COIN - What exactly went wrong then?

[muse]

This divergence in percepyion and analysis between the U.S. and Pakistan over the surge and the sustainablity of U.S. forces in Pakistan is interesting to me - I have run into no American servicemen (active service or retired) who buy into the the argument that the surge is also a part of the exit policy. I am persuaded that it is, but I suppose time will tell.

There is a economic imperative for closer economic integration based on Chinese, Pakistani, Indian and Iranian economies, were we to think that such cooperation cannot exist without the U.S, questions about the exact nature of the U.S role would become problematic, for instance, is the U.S role one in which it sees it self as primarily one of providing security ? and not providing security? This is a problematic role and we should not go there, so to speak, it's unhelpful. The U.S can and should be a partner in such economic
integration and observers would do well to understand that the U.S is one part of a package, not the totality of it.

"...it is their land and they have a right over it. Hand it back to them with all their rights. Tie them into the mainstream..."

Perhaps you may wish to include the qualifier the author suggests:

Remember, these people, the malleable ones and those likely to turn their back on militancy, belong here; it is their land and they have a right over it. Hand it back to them with all their rights

Winning against the obscuritanist must also mean doing a better job of goverenance, of actually delivering what we say are the fruits, the bettter life, the hopeful future, a more liberal dispensation can offer.

 

[Fracker]

Whereas the Terrorists were eliminating the tribal leadership the entire leadership of MMA was strongly opposing the Army actions...does it not make clear the fifth column support?

Sorry to say, you don't actually care about what other side think. The opposition of MMA for Army operation was because of these two reasons.

1. Operation is done on USA pressure,
2. Many civilian died & displacement of 2.5 million people.

They never were against pak army, but "the operation". also many analysts (non mullah) pointed same points, including the points. if there was only 3-4k militants in swat valley, what was the reason of the displacement of 2.5 million people? 2nd, Why no local people were taken into confidence?

IK is not a mullah, he was also against the operation. I feel like you are biased while analyzing anyone's stand.

Ps: i am not in favor of MMA, infact i always feel like Fazul-u-rehman is drunk when he come on the media, and also who can forget his nice hypocrite deeds like getting lands, house, cars just to obey them. He is the famous desiel Mullah. Also the Qazi, why Qazi didn't implement shariah in the NWFP when they were in the power. My whole family voted MMA, while they even didn't know the name of candidate. Just thought they might change something, but after comming in power, those who had cycle start driving parado. No development work done by them, forget implementation of shariah.

 

[S-2]

"...I have run into no American servicemen (active service or retired) who buy into the the argument that the surge is also a part of the exit policy. I am persuaded that it is, but I suppose time will tell."

It's all about differing time-lines then. Everybody exits sooner or later. Nothing is permanent. Still, if we're discussing America creating a near imperceptible dent in present matters, loudly declaring "victory", and heading home before you can say, "Uncle Sam", I don't see it.

It's July 2009. I expect us in Afghanistan in some military capacity (even if not active combat operations) in July 2019. If the intention is to reverse matters to a point of an independant, sustainable state of governance, then it'll take that long with all the accompanying fears of institutionalizing the process to the point of creating a permanent ward to foreign assistance.

"There is a economic imperative for closer economic integration based on Chinese, Pakistani, Indian and Iranian economies..."

It is my hope that regional economic opportunities and concerns trump all other points of divergence to the greater good. I simply found Chaudhry's vision a tad prematurely utopian-if hopeful. I see years upon years of basic infrastructure engineering- dams, canal systems repaired, de-mining operations, community re-construction- some parts of Kabul haven't yet been rebuilt from the Hekmatyar shelling in the mid-nineties. Those are just a few of the examples.

Everybody wants a health clinic. Who shall administer such? Aside from the issues of infrastructure, the issue of educated and competant civic leaders and local professionals to oversee the education and care of the public and the administration of its services is a couple of generations away by my calculations. Do you see otherwise?

If I'm correct, then there'll be no big parades scheduled in the near future of three to four years. Doing so would only assure our near-predictable return to the region at some unspecified later date to finish what we'd started- likely under even worse conditions than 9/11/01.

"Winning against the obscuritanist must also mean doing a better job of goverenance, of actually delivering what we say are the fruits, the bettter life, the hopeful future, a more liberal dispensation can offer..."

Lots of talk. Lots of papers. Lots of studies. Lots of plans. Lots of busy being busy. You nailed it here. Time to ante up and start producing measured and tangible gains, however modest, in these communities.

 

[muse]

War of narratives


Saturday, July 18, 2009
Asad Durrani

While serving with the army, the thought that the pen might be mightier than the sword never crossed my mind. No longer wearing the cross-swords and occasionally fiddling with the pen, it was still hard to believe that one had stumbled over a more lethal weapon. If the power flowed through the barrel of the gun, as the wise man Mao once famously contended, a hardcore gunner had no reason to give up on familiar tools in favour of some abstract notion. Lately, however, the wielders of the pen are proving to be a greater threat than the Drones and the suicide bombers.

Perceptions are deemed to be more important than the reality. Most of us therefore try to influence perceptions. Concocting conspiracies works for a while. For a more profound effect though, one needs a good narrative. Take the example of our current discomfiture: depending upon whom one dislikes more- the Army, America, or India; a narrative suitably woven works wonders. The army is charged to have committed some "strategic" sins. During the Soviet occupation, it got us involved with the Afghan resistance to protect its "strategic depth"; its policy of using non-state actors as "strategic assets" in Afghanistan and Kashmir has blown back to haunt us; and it has used hostility with India to safeguard its larger than life role. The army has also often been accused of keeping threats alive to ensure cash flow in its coffers

The US related narrative is indeed a long and an impressive one. It is supposed to have lured the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; persuaded us to fight a "proxy war" on its behalf; pressured the Saudis to sponsor madressahs that churned out Taliban fired by salafi ideology to wage jihad against the infidels; and it left us high and dry when the Soviets withdrew. Post-9/11 (stage-managed of course), it invaded Afghanistan to establish a foothold in an area that enables it better access to the natural resources in Central Asia, contain China, keep an eye on Iran, and create chaos in Pakistan to takeout our nuclear teeth. And of course that was the reason it keeps Osama or its myth alive, provides covert support to the Pakistani Taliban and avoids targeting the likes of Baitullah.

Thanks to America, India has receded on our target seeking radar. But it still is good enough to be mentioned in some of our despatches. The "archrival" has not only tricked America in the so-called civilian nuclear deal but has also trapped it to grant India a special role in Afghanistan, where it has opened God knows how many consulates to create mischief in Balochistan and plant rogue groups in our border regions. Under cover of Mumbai attacks, it is dragging its feet on the peace process to prevent us from taking out troops from the eastern borders that we so direly need on the Western.

Narratives, never entirely true or false, are a useful tool. Besides putting the nemesis on the spot, they promote innovation and rationalise inaction. If the likes of the army, America, or India, have designed our misfortunes, indeed there was nothing that we could do to change the course! That's bad news for those who want to be the masters of their own destiny. They obviously need another narration that encourages them to do what they can, and at times what they must.

The Soviets occupied Afghanistan because they could. They did not invade China or Western Europe even though the provocation was greater and the likely dividends more attractive. Strategic Depth may be a sound concept or merely another name for a "buffer", we now had not exactly a friendly superpower in the west. With India in the east, Pakistan was now caught in the proverbial "nutcracker". Helping the Afghan resistance was risky, even with the US' aid. Despite deeper involvement, America had failed in Korea and Vietnam, and later in Yemen, Saudi support notwithstanding. We still took the leap, and with America joining up two years later, succeeded. The Soviets withdrew behind the Oxus.

We could not manage the fallout – drugs, Kalashnikovs, militancy – and also failed to restore peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban, regardless of whose creation, at one stage looked all set to reunify the country. We therefore backed them, as did the Americans and the Saudis, possibly because of a pipeline that was to pass through areas under Taliban control. Of course the US left Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal since their objective had been achieved. In all fairness, no one should expect a country with global interests to stay on till the bitter end. And undoubtedly, they will leave Afghanistan when they no longer can stay; regardless of any real, perceived, declared or evolving interests. That is how they came in, in the first place, because they could. Hypothetically, if it was Russia, China, or India, where Al-Qaeda had sought refuge, the US response would have been different.

So would have been ours, if we had more faith in our ability to withstand the US' pressure. Saving causes like Kashmir and nuclear, were mere rationalisations, as we must have found out in the meantime. An unsaid reason made more sense: had we not agreed to carry out the assigned role, the Indians were all set to stand in. The mere thought that the American planes would be flying over Pakistan from the Indian territory, dropping some lethal cargo, accidentally or by design, was not very comforting. And God forbid if these were Drones attacking targets in Pakistan, declaring war on India, at least by our loose cannons, might have become inevitable.

Assuming that the charges against the army, that it shelters its strategic assets for the rainy days were true; could one not try to be more reflective? After sealing the Dayton Accord, Richard Holbrook, now of AfPak fame, did concede: "But for the foreign militants, who of course must now leave, Dayton would not have been possible". True, but for the resistance the invaders never leave. If they hang on nevertheless, what do we do with the resistors? A thoughtful state, a rare commodity, will rehabilitate them, or keep them on leash till the job was done. Otherwise there were good chances that they would turn their guns inwards, especially when they are joined by rogue groups hijacking their movement and morphing their agenda- as is the case on our western borders. The state then has little choice but to tame them.

The non-state actors, the non-militants amongst them, can do better. If they believe what was being done was wrong, they should say so when there was still time. Many of them applauded the use of force in the erstwhile East Pakistan till it was lost. Right now, there may be good reasons to act against our renegade militants; there are equally good reasons to caution against the use of wrong means - area weapons and extrajudicial killing, to quote but two. The best contribution, however, that our pen pushers can make is to take on narratives which use this lethal weapon for subversion. So successful are they that we now understand terms like terrorists, Taliban, even jihadis solely as defined by them. Semantics is the latest and the most effective form of terrorism.


The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and former head of the ISI. Email: [email protected]

 

[waraich66]

So would have been ours, if we had more faith in our ability to withstand the US' pressure. Saving causes like Kashmir and nuclear, were mere rationalisations, as we must have found out in the meantime. An unsaid reason made more sense: had we not agreed to carry out the assigned role, the Indians were all set to stand in. The mere thought that the American planes would be flying over Pakistan from the Indian territory, dropping some lethal cargo, accidentally or by design, was not very comforting. And God forbid if these were Drones attacking targets in Pakistan, declaring war on India, at least by our loose cannons, might have become inevitable.

Great analysis ,realistic and also alarming!

Our both boarders are now unsafe, main target is our nukes very close to SWAT.

Thanks to our brave army for flushing terrorists from SWAT.

 

[muse]

Fundamentalist


Sometimes I worry about your ability to comprehend the material presented.

 

[waraich66]

Fundamentalist


Sometimes I worry about your ability to comprehend the material presented.

What you conclude ,US presence in weatern boarders with collaboration of india is positive sign for our security instead it furture increase level of inscurity and weaken our defence which is already 1 to 5 in ratio with Indian armed forces.

 

[S-2]

"The best contribution, however, that our pen pushers can make is to take on narratives which use this lethal weapon for subversion. So successful are they that we now understand terms like terrorists, Taliban, even jihadis solely as defined by them. Semantics is the latest and the most effective form of terrorism."

It continues to be a war of words. The information operations of our enemies remain outstanding. How else can we explain the inability of so many to see the fundamental dangers presented to any aspiring modern society by these terrorists despite their transparently abhorrent conduct?

The war is fought here where, Muse, you and some others do a fine job combating the myths, conspiracies, and half-truths that fuel the comforting underlying assumptions of the irhabi arguments. Somebody must and too few of your professional columists see this responsibility as theirs.

Kudos to you and some select others for your lonely fight.

 

[waraich66]

"The best contribution, however, that our pen pushers can make is to take on narratives which use this lethal weapon for subversion. So successful are they that we now understand terms like terrorists, Taliban, even jihadis solely as defined by them. Semantics is the latest and the most effective form of terrorism."

It continues to be a war of words. The information operations of our enemies remain outstanding. How else can we explain the inability of so many to see the fundamental dangers presented to any aspiring modern society by these terrorists despite their transparently abhorrent conduct?

The war is fought here where, Muse, you and some others to a fine job combating the myths, conspiracies, and half-truths that fuel the comforting underlying assumptions of the irhabi arguments. Somebody must and too few of your professional columists see this responsibility as theirs.

Kudos to you and some select others for your lonely fight.

S2,

Philosophy of islam is entirely different from other nations, in Islam religion always remain on top priority but race, colour, nationality tribe,country has no value just for identification, that is reason foreign invasion shall be considered war against whole islamic world and naturally sympathies of all muslims are in favour of fighters or mujahdeen .

That is reason who believe in islam never be supressed even any nation capture every thing they own, that is why US agression in Afghanistan could not break the believe of talaban but they are now more determine to fight back and liberate their country .

The prime importance in islam is not country but to fullfill the order of Allah victory or defeat are secondary things.

 

[muse]

Waziristan and after



Monday, July 20, 2009
Asad Munir

The armed forces are all set to start an operation in South Waziristan, the stronghold of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other foreign militants.

In 2002, the agency served as the headquarters of Al Qaeda with Hadi Al Iraqi as the operational commander. Abu Laith Al Libi was the commander in North Waziristan, with headquarters in Norak. In South Waziristan, three different groups were operating, Arabs, a mix of Libyans and Algerians, other Africans and Central Asians. The Ahmedzai Wazirs initially provided them shelter in Wana and surrounding areas, while subsequently they moved to Mehsud territory. Their strength kept on increasing in South Waziristan.

Initially the militant stayed in groups of 30 to 35 in compounds provided by local Wazirs, but after an operation in June 2002, they preferred to stay in small groups of five to six living in one house. Meetings were held in the village madrasa after sunset where instructions for operations and raids against NATO forces were passed on by leaders. There was no movement during the day.

The militants raised their strength in the next three years, courtesy several “peace agreements,” which allowed them to spread their influence to other tribal areas and some settled districts of the NWFP. Had a decision been taken in 2004, the army would have had to clear only two tribal agencies. Now the situation is quite different.

Formal operations against terrorists in Waziristan have not yet started. The ambush of an army convoy by Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s men is not because of drone attacks, for the simple reason that in 2008 there were several such attacks in North Waziristan and he never protested. The reason for his protest is simple – Al Qaeda, the jihadis, sectarian groups and the local and Afghan Taliban do not want to lose the safe havens of Waziristan. Losing this area will have a great setback to their overall strategy and future designs, especially with the loss of Swat.

If the operations are confined to only the Mehsud area of South Waziristan, initially the foot soldiers of Taliban are likely to give stiff resistance from their fortified positions. The leadership would have planned their escape routes, their future hideouts, well coordinated with local facilitators. The likely hideouts are the Dawar area of North Waziristan, Upper Orakzai Agency and the Pakhtun areas of Balochistan. However, if the operations are conducted in both Waziristan agencies, than Zhob and other Pakhtun areas of Balochistan are going to be places where the militants will flee.

Once Baitullah realizes that the establishment is serious, he may well ask for a deal, But this time, it is unlikely that he will get a positive response, and in all likelihood will flee. The command and control system, logistics and supply lines of the Taliban have been made ineffective, and that is why suicide attacks have declined. The army needs to persist with its operation and must not pause. The fact of the matter is that the Taliban assumed that they were invincible because they were never handled this way. After North and South Waziritan, the battle will have to be taken to Orakzai Agency, Darra Adam Khel, Mohmand Agency and part of Bajaur Agency. If at all a deal has to be offered – after they are vanquished – it should be that they lay down their arms and do not run a parallel administration. And an amnesty can be considered only for their foot soldiers.

The writer is a former brigadier who served as chief of the Military Intelligence and the ISI for NWFP, FATA and the Northern Areas. Email: [email protected]

 

[TruthSeeker]

Philosophy of islam is entirely different from other nations, in Islam religion always remain on top priority but race, colour, nationality tribe,country has no value just for identification, that is reason foreign invasion shall be considered war against whole islamic world and naturally sympathies of all muslims are in favour of fighters or mujahdeen .

A major problem with this "philosophy" is that you put the "Islamic world" at risk based on the activities of the most extreme followers of Islam. Witness Afghanistan. Because the GoA followed your philosophy, embracing al Qaeda as fellow Muslims, they brought down on their heads 8 years of war and exile, with no end in sight. If, instead, the GoA had expelled al Qaeda or facilitated the timely arrest of al Qaeda, the US would not have attacked the GoA. So, in applying your philosophy, you must apply it only to fellow Muslims whose actions are just. That is where your philosophy is going horribly wrong for the Islamic world.

 

[TruthSeeker]

Waziristan and after
Waziristan and after
Monday, July 20, 2009
Asad Munir

muse, thank you for posting this article. I found and added the link above. It is amazing to read an article like this in the Pakistani press. If Mr. Asad Munir really has the credentials given for him by the News, and if he really knew all of these things since 2002, then who in the GoP decided to allow the situation to develop into what it is today? And secondly, I would love for all the irhabi-sympathizing Pakistani posters here at the PDF to read this and then reconcile what he presents with their cherished beliefs about the non-existence of al Qaeda.

 

[waraich66]

A major problem with this "philosophy" is that you put the "Islamic world" at risk based on the activities of the most extreme followers of Islam. Witness Afghanistan. Because the GoA followed your philosophy, embracing al Qaeda as fellow Muslims, they brought down on their heads 8 years of war and exile, with no end in sight. If, instead, the GoA had expelled al Qaeda or facilitated the timely arrest of al Qaeda, the US would not have attacked the GoA. So, in applying your philosophy, you must apply it only to fellow Muslims whose actions are just. That is where your philosophy is going horribly wrong for the Islamic world.

You misunderstood completely ,there is nothing wrong with Islamic principles.

Why OBL name still not mentioned in the list of 9/11 suspects? its mean US dont have any evidence for his involvement in 9/11.

Anyways see for yourself: Most Wanted Terrorist - Usama Bin Laden
Most Wanted Terrorist - Usama Bin Laden

How you justify now US attack on Afghanistan?

US intelligence and Bush regime made blunders after 9/11 , which Bush admitted that attack on Iraq was wrong decision? US intelligence and Bush should also be trailed for wrong decision to attack Iraq?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/george-bush-iraq-interview



George Bush, in a moment of reflection ahead of his departure from the White House, last night admitted that the decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein on the basis of flawed intelligence was the biggest regret of his presidency. The acknowledgment marks the first time that Bush has publicly expressed doubts about his rationale for going to war on Iraq.

 

[TruthSeeker]

You misunderstood completely, there is nothing wrong with Islamic principles.

Of course not. Islam is PERFECT and you know perfectly about Islam. Please forgive my tremendous, overwhelming, colossal ignorance.

 

[waraich66]

Of course not. Islam is PERFECT and you know perfectly about Islam. Please forgive my tremendous, overwhelming, colossal ignorance.

No one is perfect , but accept my fault could not be able to explain you the taste of apple.