India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[blain2]

I believe there is a logical explanation for almost everything....




1965 war caught the IA in the midst of its post 1962 re-org and expansion. Since IA was still raising new formations, especially mountain divisions, therefore some mountains division did have the dual role....NEFA as well as Pakistan...... which is followed even as we speak. Rest of course the organization and training of mountain divisions is not suited for anything other than mountains.....they were used despite these disadvantages.



Firepower.....doctrines of that time, of both sides, emphasized use of firepower instead of mobility of tanks. Presence of artillery and tanks always proved to be a booster for infantry except in some rare instances when infantry managed well without them.....



IA columns on roads presented good enough targets for PAF.

Something which normally everyone misses are the effects of PA SSG ops against IAF airfields in 1965 (like readers miss the great effects of Gibralter, term it a failure and move on). A number of IA formations were employed to hunt for PA SSG paratroopers, their clogged vehicles on roads were also found by PAF and heavy casualties were inflicted.

Even till now, both PA and IA are not properly trained to conduct ops of all types in the face of heavy air attacks....hence we have seen that normally in our region, air power tips the balance. In my opinion, it should not be the case. Highly trained troops can adopt lot many measures to negate the effect of enemy air superiority. China (1950) and North Vietnam (60s/70s) are some major examples.


Such things are part of normal drills and procedures. However, as mentioned before as well, IA was under great pressure to open the front quickly on international border due to the bad situation in Akhnur. Therefore, many IA formations attacked from the line of march, without stopping, without coordinating basic things with their supporting units, without recce.....

You are 110% right about the SSG raids. Indians had to move entire formations for search and mop-up/pacification efforts when the airborne attacks were carried out. Having actually spoken to some of the SSG officers who took part in these raids, this was the one common theme they all mentioned. I.e. the effect of their tactical operations (the purpose of which was to neutralize IAF assets on the ground) was more on the strategic side as Indians had to rebalance the employment of quite a few of their formations thus improving the situation for Pakistani defenses. So these attacks were well worth the immense sacrifice all these officers and ORs made in this Kamikazi mission.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I am following Praval, Indian Army After Independence, pg 348. You may be right, but I am faithfully going by Praval unless contradicted by a more detailed source.

3.5" Bazooka is around 89mm and has not found a place in Praval's narration. He mentions only 57 mm and 106 mm recoilless rifles. Perhaps you could take a closer look and help us to correct this detail.

* @PanzerKiel - for kind perusal

It is 100 IAB.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Joe Shearer it was 100 Ind. Armoured Brigade that was converted to 6th Armd . Division not 106. And was it 57mm RCL or 3.5 in SUPER Bazookas issued as infantry at weapons to IA formations?

Please note, @PanzerKiel has confirmed your observation, and I am correcting the text accordingly. Thank you for your alertness and for your evident interest.

 

[Rank]

There was and there will be no rules of engagement btw both..... Pakistan initiated wars to capture specific areas. Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map". Both sides failed.... In the bigger picture, with a 1X4 ratio, the biggest failure of India despite large force, failed to completely destroy Pakistan.

 

[Joe Shearer]

There was and there will be no rules of engagement btw both..... Pakistan initiated wars to capture specific areas. Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map". Both sides failed.... In the bigger picture, with a 1X4 ratio, the biggest failure of India despite large force, failed to completely destroy Pakistan.

Noted.

In the bigger picture, never mind the details, it is always the biggest failure of India despite large force.

Indians attack or responded or fight against us with this faith or ideology "let entirely remove Pakistan from the map"

Not in 47-48. Indian troops fought to vacate aggression, and to recover those parts of the state of J&K that had been lost. Not enough a peanut shell fell outside these areas.
Not in 65. Indian troops fought to resist a very large scale infiltration by regulars dressed as irregulars, and an attack with armour and artillery against her troops. Their counter-attack was specifically intended to achieve the Ichhogil Canal and convert it into a defensive line against Pakistan. Not much of entirely removing Pakistan from the map going on.
Not in 71. Indian troops fought to normalise conditions in East Pakistan, to enable the relief of 10 million refugees then living on Indian soil, and finally fought to neutralise the brutality and violence used by an army against its own people. Even Pakistani observers have commented in caustic terms about the lack of aggression in Indian operations on the western front; when they had opportunities, they failed to take them or drive home an advantage. Can't say this is indicative of the entirely removing Pakistan from the map mentality. One of the very inactive Army commanders became the next COAS, so government of India, and the redoubtable Mrs. Gandhi could not have been exactly displeased with his holding his hand.
Not in 99. Indian troops again fought to vacate aggression, and were bound by the rules of engagement not to cross to the Pakistani side. The IAF was similarly restricted.

 

[Joe Shearer]

THE INDIAN ATTACK: 62 BRIGADE

At 05:30 on 6th September, three units moved out.

To the north, on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road, 9 J&K Rifles advanced to the bund, captured the near-side embankment, but could not cross over to the far-side embankment.

To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.

There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.

This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.

At night, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.

Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.

There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.

Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.

By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.

THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE

But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.

Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.

Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy fire.

The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS, 7 Grenadiers, backed by massive artillery fire, got to the Bund, but was shelled and machine-gunned very severely as they tried to cross the Nulla. They withdrew, and the badly shot-up detachment passed through other Indian Army lines and reached the Div HQ at Valtoha.

You are 110% right about the SSG raids. Indians had to move entire formations for search and mop-up/pacification efforts when the airborne attacks were carried out. Having actually spoken to some of the SSG officers who took part in these raids, this was the one common theme they all mentioned. I.e. the effect of their tactical operations (the purpose of which was to neutralize IAF assets on the ground) was more on the strategic side as Indians had to rebalance the employment of quite a few of their formations thus improving the situation for Pakistani defenses. So these attacks were well worth the immense sacrifice all these officers and ORs made in this Kamikazi mission.

One of the lessons learnt from this discussion is that the Indian Army discounted the SSG raids. That should read - analysts of the Indian Army's reactions to events tend to discount the SSG raids. It dislocated the processes that had been envisaged for reacting to an attack by regular troops, unbalanced Western Command, and led to a lot of scrambling and ad hoc decision-making in the conflict that followed.

 

[Joe Shearer]

KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
RE-GROUPING

By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS, when J&K Rifles split into two and the CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Mulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Many thanks.

It did seem redundant for 65 Brigade to create a firm base on a flank with so much activity giving away their intentions just to lunge for the bridge the next morning. The fierce fire received by 48 Brigade constituent battalions 6/8 Gorkhas and 19 Maratha LI the next morning was only to be expected. It is also a painful thing reading again and again of frontal attacks delivered without artillery support (or none mentioned) or tank fire as a substitute, some in broad daylight. Also, everyone seems to have marched to their targets all the way; not just the last mile, but all the way from their rail-head.

This has been covered, on the lines narrated; I started last night arranging the material segregating 47-48, 65 and 71, with your remarks on these as introductions to each chapter. The discussion on the individual actions is being presented as an afterword to each chapter. Once it looks fair and equitable and balanced on both sides, I will try - this in the medium time range after all the narrative is there in PDF - to put in citations; for which purpose, I have asked jbgt90 for the books he has to be sent to me urgently.



Naturally my focus is on finishing the narrative; now 4 Mountain Division and I Corps at hand, all the rest described above to follow, once we have your critique of actions narrated.

A few closing points regarding the Lahore front...sort of analysis....

First, lets solve the riddle of Op Riddle...it did live up to its name...
It conception was at fault.....being that to defend and improve the defensibility of Indian Punjab by an advance up til BRBL....it was a very limited objective which was set....not the best way.

Moreover, since Pakistan had the advantage of interior lines in Lahore sector....it could radiate threat towards Amritsar, Patti or Ferozepur...therefore, GOC of IA XI had three choices

first--deploy minimum forces on ground for defence, while holding the max in reserve for a massive counter attack at the right moment.

Second--launch a pre-emptive attack towards Lahore, cross BRBL and attempt to tie down max PA reserves.

Third--Capture area till eastern bank of BRB...which was the safest and cautious option. However, this option meant that the offensive elements would be stretched all along the front in order to reach BRBL...this force-stretch would automatically invite a PA penetration attack.

Therefore, it can be said that IA was everywhere, but they were not strong anywhere, they were unable to mass their superiority in any one sector in order to achieve the required dominance to help them achieve their desired aims.

GOC IA XI Corps also remained torn between PA threats to Amritsar and Khem Karan.

With regards to IA 6 Sep offensive...
-It achieved tactical surprise.
-However, it lacked finesse and boldness in its execution.
-Best option would have been to stagger the attacks of 15 and 7 Divisions...this way the divisional reserves of PA 10 Division would have been employed against one IA prong, leaving the other prong with a free run.

Undue caution remained the hallmark of Op Riddle. IA, since they did achieve surprise, had the potential to capture the important bridges over BRB / Ravi, but caution didnt help them.

There are couple of theories whether Lahore indeed was the intended objective for IA in 1965.

Couple of points which go in its favour are...
-the plan of the IA to cross BRB and make a bridgehead doesnt make sense unless it was planned to go further towards Lahore.
-PAF aircraft detected long convoys of engineer bridging vehicles east of Batapur. This indicates that IA wont stop at BRB but was planning to cross it for deeper objectives.

Some points which go against this theory....
-Both divisions (7 and 15) did not employ their full potential. They attacked with only two brigades each.
-Both these divisions were not having the required number of maps of this area, moreover, the maps which were available were outdated with old names.
-Their maps did not have any details of BRB.
-All attacking troops were employed from their line of march without rest or coordination which left them in no condition for operations across BRB.
-And then the formations employed were not the best which were available.

For IA, armor was the worst handled outfit. All attacks were led by infantry instead of armour. All the bridges could have been speedily captured by armor. Armor was also not employed as a punch but was distributed in packets.


Coming to PA 10 Division.
They overall mounted a good defence of their area. Their rehearsals and thorough briefing did pay off. Initial allocation of resources, initial dispositions and location was Divisional reserves were also sound.

The most outstanding feature of 10 Division battle was their sound perception of IA ops. For this Divisional staff should be lauded.

Launching of Divisional reserves (22 Brigade) within 48 hours from an unexpected direction not only reflects on the accurate reading of the battle but also GOC's boldness. Due to the aggressive posture of 10 Division, IA 15 Division was thrown off balance.

However, 10 Division made some mistake as well...like units were frequently broken and dished out. Dograi debacle could have been avoided if the integrity of 16 PR could have been ensured. Its depth company, which was from another unit, vacated the defences without informing 16 PR which had dire consequences later on.

PAF and PA artillery played their customary roles and were instrumental in all the engagements.

THE TERRAIN

The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.

• About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
• Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
• Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
• Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.

62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –

Waigal - 3 kms

Bedian - 6.5 kms

Ballanwala - 4 kms

When we looked at 7 Division, we were faced with an additional obstacle in front of the Ichhogil Canal, the Hudiara water obstacle. Here, too, we have the Rohi Nulla, or the Kasur Nalla. This Nulla came in from India into Pakistan, and flowed parallel to the Ichhogil Canal for some distance. It was aligned with a bund; a bund is a double wall aligning a water course, one wall on each side that holds in the waters of that water course. The water course flows between the parallel lines of the bund.

OBJECTIVES

In line with the general XI Corps objective to position the units under its command along the Ichhogil Canal and use it as a defensive barrier turned against the Pakistan Army, the plan for 4 Mountain Division, brought in to plug the gap between 7 Division and the 67 Infantry Brigade at Hussainiwala, was to use one brigade, 62 Brigade, to capture the crossing points over the Rohi Nulla at two locations and form a plug to prevent any Pakistani advance from those points.

In this first phase, 62 Brigade was to capture the bridge over the Nulla on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road and another crossing over the Nulla further south, on a road from Khem Karan to Ganda Singh Walla.

They also needed to form a ‘plug’.

Just to insure against any irruption from those two bridges, the brigade was under orders to form a firm base more or less between the two axes, from which any entry from either side could be contested. In addition to its constituent battalions, 9 J&K Rifles, 13 Dogra and 18 Rajrif, 62 Brigade was given the Deccan Horse and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles.

In the second phase, the other brigade, 7 Brigade, was to fan out and use its two battalions remaining (1/9 Gorkhas having gone to 62 Brigade) to attack the three points on the Rohi Nulla mentioned earlier, Bedian to the north, Waigal in the centre and Ballanwala to the south.

62 Brigade were to move forward from its positions on the Nulla, secure the east bank of the Canal, and destroy all bridges in their sector (the entire divisional sector).

A few words about the defending PA 11 Division.
It was facing several problems of its own, since it had just been raised.
- It was NOT having its R&S unit.
-It Engineer unit was short of all sorts of equipment, including bridges.
-Signal unit was also short of communication sets.
-It had no S&T unit.
-6 Lancers, the divisional armor unit, was equipped with the older version of M47 tanks.
-Divisional artillery was having mix calibres.

FOREWORD

At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 100 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.

Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.

Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.

But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.

In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.

In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.

India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.

This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.

If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.

Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.

Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.

But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.

THE THIRD PRONG – 4TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION

Having seen 15 Division and 7 Division in action, it remains to observe the action of the southern-most division, 4 Mountain Division, of XI Corps.

A mountain infantry division is not intended to fight armour or mechanised infantry in the plains. It is intended to defend mountain territory against an enemy similarly equipped, not against an enemy who might have armoured elements, or heavy artillery deployed against it in the open. Its organisation in battalions and companies is different; it has no anti-tank weaponry (at the time of the events we are discussing, normal plains infantry divisions had the 106 mm recoilless rifle, or the less effective 57 mm recoilless rifle.

It is a measure of the times that the 4 Mountain Division was alerted early in September; issued 4 instead of the regulation 6 recoilless rifles per battalion; entrained at 02:00 HRS on 5th of September in the Simla hills and detrained at 22:00 HRS near Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up its HQ. That was a 370 kms train journey. The troops then marched 10 to 12 kms to their forming-up places for the attack, which was to start at 05:30 HRS on the 6th September.

The division also got the Deccan Horse, which joined the division at Ambala, and travelled with it 320 kms by road.

The divisional line-up was:

• 4 Mountain Infantry Division
  • • Deccan Horse
  • 7 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. D. S. Sidhu
    • 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
    • 4 Grenadiers
    • 7 Grenadiers
  • 62 Mountain Infantry Brigade – Brig. H. C.Gehlaut
    • 9 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
    • 13 Dogras
    • 18 Rajputana Rifles

THE TERRAIN

The layout of the actions that took place can be described simply, and concentrating on the Indian side, starts with the town of Valtoha, where 4 Mountain Division had set up HQ.

• About 22 kms away, in the West by South West direction, lay Kasur in Pakistan, one of the primary targets.
• Waigal, on the Rohi Nullah, was 14 kms away from Valtoha, in a West by North West direction;
• Bedian was 17.5 kms away, north west of Valtoha.
• Ballanwala, on the India-Pakistan border was 15 kms away, West by South West, more or less in the exact same compass bearing as Kasur, further behind within Pakistan.

62 Brigade was mustered 10 to 12 kms forward from Valtoha, so these intimidating distances from Valtoha need to be reduced by the radial distance between Valtoha and their locations; very approximately –

Waigal - 3 kms

Bedian - 6.5 kms

Ballanwala - 4 kms

A word about 4 Mountain Division...

Their orders were
-secure area east of BRB
-destroy bridge on Khem Karan-Kasur road.
-Contain any PA offensive.

4 Mountain Division had also its fair share of problems...
-It had only two brigades.
-It was a mountain division, not trained or organized to fight in the plains.
-They had 75 mm RRs instead of 105/106...moreover these they had only at the rate of 4/unit instead of normal 6/unit.
-9 H was placed under command at the last moment, once they started their move, therefore no coordination or marrying up could be done.
-Its artillery was ill-organized for giving fire support in plains.

KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
RE-GROUPING

By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS, when J&K Rifles split into two and the CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Mulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.

Some reasons of 4 Mountain Division rout....
-They were thrusted straight into battle after an almost 320 km journey.
-No recce of their new area.
-They were not given clear info about PA deployments.
-Both its brigades were launched on a broad front front without any depth in their attack.
-Both brigades had staggered H Hours.
-Armor was misused as usual.
-Artillery hardly intervened, was unable to silence PA artillery.

 

[Joe Shearer]

A few closing points regarding the Lahore front...sort of analysis....

First, lets solve the riddle of Op Riddle...it did live up to its name...
It conception was at fault.....being that to defend and improve the defensibility of Indian Punjab by an advance up til BRBL....it was a very limited objective which was set....not the best way.

Moreover, since Pakistan had the advantage of interior lines in Lahore sector....it could radiate threat towards Amritsar, Patti or Ferozepur...therefore, GOC of IA XI had three choices

first--deploy minimum forces on ground for defence, while holding the max in reserve for a massive counter attack at the right moment.

Second--launch a pre-emptive attack towards Lahore, cross BRBL and attempt to tie down max PA reserves.

Third--Capture area till eastern bank of BRB...which was the safest and cautious option. However, this option meant that the offensive elements would be stretched all along the front in order to reach BRBL...this force-stretch would automatically invite a PA penetration attack.

Therefore, it can be said that IA was everywhere, but they were not strong anywhere, they were unable to mass their superiority in any one sector in order to achieve the required dominance to help them achieve their desired aims.

Effectively, as you pointed out, IA radiated out from a point on diverging lines of advance, an open invitation for the opponent to pick gaps and counter-attack. With three divisions in hand, the battle was fought at company level, in a penny-packet kind of deployment. It sounds very well to turn the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichholgil Canal, against them, but that so contradicts the principle of concentration of forces, or of keeping the opposition off balance, or of using superior numbers to overcome superior position.

GOC IA XI Corps also remained torn between PA threats to Amritsar and Khem Karan.

In fact, that is a kind summation. Dhillon Sahib was nowhere in the picture in the developments at Khem Karan; he was busy fire-fighting on behalf of 15 Division on the Lahore axis, and looking anxiously over his shoulder at the Battle of Barki. Finally, 41 Mountain Brigade (from poor, sad, battered 10 Division) and the Sikhs who had lost 150 men in the Battle of Barki, were moved in to reinforce 4 Mountain Division at Khem Karan when they were trying to win back the town, but it was too little too late, and even to deploy a tired, depleted 4 Sikh to spearhead an attack on an angry, aroused Pakistani redoubt around Khem Karan was an open invitation to trouble.

It is fair to say that the Khem Karan front was entirely managed by three officers; first, by Major General Gurbaksh Singh, notwithstanding his pessimism and his message to his Army Commander, as he carefully arranged his four surviving battalions to defend his fall-back position; second by Brigadier Theograj's inspiring leadership of the 1 Independent Armoured Brigade, and Salim Caleb's leadership of his Centurions in the 3 Cavalry.

With regards to IA 6 Sep offensive...
-It achieved tactical surprise.
-However, it lacked finesse and boldness in its execution.
-Best option would have been to stagger the attacks of 15 and 7 Divisions...this way the divisional reserves of PA 10 Division would have been employed against one IA prong, leaving the other prong with a free run.

Presumably 15 Div to go first, and focus all attention on themselves, and allow 7 Div to focus on the Barki axis, a battle that was hard-fought in the actual event, but that could have been easier to achieve for the Indian Army if part of the defenders had been diverted to the defence of Lahore.

Undue caution remained the hallmark of Op Riddle. IA, since they did achieve surprise, had the potential to capture the important bridges over BRB / Ravi, but caution didnt help them.

There are couple of theories whether Lahore indeed was the intended objective for IA in 1965.

Couple of points which go in its favour are...
-the plan of the IA to cross BRB and make a bridgehead doesnt make sense unless it was planned to go further towards Lahore.

I believe that Defence Minister's Chavan's War Diary provides some useful inputs, albeit not directly, but in terms of a commentary by his Private Secretary, R.D. Pradhan:

As soon as the conflict flared up, General Chaudhuri and the Directorate of Military Operations gave final touches to Operation Riddle planned as an offensive action to secure the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal. It was felt that the mere presence of the Indian troops on the canal opposite Lahore would draw Pakistani forces from Sialkot and other areas and thus reduce its offensive capabilities in other sectors. Moreover, if India could establish a bridgehead over the canal, the Pakistan Army would be forced to fight there and that would lead to the attrition of her smaller army. By basing the defence line along the canal India would confine the war to Pakistani territory. Operation Riddle was planned to meet an eventuality like the one the Indians were facing on 4 September. That was the next move as noted by Chavan in his diary.

1965 War: The Inside Story
Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War
Chapter 7: Operation Riddle: Counter Offensive
pp34 onwards
​

I submit that an Army with its back to the wall is more likely to be thinking in terms of a desperate defensive measure than of an attack that will win the day. This is not only supported by the demonstrated defensive mind-set of Indian commanders, including the very temperamental and moody COAS, General Chaudhuri, but also by a consideration of the dates and the plans that revolved around dates and timing. Thus:

The bold plan originally envisaged that I and XI Corps would launch simultaneous offensives in the Sialkot and Lahore Sectors respectively. While the XI Corps would establish a defence line along the Ichhogil Canal, I Corps would establish itself along with the MRL. The success of Operation Riddle was based on a surprise attack on two sectors simultaneously. However, by 4th September the Indian troops in the Chhamb-Akhnur area had come under unbearable pressure and a diversionary attack had become desperately essential as Pakistani forces were poised to launch attack towards Akhnur.

Whatever aggressive spirit had permeated the plan in its original form was wholly dissipated by the firm grip on the throat of Western Command that Operation Grand Slam had given General Malik.

After the reverses in the battle for Jaurian, the situation was getting desperate and the Indian commanders had to advance the attack by XI Corps for the night of 5/6 September, I Corps were still on the move to their concentration areas and Operation Riddle could not be launched as originally planned. Realising urgency, Chavan approved Chaudhuri's decision to launch the XI Corps into attack across the international border in the Punjab. This was a desperate move and carried high risks. Chavan recorded on 4 September that: the step will change the complexion of the entire sitation. "If we fail - and I cannot even imagine of it - the Nation fails.

Quite clearly, Operation Riddle had been transmuted by circumstances into a desperate move to relieve pressure, from being a dagger thrust into the key location of Lahore.

​

-PAF aircraft detected long convoys of engineer bridging vehicles east of Batapur. This indicates that IA wont stop at BRB but was planning to cross it for deeper objectives.

Considering that the bridge had been found collapsed only that morning, and considering that Hayde and his men had made their way across it, clearly if they had really seen such a sight, it would mean that a crossing had been pre-meditated, and it was not just a spur-of-the-moment opportunism by Brigadier Rikh.

Some points which go against this theory....
-Both divisions (7 and 15) did not employ their full potential. They attacked with only two brigades each.
-Both these divisions were not having the required number of maps of this area, moreover, the maps which were available were outdated with old names.
-Their maps did not have any details of BRB.
-All attacking troops were employed from their line of march without rest or coordination which left them in no condition for operations across BRB*.
-And then the formations employed were not the best which were available.**

This part is too full of speculative element really to conclude one way or the other.

* We have already read about the advancing of the date of the attack. Quite clearly, those formations - 62 Brigade travelling for 20 hours from Simla to Valtoha, then marching 12 kms. to its jumping off point, Deccan Horse travelling with the Division 320 kms from Ambala - had been warned and moved in a manner timely from point of view of an attack two or three days later, and had to move straight into battle.

** Too many mountain troops were summoned for duties in the plains; worse, they had no anti-tank resource and, worse still, had to face attacks by armoured units. 41 Mountain Brigade being a prime example.

For IA, armor was the worst handled outfit. All attacks were led by infantry instead of armour. All the bridges could have been speedily captured by armor. Armor was also not employed as a punch but was distributed in packets.

Comment is superfluous.

The only good handling of armour was during the three-day battle of Asal Uttar.

Coming to PA 10 Division.
They overall mounted a good defence of their area. Their rehearsals and thorough briefing did pay off. Initial allocation of resources, initial dispositions and location was Divisional reserves were also sound.

The most outstanding feature of 10 Division battle was their sound perception of IA ops. For this Divisional staff should be lauded.

Launching of Divisional reserves (22 Brigade) within 48 hours from an unexpected direction not only reflects on the accurate reading of the battle but also GOC's boldness. Due to the aggressive posture of 10 Division, IA 15 Division was thrown off balance.

However, 10 Division made some mistake as well...like units were frequently broken and dished out. Dograi debacle could have been avoided if the integrity of 16 PR could have been ensured. Its depth company, which was from another unit, vacated the defences without informing 16 PR which had dire consequences later on.

PAF and PA artillery played their customary roles and were instrumental in all the engagements.

A few words about the defending PA 11 Division.
It was facing several problems of its own, since it had just been raised.
- It was {ed.} not {end ed.}having its R&S unit.
-It Engineer unit was short of all sorts of equipment, including bridges.
-Signal unit was also short of communication sets.
-It had no S&T unit.
-6 Lancers, the divisional armor unit, was equipped with the older version of M47 tanks.
-Divisional artillery was having mix calibres.

Comments by @PanzerKiel speak for themselves.

Some reasons of 4 Mountain Division rout....
-They were thrusted straight into battle after an almost 320 km journey.
-No recce of their new area.
-They were not given clear info about PA deployments.
-Both its brigades were launched on a broad front front without any depth in their attack.
-Both brigades had staggered H Hours.
-Armor was misused as usual.
-Artillery hardly intervened, was unable to silence PA artillery.

Again, further comment is superfluous.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Comments by @PanzerKiel speak for themselves.
.

I just corrected my post....11 Div was NOT having its integral R&S unit.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I just corrected my post....11 Div was NOT having its integral R&S unit.

Amended in the quoted portion.

These are amendments to portions earlier posted. Please consider them instead of the earlier posts. An effort has been made to reflect the time lines.

THE INDIAN ATTACK: 62 BRIGADE

At 05:30 on 6th September, three units moved out.

To the north, on the Khem Karan-Kasur Road, 9 J&K Rifles advanced to the bund, captured the near-side embankment, but could not cross over to the far-side embankment.

To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.

There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.

This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.

At night, the night of the 6th September, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.

Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.

There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, the 7th September, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.

Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.

By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.

THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE

But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.

Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.

Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack by armour and infantry, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy artillery fire.

The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS on the 6th night, 7 Grenadiers, backed by massive artillery fire, got to the Bund, but was shelled and machine-gunned very severely as they tried to cross the Nulla. They withdrew, and the badly shot-up detachment passed through other Indian Army lines and reached the Div HQ at Valtoha.

KEEPING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT BAY:
RE-GROUPING

By this time, between 21:00 HRS (when the Grenadiers broke and retreated) and 02:00 HRS (on the 7th now, past midnight), when J&K Rifles split into two and their CO hustled the coherent portion back to safety, Major General Gurbaksh Singh had seen two sets of soldiers, the Dogras and 7 Grenadiers, arrive exhausted back at his HQ. He decided that this must mean that the Pakistani armour was in hot pursuit; it also meant that his own divisional artillery was in imminent danger of attack. He asked his artillery brigade commander, Brigadier J. S. Sandhu, to shell the rail and road bridges over the Rohi Nulla and the Canal, with everything he had. The brigadier was happy to oblige, and between 03:30 HRS, when the shelling started, and for the full day following, the 7th of September, there was no enemy activity. This allowed 4 Division to fall back in good order and to take up positions to receive that attack that had been forestalled by Brigadier Sandhu’s shelling.

The Divisional HQ shifted back 10 kms to the hamlet of Gharyala, and the remaining four battalions, 1/9 Gorkhas, 4 Grenadiers, who had come out of Theh Pannun under fire, two companies of 9 J&K Rifles, brought out in the nick of time from the mayhem on the Ruhi Nulla after being outflanked by the opposition breaking out of Ballanwala, and 18 Rajputana Rifles, vacating their position in the Pakistani enclave were arranged in defensive positions around the village of Asal Uttar.

THE BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR: THE HORSESHOE

By 15:00 HRS, the Engineers had laid land mines all around the defensive positions of the infantry battalions. Before describing the battle that ensued in detail, over the three days of fighting that followed, some of the state of mind of the general officers involved on the Indian side needs to be depicted.

All the events described above took place on the 6th of September, and by the night, Major General Gurbaksh Singh felt the need for moral sustenance and sent a messenger to the Army Commander, stating, effectively, that 4 Mountain Division had cracked up. For Gurbaksh (gifted by the Guru) to seek help from Harbaksh (gifted by God) was quite appropriate, but the GOC-in-C, after having been woken up at 3 in the morning with this message, decided to check for himself before taking any action. In any case, it was not at all clear what he could call upon; at this time, the early hours of the 7th September, 15 Division was trying to keep its footing after the disastrous recall from Batapore, 7 Division had just been stopped short of its objectives, and would resume fighting only on the 10th, and 23 Mountain Division was still miles away, rushing along as best as it could. XV Corps could not help; it was just recovering from the tumultuous events of the previous four days of fighting, on the 1st, 3rd, 4th,and 6th, and needed time to recover. 41 Mountain Brigade, having been brushed aside by Pakistani armour during Grand Slam, needed time to recover its morale, and was useful only during the great re-shuffle that took place around the 15th of September.

On personal inspection, General Harbaksh Singh came to the conclusion that the situation could stand a little pressure even then, and no replacement of 4 Mountain Division was needed. [To be continued]

@meghdut
@PanzerKiel
@blain2
@Hachiman
@TsAr

Please note #281 has been uploaded with minor modifications to #276 and #277. The modifications consist of including a lot more data about time lines, ie, when and at what time did something happen.

When I was reading it from my sickbed, it seemed to be confusing for a reader to keep track of events, so these amendments were made. Hope it makes the narrative clearer.

 

[Nilgiri]

@Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.

It will be done...just flesh out more points here (I still have to read + catch up a great bunch here), and you know where to reach me easily when you have say a concise word doc for location of units in say an engagement snapshot or set-piece analysis....mapping it will be easy as I already have the symbols and everything.

I won't be going too advanced this time with the large reusable-orbat map concept etc, we will just zoom in to areas we want etc.

We can do it chronologically or we can do it by interest priority.

@jaibi @PanzerKiel

Get better with your health in mean time my friend Joe. My free time on matter will likely also coincide well I feel down the road when we get more to the picture/visual bit after these current written commentaries/exchanges are largely completed.

 

[Mumm-Ra]

It will be done...just flesh out more points here (I still have to read + catch up a great bunch here), and you know where to reach me easily when you have say a concise word doc for location of units in say an engagement snapshot or set-piece analysis....mapping it will be easy as I already have the symbols and everything.

I won't be going too advanced this time with the large reusable-orbat map concept etc, we will just zoom in to areas we want etc.

We can do it chronologically or we can do it by interest priority.

@jaibi @PanzerKiel

Get better with your health in mean time my friend Joe. My free time on matter will likely also coincide well I feel down the road when we get more to the picture/visual bit after these current written commentaries/exchanges are largely completed.

That mapping will be a great service. Half the time I gotta open google maps to see which areas are being talked about. Good to have you back

 

[meghdut]

Amended in the quoted
embankment.

To the south, on the Ganda Singh Wala side, 13 Dogra had also got to their objectives.

There is a piece of Pakistani territory sticking into India just south of Khem Karan, and 18 Rajputana Rifles squeezed out that bulge, and, along with some policemen, occupied it.

This state of satisfaction did not last very long. There was a strong counter-attack on the Ganda Singh Wala side, after heavy shelling; the attacking infantry came in armoured personnel carriers supported by tanks, very sophisticated methods for the times! The Dogras were unable to call for artillery support because the artillery officers were missing, one wounded, the other untraceable. After losing men, they withdrew.

At night, the night of the 6th September, the situation worsened. Enemy shelling continued; the Dogra battalion retreated in disorder.

Meanwhile, further north, the Pakistani forces had broken out from a targeted location called Ballanwala, and outflanked the 9 J&K Rifles. The CO took 2 companies still in contact and retreated towards Div HQ at Valtoha. He had left behind two companies of the J&K Rifles; with the opposition swarming all around, there was no doubt that those two companies were in mortal danger.

There is an unexpected happy ending to report. The next day, the 7th September, as the division was regrouping around the village of Asal Uttar, Deccan Horse was asked to cover the movement of the infantry, and screen them. This they did to very great effect, and allowed the re-grouping to take place peacefully and efficiently. They also fished out the isolated two companies of the 9 J&K Rifles from the vicinity of the Rohi Nulla.

Before coming to this regrouping, one must continue the narrative where it had stopped.

By the evening of the 6th, all the victories of the morning had turned to ashes in the mouth of the CO 4 Mountain Division; not only was the Ganda Singh Walla position overrun, and the Dogras back at base, the Khem Karan- Kasur bridge capture had also had to be abandoned, as the position had been outflanked by a Pakistani break-out from Ballanwalla.

THE INDIAN ATTACK: TRIAL BY FIRE FOR 7 BRIGADE

But how did they break out? The Grenadiers had been assigned to capture and hold them; 7 Grenadiers were assigned to Ballanwala and got to within 50 m. of the target, but was driven back by very heavy artillery fire. Indian artillery could not mount counter-battery fire as the communications between the guns and the forward artillery officer was disrupted by the failure of the wireless set. For some unfathomable reason, the next target north, Theh Pannun, was assigned to 4 Grenadiers, but the one after that, the northernmost point, Waigal, was again to 7 Grenadiers.
View attachment 647305
Theh Pannun was reached, but the bridge could not be destroyed as the Engineer party had not come up in time. 4 Grenadier had to retreat under heavy fire.

Waigal again was reached by the tanks of a composite attack by armour and infantry, but the infantry couldn’t get through, again, due to very heavy artillery fire.

The picture was the same at the southern end, at Ballanwala, when by 21:00 HRS on the 6th night, 7 Grenadiers, backed

When I was reading it from my sickbed, it seemed to be confusing for a reader to keep track of events, so these amendments were made. Hope it makes the narrative clearer.

Some addendums if I could

4 Mountain Divn attack was held of by 11 Inf Divn PA .
13 Dogra broke from PA counter attack supported by Tank and artillery fire
; and they broke again at the new defensive line at Nianwalla.

PA artillery fire was far super to the IA counterpart . They had much better quality of equipment and training. IA was usually outgunned most of the time.

Apart from Dogras Other battalions like 7 th Grenadiers, 9 Jak Rif and 18 Raj Rif were also cracking up. So the situation of 4 Mountain was desperate enough that the GOC suggested that 4 out of 6 units should be disbanded!(Fortunately for India the situation was somehow retrieved)

PA planned for OP Mailed Fist during 1964. It was to be unleashed when PA holding formations had blunted IA attacks and mostly stabilised the front. Then GHQ will unleash the premiere Armoured formation of PA against the most vulnerable point of IA s line.
With IA 4 mountain Divn in disarray now was the time for the PA counterstroke.
@Joe Shearer , @PanzerKiel

 

[Joe Shearer]

Useful.

As soon as my condition subsides sufficiently to allow me to knit together various strands, I will include these.