India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Joe Shearer]

For a start, Gen Mahmood's 1965 War book is a good one. Z A Khan's book as well.



A full brigade sized attack would have broken through easily.


Yes.

I cannot tell you what a difference in perspective your commentary brings. It is invaluable.

 

[PanzerKiel]

This makes terrible reading. Most of the 267 casualties must have been 16 Punjab, then.



Your added perspective makes this another very messy battle, and makes clear much of the very heavy casualty rate on both sides.

Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.

I cannot tell you what a difference in perspective your commentary brings. It is invaluable.

I'm a big believer of Rashomon effect.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.

While I was reading up for my narration right through my illness, the visions conjured up were very disturbing. This was a difficult encounter to write about. There was a Joseph Conrad book, "The Heart of Darkness", that came to mind repeatedly (it was re-made into a film,"Apocalypse Now").

Casualties were a mix from 16 Punjab and the counter attack by 10 Division.



I'm a big believer of Rashomon effect.

Most apt!

My reference to Apocalypse Now was accidental, without having read your comment. Strange coincidence.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@PanzerKiel @jaibi
@Cuirassier @Hachiman @jbgt90 @meghdut @Mumm-Ra

ABOUT 15 INFANTRY DIVISION

With this in front of us, what do we observe about units of the Indian Army, in common?

1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.

2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.

3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.

4. The IAF was absent during the early stages of this engagement. General Harbaksh Singh traces it back to his Chief of Staff, Major General Jogindar Singh, who apparently allowed the IAF to retire to remote locations without informing the GOC-in-C. That made nonsense of the prior arrangement of 24 sorties in support of the division. However, it is reported that they were very effective later.

5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.

 

[meghdut]

@PanzerKiel @jaibi
@Cuirassier @Hachiman @jbgt90 @meghdut @Mumm-Ra

ABOUT 15 INFANTRY DIVISION

With this in front of us, what do we observe about units of the Indian Army, in common?

1. At that time, the Indian Army was strongly oriented to the Infantry. From the march of 5 kms over open fields by 3 Jat to get to their objectives, to using mountain troops to fight on the plains, without any serious anti-tank weapons to talk of, against an adversary with the latest, best tanks, this characteristic comes out very clearly.

Joe, from Haydes’ account it’s really disheartening to see that Jats had to make do with mere Super Bazookas to deal with armour. Bazookas were unreliable even during WW2 to use them after 20 years against far more advanced Tanks was suicide. It’s also shocking to see that an Inf Battalion only had 6 RCLs per unit. That they could achieve that much speaks volumes of their performance.

2. The corollary is that given armoured support, these infantry formations did well. Examples: the support given by 14 Cavalry to 3 Jat to fend off the Shermans driving the Jats crazy in their bridgehead at Attoke Awan; the support given by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to 96 Brigade, helping that brigade to capture the bridge at Bhaini-Dhilwan.

Given their lack of anti armour capabilities Tank support would be a must for a successful operation I believe.
3. The PAF was very active, and troubled the 13 Punjab during their march to their jumping off point; actually rendering it ineffective as a fighting force for a little while; it troubled other IA units considerably during the conflict, most notoriously 50 Independent (Para) Brigade.
The way PAF performed suppressing IAFs combat operations and simultaneously providing effective CAS speaks volumes of their professionalism especially given their small size
4. The IAF was absent during the early stages of this engagement. General Harbaksh Singh traces it back to his Chief of Staff, Major General Jogindar Singh, who apparently allowed the IAF to retire to remote locations without informing the GOC-in-C. That made nonsense of the prior arrangement of 24 sorties in support of the division. However, it is reported that they were very effective later.

5. Since the IA had war-gamed these situations, as stated by Jogindar Singh, it is odd that we find units arriving at the battlefield from very remote locations, as far as Ambala, and immediately being deployed, sometimes with vital pieces of equipment missing. 3 Jat went into action without its wireless set and lost contact with its Brigade HQ at a vital time, and thanks to the lack of communications between forward-deployed units and its brigade headquarters, nearly 500 troops died.[/QUOTE]
Some bugger stole my Behind the Scenes book. Or else I would have looked it up again in context to this thread. Neve lend a book to anyone.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Some bugger stole my Behind the Scenes book. Or else I would have looked it up again in context to this thread. Neve lend a book to anyone.

@jbgt90 is back in town, and declared free of the virus. So now I have no problem of resources.

Sorry to hear of your loss. Incidentally, I noticed that Jogindar preferred a slightly 'different' variation of the phrase for his book title; he calls it Behind the Scene. As far as he is concerned, nothing moved; it was a static picture.

 

[meghdut]

@jbgt90 is back in town, and declared free of the virus. So now I have no problem of resources.

Sorry to hear of your loss. Incidentally, I noticed that Jogindar preferred a slightly 'different' variation of the phrase for his book title; he calls it Behind the Scene. As far as he is concerned, nothing moved; it was a static picture.

I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.

I just got Pradhan's write-up of Chavan's war diary, and read it yesterday in between sleeping jags. Not meaty enough, although it was nice to get a glimpse into the personalities involved, and read about the political backdrop in India.

 

[meghdut]

I just got Pradhan's write-up of Chavan's war diary, and read it yesterday in between sleeping jags. Not meaty enough, although it was nice to get a glimpse into the personalities involved, and read about the political backdrop in India.

Name of the book?

 

[Joe Shearer]

I read it a very long time back so don’t recall it much, except his tirades against Harbaksh Singh. I am presently reading War Dispatches, and plan to re read KC Praval.

When you read Praval, you will have problems with two several things.

In 15 Div operations, for instance, he suddenly launches 29 Brigade at the bridge at Dera Baba Nanak, without saying where it is from. He doesn't say anything about 96 Brigade, and I had to learn from PanzerKiel about its status as reserve. Integral armour is hardly ever mentioned except to say that 14 Horse turned up and fired at the Pakistani Shermans to the north of Attoke Awan.

Then he gets delicate when talking about the performance of units. 41 Mtn Brigade couldn't hold out against the Pakistani armoured attack; not surprising, but it is made to look as if the Brigade vanished from under the noses of the PA tanks like puffs of smoke, only to re-materialise on the other side of 29 Brigade at Akhnoor. He doesn't mention the debacle when 161 Artillery Regiment abandoned its guns, and that Major General Oberoi was sacked for failing to recover them. He doesn't mention that 2 Battalion COs had been removed from command, from those whose battalions were in action at Chhamb.

Then there is Harbaksh Singh's very sour remark about Niranjan Prasad having been a failure with 4 Division in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). In the same passage, he mentions another failure while commanding 25 Division. When was that? Was it possibly during that almost open mutiny when 25 Division was sought to be launched against Haji Pir Pass, but the Division commander took the permission of Katoch, the XV Corps commander, not to pursue the objective. It took strong threats of disciplinary action to get the COs moving. Was this Niranjan Prasad in charge of 25 Div, and was this the poor stint that he was alleged to have made before coming to 15 Infantry Division?

You will have difficulties in reading the maps. For the time and in that age when his book was written, his maps are naturally handwritten, but not very readable.

He remains, however, a very valuable and comprehensive contributor. I am sure you will enjoy reading the book.

Name of the book?

1965 War: The Inside Story
Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War
by
R. D. Pradhan

 

[Armchair]

Some maps would do this thread a lot of good.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Some maps would do this thread a lot of good.

That is true, but how is that to be done? I have been retracing the situation topographically on Google Maps, but there is the issue of putting the formations in, in symbolic form, and showing their movement over the hours. There is also the question of reconciling the names used in narratives dating from that time to what appears on the maps today. Dograi is shown well to the south of where the battle took place, and the site of the battlefield is shown as Dograe Kalan. There are differences in almost every particular.

@Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.

 

[Armchair]

That is true, but how is that to be done? I have been retracing the situation topographically on Google Maps, but there is the issue of putting the formations in, in symbolic form, and showing their movement over the hours. There is also the question of reconciling the names used in narratives dating from that time to what appears on the maps today. Dograi is shown well to the south of where the battle took place, and the site of the battlefield is shown as Dograe Kalan. There are differences in almost every particular.

@Nilgiri had done the maps during the ORBAT exercise, but it is not clear how much he will agree to spend time and effort on this, considering his increase work-load.

Perhaps someone like Nilgiri or someone similar can work with you and you can help him with the locations, vectors and so forth. Symbology is a pain for me to put in maps, in the end I just chose to put non-standard indicators.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Perhaps someone like Nilgiri or someone similar can work with you and you can help him with the locations, vectors and so forth. Symbology is a pain for me to put in maps, in the end I just chose to put non-standard indicators.

As I said, it depends entirely on his willingness. He is less and less active on the forum, although he initiated this thread at our joint request.

I was not hinting that you should do it, merely explaining the situation.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Nilgiri

You may not like this, but please read the three posts above. Thank you.