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How Kargil was defused - Testimony from Pakistan Embassy in Washington

The story has multiple corroborations. Nawaz Sharif, Bruce Reidel, for example. This particular piece is the second from sources linked to Foreign office that has come to my attention. The first was from the then Foreign Secretary published in Urdu press about three or so years ago. The details of that particular piece fail me now, but the gist was about the same.
I wonder if both the N.S. & Reidel "corroborations" go back to this propaganda officer.
 
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About the bold part.

You are referring to the same Benazir who lost our East Punjab intiative ? When India was threatened with a huge population (Punjabi) revolting ?

When India had NOT introduced it's economic reforms and didn't have the diplomatic or the economic clout that it has today ?

Kargil and hence Kashmir would have been a good possible win when our enemy's supplies were squeezed and supply lines under threat via punjab.

The rest as they say is History.

I do not know in which context should I place your post. Yes I know Gen Zia ul Haq had a strategy which was quite sharp and would have yielded big dividends. But that has no bearing upon this particular thread.

BB did what she thought was right. She was not Zia Ul Haq. Indians did not respond positively. Kashmir remains a headache to this day. So? What is the relevance of that to this topic?

I wonder if both the N.S. & Reidel "corroborations" go back to this propaganda officer.

1. Why do you insist on calling this guy "propaganda officer". Pakistan was no USSR. What is your problem with him.

2. Your question seems to place this person on a higher level than either Nawaz Sharif or Bruce Reidel. Am I reading this the way you intended it?

3. What is the deal with coroboration. One can hardly make a case of conspiracy here?

4. What do you hope to get out by hinting at (seemingly nonexistent) controversy?
 
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QUOTE: thanks for the info n it is well written. i hope all Pakistani citizens understand and accept who's fault it was. END QUOTE

Many of us do. The Kargil operation was part of our war-plan. To be executed as part of a broader war. Brig (R) Ghulam Muhammad briefed Bhutto about it in mid-70s when he visited this sector. ..............

Wait, mid-70s? This is a different timeline from the one given earlier where they said that the proto- Kargil plan (so to call it) was a response to India's gambit in Siachen. A key objective of this plan was to threaten and choke off the Siachen supply line.

If the Siachen angle is true, the plan could not have originated in the 70s, since this pre-dates the Siachen issue which happened in the 80s.

Or, I wonder, were the objectives for Siachen goal bolted on to the plan in retrospect?
 
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"Gentlemen! Thank you very much for gracing our Independence Day". That is how President Bill Clinton greeted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his team at Blair House, the US Presidential Guest House, on July 4, 1999. Coming at the height of the Kargil crisis, the visit was critical. Just across the road from the White House, the almost 200 year-old Blair House has long been associated with events of monumental importance in world history.

The prime minister’s arrival in Washington was shrouded in mystery. The first reports of the visit came to the Pakistan Embassy not from our foreign office but the State Department. Everyone was caught unawares. Hurried meetings were called, confidential internal memos dug up, and briefs developed to be able to lay down all the necessary ground work for the emergency high-octane meeting. Nawaz Sharif arrived on July 3 at Andrews Airbase and was received by Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, and then taken for intense briefings.

It was evident at that time that Gen Musharraf’s unauthorised, illogical and non-strategic adventurism had pushed the situation to the precipice and a full-fledged war between two nuclear rivals was imminent. Musharraf’s claim that the prime minister had approved ‘Operation Badr’ (Kargil) is not true. The PM was briefed about the Kargil operation for the first time only around mid-May 1999 when a lot had already happened. Gen Majeed Malik, a military veteran and cabinet minister who attended the briefing, is reported to have strongly opposed the idea and bitterly criticised the operation calling it “silly and utterly illogical”.

By the time Nawaz Sharif touched down in Washington to defuse the situation, the entire world had descended on us in the Pakistan Embassy with Pakistan being criticised heavily, both in the print and the electronic media. In this backdrop, Nawaz Sharif battled his way up – pleading with the world to give diplomacy a chance.

The Americans are known for treating their holidays as sacrosanct and Independence Day is the veritable sanctum sanctorum. US functionaries were visibly ill at ease. Bringing President Clinton to the table to bail Pakistan out of the imbroglio on that day was not, therefore, business as usual. It was made possible in the face of the real and immediate danger of an all-out war. Saudi intervention on Nawaz Sharif’s SOS call made this possible. And the man who could work this miracle was Prince Bandar Bin Sultan.

Prince Bandar was the face of Saudi monarchy in Washington for 22 years, rubbing shoulders with five US presidents and ten secretaries of state. An inveterate networker, he was an ultimate Washington insider who could walk into the White House whenever he wished. His influence was so extensive that he was able to acquire AWACS surveillance aircraft for his country, despite bitter opposition from the Israeli lobby.

He staunchly supported the idea of forging close relations with Pakistan and China and believed that Pakistan was under-utilising its potential. He once asked former interim Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi: “I don’t understand why Pakistan is always afraid of Indian chicken”. He made China deliver intermediate range nuclear-warhead capable missiles despite strong opposition from CIA and the Department of State. During the Iran-Contra scandal, he bankrolled the whole affair. He pressured Col Qaddafi to deliver the suspects involved in the alleged bombing of PanAm Airline aircraft in 1988.

But the mother of all mysteries is how Mian Nawaz Sharif got hold of one of the most sought after men in the US at such a short notice. The strategy, nevertheless, worked and saved Pakistan and the region from war.

On July 4, 1999 the world media was sharply focused on what was going on inside the Blair House and keenly awaited gavel-to-gavel updates. No cameras were allowed inside the guest house; PTV and other media crew were forced to clear out. The prime minister – for obvious reasons – was interested in photo-ops with Clinton for political mileage. He asked me to ensure that the international media stayed on the scene despite the scorching heat.

Pakistani journalists Shaheen Sehbai and Mohammad Afzal Khan stood outside the guest house. I was more worried about the western media. Using my personal relationship with Andrea Koppel of CNN, I was able to persuade her to wait on one of the hottest days of the season.

The scene inside Blair House was intriguing, the pace painfully sluggish. The president’s aides including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger at one point sounded frustrated, unhappy to be in a firefight for an ally that apparently deserved no sympathy for being on the wrong side of global public opinion.

The US position was tough and arduous and its attending exasperation understandable. President Clinton seemed determined to help steer an erring ally out of harm’s way but also remained responsive to Indian outrage. Calming down the Indians was an uphill task. New Delhi was blowing hot and cold, the general public and the media were hysterically demanding a military response and the generals were impatiently waiting to teach Pakistan a lesson once and for all.

The Nawaz-Clinton talks went on late into the afternoon – down a bumpy path with a heavy traffic of faxes shuttling between Washington and New Delhi. The Indian acceptance of the ceasefire was an impossibility that came off under heavy pressure by President Clinton who had somehow developed a personal rapport with Nawaz Sharif.

Though apocryphal but the story goes that simplistic yet deeply sincere remarks by Nawaz Sharif for the US president in New York a couple of months earlier are said to have stayed with Clinton when he was going through the toughest patch in his political career in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Being articulate about such situations is difficult but those who know Nawaz Sharif can testify that he comes across as an honest, down to earth and convincing negotiator. During the talks, these qualities worked in Pakistan’s favour.

Sharif never doubted a military take over. While the agreement was being documented, his anxiety was also mounting: “They will get me Mr President,” he whispered. Clinton quipped: “Yours is a rogue army. Keep them under civilian oversight”. Nawaz retorted: “It is not the army. It is (a) few dirty eggs. They will meddle to cover up the Kargil debacle”. And three months later, the military struck. The coup was inevitable. The ‘Dirty Four’ were afraid of a Kargil investigation and a possible court martial. Washington accepted it as a ‘fait accompli’.

After the October coup, those of us in the Embassy in Washington were in the dark knowing nothing about what was going on in Islamabad. There was intense media pressure - asking us to comment on what was happening back home. Ambassador Tariq Fatemi asked me to go to CNN without any brief and face the music, where I made an off-the-cuff comment: “Its not a coup, the president is still there, the constitution is intact, things are just being rearranged.” What else could I say?

Clinton always stood by Nawaz Sharif. On his few hours’ trip to Islamabad later, he refused to shake hands with Musharraf, and instead met President Tarar. But 9/11 changed the course and character of the history of the world, our region in particular.

Gen Musharraf had the last laugh. In order to stay in power he hacked everything – faked the referendum, rigged the elections, pushed us into a war we never deserved, destroyed district administrations, packed the superior judiciary with cronies and finally left behind an NRO-tainted accidental leadership. Nawaz Sharif arranged an honourable exit from Kargil but missed the gallows by inches. Gen Shahid Aziz deserves respect for telling the truth – which is always in short supply in our country. If we still have a few good men in the army, they just need to wake up and come out with the truth.

The writer is a former information minister at the Pakistan Embassy in Washington DC. Till recently he was chairman of the Pak-Afghan-US Trilateral Dialogue on Agriculture.

The unsung hero of Kargil - Malik Zahoor Ahmad

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We have had a few witnesses who have stepped forward with truth about Kargil from Pakistan's perspective. AC (R) Kaiser Tufail, Bruce Reidel, Gen (R) Majeed Malik, Gen (R) Shahid Aziz, etc.. have shed light on the Kargil Affair. No doubt many Pakistanis would like to come to Musharraf's defense, but weight of evidence is too much.

Great prapoganda by PMLn paid,so-called hero,s?
Keep it up, bt can it stop,a real commando taking his action?
Learn from past, no he can't be stopped like that, be ready for the real & forever closer of your prapoganda mills in lahore!
Try it what ever you can,how well you can,bt till kashmir problem nt get solved,kargills wouldbe keep happening allways & peoples will keep fighting for their occupied freedoms!
 
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Great prapoganda by PMLn paid,so-called hero,s?
Keep it up, bt can it stop,a real commando taking his action?
Learn from past, no he can't be stopped like that, be ready for the real & forever closer of your prapoganda mills in lahore!
Try it what ever you can,how well you can,bt till kashmir problem nt get solved,kargills wouldbe keep happening allways & peoples will keep fighting for their occupied freedoms!

Bouncing Billy back in action.

It was too good to last.
 
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1. Why do you insist on calling this guy "propaganda officer". Pakistan was no USSR. What is your problem with him.
I want to be blunt about what his job was, based on his own description: to "spin" whatever information reached the press in Pakistan's favor, not to supply information to the foreign press.

2. Your question seems to place this person on a higher level than either Nawaz Sharif or Bruce Reidel. Am I reading this the way you intended it?
"Higher level"? Whether it comes from a minister or a reporter, all information from inside an embassy has to have sources there. Not all officers in an embassy are placed to provide it to both foreign journalists and domestic leaders. In Pakistan's case I can think of only three: the press officer, the ambassador, and the chargé d'affaires.

3. What is the deal with coroboration.
I will treat the author's story as something more than just another self-serving tale when there is evidence that traces to a second source that backs this up.

4. What do you hope to get out by hinting at (seemingly nonexistent) controversy?[/QUOTE]I hope to educate yourself and others to be more skeptical and less easily duped.
 
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