Here is the real story .....
Since last year, the Indian Army has been monitoring the following launch-pads used by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate its ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments into Jammu & Kashmir: from Bhimber Gali towards Shopian and Anantnag; from Lipa towards Baramula; from Jura towards Sopore; from Athmuqam towards Kupwara; from Dudhnial, Tejian, Shardi, Rattapani and Kel towards Machhal; and from Saonar and Sardari towards Kupwara and Sopore.
The base camps or sanctuaries for the ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments are located further into the rear within Azad Kashmir and Khyber Paktunkhwa,
Finally, eight launch-pads spread over a linear 250km frontage and located at Lipa, Kel and Rattapani were chosen for targetted, surgical destruction lasting 7 hours (inclusive of cross ingress/egress) by the Indian Army’s 4 SF (Para) and 9 SF (Para) Battalions.
However, for retaining the element of surprise and initiative, an elaborate deception plan involving the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF) was required. For, to be factored in was the high state of the operational readiness at that time of both the Pakistan Army (PA) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) throughout the LoC. Following the meeting of India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) on September 21, and another meeting between the Indian PM and the two armed services chiefs on September 24, a deception plan jointly prepared by the IA’s Udhampur-based HQ Northern Command and the IAF’s Delhi-based HQ Western Command was put into effect.
Both the IA and IAF decided to lull ther adversary into assuming that a powerful AirLand attack would be launched at a few locations in southern Azad Kashmir, namely in the Bhimber sector’s areas like Tatta Pani/Hot Springs area. While the IA decided upon unleashing field artillery fire-assaults against Samahni, Bandala and Tatta Pani, the IAF commenced a series of supporting helicopter movements.
For starters, by September 24 night, the IAF began ferrying out four Mi-35P attack helicopters belonging to the Pathankot-based 125 ‘Gladiators’ Sqn Sqn (the other Sqn—104 ‘Pioneer Rotarians is at Suratgarh) and making them land at selected locations like Poonch, Rajouri, Bhimber Gali and Krishna Ghati along with in-ptheatre Mi-17V-5s. All these movements were carried out non-stop for the following four days in full view of the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms that were flying out of Kamra and keeping an eye on almost all air-movements inside both northern Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
( Thats why some media getting hint of chopper / air born operations )
Shortly after dusk on Sptember 28, the IA’s light field artillery and mortar strikes at locations inside Azad Kashmir, like Bandala, Samahni and Tatta Pani, from locations like Mankote, Balnoi and Nangi Tekri in the Krishna Ghati sector, and from Richhmar Gali in Tangdhar sector.
( Thats why PAK villages are getting sacred of loud noises and hide the noise of bullets near by)
The real insertion by foot of the IA’s SF (Para), however, took place in the Lipa, Shardi and Rattapani bulges (i.e. areas where Pakistan-controlled territory juts into J & K). Known as the JAW-HEAD tactic, this meant that the IA gave the impression of hitting the enemy’s jaws but in reality was aiming for the forehead in a totally surprising move.
The bulges were carefully selected so as to present favourable topography for the attacking forces.
For, throughout the LoC where IA and PA observation posts and bunkers are located face-to-face, extensive anti-personnel minefields are laid to cover the frontal and flank (left and right) approaches, but the rear area is devoid of any mines so as to facilitate friendly movements. Consequently, a raiding party beginning its ingress into enemy territory from the baselines of any bulge can stealthily sneak in through the rear and attack from the least expected direction. Thus, the IA’s SF (Para) detachments had to penetrate up to a depth of only 700 metres from the LoC but, if calculated from the frontal tip of a bulge, the targetted launch-pads would appear to be up to 3km inside Azad Kashmir.
Due to this common-sensical mission-planning, the SF (Para) detachments had not need for shoulder-fired LAWs like Carl Gustavs. Only NVDs and weapons like IWI-built Tavor TAR-21 assault rifles fitted with T-40 40mm single-shot underbarrel grenade launchers (UBGL) supplied by Turkish Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK, or Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corp) were used with devastating effect.
The diversionary laying of light field artillery and mortar strikes at locations inside Azad Kashmir, like Bandala, Samahni and Tatta Panim sent the PA into a tizzy and it has yet to recover from this common-sensical shock-and-awe tactics.
Tay.
