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But now it nearly June 2014 and they have money now.

It's not a money issue, but the delayes of fulfilling the industrial parts of the competition that delayed the selection. Dassault took too long for the negotiations and contract signings with Indian industrial partners, let alone the delays the workshare / responsibility negotiations took.
The new DM has to see if these parts of the requirements are fulfilled now and most likely will take a look at the life cycle cost issues that they criticized earlier too. That's why the new fiscal year, doesn't mean they would take a decision for Rafale right now, but within this year.
 
It's not a money issue, but the delayes of fulfilling the industrial parts of the competition that delayed the selection. Dassault took too long for the negotiations and contract signings with Indian industrial partners, let alone the delays the workshare / responsibility negotiations took.
The new DM has to see if these parts of the requirements are fulfilled now and most likely will take a look at the life cycle cost issues that they criticized earlier too. That's why the new fiscal year, doesn't mean they would take a decision for Rafale right now, but within this year.
All these reports were probably or should have been prepared during the previous government's tenure as they have plenty of time to work on it.
 
All these reports were probably or should have been prepared during the previous government's tenure as they have plenty of time to work on it.

They were, but as said, they have nothing to do with the government, rather than Dassault and their industrial partners in first place.
 
French airforce contingent arrives in India for 'Garuda-5'
Last Updated: Sunday, June 01, 2014, 00:55

Rafale-em-forma%C3%A7%C3%A3o-foto-via-Rafale-News-580x338.jpg

Jodhpur: Four French Rafale fighter aircraft and a contingent of about 70 French airforce personnel on Saturday landed at Jodhpur airbase to participate in the 10-day long joint air exercise "Garuda-5".

The air exercise, expected to be attended by Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, will kick start at the Jodhpur airbase on June 2.

The two air forces would be engaged in various missions ranging from close combat engagement of large forces, slow mover protection, and protecting and engaging high-value aerial assets in the exercise at the strategic airbase near Indo-Pak border.

The air exercise will include four Rafale multirole fighter aircraft and one air refueler that will participate with IAF's multirole Su-30MKI, four MiG-27 and four MiG-21 (BISON) aircraft. The chiefs of both air forces will be flying the Rafale and Su-30 MKI.

The objective of the exercise is to acquaint the fighter pilots of the two countries with the fighter tactics of each other, air to air refuelling, cross-servicing of a common type between ground crews and understanding basic concepts of each countries fighter operations, defence sources said.

French airforce contingent arrives in India for `Garuda-5`
 
EF T3A, not the best, but is it good enough for a fast replacement of Migs in 2015/16?


UK_Typhoon-in-Malaysia_300312.jpg

(CAS with Paveway IV and METEOR)

AIR_Eurofighter_RAF_CAP_ASRAAM_Meteor_lg.jpg

(METEOR)


IPA7_Swing-role-configuration_C_J_Gietl.jpg

(Paveway IV)

Ellamy-906-110525-0172-Out-Unc-0283_copia.jpg

(CAS with GBU 16 and Litening LDP)


Typhoon-SS.jpg

(Cruise missile strike with Storm Shadow, with limited range of the fighter though)

Upgrades in time for the new delivery timeframe for 2018?
ILA_Berlin_2012_PD_193-2.JPG

(Captor E AESA radar)

Typhoon.jpg

(CAS with Brimstone ATGM and METEOR)


Advantages:

- faster replacement of the Migs
- better flight performance
- better A2A load configs
- better CAS load configs by 2018
- (possibly) better radar by 2018
- IRST, HMS and Litening
- more industrial benefits


Disadvantages:

- costs
- AESA only under developments
- limited heavy and deep strike capabilities until CFTs are available
 
EF T3A, not the best, but is it good enough for a fast replacement of Migs in 2015/16?


UK_Typhoon-in-Malaysia_300312.jpg

(CAS with Paveway IV and METEOR)

AIR_Eurofighter_RAF_CAP_ASRAAM_Meteor_lg.jpg

(METEOR)


IPA7_Swing-role-configuration_C_J_Gietl.jpg

(Paveway IV)

Ellamy-906-110525-0172-Out-Unc-0283_copia.jpg

(CAS with GBU 16 and Litening LDP)


Typhoon-SS.jpg

(Cruise missile strike with Storm Shadow, with limited range of the fighter though)

Upgrades in time for the new delivery timeframe for 2018?
ILA_Berlin_2012_PD_193-2.JPG

(Captor E AESA radar)

Typhoon.jpg

(CAS with Brimstone ATGM and METEOR)


Advantages:

- faster replacement of the Migs
- better flight performance
- better A2A load configs
- better CAS load configs by 2018
- (possibly) better radar by 2018
- IRST, HMS and Litening
- more industrial benefits


Disadvantages:

- costs
- AESA only under developments
- limited heavy and deep strike capabilities until CFTs are available



Since we are talking about possibilities...

Defence Committee
Written evidence from C J A Cope, Political Editor, Warship World Magazine


Towards the end of June, the Defence Secretary, Dr Liam Fox, gave a speech to the Royal United Services Institute. In that speech, he made a number of claims which, on examination, do not appear to be accurate. This is what he said:

“Let me take head-on the persistent claim that the nature of our operations in Libya, and the cost of them, would be different had we an aircraft carrier and the Harrier in service.”

“The truth is that we still would have based RAF Tornadoes and Typhoons in Italy for the air-to-air role and to carry the precision weaponry such as Stormshadow or Brimstone that Harrier cannot carry.”

“So it would not have been cheaper—in fact, it would have been much more expensive.”

Costs
According to a parliamentary reply by Peter Luff dated 14 September 2010, the cost per flight hour of operating the Tornado GR4 was £35,000, the Harrier GR9 £37,000 and the Typhoon FGR4 £70,000.

Nevertheless, as to why the GR9 should cost more to operate per flight hour than the Tornado has not been explained and should be questioned. These figures must be independently verified by the National Audit Office.

Elsewhere in his speech, Dr Fox said that Labour had already reduced the Harrier fleet in 2009, leaving the remaining aircraft being unable to sustain operations in Afghanistan, let alone undertake contingencies such as Libya. He also said that only Tornado had the capacity to do both.

Nevertheless, in a parliamentary reply dating from this spring, the MoD stated that the number of Harrier GR9s withdrawn in December 2010 was 62. This is far in excess of the numbers of Tornadoes and Typhoons operated by the RAF either in Afghanistan or Libya. 40 of these Harriers were fully fitted for and capable of frontline combat or ground support operations. In spite of the Tornado fleet numbering 107 aircraft, only 28 were fully fitted for and capable of conducting the Afghanistan close air support task. In other words, there was much more capacity within the Harrier GR9 fleet to support Afghanistan and Libyan operations. The Tornado Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) was therefore significantly less than that of the Harrier.

A further parliamentary reply indicated that savings from the withdrawal from service of Ark Royal in December 2010 are estimated at £105 million between 2011–12 and 2014–15. Prior to SDSR, the MoD had disclosed that Ark Royal would be taken out of service in the third quarter of 2014.

Accordingly, the average annual savings following the withdrawal from service of Ark Royal during that three-year period are £35 million. That equates with the savings from the withdrawal from service of Illustrious which have also been estimated by the MoD at £35 million per annum.

It must follow, therefore, that to have maintained Ark Royal in service throughout 2011, enabling the ship to operate in the Mediterranean during Operation Ellamy would have cost the MoD about £35 million.

Dr Fox appears to be suggesting that it is cheaper to be operating RAF Tornadoes and Typhoons from Gioia del Colle in Italy than GR9s operating from Ark Royal in the Mediterranean.

It does not take a mathematical genius to realise that operating GR9s from a carrier lying just outside Libyan territorial waters has simply got to be substantially cheaper than flying Tornadoes and Typhoons from their base in Italy the 600 or so nautical miles to Libya and then back again, with VC10/ Tristar refuelling en route—not to mention the massive logistical support train by air and overland.

It is high time that the MoD disclosed the actual cost of basing Tornadoes and Typhoons in Italy, particularly following the report in the Sunday Times in June that the RAF was spending an estimated £40,000 a night for pilots and support staff to stay at 4* hotels in southern Italy.

There have been reports that land-based operations in Libya over a six months period are likely to be costing £900 million, compared with £150 million (just 17%) for sea-based operations. Moreover, if one includes infrastructure costs, the RAF figure could rise to £1.35 billion.

In any event, independent verification is essential and again I would urge you to invite the NAO to conduct an inquiry.

Launched from a carrier, a GR9 can be on task delivering weapons within 30 minutes of, for example, a call for urgent support from ground forces. In contrast, a Tornado/Typhoon operating from Gioia del Colle has a transit time of 1.5 hours to reach its target and, of course, requires air-to-air refuelling. In addition, the RAF insists on having 24 hours’ notice of close air support missions in order to support ground forces.

And finally, on the cost of operating aircraft, it has been disclosed that the Army Apache (of which four have been deployed with Ocean) are costing some £15,000 an hour—less than half that of Tornado.

Weaponry
1. ALARM (air-to-ground missile)

Is used to take out hostile radar systems. Can be operated by Tornado, but not by the GR9. However, not deployed in Libya/Afghanistan.

2. AMRAAM/ASRAAM/AIM9 Sidewinder (air-to-air missiles)
AMRAAM is a BVR (Beyond Visual Range) missile and carried by Typhoon. ASRAAM can be carried by some, but not all, Tornado aircraft. The GR9 is fully configured/fitted for the carriage and use of the well-proven Sidewinder missile. Accordingly, all three aircraft types have an air-to-air capability. However, the Tornado is notoriously deficient when conducting air combat within visual range. In contrast, the Harrier is highly agile and has a proven track record in aerial combat. Nevertheless, it has to be conceded that, without radar or a BVR system, the GR9 simply cannot fulfil an area interceptor role. But the GR9 armed with the latest Sidewinder missile and controlled in-flight by carrier-borne radar controllers/ direction officers, could defend itself in close combat against any third world fighter threat. I need hardly remind you of the astonishing success rate of the Sea Harrier during the Falklands War, when operating within visual range and with superior pilot expertise. And, of course, with the new Type-45 destroyers equipped with Aster missiles and the Sampson radar system, hostile aircraft BVR would be eliminated using Sea Viper. The Aster 30 has a range of 50 miles.

3. Paveway
There are three separate marks in service, namely Mark II (simple laser-guided bomb), Mark III (GPS precision guided “bunker-busting” 2000lb bomb), Mark IV (GPS precision guided bomb).

Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR9 have the capability to deliver all three variants accurately. Typhoon can only deliver the Mk II variant and then only when it has independent targeted help.

4. Brimstone/Hellfire
Both are anti-tank missiles. Whereas the RAF aircraft can deploy Brimstone, the GR9 cannot. However, Hellfire is as good as Brimstone (and cheaper) and is carried by Apache. Nevertheless, Apache can deliver Hellfire much more responsively and from shorter range, making it a better and much more cost-effective operational weapons system.

5. Stormshadow/Tomahawk (TLAM)
Whereas the RAF aircraft can carry Stormshadow, the GR9 cannot. Furthermore, the RAF has no Tomahawk capability.

Stormshadow has a history of misfires, not guiding to target and warhead failures on hitting a target. The RAF has substantial stocks of Stormshadow missiles (900 were ordered). Each cost $1.3 million, having a range of 400 miles.

On the other hand, Tomahawk, operated from Britain’s modified T-boats, together with the new Astute class SSN, has a range of up to 1,500 miles, can be re-programmed in flight (unlike Stormshadow) and is extremely reliable with a high probability of kill (unlike Stormshadow). Furthermore, Tomahawk is less than half the price of Stormshadow.

The only advantage of Stormshadow over Tomahawk is that it has a warhead specifically designed to penetrate and destroy hardened targets, which Tomahawk cannot do. Nevertheless, an operational commander would undoubtedly be using the Mark III Paveway with the Tornado or GR9, instead of calling up a Tomahawk cruise missile if needing to destroy a hardened target.

We know that on her first deployment, HMS Triumph (SSN) fired six Tomahawk cruise missiles. The number fired on the second deployment has yet to be disclosed (thought to be eight). Equally, the Navy has limited stocks of Tomahawk missiles. During the early stages of the campaign, the US Navy deployed USS Florida, an SSGN, which fired some 90 Tomahawk cruise missiles against Libyan targets. There was, of course, no guarantee that the USN would participate in Operation Ellamy. Please also note that no European navy apart from the RN can fire cruise missiles.

The new Astute class can carry up to 38 weapons and would be perfectly capable of deploying 24 Tomahawk cruise missiles in any deployment.

An SSN has strategic mobility whereas airfields are static and vulnerable.

6. Other systems
The GR9 can also operate Maverick, which is a close-air-support anti-tank weapon, having an excellent track record and the CRV7 rocket, a close-air-support weapon which also has a good track record. Neither is carried by Tornado.

In addition to being equipped with the Hellfire missile, the Apache helicopter has a highly accurate cannon with 500 rounds available (far more effective and flexible than the Tornado cannon which carries half the number of rounds).

Military Conclusion
Four Astute-class SSNs armed with Tomahawk would be capable of eliminating no less than 96 targets, thereby avoiding any need to use Tornado/Typhoons armed with Stormshadow missiles. One Astute is in service. The next three boats should be in service by 2016. Today, we have four TLAM-equipped T-boats, albeit with a reduced payload.

HMS Ocean, equipped with Apache helicopters, with support from Sea King AEW helicopters, has been deployed. Apache with Hellfire missiles and cannon is being utilised for anti-tank/anti-armour purposes. A full complement of 20 Apaches is feasible, bearing in mind that over 60 were delivered to the Army Air Corps.

In addition, the Navy could have been operating HMS Ark Royal equipped with GR9s and supported by Sea King AEWs. GR9s equipped with Sidewinder missiles would have been used in air-to-air combat if the Libyan air force had managed to operate.

The GR9 equipped with Paveway could have carried out bunker-busting operations and close-air-support (this is what it was designed to do) using also the Maverick close-air-support anti-tank weapon, together with the CRV7 rocket.

This naval combination would have been more effective and considerably cheaper than involving RAF Tornadoes and Typhoons and highly expensive air-to-air refuelling and logistics backup.

During Ellamy, the RAF has managed only one Tornado mission every two days, compared with the USMC flying two missions per Harrier every day.

In any event, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (CDG) has achieved no less than 40% of daily strike missions in Libya, compared with NATO aircraft and RN/USN SSNs/SSGNs making up the remaining 60%.

SDSR made it clear that in future, we would be increasingly dependent upon allies. Consider, therefore, the following situation in relation to Operation Ellamy:

1.USN—Carriers not involved.

2.French Navy—CDG returned to Toulon with a refit due at year-end.

3.Spanish Navy—Carrier not involved.

4.Italian Navy—Carrier withdrawn for economic reasons. Government contemplating withdrawal of air base facilities, with profound implications for future RAF operations.

5.RN—No fixed-wing carriers in service.

Political Conclusion
Contrary to what Dr Fox told the RUSI:

(a)The nature of our Libyan operations would have been greatly improved using a carrier/Harrier combination, together with Apache helicopters and TLAM-equipped SSNs.

(b)We could have dispensed with all land-based air operations from Italy.

(c)There is an effective naval alternative to Brimstone/Stormshadow.

(d)The Navy could have carried out the UK’s entire contribution to Operation Ellamy at a fraction of the cost incurred by the RAF.

19 July 2011

House of Commons - Defence Committee: Written evidence from C J A Cope, Political Editor, Warship World Magazine
 
Disadvantages:
- costs
- AESA only under developments
- limited heavy and deep strike capabilities until CFTs are available
You should the fact you are dealing with a consortium and not a single entity with all the added political complications with brings and as a result the lack of an integrated and fully funded future road map with each partner nation having different priorities. In my opinion the EFT consortium approach as been a failure, yes mostly due to Euro nations across the board cutting back on their respective defence budgets but the fact is upgrades and developments that should have been on the Typhoon years ago are still under consideration/development. Additionally in every single head to head competition the EFT and Rafale have taken part in the Rafale has come out ahead, the fact it hasn't secured any export orders as of yet is a separate issue.

I'm pretty confident the Rafale's production line will outlast the EFT's.
 
Since we are talking about possibilities...

The quoted figure is older and should have been gone done a bit, but as I said, the costs will be the main problem. I am only showing that it is still an option and currently even the fastest to replace the Migs.

You should the fact you are dealing with a consortium and not a single entity with all the added political complications with brings and as a result the lack of an integrated and fully funded future road map with each partner nation having different priorities.

The political complications are an assumption, which can be true, but can't be verified and the only reason why I compare the EF now again, is the fact that the difference in funded capabilies has gone down today (Paveway IV, METEOR and Storm Shadow done, AESA and CFTs lacking to fulfill the requirements, while for Rafale it would be HMS, IRST and Litening).

In my opinion the EFT consortium approach as been a failure,

No doubt about that, the UK should had lead the offer, they shouldn't had offered only upgrades with their advantage in mind, but should had offered what India needs (TVC as an option if we fund it vs joint engine development for example). However, that was back in 2012 with delivery planned in 2015, now we have 2014, the EF has got considerable upgrades and has a much more realistic upgrade roadmap prospect till 2018, the current possible delivery date.[/quote]
 
Upgrades are just... On the way. Plane capabilities in term of deep strike are still way below Rafale's despite CFT's (which are also late as compared to Rafale...). Paveway 4 is a gliding bomb, with all the advantages (cost) but also limitations (off boresight, low level release) Meteor not coming before Rafale's, still no radar guided low level automatic flying mode etc. etc.
 
Mirage 2000 - € 8672 ($11896)
Rafale B/C - € 9484 ($13010)
Should be very interesting for IAF to compare these figures.

The quoted figure is older and should have been gone done a bit, but as I said, the costs will be the main problem. I am only showing that it is still an option and currently even the fastest to replace the Migs.

I know is older, but it is a valid benchmark. Not to long ago you also gave us some numbers concerning the Rafale figures in 2012.

I believe all these figures are important and have to be considered.
 
Upgrades are just... On the way. Plane capabilities in term of deep strike are still way below Rafale's despite CFT's (which are also late as compared to Rafale...)

3000l in CFTs + a centerline 1000l fuel tank are more than enough for deep strikes with 2 x Storm Shadows, especially at lower drag as compared Rafale with 2 x 2000l subsonic fuel tanks. CFT for EF is the game changer to make it fully multi role capable, the question is only when they will be available, from 2018 or 2020 onwards.

Wrt PW IV, it's not only the cost that is an advantage, but also the fact that the EF is not only dependent on the heavy GBU 16s in CAS anymore, that it can strike several targets at a single pass now like Rafale does it. The main disadvantage is the low range, compared to Rafale with AASM of course, that will make the EF more vulnerable, but with Brimstone and SPEAR 3 on the line, the prospect in CAS and even SEAD looks clearly brighter for the EF, than for the Rafale.

METEOR is coming on EF clearly before it comes on Rafale, simply by the fact that any of the EF partners except of the UK, still use the old AIM 120 versions, which needs replacements soon, just like it is the case for Gripen C/Ds in Swedish forces. France opted for METEOR so late, because MICA has enough time left to be replaced.
 
I know is older, but it is a valid benchmark. Not to long ago you also gave us some numbers concerning the Rafale figures in 2012.

I believe all these figures are important and have to be considered.

No doubt, but they must be considered as a part of the offered package and then it needs to be seen where the priorities are and who offers more advantage. If fast replacement of Migs is given higher importance by the BJP, the EF is the better choice and if they think that justifies the higher costs, they can select it. If they put the higher priority on industrial advantages and possible creation of jobs in India, the EF might be the better choice too, which also could justify higher costs.
So unless we know if the BJP will continue with the earlier RFP priorities, or if they want to add own priorities, we can't say what happen. Remember what happend in the FX2 competition when the new government came in and the priorities for cost / cost-effectiveness was changed with a much higher importance than in the initial rules? That changed the competition mainly away from the Rafale and towards the F18SH and the Gripen E. At the end that even countered the high risks of delays the Gripen offers and that the FAB had pointed out in their evalutions too. So one has to consider these changes of a new government, possible priority changes and of course the changes of delivery timeline and capabilties of the figthers, to get to the best package for India.
 
No doubt, but they must be considered as a part of the offered package and then it needs to be seen where the priorities are and who offers more advantage. If fast replacement of Migs is given higher importance by the BJP, the EF is the better choice and if they think that justifies the higher costs, they can select it. If they put the higher priority on industrial advantages and possible creation of jobs in India, the EF might be the better choice too, which also could justify higher costs.
So unless we know if the BJP will continue with the earlier RFP priorities, or if they want to add own priorities, we can't say what happen. Remember what happend in the FX2 competition when the new government came in and the priorities for cost / cost-effectiveness was changed with a much higher importance than in the initial rules? That changed the competition mainly away from the Rafale and towards the F18SH and the Gripen E. At the end that even countered the high risks of delays the Gripen offers and that the FAB had pointed out in their evalutions too. So one has to consider these changes of a new government, possible priority changes and of course the changes of delivery timeline and capabilties of the figthers, to get to the best package for India.

You've provided a good point. Concerning our situation, not all Brazilians are convinced the Gripen is the better choice, nevertheless it is a government and air force decision.
For the records, I prefer the Rafale.
 
You've provided a good point. Concerning our situation, not all Brazilians are convinced the Gripen is the better choice, nevertheless it is a government and air force decision.
For the records, I prefer the Rafale.

The EF "solution" that I present here only to show what options are available, is actually very similar to Brazil selecting Gripen E!
In both cases:

- the country would accept a less capable version as a fast to deliver stop gap solution
- the country would get fully developed versions of the fighters in later stages (actually even here the 2018 timeframe is the same now)
- the country would be a partner of the fighter, which gives credible access to techs and manufacturing capacities
- the importance would lie on industrial improvement for the future, rather than getting the best currently available fighter

The only difference would be, that you also chose the most cost-effective solution, while the EF would be the costlier once for us, which means the technical / industrial return must be good enough to justify the costs. IF that is the case, the EF solution could benefit India more.

And I generally prefer Rafale too! :)
 
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