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How partnering with the U.S. could strengthen Pakistan's sovereignty

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How partnering with the U.S. could strengthen Pakistan's sovereignty

By David Ignatius

Thursday, December 17, 2009

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN The United States and Pakistan, always prone to bickering, need a big idea to unite and sustain them through the testing battle in Afghanistan. So here's a strategic concept I've been trying out with officials in both countries: By partnering with America, Pakistan can gain sovereignty over all its tribal territory for the first time in its history -- and thereby finally complete the task of building its own nation.

This is a classic example of what strategists call a "positive sum" game, where, by working together, Washington and Islamabad could gain benefits that they would not achieve alone. But instead of cooperating, they have been trading resentful messages over the past month in which the United States requested Pakistan's help in closing Taliban havens and Pakistan responded, in effect, "Don't tell us what to do."

Here's the cold, hard truth: U.S. success in Afghanistan depends on Pakistan gaining sovereignty over the tribal belt. If the insurgents can continue to maintain their havens in North Waziristan and other tribal areas, then President Obama's surge of troops in Afghanistan will fail. It's that simple.

The Obama administration wants Pakistan to take decisive action. That's why national security adviser Jim Jones visited here last month. And it's why Centcom Commander Gen. David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen visited this week. But they've encountered Pakistani skepticism and suspicion. "The narrative is about mistrust and betrayal," says a U.S. Embassy official here.

The Americans should be knocking on an open door. For a second cold, hard fact is that Pakistan will not be a confident and fully successful modern state until it has extended its writ to the lawless tribal regions. Lacking that control, the Pakistanis fear that their national fabric could rip along its seams.


America's war in Afghanistan paradoxically provides Pakistan with a golden moment to achieve what it has lacked since independence in 1947, which is political and military control over the Pashtun tribal belt. Even the mighty British Raj ducked this challenge, preferring a loose system of tribal governance that made the border areas a haven for bandits. That ungoverned status is no longer tolerable in an age of potential nuclear terrorism.

By bringing a mighty army into Afghanistan, the United States is offering Pakistan a rare opportunity. If the two nations can coordinate their military forces across this border every hour and every day, a war that sometimes looks hopeless from Washington and Islamabad will prove much more manageable.

This war against the Pashtun insurgency can be a decisive final chapter in the making of the modern Pakistani and Afghan states. For a comparison, think of how the Mexican-American War helped make the United States a continental nation, or how the European wars of the 19th century helped unify Germany and Italy. The alternative, a de facto "Pashtunistan" that straddles the two countries, is a recipe for permanent discord.

This vision of a sovereign Pakistan that controls all its territory has two important corollaries: first, a future common market between Pakistan and Afghanistan that can power economic development in both countries; and second, the relaxation of tensions between India and a Pakistan that no longer worries about dismemberment and discord.

It has been clear over the past several months that the American and Pakistani publics are skeptical about war and are looking for some animating vision to justify the sacrifices. What's needed now is a process such as the strategic conversations that took place in 1944, as the World War II allies were escalating their campaign against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan:

Wise American and European statesmen began planning the consequences of the peace. They imagined the network of institutions that would secure the postwar world -- the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund. The United States and Pakistan need to show that same vision and maturity now.

The ****** wars may seem like a mad gamble, but if given the right strategic framework, they represent a common effort to create a stable structure for Central and South Asia in the 21st century. The payoff is immense, especially for Pakistan. To understand why this conflict makes sense, people need to see the big idea that lies behind it -- the stabilization of a lawless tribal region that has been causing trouble for 150 years.

davidignatius@washpost.com
 
the above requires a complete 'out-of-the-box' thinking!

the issue is what does 'partnering' means in the context between the only 'super-power' on the face of this earth and a 'third-world' country with a 'efficient and disciplined' armed forces.

is this 'partnering' a partnership of 'equals' or because of the 'power disparity' mentioned above, this equality may not be possible.

does this 'partnering' take into account the 'concerns' of each partner. can these 'concerns' have a 'convergence of views' or because of the power disparity (mentioned above) it may not be possible (because of other linkages eg; US-India Strategic Relationship concerns).

i think what the author (who spent 1 month during the Swat ops) is hinting at is that if this war has to be won, then the US-Pakistan Strategic Relationship needs 'precedence' over all other 'irritants' & 'hinderences' direct or in-direct.
 
An unequal partnership?

Thursday, December 17, 2009
Ikram Sehgal

While the US is right in supporting the democratic process in Pakistan, most anti-US sentiment prevailing among Pakistanis stem from the Americans' support for pliable rulers who put their own survival and motives ahead of everything else. The broad mass of the intelligentsia and the masses in Pakistan take this as cynical manipulation to gain leverage, at the cost of Pakistan's national interest. The US must distinguish between supporting the system as opposed to an individual. Regrettably, support for the "singer rather than the song" has been a vital flaw in US policy the world over for more than half a century.

Corruption and fraud, symbolised by the presence of Hamid Karzai in office, seems synonymous with the type of rulers the US supports. One does concede that at times cold pragmatism has to take preference over ideals. Unfortunately US policy is often dictated by the inordinate influence lobbyists exercise over the US administration and the US Congress. This fatal "manufacturing" flaw is paid for and driven by the colour of money rather than any ideology.

Its landlocked location makes Afghanistan dependant upon Pakistan for almost everything, even though Iran is developing as a viable alternative route. Logistically, the US cannot wage either war or peace in Afghanistan without Pakistan. Does a land route or even an aerial route through Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) make economic sense? Whether it is food, oil, or manufactured goods, most originate from or transit through Pakistan. In an indirect way our 170-million population is directly affected by the export of our foodgrains and commodities to Afghanistan. Their price would be 35-40 per cent cheaper within Pakistan if the "exports" are stopped or even curbed. Compare the price of roti (bread). it would come down to Rs3 from the average of Rs5 presently. The average of three rotis per individual per day amounts to an additional Rs510 million (or $6 million per day). Pakistan thus spends almost $2 billion additional annually on bread alone!

At least 1.6 million refugees remain in refugee camps since the 80s, another 1.5 million live in Pakistan cities and towns. Add another $5-6 billion to Pakistan's budgetary requirements annually. Pakistani Pakhtuns do have connections in Afghanistan, but these are minuscule compared to the Afghan population's dependence on Pakistan. Stoppage of Afghan transit trade would create a famine in Afghanistan, besides destroying the country economically. In contrast, Pakistan gets almost nothing from Afghanistan except a basketful of sorrows. These include drugs and a weapons culture, a breakdown of our society that has allowed the Al Qaeda cancer under the guise of the Taliban to enter our daily lives. Their currency is to deal out death to innocent citizens of all ages indiscriminately.

For Afghanistan's economy to be energised an industrial potential must be created to add to the services sector, at present the only means of its economic existence. Whether in support of agriculture or building an industrial potential, all men and raw material and technical resources must mainly come from or through Pakistan, backed by the skill and assertive potential of Pakistani expertise.

All of Afghanistan's neighbours put together cannot match Pakistan's interaction. Pakistan's legitimate concerns are far more cogent than India's. The long-term US policy to build up India (Ambassador Galbraith's famous Memo of May 25, 1965) in the region to contain China runs counter to Pakistan's national security imperatives which see China as a credible guarantor of our existence. While traditional friendship with Afghanistan goes back many decades, it is understandable that India would be interested in a friendly government in Kabul but their interest is driven more by anti-Pakistan policy rather than friendship for Afghanistan. To give India a dominant say in Afghanistan is counterproductive, and at the cost of Pakistan's cooperation. RAW took over the Afghan intelligence agencies and started to create trouble for Pakistan on our western borders after 9/11. Paradoxically, India got a "sphere of influence" after the Pakistani army entered South Waziristan in 2004. On persistence from the Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice and company seemed to be comfortable with this, and to even encourage it. Why did the US drones keep a "hands off" policy towards Baitullah Mahsud? Was this naivety on the part of the US? There are lingering suspicions in Pakistan that since US and Indian interests (along with those of Israel) coincide about de-fanging our nuclear potential, the US was consciously helping the Indians cut us down to size.

The US must not fritter the $1.5 billion Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) through schemes that will disappear into the public memory not long after most of the money has disappeared into the pockets of consultants and go-between NGOs. The US must target major projects in Pakistan, such as dams, power stations, hospitals, roads and ports like Gwadar and Pasni, as well as north-south road and rail communications. The US must upgrade the quality of the Pakistani Armed Forces, particularly the Frontier Corps, for prolonged counterinsurgency operations, concentrating mainly on providing training, helicopters, night-vision devices and armoured vehicles. Moreover, a counterterrorism force must be funded and trained from scratch. Instead of doling out aid, the US must give us: (1) our legitimate transit dues and (2) market access for our cotton textile and manufactures thereof. Steps must be taken to bring us out of the "nuclear cold," giving us the same parity as the US nuclear accord with India. We cannot be a responsible nuclear nation if we have to depend upon clandestine sources to sustain our nuclear potential!

The US seems endlessly to find fault with Pakistan despite our many more sacrifices, suffering military and civilian casualties at more than a 10:1 ratio. Does it serve US interests to threaten Pakistan time and again unless it "does more"? We can never be equals and Pakistan has more to lose because it cannot walk away from the region as the US has done before. Pakistan's greater stake evens the imbalance of this relationship. For the new Obama Doctrine to succeed the US must understand that the roads to peace literally give through Peshawar and Quetta.

Far more effort is being put into Afghanistan (at the present moment a ratio of more than 30 to 1 in $ cost) than in Pakistan. For the Obama Doctrine to succeed the "on-off" temporary relationship must have more permanence. An effective partnership can only be formed if the US can gain the confidence of the people of Pakistan that the relationship has long-term benefits, and that the US will sustain it. Any partnership that is unequal has the element of failure inherent and no amount of rhetoric can paper over the imbalances in such a relationship.

The initiatives enunciated in the Obama Doctrine incorrectly put in order of priority the most important, "an effective partnership with Pakistan," after the "military surge" and the "civilian surge." The US recognises that Pakistan is central to any lasting solution in Afghanistan, yet there remains a yawning gap (and reluctance) to translate rhetoric into reality. Failure to rectify this major anomaly will render gains made in Afghanistan reversible, as has happened in the past in this unfortunate country.

The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=213733
=============

Ignatius' comments on shared US-Pak goals over establishing Pakistani sovereignty over all of FATA are great, but I doubt the GoP or the PA does not have establishment of Pakistani sovereignty as an end goal - that's sort of preaching to the choir.

The major issues here are the details of the Pak-US cooperation in the region to get to that point. Trust is a major issue, as is capacity, and merely pointing out a self-evident goal is not a resolution to the tensions between the two sides. Ignatius does not offer suggestions beyond 'partnership with the US' for a resolution to those tensions. Ikram Sehgal IMO goes further in actually outlining some tangible actions that could result in reducing the trust deficit and increase cooperation.

And while I have heard American analysts and government officials talk a lot about a 'strategic partnership with Pakistan' I have as of yet heard absolutely nothing in the way of proposals that would indicate that the US is in fact offering a 'strategic partnership'.

Stepped up COIN aid is not a 'strategic partnership' - it is merely short term support for a specific goal. No word on negotiations on preferential market access (if not an FTA) no word on negotiations on a civilian nuclear deal similar to India's, no word on high tech collaborative projects (especially in the military field) such as those China has undertaken with Pakistan.

The US offer of a 'strategic partnership', based on what they are actually publicly offering in this partnership, is in fact insulting in that they think that Pakistanis would actually buy into their hype on the nomenclature alone, which is all that offer is at this point.
 
If US offers Pakistan Nuclear technology platform and Space Cooperation we can try to work on joint projects as allies , other then that there is no point we are fine with our current relation we stay together when we are with each other , when we are done we all go to our own lives untill we feel the need to engage again
 
If US offers Pakistan Nuclear technology platform and Space Cooperation we can try to work on joint projects as allies , other then that there is no point we are fine with our current relation we stay together when we are with each other , when we are done we all go to our own lives untill we feel the need to engage again

Space cooperation in the form of cooperation in launch platforms is out of the question given the potential for dual use in Ballistic Missiles, however Pakistan is trying to develop its own satellites, currently primarily with China, and cooperation on that would be more on the civilian side with little offensive military use.

But the point here is that despite all this talk of 'strategic cooperation' there is next to nothing on the table in terms of avenues of cooperation the US is even willing to at least initiate dialog on, not even on preferential market access. Hence my point that it is all baloney.

And so long as all this talk comes across as a sham, why should Pakistan act on the US's timetable and potentially risk destabilizing itself further by expanding the WoT beyond its means, with little to no offset for the cost incurred by doing so through a broad strategic relationship with the US?

We might as well stick to the time table we are comfortable with.
 
Let me try to decode this entire argument in a few lines.


This guy is suggesting that Pakistan has a potential of becoming America's great partner and somehow regain its 'sovereignty' if it actually takes on the Afghan pashtun resistance just like it has taken on TTP.

While America on the other hand, keeps supporting and brewing up the most rabid anti-Pakistan elements across in Afghanistan, given free rein to smugglers, drug and war lords coupled with Northern Alliance criminals and Indian agents.

In actuality the pashtun resistance alongside the border forms a buffer zone between Pakistan's enemies in Afghanistan as they fight them without Pakistan's support at large. So in effect he's suggesting that Pak should turn against them and help the American forces defeat them so that Pakistan's real enemies will have a free access to come and create havoc in Pakistan.


This vision of a sovereign Pakistan that controls all its territory has two important corollaries: first, a future common market between Pakistan and Afghanistan that can power economic development in both countries; and second, the relaxation of tensions between India and a Pakistan that no longer worries about dismemberment and discord.


Last but not least, he mentions two strategic advantages (i'd say pack of lies and false promises) to Pakistan if it helps them fight and win against the Pashtun resistance (which shows they're not winning btw :lol: ) alongside the border, which will in actuality result in increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan will most definitey escalate tensions and ring alarm bells in Pakistan. and second one is false hope of economic development with an anti-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. Basically Pakistan will be seeing an economic boom by trading with the drug lords and criminal Northern Alliance in power. This guy has got to be crapping from his mouth...haha


Isn't David Ignitius the same guy who wrote the novel/movie Body of Lies and movie's theme is based on CIA covert operations?

Edit: Yes he is...and there goes his credibility :lol:
 
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I believe a first step to strengthening Pakistan's sovereignty would just be to stop violating it with unmanned aircraft, and then move from there. I do believe that would be a start. Agnostic has raised some very good points (what's new?).

US-Pak relations cannot be mended by Pakistan re-focusing its "sell" factor to Pakistanis alone, which I believe is what is being suggested above. They can only be mended by allowing Pakistanis to see the US as a reliable partner. They can begin to achieve this by, firstly, by taking it easy on the "do more" rhetoric. I mean, two days after the bomb in Peshawar killed over 100 people, we were hearing "Pakistan must expand its operations". How can anybody possible call this an equal partnership.

Another thing that will begin to change the perception in Pakistan is when the US begins to throw its weight behind Pakistan rather than against it, supporting it in issues that Pakistanis, justifiably, care about. This can range from Kashmir to Balochistan, from nuclear deterrance to foreign investment to international politics to Pakistan's position in the international community. Pakistanis must feel that the US is "on our side", or at least not against us, which is exactly what it looks like when the US offers India nuclear agreements while not raising the Kashmir issue once during a meeting between their respective heads of state (you can't talk peace in this region without mentioning the K word, I thought Obama was smart enough to realize that).

The points I've raised above require little more than a slight shift in the way the US deals with Pakistan on an international stage. This small change will allow the decision makers in Pakistan to "sell" this war to the public a lot better. But of course, things have gone way beyond the point where mere words and diplomacy alone can rebuild the bridge. In many cases, actions will be required, in others, sensible inaction may be necessary. The former could include things already mentioned above; (true) strategic, military, scientific, technical, economic and diplomatic cooperation. The latter would include ceasing drone strikes within Pakistan, and maybe showing enough trust in the Pakistani Armed Forces to hand over a few drones to us so we may continue the work necessary.

The point I'm trying to make is that trying to mend relations between the United States and Pakistan by simply re-branding the war is too little too late, and does not hit the main issues at all. We cannot ignore the issues, we must face them head on,and for that, both sides will need to show initiative, not just us.
 
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While America on the other hand, keeps supporting and brewing up the most rabid anti-Pakistan elements across in Afghanistan, given free rein to smugglers, drug and war lords coupled with Northern Alliance criminals and Indian agents.
I doubt that is a true and accurate assessment.

In actuality the pashtun resistance alongside the border forms a buffer zone between Pakistan's enemies in Afghanistan as they fight them without Pakistan's support at large. So in effect he's suggesting that Pak should turn against them and help the American forces defeat them so that Pakistan's real enemies will have a free access to come and create havoc in Pakistan.
And why are some elements in Afghanistan considered "Pakistan's enemies"? Is it because they revile Pakistan because of its history of supporting the cruel Taliban? Wouldn't it then be worth considering working to make friends rather than making enemies? For the ability of Pakistan to determine its "real enemies" is a matter of grave doubt as long as its most trusted institution, the military, is driven by pride and glory, rather than defence, as Benazir Bhutto's revised memoir claims and the PA's repeated efforts to make war, large and small, against India demonstrate.
 
I would advise the respected member of this forum Solomon2 not to take the words in the book the BB has written as the word of God. BB actually tries to shift the blame of all the problems that she faced during her terms in power on the PA. She does this because she wants to portray herself and this patriotic leader who did things for the interest of the people of pakistan and none for herself.
One more thing none of the american members lived in Pakistan when she was running the country. So unless you lived in Pakistan during her rule please for Fcuk sake dont lecture us about what a democrat leader she really was
 
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Experts pressurize Obama to address Pakistan concerns

Monday, December 21, 2009

WASHINGTON: President Barack Obama must complement his Afghan security strategy with political plan and address Pakistan’s concerns, particularly vis-a-vis India, both in the immediate and the post-US troop pullout perspectives, top experts said discussing imperatives of an effective way forward.

Sharing their evaluation of the new U.S. plan with the Council on Foreign Relations, analysts also cautioned against any unilateral moves that may spell further difficulties for Islamabad as it grapples with consequences of the eight-year old Afghan war.

Under the revamped strategy Obama unveiled early this month, Afghanistan will see a surge of 30,000 American and 7000 NATO troops in the coming months to contain Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda threat.

The summer of 2011 has been set as the milestone when the international forces will start handing over control to Afghan forces and begin the process of withdrawal.

Maleeha Lodhi, current scholar at Woodrow Wilson Center and former ambassador to the United States, observed that reliance on military means in Obama’s plan is accompanied by near silence on a political strategy.

“This assumes that a military solution can be successfully applied to Afghanistan, without addressing the political causes of the growing insurgency, especially Pashtun alienation.

“Military escalation in Afghanistan and the expansion of aerial strikes in Pakistan is dangerous for Pakistan, which is already confronted with mounting security challenges, a consequence, not a cause, of the insurgency in Afghanistan,” Dr Lodhi said.

She was referring to a wave of retaliatory bombings Pakistan is facing in the wake of its two major anti-militant operations in tribal areas this year. Obama has offered Pakistan economic and strategic partnership but wants Islamabad to spread anti-militant campaign to North Waziristan tribal area along the Afghan border.

In her remarks, Lodhi also feared a spillover effect of the Afghan escalation on Pakistan as militants and refugees could escape into Pakistan from across the porous border.

For their part, senior Obama Administration have visited Pakistan in recent weeks and pledged coordination in operations along the Afghan border to stem the possibility of Taliban and al-Qaeda flow into Pakistani tribal areas.

But so far, little has been pledged publicly about addressing Pakistan’s security concerns with regard to Indian role on the Afghan soil, particulalry in the post-U.S. Afghanistan.

Pakistan says India stokes violence in its southwestern Balochistan province from across the Afghan border. Experts also point to Pakistani fears that New Delhi seeks to encircle Pakistan by advancing its agenda from the Afghan soil.

“President Obama has described the partnership with Pakistan as being “inextricably linked” to success in Afghanistan. Unless this critical partner’s doubts and concerns about the new plan are allayed and Washington is prepared to modify its strategy accordingly, the relationship will only run into more problems,” Dr Lodhi cautioned.

Ahmed Rashid, a noted author and journalist stressed that “the United States needs to articulate a political strategy that draws India and Pakistan in with its plans and, despite Indian objections, puts pressure on New Delhi to be more accommodating toward Pakistan.”

At the same time, the United States should bolster support for the elected government in Pakistan, he added.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading political analyst, remarked that “Pakistan’s concern pertains to the situation the day after the United States quits Afghanistan, perhaps the region.”

“If Afghanistan’s internal situation remains perturbed, should Pakistan seek friends from among the competing players in and around Afghanistan?” he questioned.

Islamabad, he said, will also be monitoring closely the U.S. efforts for building up governance capacity of the Kabul government and the enhancement of professional capacity of the Afghanistan National Army and the police. This also calls for overcoming sharp ethnic imbalance in the Afghan army, especially in the higher echelons, he noted.

Shuja Nawaz, Director South Asian at Washington’s Atlantic Council, opined that Pakistan could play a key role in helping fracture the Afghan Taliban alliance by persuading the Haqqani group to join the government in Kabul or send surrogates instead. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has already been reported willing to strike a deal with Karzai. That would isolate Mullah Omar and make it harder for him to go it alone against the allies, Nawaz argued.
 
Reality bites as US pushes Pakistan to finish off terrorists

* Senior US diplomat hints at separate agreement allowing Washington itself to take on ‘some of the hidden war against the terrorists’

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will not go as far as Washington wants, and there’s nothing the US can do about it: that’s the sobering reality as the US tries to persuade the hesitant government to finish off the fight against terrorists.

Expand the current assault against the Taliban? The government has made clear that will happen only on its own terms. US officials acknowledge that so far they have not won the argument that militants who target America are enemies of Pakistan too.

The citizens are deeply suspicious of America’s power and motives, making it difficult for the leaders to accede to Washington’s pressure in public, lest they look like US puppets.

US officials say while Pakistani officials cooperate more in private, there are definite limits. The US wanted Pakistan to move forces deeper into the tribal belt before winter. It did not happen, and might not at all.

Hint: A senior US diplomat hinted at a separate agreement that would allow the US itself to take on some of the hidden war against the terrorists.

Speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive talks with Pakistan, the diplomat said last week that more US action is expected against the Haqqani network, led by long-time resistance fighter and former US ally Jalaluddin Haqqani.

His network, based in North Waziristan, reportedly has strong ties with Al Qaeda and targets US forces in eastern Afghanistan from across the border.

The diplomat said the stepped-up US action would only come with Pakistani support, but would not elaborate on the nature of the potential cooperation.

Pakistani officials claim they have targeted the Haqqani leadership, albeit unsuccessfully, and will go after the network when the time is right. Some US officials believe that, others do not.

Military officials say the Haqqani problem illustrates how the US sometimes needs Pakistan more than the other way around.

The US military now counts the Haqqani network as the single gravest threat to US forces fighting over the border in Afghanistan, and badly wants the government to push the militants from their border refuges. But the Pakistani answer seems to be that unless and until the Haqqanis threaten Pakistan, they won’t be a priority.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the latest US official to make the case in a visit to Islamabad last week.

More than most US officials, Mullen has cordial, long-standing relationships with Pakistan’s generals, the strongest power base inside the country. Despite those ties, Mullen’s quiet effort met with a polite noncommittal from his hosts.

Mullen advises patience and humility in dealing with Pakistan, a view not shared by some leading Republicans in Congress. Mullen said the country does not get enough credit for the push since spring against militants in the Swat valley and South Waziristan.

“Too many people eagerly and easily criticise Pakistan for what they have not done,” Mullen said Sunday, days after Pakistan’s military leaders took Mullen on a tour of a reclaimed Swat.

“When I go to Swat, and look at what they did there ... I think it’s pretty extraordinary.”

Most of the groups aligned against the US are in North Waziristan, a Tribal Area not pressed hard by the army. The only firepower directed at militants there comes from American missile-loaded drones.

Mullen told students at the National Defence University that the US was concerned about what it sees as a growing coordination among terrorist networks in and around the counrty.

“I do not, certainly, claim that they are great friends, but they are collaborating in ways that quite frankly, scare me quite a bit,” Mullen said last week.

He did not come out and say Pakistan needs to expand the fight against terrorists. But his point was clear.

In an exchange of letters over recent weeks, Obama asked for more cooperation and President Asif Ali Zardari, pledged some additional help, US officials said. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to describe private correspondence.

Zardari, reflecting the views of Pakistan’s powerful military, said his government will move against militants that attack US forces when it is able to do so, the officials said.

That leaves ample room for Pakistan’s civilian leaders to pursue their own agenda - and on their own schedule.

ap
 
I doubt that is a true and accurate assessment.
Is that all you got to refute?

And why are some elements in Afghanistan considered "Pakistan's enemies"? Is it because they revile Pakistan because of its history of supporting the cruel Taliban?

For simple reason as those that accomodate our enemies in their houses to conspire against us cannot be our friends. They've worked historically with the Russians and Indian before even the Taliban became an equation in Afg.

Pak has been living with her neighbours for the past 60 years and understands their history and psychology very well. Your history on Afghanistan seems to only start post 9/11.

Wouldn't it then be worth considering working to make friends rather than making enemies? For the ability of Pakistan to determine its "real enemies" is a matter of grave doubt as long as its most trusted institution, the military, is driven by pride and glory, rather than defence, as Benazir Bhutto's revised memoir claims and the PA's repeated efforts to make war, large and small, against India demonstrate.

So here you only remember BB's remarks which were largely to gain political sympathies, but don't remember war-mongering remarks of the current Indian Minister Mukherjee? Would you like me to quote Indira Ghandhi and other Indian top politicians on what they think of Pakistan?

It's always a pleasure to hear that our military has plans to defend Pakistan through offensive and defensive measures. those comments were on kashmir which we're still at war with India in theory.

You cannot make friends with those that are hostile to your existence. India is Pakistan's existential threat and has to be taken very seriously. India helped create rebellions in Pakistan and also was responsible for the breakup of it in 1971. therefore the military has to be prepared for any offensive
 
as Benazir Bhutto's revised memoir claims

I suppose we should believe everything Nixon said about himself as well. :D

BB, when she wrote the memoir, was still trying to get back into politics and still the leader of one of the two largest political parties in Pakistan, and that colors her memoirs in that she had a vested interest in promoting a particular narrative.

There are many other commentators (Pakistani and Western) who have written far better histories and analysis of the Pakistani Army than BB could ever accomplish. Brian Cloughley, Stephen Cohen, Shuja Nawaz etc. come to mind.
 
Solomon2:

"And why are some elements in Afghanistan considered "Pakistan's enemies"? Is it because they revile Pakistan because of its history of supporting the cruel Taliban?"


No, some elements in Afghanistan are considered Pakistan's enemies because they revile Pakistan for merely existing and covet its land. Read the following comments by Enayatullah Nabiel, director-general in the Economic Relations department of the Afghan ministry of foreign affairs - they indicate a continued refusal by Afghan officials at the highest level to, in essence, recognize Pakistan and respect it territorial integrity:

"But Nabiel pointed to a second vexing problem in the APTTA negotiations : Although the 1965 Afghan-Pakistan trade and transit pact only mentions that goods can traverse through certain “entry and exit points,” Pakistan now wanted to change this language of entry and exit points to the word “border,” a word that is anathema to the Afghan Pashtuns.

Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line believe the line was a cunning conspiracy created by the British to separate Pashtun tribes living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Nabiel said.""


http://www.defence.pk/forums/economy-development/38920-afghan-pak-transit-trade-2.html#post587507
 
the field of foreign relations is not so simple,nor r the foes & friends constant.partenering with US has had its ups & downs as well. we cannot relate the strenghtening of Pakistan to our relations with one or a few countries/nations. it's always the ability of the leadership of a country to exploit a particular international situation to best serve the interests of their own nation. unfortunately our successive leaderships failed the acid test & were unable to channelise all available resources towards attaining economic & political stability & strength. we wasted our first window of opportunity in 1950s when the US was desperately looking for a strategic partener in the region to contain communist USSR & China. India was at that time resounding with Hindi-Cheeni bhai bhai slogans & Pandit Nehru was pursuing a sosialist economic agenda. the US did'nt had many choices' nonetheless we failed to exploit the situation to the best of our own national interests.we somehow failed to communicate our genuine concerns vis a vis India to the then US administration.on the one hand we were unable to build a strong economic infrastructure which could sustain a reasonably large & well equipped army even if the inflow of foreign economic & military assistance ceased or decreased. secondly we could'nt stop US from including a very damaging clause in its aid bill as a result of which the supply of military hardware & spares was discontinued the moment 1965 war started.
The second major opportunity came our way when USSR ventured into Afghanistan. regrettably we were again unable to exploit the situation to the best interest of the country. no effort was made to improve the infrastructure.the roads, the rail had to bear the extra burden of carrying logistics for the forces fighting against russian agression yet no effort was made to increase the capacity of this network. to be exact, by the time this war ended we were in shambles. most of our national level institutions had been damaged beyond repair. no worthwhile investment had been made in industrial sector, the worst energy crises was staring us in the face and to add to our miseries the klashinkov culture had its teeth deep into our social and cultural heritage. While certain gentlemen managed to weild fortune for their future generations, the miseries of common citizen multiplied.(to b continued)
 
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