XI Corps, under Lt. General J. S. Dhillon, was asked to strike straight for the Pakistani defensive line at the Ichhogil Canal. The topography between Amritsar and Lahore is flat and unrelieved by any kind of cover; that leads to advantages and disadvantages both. The advantage was that armour could move quickly, stopped only by canals and waterways, including rivers; the disadvantages were that artillery and air attack both could stop an attacking team in its tracks. For that matter, it could also expose a defending team to a pounding.
XI Corps also had the element of surprise. Pakistan had not done anything particularly effective to defend Lahore. Even its 10 Division had been positioned in front of the city only the day before; actually, only hours before the Indian attack.
XI Corps then had, north to south, 15 Infantry Div., aiming for Dograi; 7 Infantry Div., aiming for Hudiara, and 4 Mtn. Brigade was launched at Kasur.
The initial objective was to advance along the GT Road to the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, just next to the village of Dograi, which lay east of the Canal. To do this, General Dhillon had assigned 15 Infantry Division, that had two Brigades under command: 38 Brigade, tasked to take the road bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan, leading to the Pakistani enclave; and 54 Brigade, launched straight down the GT Road (the northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak was assigned to 29 Brigade).
Let us see what happened at each of these bridges.
BRIDGE OVER RAVI NEAR DERA BABA NANAK
First, northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak, and 29 Infantry Brigade; Brig. Pritam Singh, had captured this bridge and its enclave early on 6th September. Dera Baba Nanak was 80 kms southerly of Jammu, where all the excitement had been on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th of September.
If I have read the maps correctly, this is the same bridge that connects Dera Baba Nanak to Kartarpur, over the Ravi, and allowing Pakistan access to its land enclave east of the Ravi; a bridge that has been much in the news recently.
However, the Pakistan Army, realising the situation in all its gravity with the three divisions attacking and gaining quick objectives on the 6th itself, reacted very strongly, and recovered much of the losses; this bridge was one of the first to be recovered. Around 15:00 HRS on the 6th, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander heard from Pritam Singh that the situation was dire, and that 29 Brigade should be allowed to fall back on the Batala Road, further behind his current position off the objective, of which he had been dispossessed.
There was logic behind this, although Pritam Singh had gone into a flap earlier than necessary. The thinking behind the bid to capture this bridge had been to pre-empt a Pakistani crossing in strength and a drive towards Gurdaspur and then towards Pathankot; Pathankot, it needs to be remembered, was 108 kms from Dera Baba Nanak, Gurdaspur only 70. They lay in the easterly direction from DBN; therefore withdrawing to the Batala Road, somewhat south-east of DBN, would allow Pritam to threaten the right flank of such an attack if it developed, and cut the lines of communication by attacking the connecting bridge.
However, Pritam Singh had not checked the situation on the ground, and was reacting to the tales of woe received from his forward battalions. While capturing the bridge in the early hours of the 6th, in darkness, the Indian troops had not noticed that a watchtower remained intact, and that the Pakistan Army were using it as an Artillery Observation Post, and calling down heavy fire from first light itself on the troops occupying the bridge. After softening them up for eight hours, the Pakistan Army advanced with tanks and overran two companies of the forward Indian battalion; the rest of the battalion managed to hang on. The shelling continued, and most of 29 Brigade got a fair share of attention.
This was the position at 14:00 HRS and this is what was partially reported to General Harbaksh Singh and General Dhillon at 15:00. On realising what had happened (or not happened, in this case), Dhillon ordered the 29 Brigade to stand firm, and put his GSO1 on site, to sit on Pritam Singh's head and generally encourage and edify him. For whatever reason, perhaps due to a refreshing and encouraging conversation with his Corps Commander, 29 Brigade first held out against a renewed Pakistani attack in the darkness of the 6th night, around 21:00 HRS, and then counter-attacked with armour at around 02:45 HRS on the 7th morning, winning back the bridge, and winkling out the mischief-making observation post. The PA, however, demolished one span of the bridge; in other words, the Indian defensive objective was achieved, the feared offensive move of the PA was still-born.
BRIDGE OVER ICHHOGIL CANAL AT BHAINI DHILWAN
The reader will have to bear with the narrative, as formation replaced formation in quick succession during the course of pursuing this objective.
Of the two brigades assigned to 15 Infantry Division, 38 Brigade was set to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge, and it fell to 1 Jat to achieve that. They did that, but could hold on, due to heavy artillery and tank fire. Later, on their falling back around noon on the 6th, the Corps commander personally ordered 6 Kumaon of the reserve 96 Brigade to take up the task and re-capture the bridge. They were unsuccessful in their attack on the 7th September evening, but consolidated nearby, holding on until the 8th September evening.
On the 11th, however, opposing tanks and infantry that had followed 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat when they left their firm defensive positions near Ranian, began to pose a major threat. To support them, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, held by the Corps, that had just fought a brilliant battle in the Kasur sector, was shifted from 4 Mtn. Division to 15 Infantry Division, and reinforced 96 Brigade, whose unit 6 Kumaon was. Relieved of pressure from the opposing armour, 96 Brigade now took back the bridge in three days' time, by the 14th September.
96 Brigade had been the corps reserve for XI Corps. As it had been committed, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade that had arrived on the field, was attached to XI Corps, but was relieved in two days time by our old friends, 41 Mtn. Brigade, last seen fighting for its life in front of 28 Brigade in Akhnoor, and forced to pass through that brigade to re-group and consolidate. That regrouped and consolidated formation now was transferred from XV Corps to XI Corps, and took up position as Corps reserve; 50 Independent (Para) Brigade moved to a point north of Atari.
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These, then, were the two smaller engagements that 15 Infantry Division had, involving 29 Brigade in the north, 38 Brigade, later 96 Brigade.
The larger one was the battle for the Bridge over the Ichhogil near Dograi, fought by 54 Brigade, 3 Jat in particular, and the recoil and renewed attack on Dograi after the recall of the victorious troops by the Brigade Commander of 54 Brigade. This story might be named Victory into Defeat.
This will be narrated as THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI.
Besides this, 7 Infantry Division struck out for its own objectives, and was not really successful.
To be reported as THE BRIDGE AT BARKI.
The really significant fighting under XI Corps, however, was the fighting under 4 Mtn. Div. in the extreme southern edge of the Corps boundary. That might echo Field Marshal Bill Slim's book, and be described as Defeat into Victory.
(to be cont.)
