RECAPITULATION: BEFORE THE BATTLE
To recapitulate:
On the 6th of September, the 62 Brigade of 4 Mountain Infantry Division attacked to the south-west, targeting the bund over the Ruhi Nulla on the main road, and another point on the road going off at an angle to the main road, going to Ganda Singh Wala.
It was also, as a second phase, to go beyond the bunds and reach the Ichhogil Canal from Ballanwala to Ganda Singh Wala, acting in concert with 7 Brigade, that was to reach the Canal further north, in the stretch between Ballanwala and Bedian.
For this, 62 Brigade had three battalions of its own, 9 J&K Rifles, 13 Dogras and 18 Rajputana Rifles, and one battalion from the other brigade, 7 Brigade,1/9 Gorkha Rifles, and also the armoured component, 9 Horse, the Deccan Horse, so, four infantry battalions and an armoured regiment. 9 J&K was to go for the bund on the Ruhi Nulla on the main road Khem Karan - Kasur, 13 Dogra were to take the southern section on the Ganda Singh Wala side. 18 Rajrif were assigned to squeeze out an enclave to the south of the firm ground around Khem Karan; 1/9 Gorkhas remained under the Divisional command for the time being.
62 Brigade won early gains, on the 6th September morning, and lost it all by the evening. 9 J&K Rifles got to the nearside embankment of the bund, but could not cross the Nulla or capture the far side emba/nkment against the heavy and concentrated artillery and tank fire. The Dogras, getting their objectives on the Nulla in the morning, lost it at 13:00 HRS to a mechanised infantry and tank push, preceded by an artillery barrage. We have seen, in the commentary on the action, the unfamiliarity of the artillery component to offering supporting fire in the plains, and to operating in the plains in general. The artillery officers with the battalion could not help; one was wounded, the other missing. By night, the battalion was defeated and retreated; even their firm base was abandoned, and the path was open for the Pakistani counter-attack.
9 J&K Rifles, sheltering around the near-side embankment of the Ruhi Nalla, were victims of the debacle further north. First, 7 Grenadiers, attacking Ballanwala, were repelled by heavy artillery fire. Again, there was no supporting fire from their own artillery, and this time, the problem was with the wireless. Later, in the afternoon, another attack did not come off. Second, 4 Grenadiers attacking Theh Pannun, reached the Canal, but could not blow up the bridge as the Engineering detachment did not turn up. Third, even further north, another team of 7 Grenadiers, supported by a troop of tanks, attacked Waigai; the tanks survived the shelling, the infantry could not brave it, the tanks alone could not hold it, so the party retreated. Fourth, a second attack by 7 Grenadiers on Ballanwala, supported by divisional artillery (mountain artillery fighting in the plains), got them to the eastern, near-side embankment of the Nulla, but heavy firing by Pakistani defenders, using machine guns and mortars, prevented them from going further; the intention was to cross the Nulla and the bund beyond, the western, far-side bund. Under heavy fire, they retreated right up to the Division HQ in Valtoha.
The path lay open for the PA to advance from Kasur or from any point on the Icchogil Canal that was bridged, and then after any bridge on the Nulla.
When the attack came, it was not a frontal attack. Pakistani armour burst out of the Ballanwala bridge at 02:00 HRS; the way ahead directly towards Khem Karan was clear, but the force made a sharp turn parallel to the Nulla it had just crossed, and outflanked the J&K Rifles formation guarding the eastern approach to the bridge across the Nulla on the Kasur-Khem Karan Road. Now this road, too, was open for PA armour to cross over.
The riflemen were split into two by the attack; the CO retreated with two companies, but they lost touch with each other in the darkness and reached Division HQ at Valtoha in bits and pieces. The other two companies, left behind in the confusion, were happily rescued during the course of the day by Deccan Horse.
Major General Gurbaksh Singh had the mortification of seeing two separate battalions, 7 Grenadiers and 9 J&K Rifles, scrambling to reach his HQ position searching for safety. He ordered his divisional artillery commander to target the bridges over the Nulla and, behind it to the West, over the Canal.
The Indian accounts believe that this stemmed the Pakistani advance just sufficiently long enough for 4 Mountain Division to re-group. The Pakistani account points to heavy damage to the Ichhogil Canal bridge due to a tank accident.
The pause enabled Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh to arrange his battered and defeated infantry battalions into a defensive position around Asal Uttar, while he himself shifted his divisional headquarters from Valtoha to Gharyala. The formations were the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, 4 Grenadiers, 9 J&K Rifles (2 companies at first, 2 more on rescue by Deccan Horse), 13 Dogras and 18 Rajputana Rifles. A minefield was laid around infantry positions by the Engineers, under cover of the tank regiment.
The Deccan Horse shielded these activities, and also rescued 2 companies of 9 J&K Rifles from their precarious position on the Ruhi Nulla, where they had been left behind during the precipitate withdrawal of the other half of the battalion.
With the infantry in place, with their artillery well located and with the integral armour in the shape of the Deccan Horse, 4 Mountain Infantry Division was as ready as it could be, to receive any assault at arms. However, as a matter of abundant precaution, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was also assigned to keep a watching brief from an immediately rearward location.
THE PAKISTAN ARMY PLAN: BRIDGEHEAD, BREAKTHROUGH,
EXPLOITATION
In simple terms, the Pakistan Army plan was a classic:
- an Infantry Division reinforced by additional armour would break into Indian defences and form a bridgehead;
- a strong Armoured Division would then pass through and break out through the weakened Indian perimeter;
- in the final step, the Armoured Division would travel at speed through undefended Indian hinterland, reaching strategic objectives rapidly.
So Major General Abdul Hamid’s 11 Infantry Division would undertake the first step. It consisted of a strong line-up of two infantry brigades and a strong Patton-tank equipped armoured regiment; it would be reinforced by another Armoured Brigade to assault the Indian defences.
The break through by a strong Armoured Division was assigned to the crack 1 Armoured Division. Commanded by Major General Nasir Ahmed Khan, this division had five regiments, organised as three brigades.
In the exploitation phase, those three brigades would take their own individual routes forward, ensuring that the enemy was continuously under pressure on one or the other front. The routes were formed around initial objectives; the first, the Sutlej bridge over Harike, to be reached the first day (45 kms from Kasur, 35 kms from Khem Karan, as the crow flies); the second, Jandiala Guru, east of Amritsar (45 kms from Harike); the third, the bridge over the Beas (50 kms from Harike), both to be reached on the second day. In other words, in rough daily transit of 40 to 50 kms at a time, not particularly out of reach for M-47 or M-48s, representing perhaps two hours each of unopposed passage, the objectives would be reached, and the next stage of break-out could be decided.
Apart from completely outflanking XI Corps, and finding its way to within 20 kms of the sensitive Sikh centre of Amritsar, to defend which every Sikh in sight would have abandoned whatever he was doing and rushed back, this would find the column, on the second day, in a line with Ludhiana and Chandigarh, equidistant between Srinagar and Delhi, and on the lines of communications between the rest of India and her bases at Udhampur (200 kms) and Pathankot (140 kms).
At the time that the plan might have been made, there might not have been any concrete information available about the Indian I Corps; so this would have looked like an upsized Grand Slam, hooking around Amritsar instead of Jammu, and isolating not just XV Corps, but XI Corps as well.
A quick aside about the topography.
There were two roads out of Khem Karan, one leading to Bhikhiwind, one angled further right to Patti. Asal Uttar, on which village the 4 Mountain Infantry Division defences were based, lies about 5 kms out of Khem Karan on the road to Patti. It is important to know this because Indian deployment was on this crossbar, the Lakhna – Chima Kalan Road. The heavy fighting took place in the region between Asal Uttar and these two villages that are about 11 kms apart.
Interlude: Orientation and the roads around the battlefield The road from Khem Karan to Amritsar is 60 kms, running north by north-east. Five or six kms up the road is the turn to the village of Asal Uttar, as mentioned before; another twenty kms. up is the town of Bhikhiwind, hence the name the Bhikhiwind Road.
On turning right on the Bhikhiwind Road, Asal Uttar is two and a half kilometres away. That road then turns left and heads towards Patti, about twenty five to twenty six kms.away, angling away from the Bhikhiwind Road in the north-east direction. This is what is referred to in the literature as the Bhikhiwind axis, and the Patti axis. The Patti Road also contains, quite close to Asal Uttar, the earlier HQ of 4 Division, Valtoha, and further on the road, towards Patti, the shifted HQ, at Gharyala.
About 20 kms from Asal Uttar, to the right of the Patti Road, is the village of Chima (look for Chima Kalan on Google Maps; Cheema takes you far, far away). To the left of the Patti Road is the other village of Lakhna. Set in a little, it is 5 kms further away from Khem Karan than Chima Kalan. One can imagine the Khem Karan – Patti road as the upright of a ‘T’, and the road connecting Lakhna and Chima Kalan, at right angles to the Khem Karan – Patti Road, would be the crossbar of the ‘T’.
While 4 Mountain Infantry Division had arranged its forces around Asal Uttar, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was further back, strung out in a north-westerly direction, originally facing towards Khem Karan, between the villages of Chima Kalan and Lakhna. These two are located on the south side and the north side of the road leading from Bhikhiwind to Harike, so effectively, we have a triangle: the base being this road, one side, ending in Asal Uttar, starting from Bhikhiwind; the other side, also ending in Asal Uttar, starting from the intersection of the Bhikhiwind-Harike Road with the Patti road.
THE BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR - 8TH TO 10TH SEPTEMBER
On the 8th September A preliminary probing attack was launched by Chaffee tanks on the morning of the 8th; they advanced under artillery cover along the Khem Karan – Bhikhiwind axis, and kept advancing even against Indian artillery, and stopped only when brought under fire by the Sherman tanks of Deccan Horse. Since a frontal attack seemed to be likely to face strong opposition, the attacking force split into smaller groups to outflank the firmed up infantry positions. They were fairly successful, and at one stage had surrounded the 1/9 Gorkhas, the 9 J&K Rifles and 62 Brigade HQ. Deccan Horse, in their hyperactive style, came in and mounted a counter-attack, and managed to stall the Chaffee contingent.
But this was a probing attack; the main attack came in the afternoon of the 8th with Patton tanks that overran the 1/9 Gorkhas positions; 4 Grenadiers intervened and knocked out 4 tanks, but that did not stop the bulldozing charge of the MBTs, who broke through all obstacles and overran the trenches of the Grenadiers; they also got into the positions of 18 Rajasthan Rifles, and endangered 7 Brigade HQ.
At this stage, the first of several interventions by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade occurred. 3 Cavalry under Lt. Col. Salim Caleb, stepped in. They had been positioned in the Chima Kalan – Lakhna area, and their intervention cost the attacking force 4 Pattons and a Chaffee. The attack then probed the area to the west of this encounter.
By end of day on the 8th, the PA had successfully advanced from the line of the Ruhi Nulla into the former positions of the 4 Mountain Infantry Division, just before the village of Asal Uttar, and had been probing the prepared defensive positions of the Indians, frequently overrunning the Indian defences, but did not make a break-through; the Chaffees were thwarted by Deccan Horse with its Shermans, the Pattons were halted by 3 Cavalry, fighting Centurions.
On the 9th September The Pakistani attack started at 02:00 HRS. 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had moved its other components into place beside 3 Cavalry into two sickle-shaped formations between Chima Kalan and Lakhna, even before the formal assignment of his brigade to the command of 4 Mountain Infantry Division.
When the attack took place, in spite of heavy artillery, tank and infantry fire from all hands in 4 Div, the tanks kept moving forward, until they hit the minefield laid by the engineers. However, there was to be only minor respite; during the first half of the daylight hours, there were probing attacks, as well as aerial attack.
The heavy all-arms attack came in the afternoon.
First, the softening up. PA artillery opened fire, there was aerial attack as well, for an hour. Then the armour advanced, attacking 18 Rajrif from three directions in their outlying positions. A fierce battle broke out, and the tanks sought to come into redoubts of 18 Rajrif. Indian artillery and armour lay down very heavy defensive fire, but it could not stop the attack. This bitter, close quarters battle continued for some time until Pakistani armour came so deep into the defences of the infantry that relatively close-range weapons came into play. Recoilless rifles and, later, rocket launchers were fired. The attack finally let up at 22:00 HRS.
On the 10th September For a third day in succession, there was a determined effort to break through.
Brigadier Theograj had positioned his 2 Independent Armoured Brigade with the previous two days’ experiences in mind. 8 Cavalry with its AMX 13 light tanks was positioned on the flanks of the layout; it was hoped that this would funnel the Pakistani armour towards the Centurions lined up to meet their advance.
From their movements, it was apparent that the Pakistani armour was trying to outflank the defensive positions by moving north parallel to the Ruhi Nulla, to attack them from behind. However, this had been anticipated, as the main approach through the Bhikhiwind Road had already been reasonably well defended, and an attack on the Indian left flank was also difficult; there was no way to penetrate deep enough across the front of the line of Indian defences to take the attack to the right, to the Indian left flank, that was guarded by another Nulla. Only a deep penetration on the left, that is, on the Indian right flank, remained.
As an outcome of this deconstruction of the tactical alternatives left to the Pakistani forces, and in anticipation of a deep attack down the Indian right flank, along the Nulla, the Nulla had been breached and the water let out, making the fields soggy and muddy and very difficult to traverse for tank, for wheeled vehicle or foot soldiers. There was the additional handicap of the battlefield in general, a factor already mentioned, the high standing crops that took away the range advantage of the Pakistani tanks’ guns, and that allowed their own progress to be tracked by the visible movement of wireless masts on the tanks.
This prompted the Indians to adopt two tactics to address the Pakistani tanks: it was assumed that any infantry might accompany them would be fought off by the Indian infantry. The first was to fire upon the tanks from the Centurions, the moment they emerged from concealment in the cane; the second was to let loose hunter-killer teams with recoilless rifles mounted on 4 wheel drive vehicles, to search for targets of opportunity.
The 4 Grenadiers found themselves under attack first of all, by a battalion of infantry backed up by armour. The tanks managed to overrun some of the trenches, but by their very nature, could not find the main defences. When the 3 Cavalry realised how close the Pattons had got, they advanced, and a melee ensued. This was when Havildar Major Abdul Hamid destroyed three tanks in succession before being shot by the fourth.
It was at this point of the battle that Maj. Gen. Nasir Ahmed Khan, Divisional Commander, 1 Armoured Division (P), was injured by shellfire. He went forward with his reconnaissance team to a very advanced position on the Bhikhiwind Road. Having given his location on a clear message over the radio, he was attacked by a 4 Grenadier raiding party, and also by a very accurate salvo by 4 Division divisional artillery. He was injured, and his divisional artillery commander was killed.
With their thrust down the Bhikhiwind Road being unsuccessful, the next Pakistani effort came on the Patti Road that 10th evening. This push came close to 62 Brigade HQ, but was repelled by 7 Grenadiers, who stepped up in defence, but paid a heavy price, losing four officers in this counter-attack.
By 22:00 HRS, the Pakistani armour started retreating. For all purposes the Battle of Asal Uttar was over.
Afterword: Almost all the battalions of 4 Mountain Infantry Division had proved unable to overcome the impossible odds set them, to tackle fighting in the plains with inadequate artillery organisation or provision, with no anti-tank weapons, or ad hoc supplies almost on the field of battle, and in the teeth of heavy artillery fire and air attack.
13 Dogra was the first; 9 J&K Rifles, with its CO unable to take the strain, broke and ran; 1/9 Gorkha Rifles let down Gorkha tradition by simply melting away from the battlefield, later, once re-grouped, offering little or no resistance to enemy armour attacks; 4 Grenadier and 7 Grenadier both failed to press home attacks, albeit attacks in the teeth of determined opposition, but made up with their stout resistance once reformed and set to defend. The only battalion to emerge with self-esteem intact was the Rajputana Rifles.
The Deccan Horse, under Vaidya, managed to be in six different places at once, and was fortunate that these six places were neither contested hotly by the enemy, nor were subjected to sustained attack.
The unit that distinguished itself at all times in all ways was the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade. They were always ahead of the curve, anticipating both turns in the battle and higher command instructions – Brigadier Theograj had taken up defensive positions to protect the remainder of 4 Division even before receiving orders placing him under Gurbaksh Singh. 3 Cavalry, in particular, shone; its CO, Salim Caleb, went on to Major General rank when he retired.
I have not commented on the Pakistan Army units as this paper is about the Indian Army, and addresses the question of why it failed to win outright victories, given its significant advantages.
THE BATTLE OF KHEM KARAN
What followed this remarkable turn-around by a defeated Division was tragic. Until the ceasefire was declared, Indian forces tried to recapture Khem Karan, and Pakistani forces resisted them every inch of the way.
There were three phases of these events:
- An attack on Khem Karan by the Indian Army, with the 2 Mahars and 4 Sikhs on the 11th night/12th afternoon, that led to their being repulsed;
- Several minor actions against enemy positions north-west and south-east of Khem Karan around the 12th/13th, and actions against enemy pockets north-west of Chima (that shows how deep the PA had penetrated) on 15th September;
- A final attack on the night of the 21st /22nd September that was not pressed home with much determination, and gained little.
Then the ceasefire intervened.
Immediately after the three-and-a-half days of terrible struggle of the Battle of Asal Uttar, the respective commanders’ thoughts must have turned to the next outlook. On the Pakistani side, the impact of the Indian I Corps threatening movements would be occupying their entire attention; in contrast to the units involved under XI Corps, or those under XV Corps, I Armoured Division under the reputed Rajinder Singh would have been a formidable psychological prospect. The Kasur-Khem Karan movement, in contrast, was a brilliant move, but it did not succeed. Nobody could have predicted the Lazarus-like revival of the Indian infantry battalions that were so brutally treated and dismissed during their own attempts at aggression against all reason; all but 13 Dogra made their appearance in the stout defence put up as Asal Uttar, all but 1/9 Gorkhas played their bit in the stormy three days that ensued. There were tragedies, there were comic interludes, to the extent that the grim task of war permits comedy, but from the Indian side, the outstanding images that remain are three – of Rajrif fighting it out toe to toe with formidable Pakistani attacking forces, favoured by the Pakistani brigadier’s repeated recalls to laager, of a promoted Havildar reverted to his platoon, taking on four tanks in a group single-handed, with no doubt in anyone’s mind that ultimately, he would have to pay the price, and a sharp and intelligent tactical decision by a regimental commander and his equally shrewd brigadier to convert the local conditions to suit them, and meeting their opponents’ technically superior equipment with plain, simple but well-rehearsed equipment use.
On the Pakistani side, there is a tragic story of outstanding valour and initiative at the regimental and battalion level, let down by the command failures of their general staff. That is a story for PanzerKiel to tell.
As the two forces faced each other, after the fighting on the 10th September, the uppermost thought in Indian minds was the recovery of Khem Karan. On the very next night after the climactic battle at Asal Uttar, the night of the 11th / 12th September, 7 Brigade was asked to take up the recovery of Khem Karan.
The order of battle had changed.
The ferociously effective 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had been shifted to the area of 15 Infantry Division to bolster the sagging fortunes of that division. In its place, in a manner of speaking, 4 Mountain Infantry Division had got two reinforcements – 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had left behind 2 Mahars, and 4 Sikhs were brought away from 7 Division’s battle at Barki. What people didn’t realise was the 4 Sikhs had made a mark at Barki against heavy odds, and had suffered serious casualties – some 150 dead, wounded or taken prisoner. They should have been rested but when the CO was asked by the Colonel of the Sikh Regiment, that outstanding Sikh chief of Western Command, if he and his men would celebrate the anniversary of Saragarhi by leading the attack, that man felt unable to demur. So they were to go ahead and to get to a point east of Khem Karan before dawn, and wait for the hammer to fall on them acting as anvil; that hammer was to be 2 Mahar, advancing to the right of the town, to the point where the Khem Karan distributary crossed the Bhikhiwind Road, to link up with the Sikhs. 9 J&K Infantry, in spite of its tribulations, overrun by Pakistani armour as it sheltered behind the east bank of the Ruhi Nulla, half of them fled with their CO to safer climes in the vicinity of the Brigade HQ, the abandoned half rescued by Deccan Horse and the enthusiastic Col. Vaidya, was to be in reserve.
4 Sikhs faced tragedy. They got to a suitable point east of Khem Karan, but found themselves next to a sleeping tank laager of Pakistani tanks. They deployed nearby, and the inevitable followed; the CO and more than half the battalion were captured, the rest were casualties.
2 Mahar fared no better. They attacked the outposts, supported by Deccan Horse tanks, and reached the canal distributary, but got no further; there, they were strafed by the PAF, shelled by the PA artillery, lost eight tanks and generally had a terrible morning, on the 12th.
The divisional commander persisted in his attack. The 9 J&K were brought out from reserve, and, together with two troops each of Deccan Horse and 3 Cavalry, attacked again; it didn’t work. They achieved the crossing of the distributary of the canal, and one tank troop reached the outskirts of Khem Karan, but under PAF attack and heavy artillery fire, the rest of the group retreated and the troop that had gone forward was taken prisoner.
- Several minor actions against enemy positions north-west and south-east of Khem Karan around the 12th/13th, and actions against enemy pockets north-west of Chima (that shows how deep the PA had penetrated) on 15th September;
2 Independent Armoured Brigade reverted to 4 Division at this time, on the 12th. With their help, some positions to the north-west and to the south-east of Khem Karan were cleared. This did not make the slightest difference to the status of Khem Karan.
Reorganised Order of Battle
4 Mountain Infantry Division –
+ 29 Brigade
+ 41 Mountain Infantry Brigade
+ 48 Brigade (from 7 Division)
- 7 Brigade
___________________________________________________________________
29 Brigade
1/5 Gorkha Rifles
2 Madras
+ 13 Dogras
41 Mountain Infantry Brigade
1/8 Gorkha Rifles
3/4 Gorkha Rifles
15 Kumaon
62 Brigade
9 J&K Rifles
18 Rajputana Rifles
- 13 Dogras
One point to observe is the composition of this mountain brigade; except for 2 Madras, all battalions were either hillmen or rifle regiments (18 Rajputana Rifles) – the Gorkhas were, of course, both hillmen and riflemen.
- A final attack on the night of the 21st /22nd September that was not pressed home with much determination, and gained little.
With this reorganised order of battle, 4 Division sought to make another attempt to recover Khem Karan. However, it was trying to do so with very tired troops. 13 Dogras had been handled very roughly at the preliminary stages of the attack on Kasur; 15 Kumaon had had the unpleasant experience of being swept to one side during the developing phases of Grand Slam; 9 J&K Rifles had suffered a CO who had left his battalion to fend for itself when surprised by Pakistani armour debouching over the bridge over the Ruhi Nulla at Ballanwala; 18 Rajputana Rifles had fought very fiercely during Asal Uttar and had been overrun at least once by Pakistani armour, although they had recovered gallantly.
The plan was made for 41 Brigade to capture Khem Karan outright during the night of the 21st (revised date; the original could not be kept). With the core of the town in hand, the outskirts, east of the town and along the distributary, were to be cleaned up by 29 Brigade immediately thereafter.
The attack was not a success.
None of the battalions pressed home the attack with anything like determination; on the contrary, Pakistani counter-attacks were desperate affairs, mounted with fierce determination, and making no difference that losses were suffered.
CEASEFIRE
A ceasefire, effective from 03:30 HRS on 23rd September, was agreed by both sides.
@PanzerKiel @Cuirassier @jaibi @meghdut
