meghdut
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India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results
- Thread starter Nilgiri
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Joe Shearer
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Excellent!
I am glad that you got PVS Jagan; although he is so closely associated with Bharat Rakshak, I have respect for the homework he did. Perhaps you could add Himalayan Blunder by Dalvi; a lachrymose tale, but a cautionary one. Also one I personally hate, but that has a point of view that we have to take on board: India's China War, by Neville Maxwell.
That leaves Z. A. Khan, who wrote that exceptionally readable book, The Way It Was.
You obviously don't want to know anything about the Navy, or about the original British Indian Army.
As I limp back from a horrid stomach condition, it is good to see that someone has the inclination and interest, and also the money for these books.
meghdut
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Get some rest Joe. And I read Dalvi, Maxwell and Mankekar already. I’m not much interested in Naval warfare. Have Keegans book though still unfinished. Pre Independence does interest me so please do recommend some on that. And oh I’m not rich many are pirated
and Cheap Kindle versions
. Thank you for your time Sir
Joe Shearer
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Get some rest Joe. And I read Dalvi, Maxwell and Mankekar already. I’m not much interested in Naval warfare. Have Keegans book though still unfinished. Pre Independence does interest me so please do recommend some on that. And oh I’m not rich many are pirated
Too much pending; just reached the eve of the Battle of Dograi. The sheer carnage - how does one deal with that? People charging into fixed lines of fire, that kind of thing. First, I have to deal with the curious case of 50 (Para) Brigade, and why Nambiar was sacked.
Then, after Dograi, that has to do with the 15 Division of XI Corps, there is 7 Division at Barki, and 4 Mountain Division at Kasur. ONLY after these very detailed battles can we even approach I Corps and the Pakistan Army's derring do, stopping I Armoured Division in its tracks.
Rest!
meghdut
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Take an R&R now lol
. Go on batting we tailenders will tag along.
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BL33D
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Glad you brought up The Chequered Brilliance. Shekhar Gupta sheds some light for the readers here, if you dont have the time to go through the book. A brilliant man but a disaster of a Defence Minister who contributed immensely to the most humiliating defeat of Independent India. Me and @Nilgiri had some chat about it. Hope he shares his thoughts when he is back.
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slight correction it is by Nasim Zehra
PanzerKiel
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Oh sorry..... Shireen Mazari is the other one referred.
meghdut
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Never mind dear Sir @PanzerKiel . Downloaded already. Thanks again. And please whenever if you feel like post links or book suggestions by authors you think are good reading.
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Joe Shearer
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THE LEAD-UP TO THE BATTLE OF DOGRAI
We had got to the point where 3 Jat had had to fall back to its Brigade HQ under orders from a Brigade Commander who saw that his own Division commander apparently had no confidence in the outcome of the battle. One of the outcomes of the repeated failures of Major General Niranjan Prasad in positions of command, of 4 Div in NEFA, of 25 Division in Kashmir, and finally, twice, separately, of 15 Division at Dograi, was his replacement with Major General Mohinder Singh, a far more active and forward-looking commander; also, Brigadier Rikh, who had proved so susceptible to the influence of his commanding officer’s moods and fancies, was evacuated due to injury, and replaced by Brigadier Niranjan Singh.
Some preparatory moves followed, serving as a prelude to the blood-soaked Battle of Dograi.
15 Division had been reinforced by 50 (Para) Brigade, as 38 and 54 Brigade had already taken a pounding in the first 6 days of the campaign from 6th September to 14th September.
Just to remind ourselves of the actions in that earlier period, Niranjan Prasad barely survived his panic attacks on the 6th and his recall of 3 Jat after they had managed a toehold for themselves in Batapore and Attoke Awan. He also survived a major battle for professional survival, that being his interview with his irate Corps commander and Army commander, with their instructions to 38 Brigade in his presence to press on and capture their target of the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. By this time, 1 Jat having suffered casualties and fallen back, 6 Kumaon from the Corps reserve, 96 Brigade, was asked to step in. They moved forward at dusk, but got stuck on the way. In trying to reach them physically, wireless communications having failed, Niranjan Prasad was ambushed, and, although he escaped personally, 12 men of his party and 4 jeeps were captured by the Pakistani forces.
After this huge propaganda success, and with a continued failure to meet his objectives weighing on the minds of his senior officers, Niranjan Prasad had been relieved on the 7th September itself, by Mohinder Singh.
The military situation reflected the gloomy command situation.
On the night of the 7th September, both brigades attacked objectives on the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, and 96 Brigade continued to try for success capturing the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. None of these attacks succeeded. The next day, the 8th, the PA had strengthened its defences. It launched an armoured attack against the front-running Indian troops, and by the second day after that, by the 10th September, 15 Dogra’s position at Dial was overrun.
On the 9th September, the 50 Independent (Para) Brigade had come into the theatre, and helped to relieve the beleaguered Indian forces. The pressure continued; a little further south, 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat had left their positions and moved back on the evening of 8th September, on their failure to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. This was a blessing in disguise; the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, fresh from its outstanding achievements at Asal Uttar, was wheeled in on the 11th September, stiffened the opposition and stopped the Pakistani advance, and allowed 96 Brigade, with morale uplifted, to attack and finally capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge by the evening of the 14th September.
Further reinforcements arrived on the 11th, when the 41 Mountain Brigade that had been swept aside by Pakistani armour in Chhamb, and had fallen back behind 28 Brigade, was re-assigned to this sector. It must be presumed that they had recovered from the bad scare it had got, going up against armour with no anti-tank weaponry, and had been equipped for battle on the open plains. So before the battle commenced, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade (on the 9th), 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (on the 12th) and 41 Mountain Brigade (on the 14th) had joined 15 Division. This was in addition to 38, 54 and 96 Brigade.
THE TROUBLES OF THE PARA BRIGADE
With this background, that takes us up to the end of day on the 14th September, we find Major General Mohinder Singh, determined to undo the errors of his predecessor, ordering the 50 (Para) Brigade to capture a stretch of the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal up to a rail bridge, reported destroyed, but fate uncertain, and to destroy another small bridge over the canal on a road between Dograi and Jallo. All this was to be done by 16th September. That date didn’t work; the Pakistan Army was discovered to be in greater strength than thought, and the attack was delayed by a day. 2 Para, a constituent battalion of the brigade, did capture the road bridge, but suffered horrible casualties, about 60 jawans; the bridge, incidentally,had already been blown up. So 60 soldiers died because there had been no possibility of aerial reconnaissance.
Brigadier Nambiar was removed from command. The new, dynamic division commander was determined to make a difference, and took Nambiar’s decision to dig in some distance away from the actual canal, to avoid fire from the west bank fortifications of the Pakistan Army. This was not taken well, and he lost his job.
Meanwhile, Nambiar’s worst apprehensions were realised because the Pakistani defenders, operating out of a village between the Para’s position and the canal, kept attacking the Indian troops, who suffered heavily from these attacks and from shelling and attacks by combined groups of armour and infantry. The PAF made its presence felt and caused, along with the others, heavy casualties to the Brigade.
The only silver lining to this very dark cloud was the Paras clearing of the village, Jhuggian Mohammed Baksh, on the night of 21/22nd September
As it happened, the Para Brigade’s movements were part of a larger movement, that turned into a full-scale battle, the Battle of Dograi.
We had got to the point where 3 Jat had had to fall back to its Brigade HQ under orders from a Brigade Commander who saw that his own Division commander apparently had no confidence in the outcome of the battle. One of the outcomes of the repeated failures of Major General Niranjan Prasad in positions of command, of 4 Div in NEFA, of 25 Division in Kashmir, and finally, twice, separately, of 15 Division at Dograi, was his replacement with Major General Mohinder Singh, a far more active and forward-looking commander; also, Brigadier Rikh, who had proved so susceptible to the influence of his commanding officer’s moods and fancies, was evacuated due to injury, and replaced by Brigadier Niranjan Singh.
Some preparatory moves followed, serving as a prelude to the blood-soaked Battle of Dograi.
15 Division had been reinforced by 50 (Para) Brigade, as 38 and 54 Brigade had already taken a pounding in the first 6 days of the campaign from 6th September to 14th September.
Just to remind ourselves of the actions in that earlier period, Niranjan Prasad barely survived his panic attacks on the 6th and his recall of 3 Jat after they had managed a toehold for themselves in Batapore and Attoke Awan. He also survived a major battle for professional survival, that being his interview with his irate Corps commander and Army commander, with their instructions to 38 Brigade in his presence to press on and capture their target of the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. By this time, 1 Jat having suffered casualties and fallen back, 6 Kumaon from the Corps reserve, 96 Brigade, was asked to step in. They moved forward at dusk, but got stuck on the way. In trying to reach them physically, wireless communications having failed, Niranjan Prasad was ambushed, and, although he escaped personally, 12 men of his party and 4 jeeps were captured by the Pakistani forces.
After this huge propaganda success, and with a continued failure to meet his objectives weighing on the minds of his senior officers, Niranjan Prasad had been relieved on the 7th September itself, by Mohinder Singh.
The military situation reflected the gloomy command situation.
On the night of the 7th September, both brigades attacked objectives on the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, and 96 Brigade continued to try for success capturing the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. None of these attacks succeeded. The next day, the 8th, the PA had strengthened its defences. It launched an armoured attack against the front-running Indian troops, and by the second day after that, by the 10th September, 15 Dogra’s position at Dial was overrun.
On the 9th September, the 50 Independent (Para) Brigade had come into the theatre, and helped to relieve the beleaguered Indian forces. The pressure continued; a little further south, 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat had left their positions and moved back on the evening of 8th September, on their failure to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge. This was a blessing in disguise; the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, fresh from its outstanding achievements at Asal Uttar, was wheeled in on the 11th September, stiffened the opposition and stopped the Pakistani advance, and allowed 96 Brigade, with morale uplifted, to attack and finally capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge by the evening of the 14th September.
Further reinforcements arrived on the 11th, when the 41 Mountain Brigade that had been swept aside by Pakistani armour in Chhamb, and had fallen back behind 28 Brigade, was re-assigned to this sector. It must be presumed that they had recovered from the bad scare it had got, going up against armour with no anti-tank weaponry, and had been equipped for battle on the open plains. So before the battle commenced, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade (on the 9th), 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (on the 12th) and 41 Mountain Brigade (on the 14th) had joined 15 Division. This was in addition to 38, 54 and 96 Brigade.
THE TROUBLES OF THE PARA BRIGADE
With this background, that takes us up to the end of day on the 14th September, we find Major General Mohinder Singh, determined to undo the errors of his predecessor, ordering the 50 (Para) Brigade to capture a stretch of the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal up to a rail bridge, reported destroyed, but fate uncertain, and to destroy another small bridge over the canal on a road between Dograi and Jallo. All this was to be done by 16th September. That date didn’t work; the Pakistan Army was discovered to be in greater strength than thought, and the attack was delayed by a day. 2 Para, a constituent battalion of the brigade, did capture the road bridge, but suffered horrible casualties, about 60 jawans; the bridge, incidentally,had already been blown up. So 60 soldiers died because there had been no possibility of aerial reconnaissance.
Brigadier Nambiar was removed from command. The new, dynamic division commander was determined to make a difference, and took Nambiar’s decision to dig in some distance away from the actual canal, to avoid fire from the west bank fortifications of the Pakistan Army. This was not taken well, and he lost his job.
Meanwhile, Nambiar’s worst apprehensions were realised because the Pakistani defenders, operating out of a village between the Para’s position and the canal, kept attacking the Indian troops, who suffered heavily from these attacks and from shelling and attacks by combined groups of armour and infantry. The PAF made its presence felt and caused, along with the others, heavy casualties to the Brigade.
The only silver lining to this very dark cloud was the Paras clearing of the village, Jhuggian Mohammed Baksh, on the night of 21/22nd September
As it happened, the Para Brigade’s movements were part of a larger movement, that turned into a full-scale battle, the Battle of Dograi.
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Joe Shearer
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THE BATTLE OF DOGRAE KALAN
I have been dreading writing about this battle; the carnage reminds one of the worst phases of the trench warfare of the First World War.
15 Division had decided that its three brigades (96 now being attached to it for all practical purposes), 38, 54 and 96 should advance simultaneously against three different and widely separated objectives; that was the prevailing style of this conflict, just to remind @PanzerKiel of the discussion about the concentration of 3 Army Corps in different hands, in the hands of Patton, and in the hands of Western Command. It was nothing to do with the ability of the individual commanders, as it happens; the topography and the line-up of the opposed troops was completely different.
So 96 Brigade that had last been attacking Bhaini-Dhilwan was to go for that objective once again; surprise was presumably not a consideration. 54 was to capture (re-capture) Dograe Kalan; 38 was to move forward to the line of the Ichhogil Canal. It is not surprising that an aroused and very hostile opponent ensured that both 96 Brigade and 38 Brigade failed; 54 Brigade succeeded, but at a heavy cost.
The plan for 54 Brigade was that of its three battalions, 13 Punjab (last met trying to get to the Dograe Kalan- Jallo Bridge on the 6th September, and suffering heavy casualties to the PAF ground attacks) would go down the GT Road and clear up the Pakistani concentration under cover of artillery fire; 15 Dogra, that had been holding the front line near Dial, would withdraw to remain in reserve; 3 Jat would swing out across the fields to the north of Dograe Kalan (once again) and take the village.
13 Punjab faced the Pakistan Army’s 8 Punjab, 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch. The irony is all-permeating. The 13 Punjab advanced under artillery cover, but came to a standstill soon after, due to very heavy artillery shelling. They got Indian artillery, the integral artillery of the division, to open fire again. Under cover of this massive exchange of artillery fire, 3 Jat quietly moved off-road and across the fields for their 5 kms. (!) approach march. Lt. Col. Hayde, whom we have met before crossing back and forth over the Ichhogil Canal to Attoke Awan and back, twice, had divided his attacking force to attack in company strength different sectors assigned to them. When the leading company on the outermost edge got close to the Canal, the Pakistani defenders opened fire.
I will not describe the battle in great detail. Reading accounts of the troops charging into machine gun fire was extremely trying. Here is one excerpt from Desmond Hayde:
“Suddenly, all hell broke loose from the East bank [of the Ichhogil Canal]. Tracers completely lit up the air and you could hear the angry buzzing of lethal lead, machine-gun fire appeared to be coming from every boot of the bank...with astounding courage, the forward platoons turned en masse and charged into this mass of fire....the casualties to the men were appalling; some went down in the minefields and others fell to machine gun fire, but through dogged determination the gap was closed and a terrific hand-to-hand fight....ensued.”
The battalion lost 80 men here alone. In the CO’s party of eight, only three men were left standing.
On the other side of the village, 13 Punjab was still fighting it out on the GT Road. At 06:15 HRS on the 22nd September, Hayde then opened fire with a medium machine gun and a recoilless rifle from the rear of the Pakistani ranks (his occupation of Dograe Kalan having outflanked the Pakistani position at Milestone 13) and that unexpected fire succeeded in dislodging the defenders.
The fighting did not stop. Around 07:30 HRS, Pakistani armour opened fire from the north, and were fought off with recoilless rifles. Until the ceasefire, however, Pakistani artillery did not let up.
Hayde now asked for reinforcements, and two companies of 15 Dogra joined him on the 22nd afternoon. This reinforcement helped 3 Jat to see off two separate attacks.
The casualties on both sides were horrific.
After the ceasefire, the Pakistanis collected their dead; 247 of them were counted in the 3 Jat area. The Jats lost an equal number, 216, of whom 10 were officers and 5 were JCOs. These 463 soldiers lost their lives solely because of a confused and timid Indian Major General.
This brings us to the end of the narration of events involving 15 Infantry Division.
I have been dreading writing about this battle; the carnage reminds one of the worst phases of the trench warfare of the First World War.
15 Division had decided that its three brigades (96 now being attached to it for all practical purposes), 38, 54 and 96 should advance simultaneously against three different and widely separated objectives; that was the prevailing style of this conflict, just to remind @PanzerKiel of the discussion about the concentration of 3 Army Corps in different hands, in the hands of Patton, and in the hands of Western Command. It was nothing to do with the ability of the individual commanders, as it happens; the topography and the line-up of the opposed troops was completely different.
So 96 Brigade that had last been attacking Bhaini-Dhilwan was to go for that objective once again; surprise was presumably not a consideration. 54 was to capture (re-capture) Dograe Kalan; 38 was to move forward to the line of the Ichhogil Canal. It is not surprising that an aroused and very hostile opponent ensured that both 96 Brigade and 38 Brigade failed; 54 Brigade succeeded, but at a heavy cost.
The plan for 54 Brigade was that of its three battalions, 13 Punjab (last met trying to get to the Dograe Kalan- Jallo Bridge on the 6th September, and suffering heavy casualties to the PAF ground attacks) would go down the GT Road and clear up the Pakistani concentration under cover of artillery fire; 15 Dogra, that had been holding the front line near Dial, would withdraw to remain in reserve; 3 Jat would swing out across the fields to the north of Dograe Kalan (once again) and take the village.
13 Punjab faced the Pakistan Army’s 8 Punjab, 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch. The irony is all-permeating. The 13 Punjab advanced under artillery cover, but came to a standstill soon after, due to very heavy artillery shelling. They got Indian artillery, the integral artillery of the division, to open fire again. Under cover of this massive exchange of artillery fire, 3 Jat quietly moved off-road and across the fields for their 5 kms. (!) approach march. Lt. Col. Hayde, whom we have met before crossing back and forth over the Ichhogil Canal to Attoke Awan and back, twice, had divided his attacking force to attack in company strength different sectors assigned to them. When the leading company on the outermost edge got close to the Canal, the Pakistani defenders opened fire.
I will not describe the battle in great detail. Reading accounts of the troops charging into machine gun fire was extremely trying. Here is one excerpt from Desmond Hayde:
“Suddenly, all hell broke loose from the East bank [of the Ichhogil Canal]. Tracers completely lit up the air and you could hear the angry buzzing of lethal lead, machine-gun fire appeared to be coming from every boot of the bank...with astounding courage, the forward platoons turned en masse and charged into this mass of fire....the casualties to the men were appalling; some went down in the minefields and others fell to machine gun fire, but through dogged determination the gap was closed and a terrific hand-to-hand fight....ensued.”
The battalion lost 80 men here alone. In the CO’s party of eight, only three men were left standing.
On the other side of the village, 13 Punjab was still fighting it out on the GT Road. At 06:15 HRS on the 22nd September, Hayde then opened fire with a medium machine gun and a recoilless rifle from the rear of the Pakistani ranks (his occupation of Dograe Kalan having outflanked the Pakistani position at Milestone 13) and that unexpected fire succeeded in dislodging the defenders.
The fighting did not stop. Around 07:30 HRS, Pakistani armour opened fire from the north, and were fought off with recoilless rifles. Until the ceasefire, however, Pakistani artillery did not let up.
Hayde now asked for reinforcements, and two companies of 15 Dogra joined him on the 22nd afternoon. This reinforcement helped 3 Jat to see off two separate attacks.
The casualties on both sides were horrific.
After the ceasefire, the Pakistanis collected their dead; 247 of them were counted in the 3 Jat area. The Jats lost an equal number, 216, of whom 10 were officers and 5 were JCOs. These 463 soldiers lost their lives solely because of a confused and timid Indian Major General.
This brings us to the end of the narration of events involving 15 Infantry Division.
PanzerKiel
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Some additions...
7 Sep...GOC 10 Div decided to counter attack with the reserve brigade, 22 Brigade, east of BRB to cut GT Road between Dograi and Dial....Risks involved in this attack...a weakened 22 Brigade since it had already detached some forces to reinforce main defences and moreover, no rehearsal had been carried out for counter attack on the eastern side of BRB.....
However, GOC reasoned if he delays his counter attack, IA will be able to reinforce and attack with fresh vigor, a fresh attack with fresh troops will have a greater potential to breakthrough.
Hence 22 brigade counter attack was launched...in North-South direction, along the eastern bank of BRB...complete surprise was achieved since it was an entirely unexpected direction of attack..GT Road was therefore cut at Milestone 13.
A word about 50 Para Brigade attack...
Commander 50 Para Brigade, being originally part of Army reserves, was not happy on being placed under command an infantry division. He therefore displayed a mostly casual behavior and kept asking for written orders from Army HQ.
His 17 Sep attack went in with only ONE battalion, 2 Para, which went to ground short of its objective and reported completion.
His 18 Sep attack was again pulled back by the Brigade Commander himself....overall it displayed sluggish and ineffective leadership at brigade and unit level.
Overall, Indians were getting desperate in order to show some gains since ceasefire was being talked about... therefore simultaneous attacks were planned for 21/22 Sep by 15 Infantry and 4 Mountain Divisions...out of which 54 Brigade managed to re-capture Dograi, 50 Para Brigade got partial success while attacks of 38 and 96 Brigades were a failure.
A word about the second battle of Dograi....
Weakness in PA defence of Dograi can be attributed to...
-continuous engagement of defences by IA tanks and artillery in the days prior to attack
-Multiple IAF sorties
-Continuous casualties in the defending unit with no fresh troops
-Overall, gradual attrition of manpower and equipment
Dograi could have been held....however on 21 Sep, B Squadron ex 23 Cavalry which was covering the northern flank of Dograi defences, withdrew under local orders to the west bank of BRB......this withdrawal was not known to 16 Punjab (Dograi) nor to the Brigade HQ.
3 Jat attack from the northern flank of Dograi, therefore, which should have been met by the firepower of the armor squadron, managed to exploit the gap left by our armor and reached the rear of Dograi defences, behind 16 Punjab.
16 Punjab was therefore caught between the cauldron of 54 Brigade and 3 Jat, on being ordered to withdraw towards BRB, it was decimated.
10 Division managed to mount a counter attack swiftly in broad daylight to re-take Dograi which was heavily repulsed.
7 Sep...GOC 10 Div decided to counter attack with the reserve brigade, 22 Brigade, east of BRB to cut GT Road between Dograi and Dial....Risks involved in this attack...a weakened 22 Brigade since it had already detached some forces to reinforce main defences and moreover, no rehearsal had been carried out for counter attack on the eastern side of BRB.....
However, GOC reasoned if he delays his counter attack, IA will be able to reinforce and attack with fresh vigor, a fresh attack with fresh troops will have a greater potential to breakthrough.
Hence 22 brigade counter attack was launched...in North-South direction, along the eastern bank of BRB...complete surprise was achieved since it was an entirely unexpected direction of attack..GT Road was therefore cut at Milestone 13.
A word about 50 Para Brigade attack...
Commander 50 Para Brigade, being originally part of Army reserves, was not happy on being placed under command an infantry division. He therefore displayed a mostly casual behavior and kept asking for written orders from Army HQ.
His 17 Sep attack went in with only ONE battalion, 2 Para, which went to ground short of its objective and reported completion.
His 18 Sep attack was again pulled back by the Brigade Commander himself....overall it displayed sluggish and ineffective leadership at brigade and unit level.
Overall, Indians were getting desperate in order to show some gains since ceasefire was being talked about... therefore simultaneous attacks were planned for 21/22 Sep by 15 Infantry and 4 Mountain Divisions...out of which 54 Brigade managed to re-capture Dograi, 50 Para Brigade got partial success while attacks of 38 and 96 Brigades were a failure.
A word about the second battle of Dograi....
Weakness in PA defence of Dograi can be attributed to...
-continuous engagement of defences by IA tanks and artillery in the days prior to attack
-Multiple IAF sorties
-Continuous casualties in the defending unit with no fresh troops
-Overall, gradual attrition of manpower and equipment
Dograi could have been held....however on 21 Sep, B Squadron ex 23 Cavalry which was covering the northern flank of Dograi defences, withdrew under local orders to the west bank of BRB......this withdrawal was not known to 16 Punjab (Dograi) nor to the Brigade HQ.
3 Jat attack from the northern flank of Dograi, therefore, which should have been met by the firepower of the armor squadron, managed to exploit the gap left by our armor and reached the rear of Dograi defences, behind 16 Punjab.
16 Punjab was therefore caught between the cauldron of 54 Brigade and 3 Jat, on being ordered to withdraw towards BRB, it was decimated.
10 Division managed to mount a counter attack swiftly in broad daylight to re-take Dograi which was heavily repulsed.
Joe Shearer
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I really need a reference for the Pakistani side of the narrative. This makes so much clear. Milestone 13 being a target for the attack by 15 Div on the 21st/22nd, for instance.
It is strange and painful to read this. Whatever his differences, he must have known that pushing out an attacking force with insufficient strength would cause heavy casualties. His desire to withdraw, in this context, doesn't seem to be rooted in concern for his men, but rather in a work-to-rule attitude. And his men paid the price.
This must have been an especially sensitive point, considering that several brigades under 15 Div had been led with such indifference.
A word about the second battle of Dograi....
The support from the IAF is not mentioned at all in Praval, for instance; air force oriented narratives seldom give details of sorties made for ground support.
Presumably the orders were from the regiment commander.
This makes terrible reading. Most of the 267 casualties must have been 16 Punjab, then.
Your added perspective makes this another very messy battle, and makes clear much of the very heavy casualty rate on both sides.
PanzerKiel
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For a start, Gen Mahmood's 1965 War book is a good one. Z A Khan's book as well.
A full brigade sized attack would have broken through easily.
Yes.
