FMCT: A dangerous development

[BATMAN]

FMCT: A dangerous development
By Rabia Akhtar
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=67207

For Pakistan, a fissile material cut off would be a very difficult decision to make than for all other states. Given Pakistan’s security concerns and the evolving international security environment, there are many a reasons whereby it is advisable that Pakistan should stay away from a treaty like fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT). The unfolding of Indo-US deal has much to suggest as to how Pakistan will make its future strategic choices. Now that the UN’s Conference on Disarmament has ended its second session and is planning to work in the third and the last session of this year, there is a lot of pressure on the 65 member body to arrive at a consensus on starting negotiations on the FMCT draft treaty tabled by the US last year. Pakistan being an active participant in the disarmament debates in CD, Geneva needs to put forth some solid arguments based on some hard-hitting facts.

There are various problems with the Presidential Draft Decision (CD/2007/L.1) as pointed out by Pakistan in the CD sessions. We have maintained a position that any negotiations on a fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) should be held simultaneously with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, preventing arms race in outer space (PAROS) and negative security assurances (NSAs). But according to the L.1 adopted on March 23, only ‘substantive talks’ on nuclear disarmament, PAROS and NSAs will begin, however ‘negotiations’ will begin only in case of FMCT. A consensus still needs to be reached in CD on this presidential draft decision. Pakistan has also maintained that we want an effective international verification mechanism to be adopted if an FMCT is to be a reality. This is however a position which many a states in CD do not agree with especially given the fact the US is now propagating against a verification mechanism to be included in FMCT negotiations. US wants to determine ‘compliance’ with only a ‘high level of confidence’ since it states that no international effective verification can be achieved to ensure whether states are keeping up their end of the bargain. The US by saying this has reversed from its earlier position whereby according to the Shannon mandate (adopted in CD in March 1995) CD agreed to establish an ad hoc committee ‘to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’

If a nuclear weapon state like Pakistan is not heard in multilateral arms control and disarmament forums like CD, Geneva, then the very purpose of multilateral disarmament diplomacy stands questionable. We should not make a compromise on an FMCT without preconditions and in this case preconditions being verification of both the existing and future stockpiles.

What needs to be delivered from the P-5 is a commitment to negotiate on nuclear disarmament, a very strong pillar of the non-proliferation treaty which has been very conveniently hushed aside in order to swerve world’s attention from the P-5’s own non-proliferation commitments. Secondly, negotiations on negative security assurances also need to be given a top priority in CD sessions along with FMT. It is important that not only NPT non-nuclear weapon states need to be provided negative security assurances (NSAs - ‘the pledges by NPT nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear-weapon states unless attacked by such a state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state’) by the P-5 but also the de facto nuclear powers and states with controversial nuclear weapons programme like that of Iran also need to be satisfied especially when a fissile material treaty is being suggested. And lastly, for states like China and Russia, the US missile defence plan increasingly has become threatening therefore negotiations on preventing arms race in outer space (PAROS) also needs to be taken seriously if a consensus amongst P-5 on FMT has to be reached.

Article VI of the draft FMCT treaty proposed by the US excludes the de facto nuclear weapons states in having any say for this treaty to enter into force. It states that ‘This Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which an instrument of ratification has been deposited by all of the following states: the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.’ This should not be acceptable since the key states that ideally should become part of any negotiations on FMCT need to include Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea besides the P-5.

As far as the fissile stockpiles are concerned, NPT nuclear states like US and Russia have already acquired lifetime stocks of fissile materials therefore a fissban that is unverifiable and does not include existing stockpiles is an excellent ground for them to stand on and bash others. UK, France and China also possess huge quantities of stockpiles, which are sufficient for their strategic needs. Therefore, Pakistan needs to stand independently on FMT regardless of whether the Indians or Chinese fall in line and agree to a cut off. Pakistan needs to take a look at its existing stockpiles and ask whether our existing fissile stocks are adequate for our future needs. Since Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always remained Indo-centric, we need to make some strategic choices of our own before an FMT could be struck.

At this point in time we cannot afford a fissban because we need to reach a respectable limit to ensure the credibility of our deterrence. The credible minimum deterrence posture maintained by Pakistan is also threatened if any future acquisition of ballistic missile defence system is considered by India. For that matter, in order to credibly sustain our deterrence against India, we need to continuously build our stockpiles. Since the evolving strategic environment is destabilising and raises strategic concerns for Pakistan therefore, a defensive deterrence posture should also allow space for exploring new heights. An FMT in that regard would be dangerous for Pakistan, especially when asymmetries exist between Pakistani and Indian stockpiles. The question of stockpiling adequate quantity of fissile material is a vital national security interest, which must never be compromised under international pressure or for the sake of diplomatic niceties. Pakistan must never be apologetic on the issue.

Now that CD has entered its third and last session on July 30, 2007 for discussions on FMCT, it is very important that Pakistan should figure assertively. Pakistan needs to assess its own strategic requirements especially when the Indo-US deal is allowing for India’s own fissile stocks to be spared for military production. As I have implied in my earlier pieces, miniaturisation of weapons is the future of warfare and for that matter, we need fissile materials, we need to build reserves and we also need to keep an open ended policy on nuclear testing. Therefore, neither NPT, CTBT nor an FMT suits Pakistan’s strategic needs at this point in time. Getting into either one of these international non-proliferation treaties will have serious consequences for a nuclear power like Pakistan and its national security.