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Whats the differnce between "Omnirole" and "Multirole" ??? :azn:
Here
Dassault describes its Rafale as being an "omnirole" fighter, a tag that it says denotes the type's ability to perform multiple mission types simultaneously. This differs from the widely adopted multi-role description used by its rivals largely as a result of the aircraft's ability to provide its pilot with data fused from onboard sensors, it says. These range from its Thales RBE2 fire-control radar, Spectra electronic warfare suite and passive front sector optronics equipment to the seekers on its MBDA Mica air-to-air missiles.

"The intention from the beginning was to develop a joint and omnirole Rafale," says Stéphane Reb, programme manager for France's DGA defence procurement agency.

"It was intended to perform air-to-air missions, deterrence, air-to-ground and reconnaissance simultaneously," adds Reb.

This vision was realised in July 2008, with the introduction to service of the current F3 production-standard aircraft, the broad c
apabilities of which have been showcased during the Libyan campaign since hostilities commenced in mid-March.
France's Rafale fighter proves its 'omnirole' skills
 
Cross posting from the MP forum, credits to Olybrius

Some French sources are reporting interesting, but unconfirmed things:

India: the Rafale was 15 to 20% cheaper than the Eurofighter

Reportedly, the price offered by the Rafale (Dassault, Thales and Snecma) for 126 combat aircraft was less than 15 to 20% at the price offered by its competitor, the Eurofighter Typhoon, proposed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. The price - both cost and usage - is therefore one of the main reasons for choosing India to open négocations exclusive with France...

Google Übersetzer


Air@Cosmos 2298, Feb 3, page 11:

Rafale for India might be (unexhaustive list) :
F30-4T with
- RBE2 AESA
- DDM NG
- MICA
- METEOR
- M88-4E (no decision made about Kaveri)
- AASM
- AM39 Block 2 Mod 2
- Scalp EG
- RECO NG
- Damocles or Litening
- Divy Drishti (Samtel Thales Topsight HMD)
- anti radar missile

As mentioned, bot reports are unconfirmed or backed up by propper sources, personally I have some doubt about the huge price difference in India at least as well as the requirement of ARMs, since no official IAF or MoD source talked about it.
If the report is correct though, we know that Raytheon had offered HARM (which still needs US government approval), otherwise I see only MAR 1 as a possible missile that could be integrated, but that would be interesting since PAF has bought it too. If Brazil selects Rafale, this missile will be integrated for sure and would be an easy solution for India, wonder if that was part of the talks of Brazilian defence minister and Indian officials? :rolleyes:
 
Bl[i]tZ;2568789 said:
Here
apabilities of which have been showcased during the Libyan campaign since hostilities commenced in mid-March.
France's Rafale fighter proves its 'omnirole' skills

Omnirole = Multirole, its the same thing. English is NOT your forte, is it?

Secondly, despite what Dassault and others wish to claim, the Libyan campaign did not prove anything! IF fighting against an obsolete, 20+ year old, air defense system is what you would call proving then that's nothing short of a joke.

It' a good aircraft, with a lot of decent capabilities, don't undermine it by bringing the Libyan tragedy into it. Personally I'm very happy that you chose the Rafale rather than the EF. You guy deserve every thing you are going to get with it!
 
Another report with some interesting infos about the shortlisting:

An Insight Into Why the IAF Picked the Rafale

Air Cmde Parvez Khokhar (Retd.), a former IAF test pilot, provides an insight into why the Rafale was the logical option as IAF's MMRCA...

I was the first pilot from the IAF to fly the Rafale in 2003. Having flown a number of the other competitors for the MMRCA deal, I can state with absolute conviction, that the IAF evaluation team has done a thoroughly professional job, which we should all be proud of.

I accompanied them for one of the evaluations. The short-listing of the EFA and Rafale also make total sense, since ether one of these ac would have added value to the IAF. Lets study the alternatives.

Unless we had a Single Engine fighter which we found suitable, shortlisting a SE with a twin engine would not require a rocket scientist to guess who the winner would have been.

The F-18 and the MiG-35, did not meet a large number of our QRs...

An Insight Into Why the IAF Picked the Rafale
 
Omnirole = Multirole, its the same thing.

Not exactly! Omnirole is a term by Dassault and describes that the fighter has not only the capability to switch in A2A and A2G roles, but that it was designed and developed to offer a balanced performance in all roles.
The EF for example is a multi role fighter, with the prime focus on A2A and additional A2G capabilities, the F18SH is the exact opposite, since it was designed and developed for strikes primarily, with additional A2A capabilities. Rafale fits perfectly inbetween of them, because it offers the high maneuverability, the low detectability and even SC features by design, while it still offers long range, high payload and very good low level / low speed capabilties.

So Omnirole = balanced multi role capability by design!
 
Not exactly! Omnirole is a term by Dassault and describes that the fighter has not only the capability to switch in A2A and A2G roles, but that it was designed and developed to offer a balanced performance in all roles.
The EF for example is a multi role fighter, with the prime focus on A2A and additional A2G capabilities, the F18SH is the exact opposite, since it was designed and developed for strikes primarily, with additional A2A capabilities. Rafale fits perfectly inbetween of them, because it offers the high maneuverability, the low detectability and even SC features by design, while it still offers long range, high payload and very good low level / low speed capabilties.

So Omnirole = balanced multi role capability by design!

You've never flown a fighter aircraft, have you?
 
Bl[i]tZ;2568482 said:
images of the Rafale's HUD show what the terrain following and avoidance modes will look like for the pilot on the HUD..

Those are not images of the Rafale's HUD show what the terrain following and avoidance modes, but images of a new digital color HUD prototype showed at the Paris air show last year:

Le Bourget 2011, digital color HUD for the Rafale

The French DGA is developping a digital color Head Up Display for the Rafale. This would be the first color HUD in the world in a fighter jet.
"Until now all combat aircraft had an analog HUD that was able to display gemometric forms in 2 dimensions only with a single green font"

According to Guillaume Grasset (DGA Rafale simulation trial engineer), this new digital HUD will offer a 3D display of the ground with important items like obstacles or the runway for example assuring a safety flight by night and bad visibility.

The higher resolution of this new HUD allow to display perfect geometric forms (variable line thickness and brightness) and several different font in different colors (green and red for the current prototype) in order to match the other displays color code used in the aircraft (red for high priority threats for example)

Rafale News: Le Bourget 2011, digital color HUD for the Rafale


Check the video also:

Le Bourget 2011, color HUD video

Rafale News: Le Bourget 2011, color HUD video
 
BL06RAFALE-NEW_914304f.jpg


Britain, a key arms supplier to India, cannot believe that it lost out to France.

February 5, 2012:
Last year, a group of Indian journalists were taken on a tour of BAE System's Warton Aerodrome on Britain's northwest coast, where Eurofighter Typhoons for British and Saudi contracts were being assembled.

We watched a Typhoon swoop above, tried on and played around with the jet's pilot helmet, a Darth Vaderesque object with an optical tracking system fitted inside, and generally had as much of an adventure park-like experience that one could have at an aerodrome assembling war planes.

Everyone, of course, avoided being drawn into a discussion of the four-nation Eurofighter consortium's prospects for winning the $10-billion bid for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) but there was certainly an air of cautious optimism.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps. With the exception of Russia, no other country has had as lucrative a trade with India when it comes to arms as Britain has.

Between 1950 and 2010, India has imported $15.3 billion worth of arms from Britain, against $4 billion from France and $1.8 billion from Germany,:what: according to data from the Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

It is a dominance that has continued into the current decade: In the decade till 2010, British arms exports to India totalled $859 million, more than the total for Germany ($414 million) and France ($432 million) combined.

Britain's consistent position as second-to-Russia when it came to Indian arms imports has bucked the direction of their bilateral trade relationship, which has seen Britain slip behind other European nations in relative terms. And globally the Indian arms market matters more than any: between 2006 and 2010, it was the largest arms importer in the world, accounting for an impressive 9 per cent of international arms transfer volumes, according to SIPRI data.

FRANCE'S STEADY PRESENCE

France has been a steady presence in that market since the 1950s, and Germany since the 1960s — but failed to take over from Britain.

While France has established itself across platforms — from the Mirage to submarines — Germany, the third largest exporter of arms in the world, has failed to establish a major presence beyond engine systems in the Indian market, often because of the costliness of its product, says Siemon Wezeman, senior researcher at SIPRI.

The Indian market has also consistently remained a European battleground, unlike other Asian markets (US arms exports to Japan totalled $57 billion between 1950 and 2010 against $1.4 billion from Britain and $442 million from Germany).

Excluding Russia, India's four largest sources of arms are European (Switzerland and the Netherlands are both ahead of Israel, with the US never taking off as a major supplier, partly because of its relationship with Pakistan and partly for limited willingness to transfer technology and stringent conditions such as weapons inspections).

AGGRESSIVE UK CAMPAIGN

Though the Eurofighter bid was led by Germany's Cassidian, there was aggressive campaigning by Britain — not least during the Prime Minister, Mr David Cameron's visit to India in 2010 shortly after the British general election, during which a £500-million contract between BAE Systems and Hindustan Electronics for Hawk training jets was signed.

During a visit to India last year, Britain's development minister, Mr Andrew Mitchell, linked the strategic aim of the nation's decision to maintain £1.2 billion of aid to India — while scrapping it for many other countries — to trade and even directly to the Eurofighter campaign. “The focus is also about seeking to sell Typhoon,” he said, according to Britain's The Independent newspaper at the time.

In Germany, the reaction to the news that Dassault Aviation had emerged as the lowest, and therefore preferred bidder for the MMRCA contract was relatively muted, with criticism more focused on the limited role that the Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, played in the campaign, compared with the involvement of the French President, Mr Nicholas Sarkozy on Dassault's behalf.

By contrast, in Britain, it has been vitriolic at points, making clear the presumptiveness that prevailed in some quarters, despite the fact that it had been clear that having tested all the first-round contenders against 660 different criteria, the final round was all about costs. “Well, that's gratitude,” The Daily Mail newspaper — reportedly the most read newspaper web site in the world — declared furiously.

“We give India £1 billion in aid, THEY snub the UK and give France a £13-billion jet contract!” Some Conservative MPs called on the government to revisit the decision on aid.:argh:

Mr Cameron, steering clear of any retaliatory rhetoric, vowed to do all he could to persuade India to revisit the decision — though whether he will do so at a potential cost to diplomatic relations is another matter altogether, say some observers.

BOOST FOR SARKOZY

That a country that exited the Eurofighter project — originally initiated in the 1970s as a cost-sharing project across European nations — had beaten the consortium on the complex cost calculations, including life cycle costs and technology transfer, was bad enough.

Let alone a company that is yet to sell a single Rafale outside France, despite coming close to deals in the UAE, Brazil, Libya, Switzerland and South Korea. (At one point a French minister warned that the project would have to be scrapped if no sales were agreed soon).

That it was a French victory, so soon after India had opted for a $2.5-billion upgrade of its Mirage 2000s grated even more in Britain, given the sparring between the leaders of the two nations in the past few months.

Mr Sarkozy has made no secret of his contempt for Mr Cameron's criticism of Euro Zone nations — at one point telling him to join the euro or ‘shut up'. Just the day before the contract was announced Mr Sarkozy declared Britain had ‘no industry left', a comment that wouldn't have rankled so much if there weren't elements of truth to it.

The MMRCA contact is a boost for Mr Sarkozy so close to the May Presidential elections, with the potential impact — should the contract be signed — set to be felt beyond just Dassault Aviation itself (Thales will supply information systems and Safran the twin M88 engines).

‘Dogfight' was the way Ashley J. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterised the global battle to win the MMRCA contract in a report last year, even before the initial shortlist was drawn up.

It has proved an accurate description: with the first round of short-listing last year being seen inaccurately by some of a rebuffing of a closer strategic relationship with the US, rather than the reality, which was a reflection of the military's technological needs and a willingness by the bidders to share technology.

Last week's decision is likely to face the same sort of pressure.

It is up to the government to combat that pressure, through transparency about how it arrived at the cost ranking, and to show that it is capable of having a relationship with diverse partners, based on a strict set of criteria, and that it is a relationship that no nation can take for granted.

Business Line : Opinion / Columns : Rafale win leaves UK smarting

good article

definately no one can take India for granted. its pure business, and we are nobodys lapdog.
 
This is why I put the question forward.
While I know that its more of a fleet upgrade program.. the IAF should now base those squadrons which operated obsolescent aircraft and will be replaced by the MMRCA more to the north and east.

My friend, you already know the answer, but it seems you let yourself influence too much by hype of what PAFs reaction to this selection might be. Btw, it was kind of interesting to see, that when the news about Rafales selection came up, only Pakistani members started a thread about this issue and directly related MMRCA to Pakistan, while Chinese members hardly bothered with it in the Chinese section and that although "all Indian officials" constantly said, that MMRCAs will mainly be fielded towards Chinese borders.
Don't take it as an offence please, but it's not the duty of Indians to convince Pakistanis, that things have changed (quiet some time ago) and that China is now "openly" considered as the main threat to Indias security. It's the duty of reasonable people like you, to make other Pakistanis understand, that not everything India does, has to do with Pakistan, otherwise this mistrust will never end!

Now to the quote you were refering too and let us think about this logically and not get into conclusions so fast. The article said:

first Ambala and then Jodhpur, followed by Hashimara in the eastern sector against China, say sources.

A simple google search tells us, that Ambala belongs to IAFs Western Air Command, Jodhpur to South Western and Hashimara to Eastern.
That means, that from the first 3 Rafale squads, 1 will be placed towards the western borders, 1 towards the northern and 1 towards the eastern! That alone shows, that it's just a normal placement routine and since each command gets one squad, you can't talk about a focus at all!

But there is more that we easily can find out today. You have forgotten that the prime aim of MRCA / MMRCA was, replacing old Mig 21!
So when you do another google search to find out which fighters are placed in Ambala and Jodhpur, you will find squadron no 3 (the first squadron that was upgraded to Bison standard in 2002) and squadron no 32 (another Mig 21 Bison squadron) for example.
That means when the aim is to replace Mig 21 Bisons, you logically start with the oldest isn't it? The 3rd squad got the Mig 21 Bis in 1980 which means, in 2015 when the first Rafales might arrive in Ambala, these Migs will be 35 years old!

Does it still look like a focus on Pakistan, or is it a normal procedure in fleet upgrade program?
 
Why India chose Rafale

Washington, Feb. 5: When Pratibha Patil travelled to Europe last October, she and others in her entourage had a pleasant surprise in the sky. At one point along the air space that the President’s flight was using, half a squadron of Eurofighters appeared on both sides of her Air India plane.

In the graceful style of these sleek war machines, they escorted the presidential aircraft to its safe landing at Patil’s next destination. Even so, those manning the Eurofighters could not resist showing off.

When the Eurofighters displayed the prowess of this advanced new-generation, multi-role combat aircraft to the President, members of Parliament and senior officials accompanying her, New Delhi’s quest for 126 planes of its kind could not have been far from the minds of their pilots.

The competition for the biggest military aviation deal in history, which began 11 years ago when the defence ministry initiated its “request for information” or RFI, had just entered its final and decisive phase.

But the impromptu decision to send the Eurofighters across European skies to impress the President was typical of what cost some rivals of Dassault Aviation — last week’s winners — the lucrative Indian Air Force contract.

It was somewhat reminiscent of Henry Kissinger’s disastrous invitation to defence minister Jagjivan Ram to visit Washington in 1971 as the sub-continent was heading into war, as recounted by Rukmini Menon, who was then joint secretary for the US in South Block.

“Why should I visit Washington?” Ram asked a non-plussed Kissinger and proceeded to tell him how American arms supplies had emboldened Pakistan to ruthlessly suppress East Pakistanis.

Partly, it was a similar approach that resulted in Boeing’s F-18E and Lockheed Martin’s F-16E being turfed out of the competition for the IAF deal earlier in the race. Not solely with the multi-role combat aircraft deal in mind, the Obama administration had made too much noise bereft of substance about the first state visit of his administration and Barack Obama’s first state dinner in honour of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

There was a time when India’s rulers could solely be influenced by gimmicks. But theatrics and atmospherics can no longer substitute hard policy options. This is one lesson New Delhi has hopefully absorbed firsthand from intense, albeit under the radar interaction with Israelis — especially in defence matters — in the last 20 years.

Then there was A.K. Antony, whom the losers in the bid for the IAF deal had not reckoned with. Antony, by nature, is averse to being the public face of decision-making. This has been the case throughout his tenure as defence minister, especially during scandals such as the Adarsh housing scam that rocked the army. Each time it was clear that the defence minister had made up his mind, but the decisions were put out as if they were taken elsewhere, along the proper channel.

Such an approach came through clearly in his most detailed statement on January 31 on the controversy about the army chief’s age. Ending months of virtual silence in the matter, Antony blamed the army for sitting on the problem for 36 years and then dealing with it in its own wisdom. So much so the army chief Gen. V.K. Singh had to agree with the minister.

Antony has maintained in public throughout that the multi-role combat aircraft acquisition process is a technical matter that would be decided by professionals in uniform. But such a public position overlooks the reality that Antony’s core support team in his ministry is much more ideological than in any other wing of the present government. Like civil servants, men in uniform are not immune from ministerial winds blowing in a particular direction.

Ideological considerations have prevented Antony from visiting Israel and from signing at least three defence agreements with the Americans which his core team views as compromising India’s strategic autonomy.

If the Russian plane on offer, MiG-35, had not clearly failed the tests, it was conceivable that it would very much have been in the reckoning. With the Russians out of the way, it did weigh with the political leadership in the defence ministry that France favours a multi-polar world and that India is a beneficiary of such an approach.

France won the bid for the entire order because it supplemented the requirements of the global tender with sweeteners that in the real world of strategic engagement, only three countries can offer India: Russia and Israel, in addition to France itself.

The collaborations that France has offered India in recent years in the field of intelligence sharing and upgrade are without parallel. Naturally, this is an area where co-operation cannot be publicised by the very nature of such engagement.

India and France face somewhat similar threats of domestic terrorism, vastly different from the threats faced by the US, Russia or even Israel. The assistance that Paris has offered New Delhi in preparing the country against such threats and the constant upgrading of their assistance went a long way towards creating an environment that favoured the French on the aircraft deal.

It was in direct contrast to Washington’s approach: the bulk of India’s intelligence community and key bureaucrats at decision-making levels believe that the Americans two-timed New Delhi on David Coleman Headley, their double agent in Chicago who played a major role in the Pakistan-supported terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008.

In addition, spread across India’s entire political spectrum that includes much of the Opposition, is a firm conviction that India would not have come out unscathed from the decision to conduct the 1998 nuclear tests if it were not for the steadfast backing that President Jacques Chirac — and Nicolas Sarkozy after him — offered India in an hour of great need.

It is not widely known that during the Kargil war in 1999, the French approved with lightning speed the adaptation of Indian Air Force Mirages in tandem with equally speedy Israeli supplies of laser-guided bombs which they delivered in Srinagar: without such French and Israeli support, India could have lost Kargil to Pervez Musharraf’s perfidy.

No honourable Indian in uniform can forget that in such a situation, the US or Britain would have probably suspended all military supplies to the combatants to prove their bona fides as honest brokers for peace.

Policies may be the result of collective decision-making in governments, but within that framework, individuals do matter. One such individual who has left a mark on Franco-Indian relations is Jean-David Levitte, whose critical role in securing the Rafale deal for his country will never become a matter of public record because of the nature of his job.

Levitte is diplomatic adviser and “Sherpa” to Sarkozy, who made amends for the temperamental mistakes during his President’s first visit to India as chief guest during Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi and organised a second trip that turned out to be one of most productive and substantive visits by any head of state to India.

Levitte was senior diplomatic adviser to Chirac too when Brajesh Mishra, the then principal secretary to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, flew to Paris as his first stop abroad seeking diplomatic support after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. Mishra found such support in Paris before he extracted reluctant support from Moscow.

Soon afterwards, Levitte became French permanent representative to the UN in New York where he led, along with Russia, a split among the five permanent members of the Security Council on the issue of punishing India through sanctions on the nuclear issue. Later he was ambassador in Washington.

Two of the countries which have been after the multi-role combat aircraft deal, the US and Britain, were at that time in the forefront of efforts in the Security Council to choke India into submission and roll back its nuclear programme.

Within the political and civilian leadership of India’s defence establishment, there has been no doubt that other things being equal, India should reward a friend in need, in this case, France.
 
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