Egyptian Armed Forces

[Amir_Pharaoh]

EGYPTIAN FAHD IFV

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[Mahmoud_EGY]

Egypt's quiet weapons build-up
U.S., Russia, others gather data on development of WMDs
By Robert Windrem
NBC News

NEW YORK — A number of documents NBC News has obtained from the United States, Russia and Israel — some of it public, some declassified under the Freedom of Information Act — help shed some light on Egypt's steady development of several weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade and a half, including its nuclear potential and details of a joint North Korean-Egyptian missile development agreement.

The overall impression of officials in the United States, as well as those in Israel and Russia, is that Egypt has quietly been developing weapons, in particular biological weapons and missiles.

Much of Egypt’s superweapons development, of course, is aimed at countering Israel's long standing and large-scale superweapons programs, as well as establishing itself as the leading power in the Arab world.

Israel's weapons of mass destruction program is daunting, even to the first Arab state that signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. With an estimated 200 nuclear warheads, more than Great Britain, and 100 medium-range missiles, Israel is in a world of diminishing nuclear programs, a regional superpower, at least.

Still, while Egypt continues to point an accusing finger at Israel's nuclear weapons capability, there is considerable evidence that Egypt has been quietly building up its own superweapons programs, including some evidence of interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.

In other words, Egypt may not have clean hands.

The United States has growing concerns that Egypt is working on several weapons programs it sees as destabilizing to Middle East peace.

During the past decade and a half, both the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) have publicly noted the existence of programs previously unknown. The following is a breakdown of what the documents say about Egypt’s weapons systems development programs.

Evidence of nuclear build-up The most revealing document is the Russian intelligence document, produced by the KGB's successor organization, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service or FIS. An extraordinary public document, it was issued at a time of extraordinary public openness and has not been updated since.

In the document, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," issued on Jan. 28, 1993, the Russians noted that although there is "no special program of military-applied research in the [Egyptian] nuclear sphere," there are some developments of note.

The development of the 22-MW research reactor at Inshas, north of Cairo, built with help from Argentina;
Egypt has contracted with India to upgrade a 30-year-old Soviet research reactor from 2-MW to 5-MW;
Egypt has contracted with Russia to supply a MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator which would be helpful in exploring uranium enrichment technologies;
Egypt has begun building a facility at its Inshas research center, which the Russians noted "in its design features and engineering protection could in the future be used to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from the uranium irradiated in the research reactors.”

In addition, NBC News obtained the U.S. Customs Service debriefing of Abdel Kadr Helmy, an Egyptian spy, jailed in the 1980's for trying to obtain various missile technologies, including Pershing-II guidance packages.

Helmy said in the debrief — which he now disavows — that Egypt had an active nuclear weapons development program that included sending uranium to Pakistan for enrichment to bomb-grade levels. Helmy said that an Egyptian Brigadier, Ahmad Nashet, ran both the civilian nuclear establishment in Cairo, as well as the nascent bomb program.

Development of chemical weapons The Egyptians are also interested in chemical weapons. The Russian FIS document specifically noted, "Techniques of the production of nerve-paralyzing and blister-producing toxic agents have been assimilated."

Furthermore, the FIS report stated: "There is information to the effect that Egypt is displaying interest in purchases overseas of warheads intended for filling with liquid chemical warfare agents. The stockpiles of toxic substances available at this time are insufficient for broad-based operations, but the industrial potential would permit the development of the additional production in a relatively short time."

It may very well be that the warheads the Russians discussed were ultimately bound for Iraq.

Confirmation of biological weapons program Similarly, the Egyptians have a biological weapons program, according to recent statements by the Russian FIS, as well as the U.S. CIA andArms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

“At the start of the 1970's," the FIS document stated, "President Sadat confirmed this, announcing the presence in Egypt of a stockpile of biological agents stored in refrigerating plants. Toxins of varying nature are being studied and techniques for their production and refinement are being developed at the present time in a [unnamed] national research center."

In response to a question during a U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee hearing on Feb. 24, 1993 regarding proliferation concerns, then CIA Director R. James Woolsey confirmed that Egypt is counted as a nation with biological weapons capability.

Annual U.S. ACDA reports on treaty compliance similarly listed Egypt as a probable biological weapons state.

In three annual reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1995, ACDA has used the same language to assess the Egyptian program: "The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist."

What is also interesting about these subsequent reports is that unlike a similar report in 1994, ACDA did not include this sentence: "The United States however has not however obtained recent information on this program," the implication being that the U.S. did receive damning information about the program starting in 1995.

The Russian FIS was less circumspect in its 1993 report, stating: "The country has a program of militarily applied research in the area of biological weapons, but no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs. The research program in the area of biological weapons date back to the 1960's."

Strides in missile development, thanks to North Korea The area where Egypt excels is in missile development.

The Russians FIS report noted: "By 1990, Egypt's missile forces were armed with a regiment each of Soviet Scud-B [approximately 186 miles] and Frog 7 [approximately 43 miles] transporter-erector-launchers and also a certain quantity of Sakr 80 and Sakr 365 Egyptian-Iraqi-North Korean short-range missiles. It is technically possible to fit the Scud and Frog warheads with chemical weapons.

“An agreement was concluded in 1990 on military cooperation with China in accordance with which Beijing is to assist in the modernization of the Egyptian Sakr plant and help establish the production of new modifications of the Scud B-class missiles and three domestic types of Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles."

A 1992 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) memorandum on Mid East missile programs provided this appraisal of the Egyptian program: "Egypt attaches great importance to the acquisition of GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] and to the building of a congruent technological infrastructure. During the 1950s, and aided by German Nazi scientists, a concerted effort was made to build factories which would manufacture missiles. This effort continued over the years; at present the Egyptian army diverts resources to this endeavor.

"Egypt's principal GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] focus is on the Scud, at source a Russian ballistic missile. Cairo would like to build the infrastructure which would enable it to assemble its own Scuds, with the aid of foreign countries and companies. North Korea is Egypt's main ally in this regard.

“At the beginning of the 1980s North Korea bought tens of Scud-B missiles from the Egyptians. The Scud-B is a medium range missile (approximately 174 miles), originally Russian, capable of carry a warhead of up to one ton.

“In return, the North Koreans helped the Egyptians set up the infrastructure for missile production and assembly. This was done via North Korean scientists and the transfer of North Korean technology. Work is continuing in these factories at present; they are said to begin active production in 1993.”

Similarly, the FIS noted, "Using technology obtained from Egypt the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] is upgrading the Scud-class missiles purchased earlier in the USSR and exporting them to countries of the Near and Middle East."

Condor-II missile development In addition, testimony by U.S. Customs Service agent Daniel Burns before the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee during an April 18, 1991 hearing about “Administration & Enforcement of U.S. Export Controls" bolstered the belief in Egypt’s sophisticated missile development program.

Burns testified about conversations he had with Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian-American rocket scientist who had pleaded guilty to helping Cairo obtain equipment and material for the Condor-II missile. The missile was a joint project of Egypt, Argentina and Iraq. In his testimony, Burns said Helmy discussed with him several projects including:

“The financing of the [Condor-II] program by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the roles of Egypt and Argentina and Iraq;"
"the Egyptian effort to develop a nuclear warhead, including the Cobalt-60 effort and the purchase of uranium from France;"
"the outline of the Scud missile joint development program between Egypt and North Korea;"
"the details of an Iraqi chemical warhead and its planned utilization;"
"the knowledge of President Mubarak of the Condor program and the fact that he approved it in 1984;" and
"the modification of the SCUD and SS-10 missile."

Furthermore, Burns testified that, "I also developed information in some of the other corporations that he had been in contact with during this investigation — that he had approached the Coleman Research Corp., located down in Huntsville, about obtaining Stinger guidance systems….early in our wiretap investigation we overheard him being asked to check on the remotely piloted vehicle, known as the "Scarab" that was being built by Teledyne Ryan, which is, essentially, for the lack of a better word, the poor man's cruise missile."

Helmy, in his own testimony that day, discussed the North Korean-Egyptian Scub-B upgrade program. Helmy said, "The Scud-B, I knew everything...from the Egyptian official...the other relationship with the Koreans, I knew it."

The Cobalt-60 comment is particularly revealing since Cobalt-60 is an ideal warhead for a radiological bomb or "dirty" bomb, that is, a bomb which disperses a radioactive material on detonation.
NBC: Egypt's quiet weapons build-up - Security

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Want to ask one thing,is the egyptian militaries role in the revolution seen as positive or negative by the people?
And is the revolution seen as a success?

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

Want to ask one thing,is the egyptian militaries role in the revolution seen as positive or negative by the people?
And is the revolution seen as a success?

Positive for Most people ...
About Revolution ... too early to say .. !!

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

Positive for Most people ...
About Revolution ... too early to say .. !!

this is my opinion too and about the revelotion we are ready to do anything for egypt and i am sure in time the revelotion will succesed

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

EIFV

Notes: The Egyptian Infantry Fighting Vehicle (EIFV; also known by its BAE developmental name, Infantry Fighting Vehicle - Light, or IFV-L) is a virtually unique vehicle designed by BAE for the Egyptian Army to solve a specific problem; so far, BAE Systems has not attempted to shop the design around elsewhere. The Egyptian Army’s use of the M-113 series and other M-113-based vehicles has been growing since peace between Israel and Egypt became a reality in the late 1970s, and the Egyptians began turning away from their former Soviet masters and towards the West for military hardware and trade in other areas. One of the problems posed by this new Western alliance was the Egyptian’s procurement and eventually production of the M-1A1 Abrams tank, a fast, maneuverable vehicle even in the sands of the Egyptian deserts.

The primary IFVs and APCs the Egyptians had at the time, the BMP-1, BMP-2, Fahd, and M-113, could not keep up with an M-1A1 unit with a full head of steam. The BMP-2s had armament comparable to modern IFVs, but the rest, including the BMP-1s, were outclassed on the modern battlefield. Unfortunately, the Egyptians’ recent military acquisitions, especially the M-1A1 (which they went into in a big way), meant that they didn’t have the funds for something like a Bradley or Warrior, the cheap Russian hardware that would become available in the future wasn’t there yet, and the Egyptians didn’t want to jeopardize their new relationship with the US by going to the Chinese. So they contacted BAE systems and asked them how they could modify their M-113A2s to fit the bill. BAE responded with a hybrid vehicle – a lengthened M-113A2 with the turret of an M-2A2 Bradley. In real-world cost, the new vehicle would cost about a fifth the price of an M-2A2 Bradley, but provide a significant increase in firepower and mobility. In addition, it could be built in Egypt by the ETF (Egyptian Tank Factory), at the same facilities that were being built to produce the M-1A1. This was just the thing the Egyptians were looking for. By 2010, they have built or modified some 1200 EIFVs; production had begun in 1997, and development had started in late 1994.



The Original Specs

The original specifications of the EIFV called for the lengthening of the M-113A2 to six roadwheels on each side and moving the fuel tanks to the rear of the vehicle in the same manner as on the M-113A3, making the EIFV’s hull over a meter longer than the M-113A2, and even a half a meter longer than an M-113A3. Much of the hull layout is retained, with the driver to the front left and a large hatch on the rear deck opening to the rear for the passengers to stand. (The driver’s hatch is a bit different – it rotates open slightly up and laterally opens to the right instead of opening upwards.) Though the Egyptians don’t make use of it, amphibious capability could be easily retrofitted by simply re-mounting the trim vane and enabling the bilge pumps (which are still present, but deactivated, in the EIFV). The hull shape is unmistakably an M-113-series vehicle, and the roadwheels, drive sprockets, and idler wheels are identical to those of an M-113A2. The suspension is beefed up, but is still based on torsion bars with hydraulic shock absorbers at the front and rear roadwheels. The side and frontal armor is improved with appliqué armor, including armored side skirts, but the rear ramp with a door in it are still present.

On the other hand, the engine, drive train, transmission, and driver’s station were greatly-modified, with the engine being replaced with a 350-horsepower turbocharged diesel, the transmission fully automatic, and the driver’s station having a steering yoke instead of the M-113A2’s steering laterals, as well as a conventional brake and gas pedal. The fuel tanks were also greatly enlarged.

Of course, the biggest change was the addition of the Bradley turret. This provided a great increase in firepower, and also allowed part of the EIFV force to be used as scout vehicles if desired. This turret gave the EIFV a 25mm M-242 ChainGun, a coaxial machinegun, and twin TOW launchers. It also gave the Egyptians a vehicle that could match the Abrams in the day/night vision department. (The commander does not have his own thermal imager, but can see through the gunner’s thermal imager.) At the front sides of the turret are a cluster of four smoke grenade launchers on each side.

The Egyptians were happy with this original version of the EIFV – but not totally. The engine had to work hard to keep up with the M-1A1 as it was, and the Egyptians were considering a further appliqué armor package that could be added to increase protection for the EIFV. The resulting weight of the package they envisioned would definitely have the EIFV straining to keep up, not to mention the added wear and tear operating the powerpack and drive train at high strain for long periods would seriously increase the maintenance factor. They told BAE what improvements they wanted, and out of this came the production version of the EIFV.



The Production EIFV

The first thing BAE did was to address the power problem, replacing the engine with a compatible 400-horsepower 6V53TIA turbocharged diesel. The suspension also had to be further strengthened, as did the shock absorbers. This fix was almost magical, as it addressed pretty much every deficiency the Egyptians had identified. The standard armor package remained the same, but AOI (Arab Organization for Industrialization) devised an appliqué armor package that greatly increases armor protection to the sides and also improves frontal armor protection. Lugs for ERA have been added to progressively more EIFVs (and other Egyptian armored vehicles). An air conditioner was fitted, as well as a collective NBC system.

AOI (the parent agency of the ETF) has identified some possible future modifications for EIFV, including an NBC overpressure system, firing ports in the sides and rear of the vehicle, and a hunter/killer-type observation system. The firing ports would be fitted either two (more probable) or three per side, with one in the rear door. Another possibility is revised passenger seating, with the seats going down the center of the vehicle. A further enlargement of fuel tankage is also possible, with some fuel being housed in the walls of the crew compartment.



Twilight 2000 Notes: Though most EIFVs in the Twilight 2000 timeline were of the Production type mentioned above, a few later examples were of the Original specifications. Extra appliqué armor is relatively rare.
Specifications

Weight 17.7 tons
Length 5.26m
Width 2.82m
Height 2.5m
Crew 3+7
Armour Aluminium
Main armament 25mm M242 Chain Gun / BGM-71 TOW II
Secondary armament 7.62mm FN MAG
Engine 400hp Detroit Diesel 6V53TIA
Power/weight 20.0hp/ton
Transmission Hydrokinetic
Suspension torsion bar
Fuel capacity 454 litres
Operational range 482 km
Top Road Speed 66 km/h

 

[Mahmoud_EGY]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]

 

[Amir_Pharaoh]