Discuss PAK-IND air wars

[Windjammer]

ok lets say u r right then what about this....

The PAF almost exclusively flew defensive sorties with 61.5% of the overall effort and up to
70% excluding bomber, transport and recce sorties, being purely DCA sorties. The IAF in contrast, flew
an almost completely offensive air campaign ( 65.5% according to a serving PAF author or up to 80%
according to Indian sources )

source:Lt.gen shaukat/orbat.com


also...tell me then how can you show wreckage of so many planes.....

Take out the effort in the Eastern Sector and you may find an answer close to the reality.

 

[honour]

Please share the link...As far as i know MIg-21 were fitted with K-13 which were inferior to Sidewinder fitted on F-6, Sabres anf F-104...Also K-13 was scrapped right after 71 war which proves IAF did not find missile was worth.....

brother i checked the site......it claims only official deals of Pakistan...nothing about the Libyan/Saudi help in 1971...also to mention.... the site began its independent investigation after 1974<as read in Google sources> all the events occurred earlier were sourced through Govt's...also Sweden being a close ally of US was more interested in Gen.Yeager version.....
also to mention when the first records were released in 1984..its governing member had 2 Americans,2 Swedish,one British,one Pakistani,one from Brazil and few more<12 members>
also to mention the two Soviet representatives resigned 2 months before the reports release alleging fraud in Vietnam research...

 

[deckingraj]

Take out the effort in the Eastern Sector and you may find an answer close to the reality.

Why don't you put in the numbers yourself and educate us?? Also if we go by war strategy then India's strategy was defensive in west and offensive in east...So do take that into account once you share numbers with us...

 

[Desertfalcon]

This is a good site for info. I think they are pretty fair and unbiased. Maybe it will help...

Database - acig.org

 

[Myth_buster_1]

The way F-16's were operational after santions of spare parts...By the way your buddy WindJammer has even gone to lengths saying that US offered more F-104's after 71 war and was declined by Pak....Believe me i want to agree with you but what you are not answering is that sanctions started in 65 and you had 8 operational F-104's...10 were given to you by Jordan....What happened right after 71???

You are just being STUBBORN now! Unless you can prove PAF F-104 were supplied with enough spare parts from non US supplier i will be happy to accept your claim.
You are so hell bent to delude your self and believe PAF never returned back Jordanian F-104.
You have yet to show me links which CLEARLY states PAF did not return F-104 to Jordan.

Please share the link...As far as i know MIg-21 were fitted with K-13 which were inferior to Sidewinder fitted on F-6, Sabres anf F-104...Also K-13 was scrapped right after 71 war which proves IAF did not find missile was worth.....

You are just deluding yourself and doing a very sloppy work to actually read the links that i have provided. and oh.. The link was in that quote you have to click on the bolt part which i highlighted. but anyways here is the link...
LINK

I dont know why am i now bothering my self with you. I have said this like a 100th time that go to SIPRI and do a bit more research and you will find out that India after 65 war was supplied with AA-2 next variant which was equivalent to AIm-9G where as PAF was operating Aim-9B which self life was about to end and had a very poor performance. The next variant of AA-2 for IAF was a improved version of previously supplied were also produced in large numbers...

This is not true growler...You joined a pact with US and India due to its NAM had no pacts with anyone..It is common sense that during heights of cold war and strategic location of Pakistan with their proximity with China coupled with their tentions with Russia US would be nuts not to bestow their affinity towrds you...Here is a link

1950-1964: As the Cold War heated up, a 1954 security agreement prompted the United States to provide nearly $2.5 billion in economic aid and $700 million in military aid to Pakistan.

1965-1979: With the Indo-Pakistani hostilities in the late 1960s, the United States retreated. Between 1965 and 1971, the U.S. sent only $26 million in military aid, which was cut back even further to $2.9 million through the end of the decade. Meanwhile, economic aid kept flowing, totaling $2.55 billion over the 15 years. Everything came to a halt in 1979, however, when the Carter administration cut off all but food aid after discovering a uranium-enrichment facility in Pakistan. Pakistani leader Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq refused $400 million, split for economic and military aid from President Jimmy Carter, calling it “peanuts.” The following year, he was rewarded with a much more attractive offer.

Newsweek’s View of U.S. “Aid” to Pakistan, 1950-2009 | America at War

What the fudge does it prove? That PAF was supplied with the latest weapons?

a) What China factor? You think We did not have "Soviet" factor who actually threatened us to attack?
No you did not...Russia never threatned to attack you...There threat was if China joined the war Russia would join it too...So ball was in your court...and in Fact US did tilted towards you and that's why those F-104's and other helps were pouring in...

"Diplomacy" is not the subject here.

IAF had well over 600 Combat aircraft on Pakistani front.

IAF ORBAT

Western Air Command
HQ at New Delhi
CO Air Marshal Minoo Merwan Engineer
Sector Kashmir and Chhamb
- No.1 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Adampur (CO Wg.Cdr. Upkar Singh)
- No.3 Squadron, Mystére IVA, based at Sirsa, then Hindon/Halwara (CO Wg.Cdr. Dogra)
- No.18 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Srinagar (CO Wg.Cdr. Raina)
- No.20 Squadron, Hunter F.Mk.56, based at Pathankot (CO Wg.Cdr. Parker)
- No.23 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Pathankot (CO Wg.Cdr. Mohan)
- No.26 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Adampur (CO Wg.Cdr. Batra)
- No.27 Squadron, Hunter F.Mk.56, based at Pathankot (CO Wg.Cdr. Mehta)
- No.31 Squadron, Mystére IVA, based at Hindon/Halwara (CO Wg.Cdr. Trehan)
- No.32 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Ambala (CO Wg.Cdr. Manget)
- No.45 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Chandigarh, then Pathankot, finally Nal (CO Wg.Cdr. Anand)
- No.101 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Adampur (CO Wg.Cdr. Khanna)
- No.108 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Halwara, then Chandigarh (CO Wg.Cdr. Deshmukh)
- No.120 Squadron, Mystére IVA, based at Nal (CO ?)
- No.222 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Halwara (CO Wg.Cdr. D’Costa)
- TACDE (one flight), MiG-21FL, based at Amritsar/Ambala (CO Wg.Cdr. Mukerjee)
- TACDE (one flight), Su-7BMK, based at Amritsar/Ambala (CO Wg.Cdr. Mukerjee)

Sector Naya Chor and Ramgarh Desert
- No.10 Squadron, 16 HF-24 Maruts & 2 Hunter T.Mk.66s, based at Uttarlai/Jodhpur (CO Wg.Cdr. Aggarwal)
- No.21 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Uttarlai/Ahmedabad (CO Wg.Cdr. Malik)
- No.29 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Hindon, det. at Uttarlai (CO Wg.Cdr. Swardekar)
- No.122 Operational Training Unit, 4 Hunter F.Mk.56 & T.Mk.66, based at Jaisalmer, (CO Wg.Cdr. D.M. Conquest)
- No.220 Squadron, HF-24 Marut, based at Uttarlai/Jodhpur (CO Wg.Cdr. Dhawan)

Sector Rann of Kutch and Gulf of Kutch
- No.6 Squadron, L-1049 Constellation, based at Poone
- No.35 Squadron, Canberra B.(I).Mk.58/B.Mk.66, based at Poone (CO Wg.Cdr. Badhwar)
- No.47 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Jamnagar/Halwara (CO Wg.Cdr. Gill)
- No.106 Squadron, Canberra PR.Mk.57, based at Agra (CO Wg.Cdr. Thakar)
- JBCU, Canberra (different marks), based at Agra (CO Wg.Cdr. S.Thakar)

Central Air Command
- No.5 Squadron, Canberra B(I).Mk.58/B.Mk.66, based at Agra (CO Wg.Cdr. Talwar)
- No.8 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Poone (CO Wg.Cdr. Sen)
- No.9 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Jamnagar, later Halwara (CO Wg.Cdr. Yadav)

- No.107 Helicopter Unit, Mi-4, based in Goa
- No.109 Helicopter Unit, Mi-4, based in Goa
- No.111 Helicopter Unit, Mi-4, based in Goa

Transport Units
- No.11 Squadron, HS.748, based in Palam
- No.12 Squadron, C-119G, based at Chandigarh
- No.19 Squadron, C-119G, based at Chandigarh
- No.25 Squadron, An-12B, based at Chandigarh
- No.33 Squadron, DHC Caribou, based at ?
- No.41 Squadron, DHC Otter, based at Agra, (CO Wg.Cdr. Vashist)
- No.42 Squadron, Il-14, based at Palam
- No.43 Squadron, C-47, based at ?
- No.44 Squadron, An-12B, based at Chandigarh
- No.48 Squadron, C-119G, based at Tezpur
- No.49 Squadron, C-47, based at ?
- No.59 Squadron, DHC Otter, based at ?

Eastern Air Command
HQs at Shillong, near Calcutta
AOC-in-C Air Marshal H.C. Dewan
Sector Jessore (western East Pakistan)
- No.2 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Dum Dum then Amritsar/Ambala (CO Wg.Cdr. Greene)
- No.7 Squadron, 16 Hunter F.Mk.56 & 2 Hunter T.Mk.66, based at Baghdogra; 6 December eight Hunters to Nal, balance of unit to Hindon; on 12 December all aircraft to Pathankot, Chhamb sector (CO Wg.Cdr. Coelho, then Wg.Cdr. Suri)
- No.14 Squadron, Hunter F.Mk.56, based at Kalaikunda (CO Wg.Cdr. Sunderesan)
- No.16 Squadron, Canberra B(I).Mk.58/B.Mk.66, based at Kalaikunda (CO Wg.Cdr. Gautam)
- No.22 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Dum Dum and Kalaikunda, then Calcutta (CO Wg.Cdr. B.S. Sikand)
- No.30 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Kalaikunda (CO Wg.Cdr. V.S. Chadha)
- No.221 Squadron, Su-7BMK, based at Panagarh (until 14 December), (CO Wg.Cdr. Sridharan)
- No.104 Helicopter Unit, SA.316B Alouette III, based at ?
- No.110 Helicopter Unit, Mi-4, based in Dum Dum

Sector Sylhet-Comila (eastern East Pakistan)
- No.15 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based in Gauhati, later to Agartala (CO Wg.Cdr. M.M. Singh)
- No.17 Squadron, Hunter F.Mk.56, based at Hashimara (CO Wg.Cdr. N. Chatrath)
- No.24 Squadron, Gnat F.Mk.1, based at Gauhati (CO Wg.Cdr. R.L. Bhadwar)
- No.28 Squadron, MiG-21FL, based at Gauhati (CO Wg.Cdr. B.K. Bishnoi)
- No.105 Helicopter Unit, Mi-4, based at Agartala
- No.121 Helicopter Unit, SA.316B Alouette III, based at?

What??? How....atleast provide some links man...

I did but you are not just picking where to find the link from the quote itself. Usually the links are in bold or any darker letters.

but then i will post the link 100th time before you can pick it up.

http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=160&Itemid=47

We disagree on numbers...I am not challengind PAF combat numbers and will take your words on it...However IAF had only 650+...even then we have numnerical superiority but the disparity was not as big as you are portraying...I know that you have lot of knowledge then me but you are helping your case by providing me links so that i can correct/validate them...I hope in your next message you will do it...

Bull****t. Disparity was not as big? PAF operated only 240 combat aircrafts vs 650+ of IAF was not a big difference? 150+ 2nd - 3rd Generation Mig-21 equipped with new variant of AA-2 (equivalent to Aim-9G) vs 100 vintage 1st generation F-86, F-104, and F-6?

You must be deluding yourself.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

listen you man first confirm with windj what is the fact...he says the planes reached Pakistan after the air war.....u say i was not used because it lacked aim-9B capability....

seems like u both are lost in the words/facts/truth/lies/fantasies/bs

You are really a retarded!
Wont bother replying to your useless posts.

you are nothing but a deluded pathological lair.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

Here is the confirmed list of IAF kills shown to foreigner defence analysts. Gun cameras, wreckages, etc were also shown to foreigners to make their claims more authentic.

Source: Air Enthusiast

 

[Desertfalcon]

If anyone bothered to look at my acig.org link, I tend to think they are pretty accurate. They gather information from both sides of a conflict and present it without a point of view. They let you know what is claimed vs. what is confirmed and what is UNK.

For example, according to their information on PAF F-104 operations in both the 65' conflict and the 71' conflict, they show that PAF Starfighters shot down a total of 8 confirmed kills and in exchange for 5 of their number being shot down by the IAF. Do those figures sound about right? Anyway, look at the site and see what you think.

I don't have a bias in this guys and I think both countries air forces are extremely professional.

 

[Areesh]

Thanks for your welcome...appreciate it...

Moreover tell me Do you trust the air enthusiast magazine from the scans provided by growler/windjammer...?

Yes I have trust in them because they are based on photos, gun camera films and other proofs.

Just a hint how the American/western military officials were tilted to your side due to India-Soviet relations


In 1971, Yeager was assigned to Pakistan to advise the Pakistan Air Force at the behest of then-Ambassador Joe Farland.Prior to the start of hostilities of the Bangladesh War he is reported to have said that the Pakistani army would be in New Delhi within a week. During the war, his twin-engined Beech craft was destroyed in an Indian air raid on the Chaklala air base - he was reportedly incensed and demanded US retaliation.[/B] Despite Pakistan's surrender to India in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Yeager stayed in Pakistan until March 1973, and recalled his stay in Pakistan as one of the most enjoyable times of his life. During his stay he spent most of his time flying in an F-86 Sabre with the Pakistan Air Force and making several expeditions to the K2 mountain, vacationing in Swat, Pakistan, trekking and hunting in the Northern Areas and learning the Urdu language.
Chuck Yeager - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

2.

It was the morning after the initial Pakistani strike that Yeager began to take the
war with India personally. On the eve of their attack, the Pakistanis had been prudent
enough to evacuate their planes from airfields close to the Indian border and move them
back into the hinterlands. But no one thought to warn General Yeager. Thus, when an
Indian fighter pilot swept low over Islamabad's airport in India's first retaliatory strike,
he could see only two small planes on the ground. Dodging antiaircraft fire, he blasted
both to smithereens with 20 -millimeter cannon fire. One was Yeager 's Beech craft. The
other was a plane used by United Nations forces to supply the patrols that monitored the
ceasefire line in Kashmir.
I never found out how the United Nations reacted to the destruction of its plane, but
Yeager's response was anything but dispassionate. He raged to his cowering colleagues
at a staff meeting. His voice resounding through the embassy, he proclaimed that the
Indian pilot not only knew exactly what he was doing but had been specifically instructed
by Indira Gandhi to blast Yeager's plane. ("It was,' he relates in his book, "the Indian
way of giving Uncle Sam the finger.')
The destruction of the Beech craft was the last straw for Yeager. He vanished from his office, and, to the best of my knowledge, wasn't seen again in Islamabad until the war was over.
Edward C. Ingraham, "The right stuff in the wrong place" - Chuck Yeager's crash
landing in Pakistan, Washington Monthly, Oct, 1985

The right stuff in the wrong place - Chuck Yeager's crash landing in Pakistan | Washington Monthly | Find Articles at BNET

December 26, 2006 14:14 IST

A few months ago, the Office of the Historian at the US State Department released Volume XI of the Foreign Relations of the United States devoted to the 'South Asia Crisis, 1971': in other words, the Bangladesh War.
This 929-page publication groups together documents which were already known like the minutes of Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971 as well as scores of freshly declassified material available for the first time to the public.

some parts of it are....

But events in the subcontinent and the Chinese factor forced Nixon to change his stand. The new closeness between Washington, DC and Beijing and the involvement of the Pakistan president as a secret go-between greatly influenced US policy.

Then US President Richard Nixon According to the State Department historian, 'When the fighting developed, the Nixon administration tilted toward Pakistan. The tilt involved the dispatch of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to try to intimidate the Indian government. It also involved encouraging China to make military moves to achieve the same end, and an assurance to China that if China menaced India and the Soviet Union moved against China in support of India, the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union. China chose not to menace India, and the crisis on the subcontinent ended without a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.'

The first US documents deal with the background of the conflict. Nixon's position was clear: 'We should just stay out -- like in Biafra, what the hell can we do?'

But everybody did not agree with him. In a telegram sent on March 28, 1971, the staff at the US consulate in Dhaka complained, 'Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government... We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation's position as a moral leader of the free world.'

When US Secretary of State Will Rogers received this 'miserable' cable, he informed President Nixon that the 'Dacca consulate is in open rebellion.' This did not change Nixon's opinion: 'The people who ***** about Vietnam ***** about it because we intervened in what they say is a civil war. Now some of the same bastards...want us to intervene here -- both civil wars.'

From the start, the Nixon administration knew 'the prospects were "poor"... the Pakistani army would not be able to exert effective control over East Pakistan.' Washington believed India was bound to support Mujibur Rahman. The CIA had reported that 'India would foster and support Bengali insurgency and contribute to the likelihood that an independent Bangladesh would emerge from the developing conflict.'

It is here that the Chinese saga began. In a tightly guarded secret, Nixon had started contacts with Beijing. The postman was Pakistani dictator Field Marshal Yahya Khan.

When on April 28 1971, Kissinger sent a note defining the future policy option towards Pakistan, Nixon replied in a handwritten note: 'Don't squeeze Yahya at this time.' The Pakistan president was not to be squeezed because he was in the process of arranging Kissinger's first secret meeting to China. The events of the following months and the US position should be seen in this perspective.

Indira GandhiIn May, Indira Gandhi wrote to Nixon about the 'carnage in East Bengal' and the flood of refugees burdening India. After L K Jha, then the Indian ambassador to US, had warned Kissinger that India might have to send back some of the refugees as guerillas, Nixon commented, 'By God we will cut off economic aid (to India).'

A few days later when the US president said 'the goddamn Indians' were preparing for another war, Kissinger retorted 'they are the most aggressive goddamn people around.'

During the second week of July, Kissinger went to Beijing where he was told by then Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai: 'In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by.' Kissinger answered that Zhou should know that the US sympathies also lay with Pakistan.

On his return, during a meeting of the National Security Council, Nixon continued his India bashing. The Indians, he noted, are 'a slippery, treacherous people.'

The State Department historian says, 'in the perspective of Washington, the crisis ratcheted up a dangerous notch on August 9 when India and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation.' It was a shock for Washington as they saw a deliberate collusion between Delhi and Moscow .

During the following months, the situation deteriorated and many more refugees came to India. The Indian prime minister decided to tour Western capitals to explain the Indian stand. On November 4 and 5, she met Nixon in Washington, who told her that a new war in the subcontinent was out of the question.

The next day, Nixon and Kissinger assessed the situation. Kissinger told Nixon: 'The Indians are bastards anyway. They are plotting a war.'

To divert the pressure applied by the Mukti Bahini on the eastern front, the Pakistan air force launched an attack on six Indian airfields in Kashmir and Punjab on December 3. It was the beginning of the war.

The next day, then US ambassador to the United Nations George H W Bush -- later 41st president of the United States and father of the current American president -- introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.

The CIA reported to the President: 'She (Indira Gandhi) hopes the Chinese (will) not intervene physically in the North; however, the Soviets have warned her that the Chinese are still able to "rattle the sword" in Ladakh and Chumbi areas.'

Henry Kissinger For Kissinger it was clear that Indira Gandhi wanted the dismemberment of Pakistan.

On December 9, when the CIA director warned Nixon that 'East Pakistan was crumbling', Nixon decided to send the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to threaten India.

Let me recount an anecdote related to me by Major General K K Tewari (retd), Chief Signal Officer, Eastern Command, during the 1971 War.

General Tewari was present at a briefing the three defence services held for Indira Gandhi. She was seated at a large table. On one side was General S H F J Manekshaw, the army chief, and on the other Admiral S M Nanda, the navy chief.

During the course of the presentation, the admiral intervened and said: 'Madam, the US 8th Fleet is sailing into the Bay of Bengal.' Nothing happened; the briefing continued. After sometime, the admiral repeated, 'Madam, I have to inform you that the 8th Fleet is sailing into the Bay of Bengal.' She cut him off immediately: 'Admiral, I heard you the first time, let us go on with the briefing.'

All the officers present were stunned. Ultimately, their morale was tremendously boosted by the prime minister's attitude. She had demonstrated her utter contempt for the American bluff.

On November 10, Nixon instructed Kissinger to ask the Chinese to move some troops toward the Indian frontier. 'Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do now.'

This was conveyed to Huang Hua, China's envoy to the United Nations. Kissinger told Huang the US would be prepared for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacked China.

On December 12, the White House received an urgent message. The Chinese wanted to meet in New York. General Alexander Haig, then Kissinger's deputy, rushed to the venue, but was disappointed. Huang just wanted to convey his government's stand in the UN, no words of an attack in Sikkim or in the then North East Frontier Agency (now, the northeastern states).

The myth of the Chinese intervention is also visible in the secret Pakistani dispatches. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in Dhaka, was informed: 'NEFA front has been activated by Chinese although the Indians for obvious reasons have not announced it.'

Until the last day of the war, Pakistan expected its Chinese saviour to strike, but Beijing never did.

In Washington, Nixon analysed the situation thus: 'If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis...we may be looking down the gun barrel.' Nixon was not sure about China. Did they really intend to start a military action against India?

Finally, on December 16, Niazi surrendered to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. Nixon and Kissinger congratulated themselves for achieving their fundamental goal -- the preservation of West Pakistan. They were also happy for having 'scared the pants off the Russians.They now started to think how to glorify the outcome as a success of their foreign policy.Best way was suggested to kissinger by Gen Tikka that he should try to convince the senate that indian losses were more than the Pakistan'

Kissinger's South Asia policy upset many in the US, not only the American public, the press but also the State Department, and more particularly, Secretary of State Rogers who was kept in the dark most of the time.

It is worth mentioning an episode which, of course, does not appear in the American archives -- The Tibetan participation in the conflict. After the debacle of 1962, the Government of India had recruited some Tibetans youth in the eventuality of another conflict with China. The Special Frontier Force was trained in Chakrata in Uttar Pradesh under the command of an Indian general.

In 1971, nine years after its creation, the SFF was sent to East Pakistan to prepare for the arrival of regular Indian troops. Their saga is one of the least known parts of the Bangladesh war.

Late October 1971, an AN-12 airlifted nearly 3,000 Tibetans who later assembled at Demagiri close to the India-East Pakistan border. On the other side of the border were the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Armed with Bulgarian-made assault rifles, the SFF was given the task of organising guerrilla raids across the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Opposite the SSF, in thick jungles and leech-infested marshes, was stationed a Pakistan brigade, including a battalion of its elite Special Services Group.

The Indian army knew this brigade was a threat to one of its corps preparing to advance on Dhaka.

During the second week of November, Operation Eagle began. Leaving Demagiri in canoes, the Tibetans commandos entered East Pakistan. The SFF then started overrunning one Pakistani post after another.

By the time the war was officially declared, the Tibetans had already been inside East Pakistan for more than three weeks. Using both their Bulgarian rifles and native knives, they advanced swiftly. Their Indian commandaner, Major General S S Uban later said, 'They were unstoppable.'

On December 16, the SSF was 40 kilometers away from Chittagong port, having successfully managed to neutralise the Pakistani brigade.

After Pakistan's surrender, they paraded through Chittagong. Unfortunately, 49 Tibetans lost their lives for a nation which was not theirs.

The release of the State Department volume on the 1971 conflict is a posthumous homage to the courage of the Indian Army which despite heavy odds and the might of the United States freed Bangladesh from Pakistani clutches.

Some aspects are still missing to make the puzzle complete.

First, the Indian history from the Ministry of Defence does not detail the political compulsions of Indira Gandhi's government. Second, the secret operation involving the Tibetan Special Frontier Forces in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is virtually unknown. Lastly, the Chinese involvement from the Chinese point of view remains unexamined.

Like the Henderson Brooks' report on the 1962 border war with China, it may take a few decades more to be revealed.

A very irrelevant and unnecessary post in the context to my post in which I posted a photo of a SU-7 wreckage. Anyways being an Indian defines it all.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

The Pathological Lair Indian officials claims have been debunked.
IAF claimed to have destroyed over 6 PAF Mirage-III have been proved wrong by displaying 22 Mirages in tarmac and 1 in hanger and one crashed in a accident.
IAF another bloodily false claim of destroying 6+ F-104 have been also proved wrong. 10 Jordanian F-104 (which rarely saw any combat) were returned back in 1972 and lost only 2 in combat out of operational 7 F-104s. 6 F-104 survived the war which are displayed across PAF sites.

In 1971 IAF lost close to 100 combat air crafts on ground, air, and to a anti-aircraft fires where as PAF lost no more then 30 aircrafts on their own (excluding self detrimental Sabres/T-33).

 

[honour]

@ growler...plz stick to the topic...dont try to be aggressive....and be in your limits.

moreover the link you posted has a pakistani as its author and still you want us to trust that.........

http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/inde...=160&Itemid=47

India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction
Contributed by Tom Cooper, with Khan Syed Shaiz Ali
Feb 10, 2008 at 07:37 PM
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was so far the largest (conventional) conflict between these two countries. The air force played an important - sometimes the crucial - role in this war, fought on two huge battlefields separated by thousands of kilometres. This is the first out of a multi-part feature about the role of air power in this conflict.

 

[honour]

The Pathological Lair Indian officials claims have been debunked.
IAF claimed to have destroyed over 6 PAF Mirage-III have been proved wrong by displaying 22 Mirages in tarmac and 1 in hanger and one crashed in a accident.
IAF another bloodily false claim of destroying 6+ F-104 have been also proved wrong. 10 Jordanian F-104 (which rarely saw any combat) were returned back in 1972 and lost only 2 in combat out of operational 7 F-104s. 6 F-104 survived the war which are displayed across PAF sites.

In 1971 IAF lost close to 100 combat air crafts on ground, air, and to a anti-aircraft fires where as PAF lost no more then 30 aircrafts on their own (excluding self detrimental Sabres/T-33).

To remind you most of the dassault sources/neutral sources claim that 28 mirages were supplied to you.....also the fact told behind the return is that first you used them to show them as your plane so as to minimize ur damages and then you returned it<or not>...


The Mirage -IIIEP served with No.5 squadron at Saragodha during the 1971 war,
operating primarily in the air Defence role. Some 28 Mirages were supplied by France,
and 23 were shown after t he war, though six extra aircraft were said to have been
supplied by a Middle Eastern ally.
The PAF played a more limited role in the operations, and was reinforced by F -104s
from Jordan, Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern Ally (probably Libya) a nd by
F-86s from Saudi Arabia. Their arrival helped camouflage the extent of Pakistan's losses.
Libyan F -5s were reportedly deployed to Saragodha, perhaps as a potential training unit
to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F -5s from Saudi Arabia .
Chris Bishop, Indo-Pakistan wars 1965-71, p.386, "The Encyclopedia of 20th Century
Air Warfare", 2001 Aerospace publishing ltd, 2001 edition

 

[deckingraj]

@growler, @Windjammer, @Honor

I am going out of town for 2 days and would not be able to reply back...Sorry about it...

Growler stay tuned for my reply...I do have some more information...

 

[Areesh]

@ growler...plz stick to the topic...dont try to be aggressive....and be in your limits.

moreover the link you posted has a pakistani as its author and still you want us to trust that.........

http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/inde...=160&Itemid=47

India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction
Contributed by Tom Cooper, with Khan Syed Shaiz Ali
Feb 10, 2008 at 07:37 PM
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was so far the largest (conventional) conflict between these two countries. The air force played an important - sometimes the crucial - role in this war, fought on two huge battlefields separated by thousands of kilometres. This is the first out of a multi-part feature about the role of air power in this conflict.

And "neutral" sources provided by deckingraj and other Indian members not only include Indians but even Government of India and Defense Ministry of India it self and still you want us to trust those "neutral" sources. Lolllzzz.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

@ growler...plz stick to the topic...dont try to be aggressive....and be in your limits.

moreover the link you posted has a pakistani as its author and still you want us to trust that.........India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction
Contributed by Tom Cooper, with Khan Syed Shaiz Ali
Feb 10, 2008 at 07:37 PM
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was so far the largest (conventional) conflict between these two countries. The air force played an important - sometimes the crucial - role in this war, fought on two huge battlefields separated by thousands of kilometres. This is the first out of a multi-part feature about the role of air power in this conflict.http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/inde...=160&Itemid=47

It is actually below my dignity to reply to a person who lacks comprehension of any subject.
The subject here is Pak-ind air war not 71 air war.

Almost all your links are associated with Indian sources. Your orbat 1971 1965 kills links which you are hell bent to believe as "neutral" are infact all associated with Indian sources like bharat-raksak and bharati authors.
Neither Tom or Khan are saying anything bias. They are both assessing 1971 order of battle of both nations. At least point out at points which you dont agree or you think is wrong.