CRS is supposed to have been created by the US Congress “in order to have its own source of non-partisan, objective analysis and research on all legislative issues”. Indeed, the sole mission of CRS is to serve the United States Congress.
What an objective and non-partisan service indeed! And of course, nobody in South Block bothers to complain to “our American friends”! It is necessary to make a quick return to the past to understand the history of the LoC and the glacier. Following the ceasefire of January 1, 1949, the military representatives of India and Pakistan met in Karachi between July 18 and 27, 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. An agreement was reached and the Line of Ceasefire (today’s LoC) was demarcated. The last point on the map was known as ‘NJ 9842′. Nobody thought of going further north at that time. The agreement of July 1949, mentioned therefore that the Line extended “thence north to the glaciers” without going into the details. The important point which is often forgotten now has been pointed out by General SK Sinha, the Governor of J&K, who participated in the Karachi negotiations as the ADC to General Shrinagesh, the head of the Indian delegation. Before leaving for Karachi, the delegates had a briefing from Nehru and the Secretary General of the MEA, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who explained the legal position in detail to the delegates. He told them that the resolution of August 1948 “had conceded the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India and as such no man’s land, if any, should be controlled by India during the period of ceasefire and truce.

This meant that the onus of proof to convince the commission of any factual position, on the date of ceasefire, in any disputed territory, rested with Pakistan. “In the absence of any such convincing proof, and even if India had no troops on the date of ceasefire in that area, the disputed territory should automatically come under Indian control. This convincing and legalistic argument proved a trump card in our hands at Karachi. Based on this, we obtained control of several hundred square miles of State territory where we were not in position on the date of the ceasefire.”
This position was then accepted by Pakistan and the UN. It remains valid today. Even if not demarcated, the glacier legally belongs to India. More, the area (including the Saltoro range) has been in the physical possession of the Indian troops since in 1984. In the early ’80s, Islamabad had tried to occupy the glacier under the cover of mountaineering expeditions, but the Indian Army intervened in time and took control.
This was the beginning of the conflict. What disturbs me most is seeing the Indian press biting the Pakistani propaganda bait. Take, for example, a reputed national weekly which regularly publishes the map of Jammu & Kashmir with a different colour for the Siachen¬as if the glacier is were disputed. After the recent dialogue on Siachen between the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan which concluded without any agreement, many newspapers
spoke of “failure of the talks”. Does it mean that a unilateral withdrawal from the glacier would have been a “success”? General Musharraf likes to quote the Fifth Round of talks in 1989: “Yes, indeed there was an agreement in 1989. And that Agreement was based on reallocation of the Siachen.” This is far from true. The negotiations saw a hardening of the position of the Pakistan military and, finally, the talks broke down.

However, a communique was issued stating that “both sides would work towards a comprehensive settlement” in future talks. It was conveniently interpreted in Pakistan as meaning that India would unilaterally withdraw from the glacier. India’s position has always been clear: Delhi is ready to concede a redeployment zone for the sake of a compromise; but, as General VR Raghavan who has been involved in the earlier negotiations, wrote: “First, each side should acknowledge its current position before a disengagement commences. Second, there should be a high level of assurance that neither side would breach the agreed formula.”
This would require mutual verification and surveillance. It is what General JJ Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff, reiterated when he asked Pakistan to accept the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the 72 km long glacier before even talking of ‘redeployment’. But Pakistan today, like 15 years ago, is not ready to admit that its troops are not positioned on the glacier. This is the reason why it refuses to acknowledge the AGPL.
The Indian negotiators, who have managed to remain “on their ground position” while agreeing to keep the ceasefire and “continue talks in the future”, deserve to be complimented. It is true that the Pakistani intrusions in Kargil ordered by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 have helped New Delhi to better understand the mind of Pakistani leaders. To kidnap a beautiful girl is easy, it is not quite as easy to get her back home.

 

[ajtr]

India-Pakistan Experts Agree on Confidence-building Measures at Lahore Meeting

October 02, 2012
OTTAWA, October 2, 2012 - At a recent meeting in Lahore, Pakistan, a group of retired senior officials, military officers and diplomats have reached a consensus on a number of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). More specifically, they have agreed on a proposal regarding the demilitarisation of the Siachen area, which has been a potential flashpoint between the two countries for many years. The participants in the process adopted by consensus a general report on their work and the specific proposal on the Siachen issue.
These discussions are undertaken as part of a project on conventional confidence-building, which is jointly organized by the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Centre at the Atlantic Council. The project is supported by the Near East and South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University and the United States Institute of Peace, with additional support from Stanford University. The participants in this process have decided to continue their work on these matters, and have accordingly asked the organizers to prepare a new round of meetings.
For further information on this process, please contact the two co-chairs of the discussions: General Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan Army, retired) Jehangir.karamat@gmail.com or Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi (Indian Air Force, retired) sptyagi2001@yahoo.com.

 

[ajtr]

Demilitarization of the Siachen
Conflict Zone: Concepts for
Implementation and Monitoring

Brigadier (ret.) Asad Hakeem
Pakistan Army
Brigadier (ret.) Gurmeet Kanwal
Indian Army
with
Michael Vannoni and Gaurav Rajen
Sandia National Laboratories

Abstract
Pakistani and Indian militaries have been occupying the Siachen Glacier and surrounding
regions for decades. Although a cease-fire is in place, continued occupation carries the
risk of an inadvertent conflict, which could escalate into a full-fledged nuclear-backed
confrontation. Political and military analysts in Pakistan and India now question the
strategic significance of the Siachen Glacier and agree that under the right circumstances,
military withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier region would not adversely affect either
state. The difficulty lies in conducting the withdrawal in such a way that neither side feels
vulnerable, and in maintaining the demilitarization in a way that can be verified. In this
paper, the authors who have both held command responsibilities in the Siachen Glacier
region present a process for conducting and verifying the demilitarization of the Siachen
Glacier region. The authors discuss the role of monitoring and verification tools and their
relevance to this border zone of conflict.

Executive Summary
The Siachen Glacier and adjacent regions—a part of the larger territorial dispute between
India and Pakistan that has its origins in the 1949 Karachi Agreement—has been
occupied by the Pakistani and Indian militaries since 1984. The conflict has its genesis in
the formulation of the cease-fire line in the 1949 Karachi Agreement. The text defines the
cease-fire line in this area as running to map coordinate NJ 9842 and “. . . thence north to
the glaciers.” The line was never demarcated. The Indian interpretation is that the current
line of control (LOC) should run northeasterly from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro Range to
the Chinese border. The Pakistani interpretation is that the LOC should run from NJ 9842
straight to the Karakoram Pass (KKP) on the Chinese border. Both nations have incurred
heavy economic costs and casualties in this conflict. Both nations recognize the benefit of
ceasing the conflict and demilitarizing the area. An informal cease-fire has held in
Siachen and Kashmir since November 2003. Prior to the current cease-fire, combat
consisted of small-scale clashes during the summer and the exchange of artillery fire.
Aircraft have not played a combat role. Talks were first conducted during 1986–1998,
and were restarted in 2004 as a topic in the Composite Dialogue.
The goal of this study is to develop a practical process for military disengagement in the
Siachen conflict zone, leading to demilitarization. It draws on international precedents for
establishing demilitarized zones (DMZ) as well as India-Pakistan precedents, such as the
successful Chumik Glacier disengagement in 1989. It assumes that political consensus
will eventually be reached and focuses on the operational steps necessary to implement
disengagement and subsequent monitoring and verification. Disengagement must be
based on general adherence with the Simla Agreement and be without prejudice to
current or future agreements associated with Pakistan’s and India’s borders with China.
An outline of the disengagement strategy developed by this study follows:
• Step 1: Formalize the current cease-fire understanding. It would be of value
formalize the current informal cease-fire agreement. Communication links
between the Indian and Pakistani brigade and division headquarters should be
established.
• Step 2: Establish an Uninhabited Zone (UZ) around the Siachen Glacier and
the Saltoro Range (see Figure 9 in the main report for maps). No military
personnel, stores, or facilities, nor any civilian residents are permitted in the UZ.
Under the agreement, neither country will have administrative control of the UZ.
No aerial overflight is permitted unless part of an agreed monitoring activity. The
UZ established by the agreement is to be without prejudice to the Pakistan-China
Border Agreement of 1963 and the known position of India. It does not affect
India’s current patrolling in area under its control east of KKP. After the UZ has
been fully established, the temporary presence of personnel in the UZ is permitted
for the following activities:
• scientific research by international organizations
• restoration of the environment on the Siachen Glacier by international,
Indian, and Pakistani staff
• entry by licensed, agreed international mountaineering expeditions

Step 3: Establish a Civilian Zone (CZ) bordering the Uninhabited Zone (see Figure 9
in the main report). The CZ has two parts: one part east of the UZ (administered by
India) and one part west of the UZ (administered by Pakistan). Civilian residents and
activities are permitted, but no military or paramilitary personnel or facilities are
permitted except under the following circumstances.
• Aerial overflight to monitor the agreement is permitted subject to agreed rules.
• Military or paramilitary forces may enter the CZ to perform relief operations
associated with natural disasters.
• Personnel providing administrative support and physical security to
monitoring activities are required under the conceptual agreement.
• Military or paramilitary personnel may continue to provide social services
(e.g., medical, communications, and road construction) to the civilian
population if those services were part of their duties prior to the agreement.
Adverse weather makes disengagement feasible only during the summer season. The
Indian opinion that two to three summers are needed contrasts with the Pakistani opinion
that only one summer is necessary. The major steps in disengagement are:
• Step 1: Withdraw medium artillery located in base camps. The withdrawal of
artillery could potentially be implemented very soon after completion of the
agreement even if this is during the winter.
• Steps 2–4: Redeploy from Northern, Central, and Southern sectors
respectively.Forward and fire support posts
o Declare interim assembly camps where troops from forward positions can
concentrate, rest, and prepare for the next movement
o Dismantle interim assembly camps after withdrawal
• Step 5: Withdraw from logistics camps on or near the glaciers
• Step 6: Dismantle logistics camps
• Step 7: Withdraw from base camps
• Step 8: Dismantle or convert base camps to scientific or civil use
After the DMZ is established, a secondary expansion of the DMZ, called DMZ-2 (see
map in Figure 10 of the main report), along the demarcated LOC to where the line
crosses the Shyok River would be a significant confidence-building measure. The
establishment of the DMZ does not depend on the acceptance of this proposal, but it
would set a precedent for future steps along the LOC. This establishment of DMZ-2
could occur during the summer following the completion of the establishment of the
primary DMZ.
The conceptual disengagement agreement has two phases of monitoring and verification.
First, the process of implementing disengagement will need to be monitored to verify that
military personnel have departed and agreed facilities have been dismantled according to
the agreed schedule. Second, after the DMZ is established, it is necessary to conduct
long-term monitoring to verify that military personnel and equipment have not re-entered.
Monitoring the Disengagement Process
In this process, on-site monitoring will play a primary role and remote sensing will play a
secondary role. A temporary facility should be established near the LOC where face-to-face flag meetings can be held near the village of Siari (just west of where the LOC
crosses the Shyok River).
Visual Observation in Place. The abandonment of forward posts within line of sight of
each other is to be coordinated so each side can observe activities of the other.
Joint Aerial Reconnaissance. To confirm the abandonment of positions that are not
within line of sight, a pair Indian and Pakistani helicopters will rendezvous at an agreed
location and then fly together over the agreed sector to visually observe and
photographically record withdrawal and dismantlement of posts. During a Joint
Reconnaissance Flight, both sides have the right to request its representative land at a
location within the sector to confirm withdrawal and dismantlement for facilities.
On-site Inspections. Scheduled visits to confirm the abandonment and dismantlement of
base camps with road access will occur through the exchange of escorted observers.
Long-Term Monitoring of the DMZ.
The goal of long-term monitoring is to detect illicit reoccupation of positions within the
DMZ. Monitoring to verify demilitarization of the Siachen conflict zone will need to
continue until there is a comprehensive political settlement. The temporary facility for
Flag Meetings at Siari should be considered for expansion into a Joint Monitoring Center
(JMC) to support the function of the DMZ.
Illicit reoccupation could occur either by insertion of forces using helicopters or
infiltration on the ground. The former is not a serious concern because such activities
would be easily detectable and the requirement to establish an “air bridge” would be a
major burden. Given these considerations, the focus of monitoring will be on groundbased logistic routes using a combination of remote monitoring, remote sensing, and onsite inspection. Given the terrain, there is only a small number of routes that India and
Pakistan can use for logistics. Supplies are shipped from depots to base camps in or near
the proposed DMZ. India uses a single base camp at Dzingrulma. Pakistan has a base
camp at Askole (northern sector) and at Goma (central and southern sectors). At the base
camps, supplies are broken into smaller loads and moved to forward logistic camps and
posts by helicopters, jeeps, pack animals, and porters.
Remote Monitoring: Sensor-activated systems would be placed at Access Control Points
to be established at Chumikchan on the road to Dzingrulma, Dansam on the road to
Goma, and near Askole. Reports would be transmitted to the JMC.
Remote Sensing: Regularly scheduled aerial overflight of the DMZ with photographic
and thermal imaging equipment is to be conducted using paired aircraft or a jointly
crewed single aircraft. There would be an option to request an unscheduled flight to
resolve questions of compliance that might arise. Commercial satellite imagery would
play a supporting role with more frequent collection of images.
On-site Inspection: Scheduled on-site inspections of facilities in the UZ and CZ that have
been converted to scientific use and former military facilities in the CZ that provide
social services will be conducted.
Many strategic analysts in South Asia now question the strategic significance of the
Siachen Glacier. Political will and innovative approaches are necessary to stop the
conflict in Siachen. This study concludes that disengagement is operationally feasible.
Clearly, the demilitarization of Siachen is an idea whose time has come.

 

[ajtr]

The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government
-- Lt. Gen. Prakash Chand Katoch

" Individuals must give up the delusions of what has been rightly called “the Gujranwala School of Foreign Policy” — the delusion, namely, that while others have failed, I will succeed because I am manifestly more sincere, because I am from that part of the sub-continent ".

Arun Shourie - Indian Express : " Third-class governance can’t give first-class response to terrorism " - 02 Aug 2006

[ ]Third-class governance can’t give first-class response to terrorism - Indian Express
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India


The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government


Prakash Chand Katoch


13 October 2012


[The Indian government is acting against the interests of the country by surreptitiously agreeing to a deal with Pakistan according to which it will withdraw troops from Siachen Glacier, the command of which gives India immense strategic advantages.]


India is committing a historical strategic blunder by quietly agreeing to Pakistan’s demand for withdrawing from Saltoro Ridge in Siachen glacier. The Indian public and parliament have been kept in the dark. A backroom deal has been concluded through questionable intermediaries with close ties to Pakistan.

Since November 2011, militaries of both India and Pakistan have held several rounds to boost confidence building measures. These meetings were held in Dubai (20-21 November 2011), Bangkok (23-25 February 2012) and Lahore (23-25 September 2012). Additionally, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai (21 April 2012) and Palo Alto (30-31 July 2012). In the Track II round held in Lahore in September this year, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to demilitarize Siachen despite the grave reservations of some members of the Indian delegation. The members who expressed reservations include a former ambassador, a former intelligence officer and two former officers from the Army and the Navy.

The decision to de-militarize or rather withdraw from Siachen has been taken arbitrarily at the highest political level disregarding strong objections by successive army chiefs including the current chief, Gen Bikram Singh. He has even made a statement to the media opposing demilitarization of the glacier. The agreement mainly includes: setting up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, the map coordinate south of the incompletely demarcated disputed territory; joint authentication of present ground positions; determination of places for redeployment; disengagement and demilitarization in mutually acceptable time frame, and cooperative monitoring of activities to ensure transparency.

The agreement states that re-occupation cannot be done speedily. This is absurd as it negates India’s ability to use helicopters for lightning occupation. This gives Pakistan a huge advantage because the western flanks and glacial valleys of the Saltoro ridge are controlled by Pakistan. They do not have snow during summer and can be reached under cover of darkness and of bad weather on foot. The provision for technical surveillance is a red herring because of the tough terrain and extreme weather. It is important to remember that because of these conditions even the US with all its technical resources was surprised by India’s nuclear tests of 1998.

The Indian government briefed the Lahore Track II Team to keep in mind the army’s stand that further talks would only be taken up “after” positions of both sides were authenticated on ground. The Indian Army’s concerns have clearly been ignored. The strategic importance of the Saltoro Ridge, especially in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan, Northern Areas, Shaksgam and Wakhan Corridor has been systematically obfuscated by a government that retains far too much of power over electronic and print media. The government has carried out a massive public relations exercise using gullible television channels to transmit the message that Siachen has no strategic significance. At one point, one so called expert claimed that India holds the Karakoram Pass, which is a blatant lie. National dailies have refused to publish articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen. Similarly, this issue has not been debated on national television. There are rumors that the media is muffling any discussion on Siachen on the instructions of the government.

The selection of Indian delegates who visited Lahore was incongruous. None of them had served in the Siachen, not even the six army officers who were part of the delegation. The negotiating team did not bother to visit the conflict zone despite months of parleys with Pakistani officials at beautiful locations. Two former military officers in the delegation are infamous for their political connections. It is rumored that the Air Force four star officer is to be rewarded with an ambassadorship or governorship while the one star army officer is to be given another bag of carrots for towing the official line.

It is surmised that the government is aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize to recover the legitimacy that it has lost after a succession of scandals. The Indian military has been castrated and is not allowed to state its views. Veterans who oppose de-militarization are denied media forums. It is inconceivable that any other major power would shut its military out of decision making and discourse the way India is doing at the moment.

Jehangir Karamat, the former army chief heading the Pakistani delegation, understands the strategic significance of Saltoro unlike his Indian counterparts. Under his leadership, Pakistan has grabbed the strategic opportunity to attain all its key goals.

The Atlantic Council of Canada that acted as the peace broker has promptly put out the news on the net. Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani strategic analyst who heads the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the US, has close relations his Canadian counterparts. More worryingly, he has close ties with the Pakistani military and is said to be a trusted advisor to both Gen Kayani and Gen Musharraf. Indians have long distrusted the Atlantic Council, which is perceived to be in bed with the Pakistani military and which has never really concluded its Cold War love affair with Pakistan. It is incredible that India should agree to the Atlantic Council as a mediator as it is unlikely to be a disinterested party and, as per the old adage, Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion.

The Line of Control between India and Pakistan was originally drawn on a 1:250,000 map with a thick sketch pen without military advice. This has left an ambiguity as to the location of any given point on this line to the tune of about a hundred meters. Furthermore, the line does not follow ridgelines creating a source of constant and persisting hostility and acrimony. The same thick pen may be used once again in Siachen to devastating effect. A withdrawal from Siachen would facilitate further Pakistani incursions into Kashmir and put Ladakh, the Buddhist part of the state, under threat.

Gen Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistani president and army chief, mentions in his autobiography, ‘In The line of Fire, that he was planning to put a battalion on Saltoro Ridge. Indian officers preempted his move. Since 1984, Pakistan has been trying to control Siachen. Pakistan invaded India in 1999 to control Kargil and cut off Siachen. Pakistan is attempting to eradicate its strategic disadvantage through both military and non military measures. People in Shia dominated Baltistan, the place close to Siachen Glacier, are being forcibly converted to Sunni Islam. The Pakistani state often sponsors Shia massacres. The idea is to create a strong base for Pakistani troops to advance from when they make their next move.

If India withdraws from Siachen, the new defense line will need additional troops. The new number will be many times the number of troops holding Siachen presently and the costs to the exchequer will increase exponentially. The joint agreement innocuously says in Annexure II, “small-scale intrusions are neither significant nor sustainable”. This is absurd. Small scale intrusions can easily take place undetected in areas devoid of snow during summer months. They can then be staging posts for infiltration. The Indian army lost the flower of its youth in 1999 when Pakistani troops intruded to take the heights in Kargil. With no defense line in Siachen, Ladakh will be open to infiltration. Irregulars and members of the Taliban will be able to cross into territory that belongs to India while Pakistan will deny culpability for ‘non-state-actors’. Gen Musharraf once declared that there would be many more Kargils in the future. Withdrawing from Siachen will make the general’s declaration a reality.

The public and the parliament have the right to ask the government why the Siachen issue has not been debated publicly and in the parliament. What exactly has Pakistan done to earn Indian trust? Has the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir been dismantled? Has any progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks? Has the government forgotten that Pakistan has repeatedly double crossed us? During a visit by a delegation from Pakistan to discuss confidence building measures, why was the Pakistan Army breaching the ceasefire? Why is the Pakistan arming and stoking insurgencies in India? Why is the Pakistani intelligence trying to revive terrorism in Punjab? Why do American think tanks repeatedly state that Pakistan is the most dangerous place in the world?

What does India gain from giving away Siachen?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prakash Chand Katoch is a veteran Special Forces Lieutenant General whose last assignment in his 40 years army service was Director General Information Systems. An MSc in Defence Studies from Madras University and Post Graduate from National Defence College, he has authored over 160 articles on international relations, strategic affairs, national security, military, technical and topical issues in various magazines and journals. A leading Defence expert, he is a visiting fellow in foreign Think Tanks and contributes regularly for Indian and foreign publications. Active in seminars at both national and international levels, he has vast experience in special operations, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, high altitude / jungle / desert warfare.

1. He holds the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence at the USI of India and is authoring a book on “Special Forces of India.”

2. Has been contracted by the Centre For Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi to author a book on “Netcentricity and Indian Military.”


The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.







=======================================================================

AN E-MAIL FROM LT. GEN.(RETD) P.C. KATOCH IN A VETERANS' GROUP :


Dear All,

I had occasion to discuss the Siachen De-militarization Issue with Air Chief Marshal Tyagi (Retd) today during a break in the National Security Seminar at the USI. ACM Tyagi as you know was the Co-Chair of the Track II Team whose agreement with their Pakistani counterparts at Lahore to demilitarize Siachen was put on the net first by Atlantic Council of Ottawa that broke the news to the world, particularly Indians. Given below is the gist of our conversation.

1). To my query as to how the Track II Team was selected, he said that each and every member was individually selected by Atlantic Council of Ottawa and not by GoI. He has no idea how Atlantic Council of Ottawa got these names.

2). Queried about the source of funding, his response was that the complete expenses at various locales including in Pakistan were borne by Atlantic Council of Ottawa (implying travel, stay, meetings, the works which obviously would be five star). I then asked him if he knew that both the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and Atlantic Council of US are actually extensions of Pakistani Army and funds would obviously be coming from the Pakistani Military / ISI. He said “so be it” but their job was only dialogue.

3). I then asked him which government officers briefed the Track II Team and what exactly was the content of such briefings? He said that it is the Track II Team that asked for briefing from MEA and the Military. The MEA briefing was largely about the visit of our Foreign Minister to Pakistan and this briefing had NO mention of Siachen, and the Track II Team also asked NO questions about Siachen (rather strange !). In the briefing by the Military, the Military categorically stated they did not want demilitarization from Siachen.

4). I further asked when the MEA did not give any directions for demilitarization and the Military was categorically against it, why did our Track II Team agree to demilitarization? He responded that this was their individual view. I expressed astonishment why such an agreement was signed in the first place. To this, he said no one affixed their signatures and it was not an agreement but really an account of what was discussed. I pointed out that the document talks of 'agreement' and not 'record of discussion' but he insisted there was no agreement.

5). I asked him what the de-briefings were after the various meetings. He said there were no de-briefings but a report was sent by the Track II Team to the Raksha Mantra, MEA, NSA and Service Chiefs (some other members maintain that after each visit the Track II Team did get in touch with MEA and Military representatives).

6). I asked him why the Indian public has been kept in the dark and why not put out a statement in the media. He said that my article had already done that.

7). He then asked me whether I still consider their actions as “treason”? I replied I was more convinced now that without any directions by MEA towards demilitarization and our Military firm on NO demilitarization, this “Private Body”, as stated in his e-mail, had still gone ahead to discuss and agree to withdraw from Indian Territory in violation of both the Constitution of India and the 1994 Parliament Resolution reiterating that entire J&K is part of India. He then said he had erroneously mentioned “Private Body”. Actually, they were “individuals” in their own private capacity. When I pointed out that he was the Co-Chair, he said he had acted in his individual capacity and had absolutely “no control” over the other Track II Members. Their conversation was akin to the discussion he was having with me. I said I do not agree as the two are hardly comparable when a strategic issue like withdrawal from territory is being discussed at international level with a military heavy Pakistani body. His response was that I was welcome to my views and he would not like to continue the discussion any further. At that juncture he also said the he had received some questions by someone called Devasahayam but he was not going to respond to any questions from any quarter. I had other questions but the conversation had ended abruptly.

You may draw your own conclusions from the above including examining why an organization like Atlantic Council of Ottawa funded by the Pakistani Military /ISI would spend millions to hold conferences in different exotic locales and with what aim. It is not without reason that the Supreme Court of Pakistan recently ordered the Pakistani Government to take legal action against General Mirza Aslam Beg and General Asad Durrani for distributing millions of rupees among politicians to rig the 1999 general elections while both held the appointments of Pakistani Army Chief and Director General ISI respectively. There is definitely more to this murky affair than meets the eye.

I am sending this e-mail to you as you have been keenly watching this development and so would your friends in your own groups, many of whom have joined the debate on the net.

Warm regards.

Prakash.

Bharatkalyan97: The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government -- Lt. Gen. Prakash Chand Katoch

 

[ajtr]

===========================================================

Dear Air Marshall Tyagi,



I have read the communications between you and Lt. Gen Katoch and have also received several emails on the subject. I am afraid your response to Gen Katoch is unsatisfactory and in fact confirms our worst fears. Your contention: “We were not appointed by any Government Agency nor do we have anything do with the Govt of India” does not make any sense whatsoever. Since when territories of sovereign India have become ‘real estates’ for private individuals belonging to two different countries to trade, negotiate and arbitrate upon?



Your adverse reference to Gen Katoch and Kunal Verma cannot be countenanced. While the former was Siachen Brigade Commander the latter has written a fine, well-researched and illustrated Book on Siachen which I have read from cover to cover. Besides being patriotic citizens, they are also emotionally attached to the Siachen Glacier.



Be that as it may, in order to clean up the air and provide an opportunity for you and your Track II colleagues to explain things, I herewith pose 12 Questions which I would like you to respond ASAP:



i. Who appointed the Track II Team, who are the members and what are their credentials and what is their service record in the Siachen area?

ii. Who briefed the Track II Team – NSA, Defence Secretary, MoD, MEA?

iii. Did the Track II Team visit Siachen before inking the agreement?

iv. Was the decision of Track II Team unanimous? If not on what authority the dissent was suppressed-PMO, NSA, Defence Secretary?

v. Decision to demilitarize Siachen has grave military consequences. Were the three Service Chiefs consulted on this? If not why not?

vi. This issue has serious strategic, deployment, logistics, demographic, displacement, cost and time implications for the Army. Were they consulted and the matter discussed with the Northern Army Commander? If not why not?

vii. After ‘demilitarisation’ what measures will be required to check terrorist infiltration (including Taliban) and how effective will it be as compared to our defences and counter infiltration forces in Kashmir Valley?

viii. Is it merely a Track II initiative? If so why were the members briefed by Government officials before the Lahore meet? Were they not told that this team is “as good as Track I”? Does it not make it official?

ix. NSA is stated to have briefed the leader of the Track II Team and one/two members separately? If so why? To firm up a secret deal?

x. The whole process, particularly signing of the Track II agreement was kept under wraps and one came to know of it only through the Website of a foreign agency. Why this secrecy?

xi. On whose orders did some select members of Track II Team along with Ambassador KC Singh, justify the agreement at a meeting in India International Centre on 3rd October?

xii. Most importantly, why was such a major decision not discussed in Parliament and in Public? Has the President of India been kept informed?

Awaiting an early response. I am copying this mail to Gen Katoch and Kunal



M.G.Devasahayam IAS (Retd)

 

[ajtr]

Withdrawal from Siachen – a manifestation of Prithviraj Chauhan syndrome!
By Maj Gen Mrinal SumanIssue
Net Edition | Date : 06 Nov , 2012

Siachen is in the news again.Having served at the glacier, one is aware of the ground realities. It is being suggested that ‘demilitarization’ of the glacier will act as a catalyst to foster friendly relations between Indian and Pakistan. To be honest, one has not heard of a more convoluted and outlandish logic.
Demilitarization of an area implies withdrawal of the opposing military forces from the designated area with an agreement that neither side would undertake any military activity till the resolution of the conflicting territorial claims. Thus, demilitarization necessarily entails withdrawal by both the sides from the disputed area. The area becomes a de facto frontier between the two nations.

In the case of Siachen, Pakistan has no presence on the glacier – not even a toehold. Their positions are well west of the Saltoro Ridge. If they are not present on the glacier, the question of Pakistani withdrawal just does not arise. Therefore, demilitarization of Siachen means unilateral withdrawal by India and nothing more.
It is understandable for the Pakistani military to use the term demilitarization as it wants to continue deceiving its countrymen that it is occupying part of the glacier. However, it is simply preposterous for Indian strategists to speak in terms of demilitarization and thereby mislead the public. They should be honest and refer to the proposal as ‘unilateral vacation of Siachen by India’.

‘Demilitarization of Siachen will assure Pakistan of Indian sincerity in resolving contentious issues and help bring about a reduction in Pakistan’s hostility towards India. Both countries can live peacefully thereafter’ is the commonly touted argument of the Indian advocates of the withdrawal.
The above logic is absurd and farcical. It is based on three phony contentions. One, it is for India to convince Pakistan of its good intentions and not the vice versa. Two, a placated Pakistan will shed its enmity and be a good neighbour. And three, Pakistan should be trusted to honour its commitment.

Over the last six decades India has tried various measures to convince Pakistan of its sincerity to develop a rancor-free relationship. India has never coveted Pakistani territory. It stopped short of re-conquering the whole of Jammu and Kashmir and went to the Security Council. It gave back the strategic Haji Pir Pass as a goodwill gesture in 1965 and returned 96,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War after the war in 1971. It has never trained and sent terrorists into Pakistan to create mayhem.
As a matter of fact, India’s over-indulgence and conciliatory gestures has emboldened Pakistan into considering India to be a soft state and increased its intransigence and hardened its anti-India attitude. While the Indian leadership was trying to break ice through ‘bus diplomacy’ in 1998-99, Pakistani military was busy planning the notorious Kargil incursion.

As regards the second issue of changing Pakistan’s mindset, it is nothing but self-delusion. Pakistan’s shedding of hostility towards India and adoption of a friendly stance would amount to the negation of the two-nation theory, the raison d’être for its very existence. A nation born out of hatred needs hatred to feed itself on for continued sustenance and to justify its existence.
Issues like Kashmir and Siachen are merely a manifestation of Pakistan’s infinite hostility towards India. Were India to hand over Kashmir to it on a platter and withdraw from Siachen, Pakistan will invent newer issues to keep the pot boiling. Pakistan cannot afford to shed its antagonism towards India as that would amount to questioning the logic of its very creation.

Coming to the third premise, can Pakistan be trusted not to undertake clandestine operations to occupy the Siachen heights vacated by trusting Indians? Who can guarantee that? Remember, deceit is a part of Pakistan’s state policy.
Independent Pakistan started its track record with treachery. Despite having signed a ‘stand-still agreement’ with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan unleashed Pashtun marauders on the hapless Kashmir valley with the active participation of Pak army. Breaching undertakings given to the US, it surreptitiously used American equipment to launch a surprise attack on Kutch in April 1965.

Even before the ink had dried on the Kutch agreement, Pakistan was back to its perfidious ways. Covertly, it infiltrated its forces into Kashmir, expecting a local uprising against India. Under the Tashkent agreement, Pakistan promised to abjure the use of force to settle mutual disputes and adherence to the principles of non-interference. However, Pakistan continued its proxy war through its notorious secret agencies. Sanctuaries and safe passage were provided to underground elements of North-Eastern India.
Under the Shimla Agreement, Bhutto had given a solemn verbal undertaking to accept LOC as the de facto border. Instead, true to its perfidious nature, Pakistan redoubled its efforts to create turmoil in India. In addition to regular terrorist attacks, it never misses an opportunity to embarrass India in every world forum.
Finally, India has been repeatedly duped and cheated by Pakistan. What has Pakistan done in the recent past to earn another chance to be trusted? Has it arrested and deported all terrorists? They are roaming free in Pakistan spewing venom against India. Pakistan is colluding with China by bartering away territory in Gilgit-Baltistan. One is not aware of a single step taken by Pakistan to assuage Indian feelings and earn its trust.

Pakistan is adept at achieving through negotiations what it loses in war. The current dialogue on Siachen is an extension of the same subterfuge. Indian soldiers shed blood to gain military ascendency, only to see their hard fought gains being lost through the misplaced zeal of some self-proclaimed advocates of peace.

We should never forget that deceit, betrayal, duplicity and perfidy are synonym with Pakistan. Therefore, any Indian who suggests vacation of Siachen should be treated as an anti-national element and tried for high treason. Enough of Prithviraj Chauhan syndrome. He repeatedly trusted Ghori and set him free; only to be captured and blinded later on. Pakistani text books portray Ghori as an ideal leader whose exploits should be followed.
It is time India learns.

 

[ajtr]

Siachen: What is the strategic or diplomatic rationale for demilitarization?

The government hasn’t spoken about it. The opposition seems to be oblivious to the goings on. The print and electronic media have chosen to remain silent. But the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank in its Press release on 02 Oct 2012 announced that a group of retired senior officials, military officers and diplomats of India and Pakistan “have agreed on a proposal regarding the demilitarization of the Siachen area”. The project it appears had been “jointly organized by the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council”.

No one seems to know if this Track 2 effort had been undertaken at the behest of Government of India, Pakistan or some other third party. However one of the team members has confirmed that the team had received briefings in New Delhi from Government officials. It appears that India and Pakistan have been engaged in military-level Track 2 talks for the past 12 months, with the delegates of the two sides meeting in Dubai, Bangkok and finally in Lahore in September. Smaller “sub-group” meetings in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Palo Alto (California) have also featured in the Track 2 process. All these meetings, the move of both the teams back and forth would have cost some money. Who footed the bill? Was it India, Pakistan, Atlantic Council, or the University of Ottawa? What was the interest?

Is it a normal practice in diplomacy for a foreign think tank sponsored Track 2 team consisting of individuals selected by the sponsoring agency to be briefed by Government officials? Is it appropriate for the team to go to an inimical foreign country and agree on demilitarization or to agree on the modalities for demilitarization of an area which it had been holding for years without the Government deciding on the very basic question whether to withdraw from the position or not? Or has the Government taken a decision to withdraw from Siachen without taking the Parliament or the opposition into confidence? Which of these are true? The people of this country have a right to know the truth.

Three countries have interest in areas in and around Siachen. This aspect will have a major bearing on the strategic importance of Siachen and India’s decision to demilitarize the area (See map). The areas concerned are the Northern Area, Gilgit, Baltisatan, Saltoro, Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. The Gilgit and Baltistan located to the immediate west of Saltoro is a part of Pakistan with majority Shia population. Pakistan is actively considering a proposal to lease the region to Beijing for 50 years. The Sakshgam valey immediately to the North of Saltoro has already been ceded to China by Pakistan illegally. Xinjiang lies to the immediate North of Sakshgam. Aksai Chin which is occupied by China lies to the South East of Sakshgam Valley.

The Nurba Valley and Ladakh leading to J&K are hemmed in on three sides by Baltistan, Sakshgam Valley and Aksai Chin. If the proposal to lease the Gilgit – Baltistan area goes through and India withdraws from Siachen, all the three areas right up to Xinjiang will be under Chinese control.

The Karakoram Highway which runs through these areas connects China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's Northern Areas across the Karakoram mountain range, through the Khunjerab Pass. China and Pakistan are also planning to link the Karakoram Highway to the southern port of Gwadar in Balochistan through the Chinese-aided Gwadar-Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi. The Karakoram Highway passes through an area where China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come as close to each other as 250 kms and has its own strategic importance and significance to India.

Looking at the map in the context of the above, does anyone have any doubt as to which of the three countries would benefit the most by vacating Saltoro? Is Pakistan trying to help their all-weather friend to be able to dominate the entire area to the North of our areas of interest? Saltoro ridge acts as a separator between Pakistan (Baltistan – Gilgit) and China. Do we want them to link up by demilitarizing the area? Doesn’t vacating Saltoro threaten the security of Nubra Valley?

The entire country believes that the Military is occupying Siachen because it belongs to it and rightly so. The 1972 Shimla Agreement clearly stated that from the NJ9842 the boundary would proceed "thence north to the glaciers." This implies that Saltoro ridge is well within Indian Territory. Is it necessary for a country to go and sign an agreement with a neighboring country for unilaterally withdrawing its forces from its own territory? What are the compulsions warranting India to concede to Pakistan’s demand for withdrawing from Saltoro ridge? Even assuming that the agreement provides adequate safeguards against Pakistan occupying Saltoro ridge after India’s withdrawal, does the agreement provide any guarantee against China occupying the Saltoro ridge and threatening India especially after the Baltistan – Gilgit areas have been leased to it by Pakistan? Would we not run into another mess should China choose to say that it has nothing to do with the agreement signed between India and Pakistan?

Withdrawal from Saltoro and Siachen would threaten Ladakh and will expose important mountain passes that are gateways to Ladakh and onto Kashmir to the aggressor including terrorists. Will that not require establishing a fresh defence line along the Ladakh Range to successfully defend our areas of interest? What will be the requirement of troops for such a venture and at what cost? Has an appraisal of the military requirement in the event of demilitarization of Siachen been obtained from the Army Chief? How will such a withdrawal impact our security in relation to the Karakoram Highway?

As experienced in the past, aren’t issues such as cross border terrorism in J &K, terrorist training camps across, funding and arming terrorists in J&K to destabilize the country much more serious than Sir Creek or Siachen? Why then are we being soft on Pakistan by agreeing to unilaterally withdraw from Siachen while Pakistan continues to aid and abet terrorism right inside our country? Has Pakistan done anything in the past to exhibit its sincerity or to be able to trust them? Have we sought any guarantees or quid pro quo in the other major areas of our concern?

Is the Government of India prepared to give a guarantee that the Indian Army would not be required to recapture Saltoro ridge should Pakistan or China occupy the position after India vacates it or if Indian soil is threatened? If not, would the soldiers of the Indian Army be forced to shed blood for a mess up by the arm chair politicians and bureaucrats who are least concerned with war fighting or its cost to human life and to the country?

Lack of strategic culture and the worth of a non-professional generalist bureaucracy is showing up once again. Were the Service Chiefs parts of the decision making process in whatever role that the Government had played in the Track 2 diplomacy? Isn’t the military a concerned party? Why then are they not part of the decision making process?

It only goes to prove that our bureaucrats and politicians would never hesitate to shed your blood for their stupidities and ambitions.

 

[MilSpec]

^yeah rite... withdrawal not happening!

 

[ajtr]

^yeah rite... withdrawal not happening!

Well after all its indian media and retired indian military officials who are making noise.There is no news from other media sources not even pakistani media.

 

[ajtr]

Military to Military CBMs

General

Military to military CBMs were held in Lahore from 23 – 25 September 2012. They were attended by the following : -

(a) India
• Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Shashi Tyagi.
• Lieutenant General (Retd) Aditya Singh.
• Lieutenant General (Retd) Arvinder Singh Lamba.
• Lieutenant General (Retd) BS Pawar.
• Vice Admiral (Retd) A.K. Singh.
• Brigadier (Retd) Arun Sahgal.
• Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal.
• Ambassador (Retd) Lalit Mansingh (former Foreign Secretary of India).
• Ambassador (Retd) Vivek Katju.
• Mr Rana Banerji (former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, India).
• Mr Ajai Shukla (Journalist).

(b) Pakistan
• General (Retd) Jehangir Karamat.
• General (Retd) Tariq Majid.
• Admiral (Retd) Tariq Khan.
• Lieutenant General (Retd) Tariq Ghazi (former Defense Secretary of Pakistan).
• Lieutenant General (Retd) Sikander Afzal.
• Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Shahzad Chaudhry.
• Ambassador (Retd) Riaz Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan)
• Ambassador (Retd) Maleeha Lodhi.
• Ambassador (Retd) Aziz Khan.
• Major General (Retd) Qasim Qureshi.

Subsequent to the above, a Round-Table discussion was held at CLAWS on 15 Oct 2012 wherein Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal and Capt (IN) Alok Bansal, Senior Felow CLAWS presented their views on the Track II Dialogue process in Lahore. Capt (IN) Alok Bansal was not part of the military to military CBMs but took part thereafter in a track II meeting discussing CBMs over the Indus Water Treaty.

The discussion at CLAWS was attended by select officers from the Army and members of the CLAWS faculty.

Lt Gen BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The third round of the Track II process between retired military officers of India and Pakistan was held at Lahore recently with the previous two rounds being held at Dubai and Bangkok respectively. The two sides have reached an agreement on resolving the Sir Creek and Siachen disputes. The proposals are doable and are awaiting the government’s approval. It appears that the Track II process has the blessings of the Pakistan Army. On Siachen, the Pakistan Army is conscious of the fact that the Indian Army enjoys a tactical advantage and can dictate terms.

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

Track II efforts are nothing new and hundreds of such initiatives have been undertaken ever since the conclusion of the Second World War. A recent example was the Norwegian mission in Sri Lanka. The India-Pakistan Track II has held several discussions of the general situation, both in the region and bilaterally, and how this affects the prospects for progress on the CBM file. It was reported that the relationship between the two countries is going through a relatively positive phase. Diplomatic and business contacts are improving across a range of issues. At the same time, suspicions remain concerning each side’s view of the other’s objectives and alleged actions in Afghanistan, and in the area of military doctrines and deployments. There has been another round of Track 1 discussions on both conventional and nuclear CBMs, but both sides found it disappointing. The 2007 accord “Reducing Risk Relating to Nuclear Weapons” has been renewed for another five years. However, there was no progress on other proposals to develop new CBMs. In contrast, some participants pointed to lower profile examples of confidence-building measures at work between the two countries. For example, when there was an inadvertent helicopter crossing of the LC into Pakistan, the matter was managed quickly and effectively.

The project reviewed the status of existing CBMs between the two countries. Based onpresentations from the two sides, it was agreed that the main existing military CBMs are:

• DGMO Hotline
• Non-attack on nuclear facilities (1988)
• Advance notice of military exercises and maneuvers (1991)
• Informal ceasefire along LOC/AGPL (2003)

It was by and large agreed that most of the above CBMs were working well.

The following CBMs could be further strengthened:-

• Prevention of Airspace Violations (1991)
• Link between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (2005)
• Joint patrolling along the international border and periodic flag meetings. Non
development of new posts
• Biannual meeting between Indian border security forces and Pakistani Rangers (2004)
• Advance notice of Ballistic Missile tests (2005)

Several CBMs which have been proposed between the two sides, but not yet agreed, were identified. These are:

• A Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement
• The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of a Communications link between the two navies;
• Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
Seminars.
• Mil-to-mil exchanges and “cultural” activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
visits by military bands; sports teams and adventure activities)
• Quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC; and
• Speedy return of inadvertent line crossers.

On Sir Creek, Pakistan is willing to forego its claim on the southern line and the dispute is ripe for resolution.

The following clear package of integrated and inter-linked stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of Siachen and delineation of the AGPL.

• Set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing Agreements;
• The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records exchanged;
• The determination of the places to which redeployment will be affected would be jointly agreed;
• Disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable time frame to be agreed;
• Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and
• Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency.

It was agreed upon to hold further discussions on crisis stability and terrorism. Beyond military CBMs, it was recognised that intelligence-sharing is a key issue. It should be noted that information is being shared on lists of terror groups which both sides wish to see stopped but cooperation on investigations regarding these groups should be more intensive and transparent.

Capt (IN) Alok Bansal

The dialogue on water issues between India and Pakistan was organised by the Atlantic Council, USA and Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This was the first Track II dialogue on the subject and was more of an effort towards breaking the ice. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is a perfect mechanism which has withstood the test of time. Yet, public perception in Pakistan on water issues is quite mis-guided and ill-informed. The common man is not aware of the principles of the IWT and perceives India to be deliberately trying to curtail the flow of water into Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan has seen a tremendous increase in its population and this is an important factor which has led to hardening of stand on the water issue. The mis-management of canals in Pakistan has added to the problem of water management.

The IWT lays downs conditions for use of river waters for consumptive use, agriculture and for building run of the river hydroelectric power projects. The IWT does not limit use of water for domestic consumption. There is a perception in the Kashmir valley that excessive exploitation of the rivers is leading to the receding of glaciers thereby creating environmental issues. Over the years, land area under horticulture in the valley has increased while that under agriculture has come down. Pakistan’s major concern against India is that the latter does not share information on damming projects on the Indus and its tributaries. On the other hand, India feels that sharing information with Pakistan has led to troubles and delays in implementation of projects on the river waters. For instance, the re-designing of the Salal hydel project on the river Chenab led to silting which rendered the dam useless. The Pakistani objection to the Kishanganga project is on the ground that India is diverting waters of one tributary of the Indus to another – river Jhelum. The Pakistani aim is to prevent the building of hydro-electric projects to stall the economic development of J&K.

Discussion

• The argument that Siachen must be demilitarised because of the high costs involved in maintenance of troops and to minimise casualties is flawed. India has to defend its borders and there are other areas also which present a challenge similar to the one experienced in Siachen. It would be setting a wrong precedent if troops are to be withdrawn on such frivolous grounds.

• Building confidence and trust between the two countries is necessary if India- Pakistan relations are to improve. However, Siachen cannot be a start point for the above process. Withdrawal from the Glacier will not lead to any improvement in ties bewtween the two countries. What can improve the environment is for Pakistan to stop sending terroists into India and to close the 42 terrorist training camps which are supported by state patronage. Unless Pakistan is prepared to give up its policy on supporting terrorist organisations which they maintain as their strategic assets against India, no improvement in relations can take place. Better confidence building can be done by stopping the hostility displayed by the police forces of both countries at Wagah, and by exchanging prisoners, thousands of whom are rotting in each others jails.

• The resolution of the Sir Creek issue is doable and should be de-linked from having an agreement on Siachen first.

 

[ajtr]

Demilitarizing Siachen: Trading Strategic Advantage for Brownie Points

The troubled India-Pakistan relationship has been punctuated by four military conflicts and decades-long military face-off across the IB and LOC, the most recent starting in 1984 on Siachen glacier in Ladakh. The illegal ceding of areas of north Ladakh by Pakistan to China, and China’s occupation of the Aksai Chin area in east Ladakh make Siachen glacier a regional strategic flash-point.
While over the past few months, the Siachen glacier (hereinafter referred to as “Siachen&#8221 has been in the news, recently there has been a flurry of correspondence within the Indian strategic community on its demilitarization, some arguing for and others against it. There is a lobby favouring demilitarization, especially of Siachen, and meetings to discuss it have been held by an India-Pakistan group, the so-called Track-II team, comprising retired military officers and retired diplomats of both countries. Siachen-experienced retired Indian army officers are strongly opposed to demilitarizing Siachen for strategic and tactical reasons. There are no two opinions within Pakistan on this issue, because Pakistan only gains politically, economically and militarily by demilitarizing Siachen. This article examines demilitarization of Siachen without prejudice to demilitarization elsewhere or CBMs between the two countries.

In a recent diplomatically-savvy initiative, Pakistan army chief General A.P.Kayani “advocated peaceful coexistence with India, adding that the civil and military leaderships of the two countries should discuss ways to resolve the issue” [of] “demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier” [Ref.1]. This initiative, triggered by the loss of 139 Pakistani soldiers killed in an avalanche at Gayari in April, is said to be driven by the need to cover up the long-standing lie sold to the Pakistani public that their soldiers were dying on Siachen facing Indian troops. The fact is that Gayari is in the Siachen region and not on Siachen itself, and there are no Pakistani troops on Siachen because Indian troops occupy Siachen and its commanding heights.
“Peaceful co-existence” is a strange phrase coming from a Pakistan army chief. Peaceful co-existence can very easily be achieved if the General would order his troops not to violate the ceasefire as is continually occurring, not violate the LOC as Pakistan did stealthily in 1999 around Kargil, and stop training and infiltrating terrorists across the LOC. But what is beyond being strange is that some eminent Indians took up the cue and recommended immediately settling the Siachen dispute by demilitarization. Such a recommendation is innocent of the fact that demilitarizing Siachen clearly involves India losing both strategic and tactical advantage, while for Pakistan it is a definite strategic gain traded off against an insignificant tactical loss. The strangeness does not end there. A former Indian army brigadier even suggested that demilitarizing Siachen was “a low-risk option to test [the] Pak[istan] army’s sincerity” [Ref.2]. The wisdom of taking the “low-risk option” of giving the key of one’s house to a thief to test his self-professed honesty, if at all it is an option, is questionable. Nor would it be an unduly harsh reflection on the Pakistani establishment, sometimes civilian, sometimes military, but always with antipathy towards India. This officer is part of the Track-II team that has agreed upon the modalities of demilitarizing Siachen.

India has consistently maintained in international fora that Jammu & Kashmir, including Siachen, is a part of India. Hence Indian troops abandoning their posts on and around Siachen and vacating Indian territory to satisfy “peace” initiatives by Pakistan, amounts to India surrendering its sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir, with repercussions on other parts of the LOC.
Besides, successive army chiefs including the present incumbent Gen Bikram Singh, have spoken strongly against demilitarizing Siachen because it would be strategic and tactical folly of the highest order. Notwithstanding, on April 30, 2012, Defence Minister A.K. Antony informed Parliament that government was holding meaningful dialogue with Pakistan to demilitarize Siachen [Ref.3]. Did Government of India (GoI) respond with unseemly alacrity to the Pakistan army chief’s call to demilitarize Siachen, even going through the procedural formality of informing Parliament? It is a fair bet that most MPs do not know where Siachen is, or what are the national sovereignty and security implications of its demilitarization. Perhaps GoI considers that informing Parliament is concurrence to proceed with talks, even demilitarization.
In early 2005, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh was preparing for strategic cooperation with USA starting with the Framework Agreement on civilian nuclear energy and the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture. International agreements are always finalized with wide-ranging preparatory discussions between the governments that are entering into agreement. Thus, it can safely be surmised that geopolitical strategic matters would have been discussed between USA and India in the preparatory stages. Perhaps demilitarizing Siachen was discussed at that time, because on June 13, 2005, the Prime Minister told troops at Siachen Base Camp that Siachen would be “converted from a point of conflict to a zone of peace”.

When governments negotiate, officials of both sides, with clear instructions from their respective governments, meet to work on the nitty-gritty of the negotiations, while the decision makers handle the policy and macro aspects. However, the media reports [Ref.4] that GoI has permitted Track-II negotiations on demilitarizing Siachen “through questionable intermediaries with close ties to Pakistan”. The “questionable intermediaries” are the retired Indian military officers and diplomats who formed the Indian side of the so-called Track-II discussions held in September 2012 at Lahore [Note 1]. The Indian side could not have operated without the knowledge of the Indian government, but it did so without mandate, even signing an agreement regarding the “how” of demilitarizing Siachen without the Indian government’s “whether” and “when” of demilitarization [Ref.5]. Obviously the Pakistani establishment has no trouble at all on “whether”, and “when” is clearly ASAP.
The mainstream print media has brought out articles that press for demilitarizing Siachen, some even arguing for it “now”, notably by A.G.Noorani [Ref.7]. An immediate riposte to it was not published by any newspaper, but fortunately did get published in niche journals, including one the same day [Ref.8]. This perhaps substantiates the view that “National dailies have refused to publish articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen. Similarly, this issue has not been debated on national television. There are rumors that the media is muffling any discussion on Siachen on the instructions of the government” [Ref.4].
One wonders why the Indian government would want the public to read about the “advantages” of demilitarizing Siachen, without allowing arguments that it may not be in the national interest. This, particularly when demilitarizing Siachen is against the advice of India’s army chief and such an issue of national importance with long-term strategic repercussions has not been discussed in Parliament. This undemocratic and politically devious approach by Government of India has surely set the rumour mills in motion, including one concerning a Nobel Peace Prize.

Government of India is already engaged in dialogue with Pakistan on demilitarizing Siachen. If the decision to demilitarize Siachen has already been secretly taken, the present dialogue is to decide when to demilitarize. Pulling back troops from Siachen can only commence after written orders are issued by the Cabinet to the army chief. Actually pulling back troops depends upon the military situation, the time of year, preparation of positions to which to pull back, surveillance arrangements, and other operational and logistic arrangements. Only the Indian army can work out the modalities of demilitarization. Therefore the agenda of the Track-II team is meaningless and ACM Tyagi’s statement that the Track-II team has worked out a way to demilitarize Siachen “should the two sides ever agree to demilitarize”, is hollow. Indeed, it leads one to wonder whether the Track-II initiative is meant to force the hand of legitimate decision makers.
Those who oppose demilitarizing Siachen have questioned the competence of the Indian Track-II members to discuss demilitarization because of not having even visited Siachen. There are also conjectures of personal gain for its members. Words like “treasonable” have been used. Even if true, none of these can be proved at present, and probably never. Therefore it is best to confine the discussion to examining the arguments concerning demilitarization of Siachen in terms of regional and global geopolitics, noting that India’s over-riding considerations regarding Siachen are military and not civilian.
According to media reports, Pakistan is negotiating or has already negotiated leasing the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (***), to China for 50 years [Ref.9]. This includes the area Pakistani troops now occupy, facing Indian defensive positions on Siachen. If Indian troops pull out of Siachen, Pakistani or Chinese troops can easily defeat surveillance, as any soldier who has experienced Siachen will confirm, and infiltrate into tactically superior former Indian posts to gain strategic advantage. Re-occupation of these posts by Indian forces will be almost impossible. Chinese presence in Baltistan sets Siachen as a new frontier and possible flashpoint for hostilities between India and China. In the context of China having deployed missile units in Tibet within easy strike range of New Delhi. In this changed geopolitical situation, India pulling back from Siachen would be monumental strategic folly.

Strategist Gurmeet Kanwal, a member of the Track-II team, suggested an India-Pakistan Siachen demilitarization agreement including a clause that allows either side to take military action in case of violation by the other side [Ref.10]. If Pakistan or its Lessee, China, infiltrates into the demilitarized zone, India will “be at liberty” to take military action to vacate the encroachment. Thus, the “peace” agreement envisages violation, but suggests the remedy of re-opening armed hostilities that end peace! The inescapable fact is that demilitarizing Siachen will gift huge strategic advantage to Pakistan and China at India’s strategic cost, make a strategic coup for Pakistan. Would India consider demilitarizing disputed areas of Arunachal Pradesh to China for the sake of peace?
India’s strategic alignment with USA following the India-US nuclear deal signed between Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and U.S President George W. Bush dates back to 2005. The 123-Agreement was over-shadowed by the provisions of the U.S Hyde Act which is India-specific, and visualizes India adopting foreign policy “congruent with” USA’s.
NATO, a U.S-dominated military alliance, concerns the North Atlantic, but it has spread its area of policy and military influence into Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO is now influencing policy further eastward. Simultaneously, the Atlantic Council, a non-profit policy organization headquartered in USA and founded in 1961 to encourage cooperation between North America and Europe, has expanded its area of interest into the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Although it has close connections to influential policy makers within USA it is, by charter, independent of USA as well as NATO. But its activities include consideration of “global challenges [including] NATO’s future” [Ref.11]. Its South Asia Center “provides a forum for countries in greater South Asia to engage with one another on sustainable stability and economic growth in our quest to “wage peace” in the region, and develop links and better understanding among them and members of the Atlantic community”.

The Track-II talks on demilitarizing Siachen were sponsored and funded by the Atlantic Council. Thus, the Atlantic Council, which has reach to and is influenced by the policy-making mandarins of NATO (including the Pentagon) and the U.S administration, chose the Indian and Pakistani Track-II team members. The averment that the Indian Track-II members have nothing to do with the Indian government raises the question whether Pakistan’s initiative for demilitarizing Siachen has USA’s backing through the Atlantic Council, to persuade India to acquiesce against its national strategic best interests. That could explain the Indian government’s apparent eagerness to demilitarize Siachen and earn brownie points with its senior strategic partner, thus scoring a self-goal with unacceptable and irretrievable strategic costs.
Article 73 of the Constitution of India empowers the Prime Minister, as the country’s chief executive, to enter into a treaty or agreement with a foreign power. Thus, in 2005, the government went ahead with signing a strategic agreement with USA, without prior discussion in Parliament. Apprehensions that the present government, beset by accusations of weakness, indecisiveness and monumental corruption, may sign an agreement with Pakistan to demilitarize Siachen to divert public attention, may not be unfounded.
While diplomatic engagement for peace with Pakistan is necessary, compromising national sovereignty and security or territorial integrity is unacceptable. Therefore, it is vital that Parliamentarians carefully consider arguments for and against demilitarizing Siachen without prejudice to CBMs or demilitarization in any other sector, and ensure discussion on the matter before any agreement is signed. If Indian troops are ordered to vacate posts on Saltoro ridge and Siachen that were won at the cost of the lives and limbs of many soldiers, it would amount to devaluing their sacrifices and their families’ pain and suffering, besides being strategic folly.

 

[ajtr]

Is Congress slyly selling out on Siachen?

Growing murmurs of disapproval are rising in Indian military and diplomatic circles over the recent Track II diplomacy over the Siachen glacier. Sources say that military veterans are adamant that a settlement can give no advantage to India and would only enhance the bruised status of the Pakistan army within that nation’s public life.

Moreover, given the China-Pakistan nexus and Chinese presence in the Shaksgam Valley north of Siachen and in Aksai Chin to its east, plus the ISI’s continuing links with terrorist networks in India, there is simply no merit in a retreat from the glacier. Yet it is undeniable that Islamabad has successfully suborned the national consensus on this strategic issue.

The disquiet relates to the recent military-to-military (actually retired officers) confidence building measures in Lahore from September 23-25, 2012. This was followed by a round table discussion in Delhi on October 15, 2012, where both the Lahore dialogue and the Indus Water Treaty were discussed. Select officers from the Army and members of the CLAWS faculty were present at the Delhi conclave.

The Lahore Track II meeting was the third such conclave (previous ones having being held in Dubai and Bangkok), wherein both sides reportedly reached an ‘agreement’ on resolving the Sir Creek and Siachen disputes. The apprehension among nationalists is whether the shaky UPA regime is covertly agreeing to American pressure to surrender Indian interests in this strategic sector without taking the Indian public in confidence.

In a political environment in which citizens and retired veterans alike are demanding unveiling of the true facts behind the military debacles of 1947 and 1962, and public protests over the secret diplomacy that led India to unilaterally surrender the gains of military action in 1965 and 1971 are growing, it is amazing that such furtive manoeuvres persist.

With American troops slated to leave Afghanistan soon, and Islamabad determined to give New Delhi no space in what it considers its backyard, how can Siachen be discussed in isolation to larger developments in the region? It is admitted that official talks regarding conventional and nuclear CBMs have failed. What can Track II achieve that official talks cannot?

Military veterans are aghast that the Atlantic Council of Ottawa which broke the news of the Track II accord, had actually sponsored the dialogue, no doubt with the blessings of the American, Canadian and British global policemen who are determined to demilitarise the glacier. A veteran present at the Lahore talks privately told to an interlocutor that the Track II Team was handpicked by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and not the Government of India! The complete expenses of travel and stay were also borne by the Council.

As senior retired military and diplomatic officers, surely the participants would have known that the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and Atlantic Council of US are extensions of the Pakistani Army which would obviously be funding this so-called diplomacy. So despite the Ghulam Nabi Fai debacle, our people are determined to learn nothing from history, so desperate is the craving for foreign trips in five star comfort. We need to know more about the covert official backing for such talks, if any, in the light of the experience that persons who availed of the dubious hospitality of Ghulam Nabi Fai were appointed by the Union Home Ministry as interlocutors on Jammu & Kashmir.

Worse, though the Track II groups (that is, individuals selected by the Atlantic Council for unknown qualities) informed the Ministry of External Affairs and the military brass about their meeting and sought some inputs. Some MEA officials did meet them but did not even mention Siachen, nor did the team ask questions on the subject.

The Military, however, was adamant that it did not favour any demilitarisation. General VK Singh when approached reportedly retorted, “What bloody demilitarisation? Don’t let the @#$%$#@S discuss this. There is nothing to discuss with Pakistan over Siachen”. The new Army Chief General Bikram Singh was equally explicit, “Tell the $##s (in Punjabi) to first stop exporting terrorism. No question of discussing any demilitarisation”.

So why did the Government of India let this handpicked group of retired military and diplomatic officers including a self-righteous journalist, go to Lahore and discuss and even agree to demilitarisation? What is the legal standing of this group? It would be in the fitness of things for the Government of India to quickly take an official view on this Ottawa-funded jamboree from the account reportedly furnished to the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, the NSA and the Service Chiefs. There is need to crack down of such potentially harmful ‘private initiatives’.

It is scandalous that a bunch of individuals selected by a foreign body most likely funded by the Pakistan Army / ISI, with no authority to discuss geo-strategic matters, went and in violation of the Indian constitution and the 1994 Parliament Resolution reiterating claim over the entire J&K State as acceded to India by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947, agreed to demilitarise the Siachen glacier. This, despite being told by the outgoing and current Army Chief, that the matter was non-negotiable.

According to the gist of the Lahore discussions, Pakistan is reportedly willing to forego its claim on Sir Creek and the dispute can be resolved. Both sides reportedly agreed to set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing Agreements; that present ground positions would be jointly recorded and records exchanged; the determination of places to which redeployment will be affected would be jointly agreed; disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable timeframe; prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency.

Military veterans aver that India cannot surrender such a strategic height in such a sensitive sector.

 

[ajtr]

On being asked if there were efforts being made through track-II dialogue on demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier, Antony said: “No, we are not for that. Our stand on Siachen is very clear and there is no change in our stand”.

India wants authentication of the present positions. New Delhi has always insisted it will pull back troops only after joint “authentication” of the frontline along the 109-km Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) — the name of the de facto border on the glacier. The AGPL has never been marked on the ground or on any document accepted by both sides.

If Pakistan violates a de-militarisation treaty, it would enjoy easier access to Siachen, leaving India at a disadvantage. New Delhi wants international guarantee against any violation. Pakistan resists “authentication” as a pre-requisite to de-militarisation.

The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Main News