Taking Out Iraq's Nukes
Published: November 25, 1990
The prospect of Saddam Hussein brandishing an arsenal of nuclear weapons is the nightmare of all who oppose him. Just imagine if his invasion of Kuwait had been backed by a nuclear punch that could decimate the forces now massed against him and devastate Israel, among other countries.
Is that reason enough to go to war now, before Iraq gets nuclear weapons? Some experts and commentators urge a prompt military strike, either as the surest way to eliminate the emerging nuclear threat or in the belief that Iraq is close to a crude nuclear weapon that could threaten allied forces in the Persian Gulf. President Bush has picked up the theme, warning American troops that the nuclear threat is grave and urgent.
The American public may also be ready to wage pre-emptive war.
A New York Times poll shows that significant majorities oppose war against Iraq to protect the world's oil supplies or restore the government of Kuwait. But a solid majority supports military action "to stop Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons.
The concern is justified. He has been trying for years to acquire nuclear bombs, and some day he will succeed unless firm action is taken to stop him. But military action should be the last resort, not the first and certainly not the best.
Allied forces in the Persian Gulf seem in no immediate danger. In an illuminating report in The Times last Sunday, Malcolm W. Browne cited
intelligence estimates that Iraq would require 2 to 10 years to develop a nuclear arsenal.
The Iraqis could pursue two routes to nuclear weapons, neither of which seems a present danger. One would use a small batch of highly enriched uranium fuel salvaged from a reactor destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 1981. This uranium has been inspected regularly by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but it is always possible that Iraq could build a bomb or two between inspections, too few to be decisive.
More likely, Iraq will try to build a small nuclear arsenal from scratch, outside the view of inspectors. It already has crude uranium, is said to have a chemical plant to perform the initial processing and has been caught trying to import machinery and parts for centrifuges that could turn this material into weapons-grade uranium.
But even if Iraq has 26 centrifuges, as some observers speculate, that is far short of the thousand or more needed. And any centrifuge plant big enough for weapons production should be spotted by intelligence satellites, leaving time for diplomatic pressure and military action if necessary.
The Iraqi nuclear threat does not, in itself, justify a military strike now. It is not even clear how much military action could accomplish. In 1981, the Israelis disrupted Iraq's nuclear drive by bombing a crucial reactor. But today Iraqi capabilities are harder to cripple. There is no central plant yet, just a handful of centrifuges, stores of crude uranium and knowledge in the minds of technicians.
The only long-term solution, short of unending military occupation, must be diplomatic. In the final resolution of the gulf crisis, the nuclear issue must be high on the agenda. All shipments of bomb-making material to Iraq should be embargoed, international inspections should become far more aggressive and Iraq should be pressed to forgo building facilities that could be rapidly converted to bomb production.
American troops are not likely to face an Iraqi bomb in the current crisis. Military action now to "take out" presumed nuclear facilities would satisfy emotion more than good sense. But sooner or later the world will face a nuclear-armed Iraq unless it takes firm diplomatic steps to head off that nightmarish prospect.
Taking Out Iraq's Nukes - New York Times
