7TH DIVISION AND THE BATTLE OF BARKI
Having considered the entire history of the 15 Division, it is time to consider the efforts of 7 Division, deployed immediately to the south of 15 Division, in the centre of the broad attack by XI Corps on the Pakistani line of defence on the locus of the Ichhogil Canal.
A reminder: the broad plan of action for XI Corps was to attack through its constituent divisions, 15 Division, 7 Division and 4 Division, towards the bridges and crossings over the Ichhogil Canal. 7 Division was given the task of attacking the crossing over the Canal at the village of Barki, in a south-east to north-west direction, on the road to Lahore; this was the task of 48 Brigade, while 65 Brigade was to capture the crossing at Bedian, to secure the left flank of the 48 Brigade attack from counter-attack by the PA.
It is sad to see that this part of the offensive got bogged down fairly early, was forced back onto the front foot by firm pressure from divisional command, lost soldiers in frontal attacks, and finally ended in the Battle of Barki. This battle had a tragic aftermath, and that will come into the narrative when looking at the actions of 4 Mountain Division.
PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS
Before the attack commenced on 6th September, 7 Division was arranged on a north-east to south-west axis, almost 90o to the line of advance planned; so, Divisional HQ was at Narla (north-west of Bhikhiwind), 48 Brigade was further forward on the road to Lahore, and 65 Brigade was further on that NE-SW line, south of the Lahore Road, in the Marimegha area. The plan was for 17 Rajput to detach itself from the 65 Brigade concentration point, and secure the Bedian bridge by 18:00 HRS that evening (6th September evening). In front of 65 Brigade, 48 Brigade would advance along the road, supported by Central India Horse and artillery, and take Barki, by the same time, 18:00 HRS that evening.
Like 15 Division, 7 Division also achieved early successes. Before dawn, the border outposts were cleared. By 05:30 HRS, the Brigade (48 Brigade) advanced down the road; in front was 6/8 Gorkhas, backed up by 19 Maratha LI and 5 Guards. When they came close to an intermediate water bearing body called the Hudiara Drain, the opposition opened fire. The Gorkhas were pinned down, but recovered, and cleared the village Hudiara, lying north of the Lahore Road, by 10:30, and landed up facing very strong enemy positions across the Drain and on the Drain (meaning, to its east), so they dug in South of the village.
Across the Road was the village of Nurpur; 5 Guards was asked to clear that, cross was promptly foiled by the PA sensing the intentions of 5 Guards moving into Nurpur; they pre-empted the move, retreated to the other side of the Drain and blew up the bridge. The Guards continued, cleared Nurpur, and by 17:00 HRS on the 6th, had crossed the Drain and swung right, northwards, to cut off the new Pakistani positions on the west bank. The Pakistanis retreated to their strong point at Barki, which was very well fortified. The target of 18:00 HRS was clearly not going to be achieved.
At this stage, the Divisional HQ decided that 65 Brigade was to pass through 48 Brigade, already astride the Drain, cross the Drain over a Bailey Bridge, to be built by the Engineers and clear Barki. However, the PAF had other ideas, and attacked the road and formations in and around the starting point of the planned attack. The Engineers were badly delayed, and finally the Bailey Bridge came up on the Drain only by PM on the 7th September.
Meanwhile, 17 Rajput had got bogged down, literally, in its attempt to capture Bedian. First, its armoured adjunct, the troop from CIH that was to help its advance, got stuck in the slushy ground; Alone, by itself, 17 Rajput failed to take the Pakistani positions, defending Bedian with exactly the opposite strength of one infantry battalion and armour, so they dug in east of the Bridge. The enemy counter-attacked at night, but was driven back, and decided to slow down any possible attack by flooding the area by cutting the Upper Bari Doab Canal. So that put paid to that, at least for the time being.
Back on the roadside and on the Drain, the Engineers had struggled through artillery and air attacks and put up the Bailey Bridge by the afternoon of the 7th. This left 65 Brigade free to deploy two component battalions, 9 Madras and 16 Punjab, to attack and capture a village on the west side of the drain, 3 kilometres west, named Barka Kalan that same evening.
On the 9th, Lt.Gen. Dhillon visited Divisional HQ and wanted relentless action, including the use of armour at night, that had been done so successfully at Dera Baba Nanak immediately before that. That night, Barka Khurd, another village north of the Lahore Road, was cleared and occupied.
On the 9th evening, therefore, elements of 65 Brigade – 9 Madras and 16 Punjab* – were sitting at Barka Kalan, 3 kms west of the Hudiara Drain, on the Ichhogil Canal due south of Barki; another element was in occupation of Barka Khurd, on the west of the Drain, East-South-East of Barki. That Brigade’s third battalion, 17 Rajput, was left at Bedian, watching against any sudden attack by the opposition.
48 Brigade was in echelon behind 65 Brigade, on the Lahore Road, occupying Nurpur south of the Road (5 Guards) and Hudiara to the north (6/8 Gorkhas). 19 Maratha LI were in reserve.
* In a twist of fate, the Pakistani 16 Punjab and the Indian 16 Punjab were both involved in the 1965 conflict. Sadly, the Pakistani 16 Punjab suffered the heaviest casualties of any Punjab Regiment during the conflict, as pointed out by Cuirassier earlier.
@Cuirassier
THE BATTLE
The Battle of Barki itself was remarkable from the Indian point of view for one formation’s excellent performance, and for the sad fact that this performance led to that unit getting decimated soon afterwards. But we are running ahead.
There was a great deal of anxious preparation for the actual attack on Barki, scheduled for the night of 10th/11th September. A new battalion had joined 7 Division, and this battalion, 4 Sikh, was assigned the task of attack along with Central India Horse. The attack was to have been in two phases – this, incidentally, seems to have been a particular favourite of the Brigade Commander, for a forward battalion to capture a point, and for a follow-up formation to ‘pass through’ and move towards the next objective. So 16 Punjab was the follow-up formation to 4 Sikh’s attack on Barki.
Barki proved to be a very tough nut to crack. Much on the lines of the house-by-house fighting last seen at Dograi, Barki was protected by pill-boxes, and entrenchments at each house. Even more, the PA 155 mm howitzers covered the Lahore-Wagah axis, and engaged the field artillery attached to 7 Division, just at 19:30 HRS, when the 4 Sikh commenced their attack, but the Sikhs pressed hard, in spite of losing nearly 150 men in their battalion, and in spite of the troubles that their armoured back-up, the CIH, went through, losing 4 tanks in very short order in a minefield. The regiment also lost its CO to injuries to which he succumbed later.
By 20:45 HRS, 16 Punjab were able to pass through to the Ichhogil Canal, along with surviving elements of the CIH, only to find that the PA had already prudently blown up the bridge.
This was indubitably success, but at a very high cost, a cost that was to be multiplied in the most stupid move that was made soon afterwards, affecting 4 Sikh.
Still on 7 Division’s front, however, 48 Brigade sought to make the most of the situation by attacking a village on the other side from Bedian, but failed the first time, on the 10th September.
There was a change of command then, and Brigadier Sahaney was posted out and Brigadier Pyara Singh took over.
The attack on the village, Jahman, was renewed, and it was taken a few days later, on the 15th.
At this stage, as part of the re-shuffling of forces that took place around 15th September, 48 Brigade was sent off in support of the beleaguered 4 Mountain Division, and that marked the end of 7 Division actions in the 65 conflict.
