Efforts to find, clear, and defend against IEDs showed
modest gains over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both theaters, the
“find and clear” rate improved from 40 percent in the earliest months of the wars
to 60 percent by the end of
2011. In Iraq, improved force protection measures, including armor and electronic jammers for radio-controlled IEDs, also
quadrupled the number of IED attacks required to cause a casualty, from five to 20. Total IED attacks also fell precipitously beginning in June 2007, six months into a 15 percent increase in U.S. troop numbers during the
surge. That same month also marked the beginning of the “Awakening” as Sunni tribesmen increasingly began working with U.S. forces against the insurgency. As a result, IED casualties dropped dramatically even before coalition troop numbers fell
similarly. In Iraq, key technical innovations made gains against the IED,
but the tide turned only when gains were made against the insurgency itself.
..........
Gains in Afghanistan came much later, however, and in a different form. Through 2010, the IED was winning — the number of attacks required to cause a casualty actually fell from 14 to 11.
Total IED casualties spiked thereafter, as a surge of U.S. forces implemented a counter-insurgency strategy that required more dismounted patrols among the Afghan
population. As the surge wound down and Afghan forces were placed in the lead in 2012, coalition IED casualties dropped from 60 to 40 percent of total
casualties.
IED attacks against Afghan forces surged that same year, however, increasing 124
percent. Coalition IED casualties continued to recede as additional stress was placed on Afghan forces. Since 2012, overall attack levels have remained high, varying more with the seasons than with the passing
years. In Afghanistan, adaptation reduced risk to coalition troops rather than innovation. Placing local security forces in the lead, and removing coalition forces, reduced the IED threat more than innovative means of addressing the devices.
The U.S. military was able to achieve modest gains against the IED by innovating its way toward improved detection, disablement, and protection against the bombs. The 50 percent increase in the find and clear rate, though, was far from enough to make insurgents consider abandoning the devices.
When a $265 device can disable a $525,000 armored vehicle, quadrupling the number of bombs required to be effective does not turn cost and risk in favor of the counter-insurgent. Despite efforts to control access to IED components, the devices actually got cheaper over the course of the wars even as armor, electronic jammers, and mine detectors became more
expensive. Innovation saved lives and improved freedom of maneuver, but barely dented the IED’s asymmetric advantage.
Source:
https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/h...-the-myth-of-tactical-success-and-innovation/