COIN - What exactly went wrong then?

[Elmo]

This is a combined answer for you all (before this thread dies out, but a detailed reply later).

Firstly, we need to understand what is an insurgency: going by the international definitions for it, it is a movement for a political aim, that aims to destabilize the existing political establishment in place and which may or may not resort to violent means to achieve its end.

Also even our own history has examples of insurgencies for our benefit: remember Shah Waliullah's movement, Swat during colonial rule, Bengal and the freedom movement started as insurgencies.

Nasim Zehra agreed does not provide a solution but she rightly points out the need for transparency (from politicians and the military) — which is lacking in what is happening in the country's north-west.

Here's a brief overview from the US's COIN manual on achieving the same. The security forces in Pakistan it seems to be dealing the insuregency as if it's in the first stage, while the insurgents are clearly in the second phase.

"COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. The focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct stages that can be envisioned with a
medical analogy:

􀁺 Stop the bleeding.
􀁺 Inpatient care—recovery.
􀁺 Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency.

Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational environment are important to the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. This knowledge allows commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”
Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security. During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common operational picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed. Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”
5-5. The middle stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability. Counterinsurgents are most active here, working aggressively along all logical lines of operations (LLOs). The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of
economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of human and other types of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public
expectations.

LATE STAGE: “OUTPATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY”
Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces. The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN
leadership. In this stage, the multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Quick reaction forces and fire support capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LLOs are performed by HN forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As the security, governing, and economic capacity of the host nation increases, the need for foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the host nation has established or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable government that sustains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the nation’s entire population.

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(A hurried reply, more later)

 

[S-2]

The below quote summarizes Kilcullen's thoughts.

"...it is clear that the campaign in Pakistan, since well before 9/11 but even more so since then, is a relatively classic example of the accidental guerrilla syndrome. AQ and other extremists moved into an already disrupted social framework in the FATA during and after the Soviet-Afghan war, infecting an existing problem of poor governance and societal weakness. The contagion effect from their presence (most obviously the 9/11 attacks themselves) brought a western-prompted intervention by the Pakistan Army into the FATA. The use of heavy-handed, overly kinetic tactics by troops who were mainly lowland Punjabis, culturally foreign to the area where they were operating, contributed to a societal auto-immune rejection response. The tribes coalesced and rose up to drive out the intrusion, resulting in the perpetuation of destructive patterns of what Akbar Ahmed called “resistance and control” on the frontier, and undermining the established, if loose, local governance system. Pumping additional assistance to Pakistan, without a fundamental rethink of political strategy, is therefore likely to be highly counterproductive in the long run."

Does he not indicate "what exactly went wrong then?" Seems a succinct description of events reaching BEYOND the Soviet Afghan war-

"...an already disrupted social framework in the FATA during and after the Soviet-Afghan war, infecting an existing problem of poor governance and societal weakness..."

We can fairly construe that much of our issues now reach beyond the Soviet-Afghan war into more intractable and deeper fissures arising from mal-governance and neglect of these regions. Chronically poor to this degree for so long has likely began altering local DNA structure.

How to reverse the abysmal health and education standards for NWFP, Baluchistan, FATA and Afghanistan?

"�� Stop the bleeding.
�� Inpatient care—recovery.
�� Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency."

Where's "triage"? You know...the part BEFORE "Stop the Bleeding" where you decide because of limited means whose bleeding you intend to stop?

Triage: The Next Twelve Months In Afghanistan And Pakistan- CNAS

Sort of an all-star cast of Andrew Exum, Nathanial Fick, Ahmad A. Humayun, and David Kilcullen. The reading, though, is blunt about prioritizing the use of best practices and limited resources to optimal effect while recognizing the inherent risks accepted by such. Too, objectives are limited under such a scenario...though ambitious all the same.

Some thoughts on Kilcullen's underlying premises taken from your excerpts-

The American army, generally, was/is guilty of every criticism afforded to the P.A. by Kilcullen. From focusing upon HVT in counter-terror kinetic ops to some self-congratulatory applause for our "COIN" conversion. These are gross generalizations but fair enough on the whole.

We've suffered from our own infatuation with technology. We've suffered from issues of air-mobility despite possessing perhaps the world's largest fleet of advanced rotor aircraft. We've been guilty of an enemy-centric approach that's too often ignored the fundamental premise of population security.

To be fair here, though, requires a nuanced understanding of the details in securing a "population". Make no mistake, enemy-centric kinetic ops secure a population to some degree. These operations possess absolute validity in a LOT of instances throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan and will not cease completely for the foreseeable future. It's the context in which they occur, though, that shall define success or failure.

Finally, whether Pakistan or Afghanistan, it comes back here-

"AS U.S. MARINES launched a major offensive in Afghanistan's Taliban-infested Helmand province yesterday, one problem was already apparent: There are not enough troops to properly carry out the Pentagon's new counterinsurgency strategy. The force is "a little light," Marine Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, its commander, told national security adviser James L. Jones in a meeting reported by The Post's Bob Woodward. "We don't have enough force to go everywhere."

On the Offensive: Can Commanders In Afghanistan Tell Obama The Truth About Troop Shortages- WAPO Editorial

In a province that is Afghanistan's largest but holds less than 900,000 people we've allocated around 9,000 British troops and maybe 10,000 U.S. and other forces. 19,000 ISAF troops out of a total of 90,000- maybe 22% of our available forces to secure less than one-thirtieth of the nat'l population.

There are, obviously, exacerbating reasons to commit these troops- from opium, high concentrations of taliban, and a relatively high population density in the immediate surrounds of Lashkar Gah from Musa Qala south to Garmsir, to the pursuit by Karzai for pashtu votes in the upcoming presidential elections. So I presume that the payoff to such an allocation is considered a worthy investment.

Why besides him being Pashtu the southern pashtu would vote for Karzai is beyond me but that's a separate issue I suppose.

Until the ANA/ANP can actually play a meaningful role, we will not succeed in expanding the GoA writ despite any localized successes achieved. From what little I've seen, that may be a very considerable time.

 

[muse]

I found the "Triage" paper useless - U.S army COIN manual may be a starting point for the FAUJ, but it is not the the FAUJ's game plan. "Hold and Build" requires a wholesale structural reform which the political elite are unwilling to commit to, and finances that neither Pakistan has nor will have in the near and mid-term.

While much is being made about how the general attitude of most Pakistanis seems to have turned against Talib, the structure, ideological, social and political which enable the insurgency have a firm hold on the populace - Fundamentalist, has presented an idea, that is to say, the question of "Which Islam", in my opinion is key -- The manner in which Islam is presently understood in Pakistan, Insurgency and the tactic of Terrorism, are part and parcel of Islam and those who have spoken against such a Islam, have been dealt with effectively by the Talib, you will note that we have no more of so called "Ulema" speaking up against the tactics of the Talib or characterizing these tactics as "unIslamic". I think this idea, the idea of "which Islam" is a key idea, without an understanding of Islam free of Islamist interpretations, free of the explanation and justification of violence in the pursuit of political aims, the populace will be lost to the Talib.

Heresy and sacrilege that it is, we may want to take a close look at how the Indian has dealt with Insurgency and the tactics of terrorism in the part of Kashmir they administer. There, the idea of "Flooding the swamp" with government forces is a relative success; S2 seems to be signalling the same when he argues that more troops are required.

The U.S COIN operation in Afghanistan includes a strategy which will be more focused on district level development and a "civilian surge" to enable that development. The U.S has the financial resources to engage in such, even if the effort suffers from a serious lack of co-ordination among stake holders at all levels. Not only to U.S commanders (BCT commanders) and PRT commanders have deep pockets, additional agencies of the U.S government and coalition forces similarly have deep pockets.

The Fauj, it is becoming more apparent, has a problem of capability and it seems to me, of capacity. It's a force built around more the idea of the 2 week war and a cease fire - it is unable to deal effectively with the insurgency, let alone the external adversary. I find it difficult to understand how putting more troops in the effort when the one's already committed do not seem to have sufficient training and logistical support and air cover, will be of any useful purpose

On the Structural reform front, neither the kinds of ideas, such as doing away with the structure of the FATA and extending full legal and political rights to the area, the reorganization of the present four administrative units of provinces and either reverting to districts or the creation of smaller provinces - restructuring the framework of the national economy and federal and provincial fiscal outlays away from "populist" ideas, which account for a great deal of the mismanagement and embezzlement of government funds, towards a free market economy and the unrestricted trade within the territory of Pakistan - these ideas are not even being explored by the politicians, indeed, readers will have noted that the federal budget was passed by the national assembly without debate, for which of course the Premier, then doubled the "development" allowance of each NA member - these put together, to my thinking, suggest a painful and needlessly long experience with insurgency, which will develop characteristic of a existential nature which the political elite simply will not acknowledge, exacerbating the problem even further.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

brief hint:

First read 'FM 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY' before trying to make headway with the articles as provide above.
It is only 280 odd pages and great bedtime reading. Sends you to sleep very fast.

 

[muse]

You will find that most with the exception of Fundamentalist have read FM 3-24.2

 

[S-2]

"I found the "Triage" paper useless - U.S army COIN manual may be a starting point for the FAUJ, but it is not the the FAUJ's game plan."

Having read your comments, all valid and necessary topics of discussion, I think you miss the purpose of "triage". It's hardly the operational product of an effort guided by unlimited "deep pockets".

Two dilemmas premise the use of "triage"- 1.) Can we comprehensively and simultaneously extend the writ of state to all corners of both Pakistan and Afghanistan?

No.

2.) Who, then, will be afforded protection and who won't?

I suppose that answer is resource-dependant and encompasses the calculus of maximum ROI for minimal contribution. So if Pakistan's pockets aren't deep (and they aren't), it seems there's more practicality to "triage" than you ascribe.

"this paper recommends that the United States and its allies pursue an “ink blot” strategy over the course of the next 12 months on both sides of the Durand Line, securing carefully chosen areas and then building from positions of strength.2"

We must recognize what's doable and sustainable then build upon those successes incrementally. Progress will be tediously slow in many respects. The metrics to chart such will depend upon the level of development one aspires and are after-the-fact in any case.

Prior to my leave of absence I recommended that the P.A. "go slow" on Waziristan operations- either north or south. I still do despite the recent ambush outside Miran Shah that may drag your forces into a major engagement pre-maturely IMV. In fact, because of this ambush, I'm more adamant than ever that the P.A. restrain its instincts to roll on to the next target.

I sense a concern that there's a window of opportunity with public opinion that's driving these operations onto the Waziristans...a ticking clock, if you will. That must be resisted. Waziristan is complex and will require both a careful tactical/operational study that integrates your own civilian elements, beginning with the IDP issues likely to arise from any combat operations on to the GoP's plans for FATA's development and reconstruction (assuming there are such).

Your comments-

All to the point. So overdue at this point, either within your religious community or the Pakistani polity, to suggest that they'll never happen.

The radicals have seized the religious high-ground to cloak their ambitions by intimidation and rhetoric. It is deeply-rooted, highly resistant, and has altered the political landscape of muslim-majority countries for the worse. It will be a very long time reversing such if that's your ambition. Nonetheless, with each passing day it only becomes longer.

As the above discussion seems off-limits to non-muslims, any discussion involving the structural and administrative reform of Pakistan is off-limits to non-Pakistanis. Either those like you carry the fight or it doesn't happen.

But you are correct. Don't forget an armed society couched in familial vendetta. That's a societal problem of some magnitude, it seems. Makes the police superfluous, don't you agree? Writ large, it's the galling aspect of your war whenever some tribe stands up a lashkar to oust the taliban "side-by-side" with their P.A. brothers.

Sorry. Put down your weapons, point out the bad guys, and stand aside.

That'll change in about another couple of hundred years...

Anyway, good luck with your discussions in those areas. You'll need it.

 

[muse]

S2


I think the idea of giving up on FATA is not one that is going to go down well among Pakistanis - The idea that these are not citizens of Pakistan and therefore should not be afforded the protection of the state is non-starter, if I have judged public opinion correctly.

With regard to ideology, yes, allow me elaborate on this idea - this idea owes it's prominence in society as much to the failure of politicians and state, as it does to the Saudi funded mullah and his information operations.

And you can see it here on this board - while decent peoples abhor the Talib, they cannot get themselves to be truthful with themselves about the nature of Islamism in Pakistan - they "dream", they "imagine" that the VALUES that guide the AKP may come to define Islamism in Pakistan - and this "dream" will die hard but die it will. Sooner or later sobriety and ethics will not be denied. But notice among so many decent people here, notice the terms they use to register their abhorrence of the talib, they are the same terms and the same ideas which gave birth to the Talib in the first place -- defining politics and society and social ills with reference to Quranic verses hadith gobbledygook - this idea of a "little Red book" out of the Quran and Hadith is exactly what has led to movements such as the Talib.

any discussion involving the structural and administrative reform of Pakistan is off-limits to non-Pakistanis

.

I don't think this is the case and certainly not the case as long as I'm around

because of this ambush, I'm more adamant than ever that the P.A. restrain its instincts to roll on to the next target.

I sense a concern that there's a window of opportunity with public opinion that's driving these operations onto the Waziristans...a ticking clock, if you will. That must be resisted. Waziristan is complex and will require both a careful tactical/operational study that integrates your own civilian elements, beginning with the IDP issues likely to arise from any combat operations on to the GoP's plans for FATA's development and reconstruction (assuming there are such).

Please do elaborate on what you think the ambush meant and why you think the Waziristan operation should be held up.

I do agree that there is an element of the public opinion clock driving events - why Pakistan specifically is this a problem?

 

[muse]

more on the public opinion driven clock:



Disunity in Al Qaeda?
By Mushfiq Murshed
Friday, 26 Jun, 2009 | 03:00 AM PST

BANNERS declaring democracy to be un-Islamic can still be found hanging from poles in the streets of the not-so posh sectors of Islamabad. The name of the group responsible, Hizbut Tahrir, is mentioned below the core message of the banner. However, more interesting than the message and the name that follows is that they refer to Pakistan as a province (waliyat-i-Pakistan).

To the myriad radical foreign organisations that have united under the Al Qaeda banner Pakistan is just another province of a greater pan-Islamic entity that would enforce ‘true Islam’. The logic used to justify this is that the nation-state phenomenon was the product of the Industrial Revolution, prior to which national boundaries were inconsequential during the ascent of Islam. However, the contradiction in Al Qaeda’s ambitions of uniting the Muslim world is that the militants that have joined this organisation from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, North Africa, etc., all have nationalistic tendencies too. Any organisation, working under such dynamics, is obviously fragile and the possibility of disunity can be immense if there is a leadership vacuum.

One would have assumed that the ambivalent policies pursued by the Musharraf regime would have given Al Qaeda time to streamline its operations and establish a concrete framework. Some commentators are inclined to believe that Osama Bin Laden has been killed. A speculative statement to this effect was also made by President Zardari recently. Whatever the truth, there are signs that infighting within Al Qaeda has intensified.

The Egyptians under Ayman al-Zawahiri are among the more prominent groups involved in this power struggle. Al-Zawahiri formally announced in 2006 that the Egyptian Jamaat al-Islamiyya had merged with Al Qaeda. He had, long before this merger, already influenced Osama Bin Laden to believe that the al adou al qareeb (enemy who is nearby) should be targeted. This was in direct contrast to the al adou al baeed (enemy who is far) concept propounded by the late Abdullah Azam. Although Azam was killed before the Al Qaeda was formed, the founding principles of the organisation are said to have been based on his philosophy of fighting a ‘global jihad’.

According to Khalid Ahmad in an article ‘Transformation of Al Qaeda’, the near-enemy concept was “in effect the beginning of the narrowing of the vision of Al Qaeda. Once this strategy was adopted the jihadists or mujahideen were permitted to vent their own local and regional anger….”. Through this change in direction, Al Zawahiri himself wanted to target Egypt and bring about a change in government there. The post-Lal Masjid spate of ruthless terrorist attacks was credited to him as an integral part of his 2007 attempt to kill Musharraf and topple his regime. This was in line with the strategy of eliminating the ‘enemy who is nearby’.

Other factions, particularly the Libyans under the leadership of Abu Yahya Al-Libi, resented the perception that Al Zawahiri was second in command to Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, they considered his aggressive stance towards the Pakistan government as well as his attempt to take operational control of their organisation as detrimental to their cause. This was the first indication that an ideological split was emerging within Al Qaeda.

The anti-al-Zawahiri faction did not wish to open another front against the Pakistan Army which could jeopardise their sanctuaries and safe havens that they had established in Pakistan, particularly in Waziristan. Their apprehensions are becoming a reality. If, according to recent statements made by Prime Minister Gilani and President Zardari, the military operations will continue until all extremist militant elements are eradicated in Pakistan then it is logical to assume that the Swat operation’s final culmination will be in Waziristan.

The current military onslaught, backed by near national consensus, suggests that the army is resolute in completing the task assigned to it by the government and its renewed commitment will not falter. Under this pressure, the Al Qaeda-Taliban alliance seems to be crumbling.

Furthermore, although the overall impact of the drone attacks has been negative due to the collateral damage, it cannot be denied that these attacks have also served a purpose. Accurate intelligence has enabled the drones to target and eliminate key Al Qaeda leaders. The replacement of what has been described as ‘Al Qaeda prime’ will be difficult in the face of the growing mistrust and disunity among the outfit’s various factions. This also makes it possible that disgruntled elements within the organisation could pass on critical information to the security agencies.

Against this backdrop reports are emerging that Al Qaeda is relocating to countries such as Sudan and Yemen. As the military pressure mounts against them in Waziristan, some commentators in the West are inclined to believe that the already fragile coalition of global militant factions will crumble. It is, therefore, critically important that, at this juncture, the Pakistan government must not slacken in its resolve to permanently eliminate the militants from the tribal areas. Only then can peace be restored.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Criterion Quarterly.

mushfiq.murshed@gmail.com

 

[S-2]

"I think the idea of giving up on FATA is not one that is going to go down well among Pakistanis..."

I'm unsure where I or TRIAGE suggest such. "Giving up" means forever turning your backs. I don't ever expect anything remotely like that. FATA are your lands.

I do fear that in a population-centric security approach we surrender too much initiative to the enemy unless local commanders understand the need for active patrolling and reconnaissance beyond the edges of the secured populace at each level of command. For the commander of RC-EAST, for instance, that should entail active combat operations on the border areas and primary eastern approaches to Kabul.

Secondly, "ink-spotting" is valid-but only if established simultaneously with many other adjoining "ink-spots" and rapidly successful at securing (hold) and sustaining (build) the presence of combat forces, police, and local governmental administrators.

That means growth to merge "ink-spots" must rapidly follow. If not, then these locations are easily isolated and attacked/neutralized with very limited influence, if any.

"...this idea of a "little Red book" out of the Quran and Hadith is exactly what has led to movements such as the Talib."

There is comfort in the Lord's word thus opium for the masses in some instances where evil alchemists pervert the essence.

"Please do elaborate on what you think the ambush meant and why you think the Waziristan operation should be held up."

I'm simply unconvinced that your military and civilian government have extracted all the useful lessons from SWAT/Buner/Dir. I've long thought that the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan represents the final redoubt for many elements beyond simply Baitullah Mehsud. I don't ascribe to any of those elements competing with Mehsud representing any temporal nor long term asset for your government. As such, whether they fight or align themselves with Mehsud is irrelevant. They (Bahadur, Nazir, Omar, Haqqani, Hekmatyar, etc.) must also go and it is in the Waziristans where all except Omar will be found.

Thus, size of land and both the size/complex mix of enemies warrants a very careful and thorough assessment of this operation. Separating the local population, themselves no overwhelming fans of the P.A. (or any authority other than their own) from our enemies will not be easy nor quick. Dealing with those who don't stay and instead become IDPs promises to dwarf the effects of Bajaur, Buner, Dir, and SWAT combined. Over time, I suspect it will prove the largest and longest military campaign of Pakistan's history.

That's cause for a pause, IMV, while consolidating your successes in Dir, SWAT, and elsewhere. Doing so will take time and resources.

"I do agree that there is an element of the public opinion clock driving events - why Pakistan specifically is this a problem?"

I don't know that it is, specifically, a Pakistani problem. Europeans and Canadian citizens seem vulnerable and waffling as a political polity. Less so with Americans but there have been in-roads there as well.

We'll take losses-both blood and capital, if we believe that our leaders have a plan, will execute their plan, and can eventually see tangible SIGNS of success. Most don't ask much. Despite such, both Iraq and Afghanistan have been fraught with bumbling mis-management that defies the most elemental principles of management. Patience is wearing thin in the west.

In Pakistan, there seems a window heretofore non-existent where your nat'l population appears prepared to recognize that (at least) Mehsud and Faizullah must go. That, too, seems to waffle depending upon whom you read but the vast majority concur for the moment.

I'm less convinced of perceptions regarding Pakistan's "good" taliban. I make no distinction and personally wish all dead. Others in Pakistan, however, do still see distinction and, therein, utility.

I guess we'll see what side prevails there. Personally, I don't believe Pakistan shall ever see a need to carry this fight beyond the Waziristans to Quetta but...who knows?

 

[muse]

You may want to check out this month's Foreign Affairs - "Flipping the Taliban" -- it made for depressing reading as the authors seem to once again revived the good/bad talib thing

I'm simply unconvinced that your military and civilian government have extracted all the useful lessons from SWAT/Buner/Dir. I've long thought that the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan represents the final redoubt for many elements beyond simply Baitullah Mehsud. I don't ascribe to any of those elements competing with Mehsud representing any temporal nor long term asset for your government. As such, whether they fight or align themselves with Mehsud is irrelevant

Yes, I do take your point and largely agree that the Fauj has been less than solid, capacity/capability has proven a terrible challenege - but we got what we got -- I can't see improving substantially -- with Waziristan, there are peculiar ideas gaining ground among some former communists(read today's nationalist) in Kabul -- For whatever reason they are convinced that Balouchistan is for their taking and giving Afghanistan what Pakistan denied the Soviet -- Critics will point out that Afghans seem to be getting quite used to firing off the U.S shoulder, even as they have much pacification to do in home - Some Pakistani observers, opting to keep their "welcome" powder dry for the Afghan, have suggested that this particular line of thinking in keeping with noises about the Durand line, should give urgency to operations and success in Waziristan at the earliest in order to deter temptation in Kabul, wherever else the fountainhead, the currency of these ideas in Kabul is taken seriously by some.

 

[S-2]

"there are peculiar ideas gaining ground among some former communists(read today's nationalist) in Kabul -- For whatever reason they are convinced that Balouchistan is for their taking and giving Afghanistan what Pakistan denied the Soviet ... wherever else the fountainhead, the currency of these ideas in Kabul is taken seriously by some."

You'll love this article-

Afghani-Pakistani Hostility Impedes U.S. Troops-WAPO

Let me add this late in reply to your comments about "flipping the taliban". Relevant to the topic-

The "Moderate" Taliban-Wishful Thinking On The West?- The Washington Times

 

[muse]

S2

The first article fed directly into the perception I was speaking of.

As for the second, I'm with the author, but I wonder if Afghan Talib and Pakistani talib are the same - actually I don't think they are same at all - nevertheless, neither deserves to be spoken to.

 

[S-2]

"By better protecting the population, by organizing local citizens groups to cooperate on economic development and by recruiting more locals around the country into the growing Afghan army and police, the Afghan government and its international partners can weaken the insurgency. Only in this way will "reconcilables" be separated from irreconcilables - namely, anyone connected with Mullah Omar and his fellow purveyors of hate and extremism."

Not just a prescription that obviously makes sense and which we've read already from so many but, more importantly, a means to separate those whom are ideologically or personally loyal to Omar and therefore fight FOR the taliban from those whom fight AGAINST the GoA/ISAF.

Can we give those whom aren't ideologically or personally devoted to the taliban any reason to reconsider against whom they fight and why? Ms. Sherjan seems to understand it's a simple matter of providing alternatives in many cases.

So do we...in theory. Long overdue that we systematically practice what we preach. Until, more than effort, we generate positive RESULTS, we'll provide little incentive to less-than-fully-committed enemies and waffling fence-sitters.

 

[muse]

S2, Nadja -- the piece below was published in today's The News International, clearly it preceds Operation Khanjar please keep in mind thr "Flipping The taliban" acticle from "Foreign Affairs" in mind , Clearly the Air Marshal is a fan of our discussions-- What do you make of it?



An alternate ‘Af-Pak’ strategy
Monday, July 06, 2009
Shahzad Chaudhry

The stated ****** strategy of the USA has the following four goals: neutralise Al Qaeda, bring stability to Afghanistan, ensure nation- and state-building in Afghanistan through various support and institution-building programmes, sanitise Pakistan’s tribal belt to eliminate safe havens. In a strange way, this also is Obama’s exit strategy. Smart – you might call it; deliverable in a very reasonable time, is how McChrystal and Co view it.

Let’s clothe this skeleton and view the progress to-date. The mini-surge of 21,000 more troops will do a couple of things: boost the sagging morale of the garrisoned British deployments in Helmand area closer to the border of Iran; attempt to neutralise and eliminate the growing domination of the Taliban in the area where both trade from Turkmenistan to Iran and back actually routes, and poppy grows in abundance, bringing the riches to the Taliban providing the all critical funding to their movement.

When do these 21,000 additional troops actually take the fight to the Taliban, is yet to be seen. Their second order of formal business is to secure the towns and cities of Afghanistan to enable holding of unhindered presidential elections in August, which, to all indications, will also be delivered as per plan. McChrystal, the general in charge in Afghanistan, however, is also known for some cerebral interventions to conflict resolution: amongst those is his proclivity to negotiate peace with the opposing parties, thus diluting the impact of armed opposition to his special operations forte.

Together, it makes for a stable and promising socio-political environment in the more visible urban Afghanistan. How will it weigh against the 70 percent ungoverned Afghan space is yet to be determined. But a more likely media blitz claiming dynamic improvements in socio-political order, a la Iraq, may well be spruced up by some significant negotiated breakthrough with elements of the Afghan Taliban.

Meanwhile, a 140,000 military and a 70,000 police is under training, a la Iraq, to seek a gradual replacement of the US and coalition forces indigenising the security responsibilities as a part of achieving Obama’s declared objectives. A large group of civilian experts in various fields of nation-building will however stay on to ensure ostensibly the support to development programmes, while in actuality sustaining and minding American interests in the region.

Were this armed effort to sustain till 2012, the year of Obama’s re-election bid, it might just afford the minimum time for the US/NATO/ISAF troops to clean up their beats, apparently, and retreat back home from what may by then be known as an “unnecessary” war in various capitals.

But will Afghanistan ever acquire the modicum of stability that may propel it towards the Jeffersonian model of democracy and progress, particularly after the overhang of American security is removed and the imposed governing structure is rendered vulnerable to competing domestic political forces? What might it entail to pacify a confrontationist socio-cultural structure and tradition between the Afghan Pakhtoons and non-Pakhtoons, particularly emphasised in Afghanistan’s own civil war after February 1989? What is the ethos under which the Afghan tradition has survived over centuries as a buffer between competitive imperialist influences?

Given the social, psychological and intellectual turmoil that the larger Pakhtoon society would have endured by then, something that I based my premise around, carried by this paper titled “Underlying sentiment in militancy” (June 29), there is one of the following possibilities how Afghanistan may fare in the post-American scenario: a gradual decay of the aroused sentiment in Pakhtoon sensibilities, permitting a sure withdrawal to the pre-hostilities status quo; an acute awareness of the psycho-social turmoil leading to an agitated pursuit to change the status quo–again, this can carry more than one manifestation; or the continuity of instability because of internecine armed attempts by various groups to wrestle control in the centre and benefit from the centuries-old tradition of controlling trade, mostly illicit, in arms, goods and narcotics.

If Afghanistan were to slide back into its traditional ways of existence, it would have once again remained only a convenient stage for the world’s privileged to enact their power-play, without it ever getting the opportunity to climb out of its rather archaic existence. Considering that under the emerging geo-economic realities, Afghanistan’s pivotal location can be leveraged to usher in a new environment of interdependence and regional trade that can offer not only a more productive engagement of most populations of Central, West and South Asia, but also foster initiation of socio-economic progress within Afghanistan with the unfailing consequence of embedded but educated and informed awareness. This in itself will form the buffer between obscurantist and orthodox isolationist philosophies and the progressive, relevant and enlightened socio-political and politico-religious mores. Stability will be a natural consequence with interdependence and shared stakes in the region.

Pakistan, when it comes out of its current morass resulting inalienably as a fallout of the failures of Afghanistan, will revert to its agenda of rapid economic growth. Along with India and China, it will need consistent and increasing supplies of annual per-capita additions in energy of around 10 percent or higher–a figure indicative of Pakistan’s developmental needs prior to its being embroiled in the current impasse. Central Asia, with its huge reserves of natural gas, can become the main source of imported energy for South Asia. While it has been talked for long, it needs to be done. Similarly, Iran could access this market for its oil while linking into the regions of South, West and Central Asia. Ultimately, whatever ties the region into interdependencies can only have a salutary and stabilising effect in the region.

Would it be too much to expect that Iran and India, both at the periphery of this interlinked region of trade, connectivity and energy, may find the advantage to leverage in with both their products and markets? Could it be that political issues find compulsive attention and resolve beneficially to the advantage of all? Could it be that societies and cultures open up to complementary neighbourly influences engendering better understanding of each other and reinforcing stability through peace, progress and prosperity? Then, may “Af-Pak,” alter its objectives to include sustaining linkages of interdependence and an environment of economic activity and development within the region, replace forever strife, deprivation and socio-economic oppression and exploitation!
Pakistan, India, Iran and the USA, all need to change their attitudes towards each other and reassess their perceptions of each other. Trade will help open up societies, and open societies assimilate fresher ideas and thoughts better, changing perceptions. Are we ready to do it? We will still get the desired results: peace and prosperity for our people; resolution of political issues in a conciliatory and mutually acceptable frame-work; enlightened and progressive societies; a secure neighbourhood; and an opportunity for all. Mindsets will need a major, major change. For the sake of the future of the peoples, it must happen.

Obscurantism and militancy will need a share and for that it must relinquish its chosen path to enmesh within the socio-economic structure; these will therefore wither under their own irrelevance.

What must McChrystal do in the meanwhile? In the more than likely three years available to him, work absolutely closely with the Pakistani military to synchronise operations both sides of the Durand Line, so as to aim for synergistic gains, and give meaning to their decade long military presence in the region. Pakistan shall need pervasive intelligence sharing from forces across to time their manoeuvres well; without such coordination, with operations displaced in time, the effect will largely be dissipative and diffusive; the aim being to sanitise regions on both sides off the hardened and the criminal elements. Remember, these people, the malleable ones and those likely to turn their back on militancy, belong here; it is their land and they have a right over it. Hand it back to them with all their rights. Tie them into the mainstream; give them the means to move up the social ladder through bona fide socio-economic facilitation, and the momentum of the regional economic compulsions, suitably supported by other initiatives in education, health, and institutional services, will right all the doctrinal, socio-political and confrontationist distortions.

This will be our only hope. “Af-Pak” needs a rewrite, and a vastly different strategy.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador. Email:shahzad.a.chaudhry@gmail .com

 

[S-2]

"What do you make of it?"

Let's start here-

"The stated ****** strategy of the USA has the following four goals: neutralise Al Qaeda, bring stability to Afghanistan, ensure nation- and state-building in Afghanistan through various support and institution-building programmes, sanitise Pakistan’s tribal belt to eliminate safe havens."

O.K.

"In a strange way, this also is Obama’s exit strategy."

In a very strange way. Which element in the aforementioned "strategy" indicates any exit from the scene anytime soon? Certainly not the objectives. They appear a mighty chunk for any nation to bite off, do they not?

"McChrystal, the general in charge in Afghanistan, however, is also known for some cerebral interventions to conflict resolution: amongst those is his proclivity to negotiate peace with the opposing parties, thus diluting the impact of armed opposition to his special operations forte."

Nonsensical unless the Shahzad Chaudhry wishes to suggest that General McChrystal possesses some talent for getting one afghan faction to battle another. Nothing special about that. The common denominator is normally cash in that long history.

"How will it weigh against the 70 percent ungoverned Afghan space is yet to be determined."

If that space equates to an absence of people, it might not matter one iota. That's part of the objective is to realize that governance relates to the population. Much of America's west is as "ungoverned" as Afghanistan. It's also as empty.

"But a more likely media blitz claiming dynamic improvements in socio-political order, a la Iraq..."

There's no media blitz CLAIMING dynamic improvements in Iraq. Those were dynamically clearly contrasted facts from previously odious data. Real enough.

What happens to Iraq hereafter is dependant upon Iraqis more than anybody else. As it should be, I suppose.

As for Helmand or anywhere else in Afghanistan, only a fool would be prepared to buy off on a "media blitz claiming dynamic improvements".

First, things are so bad on the civil reconstruction/governance side that it doesn't take much improvement to constitute a dynamic difference. That's, sadly, no measure of success.

Second, any reasonable measure must allow for time to sustain any "improvements". As example, Afghanistan reduced it's opium cultivation by 20% as of August 2008 from the previous year. Can they meet or exceed the same again? Anybody who jumps the gun on having irrevocably turned corners or seeing "lights at the end of tunnel(s)" would be recognizably and grossly pre-mature when it comes to Afghanistan.

"A large group of civilian experts in various fields of nation-building will however stay on to ensure ostensibly the support to development programmes, while in actuality sustaining and minding American interests in the region."

I never cease to be amazed.

"...it might just afford the minimum time for the US/NATO/ISAF troops to clean up their beats, apparently, and retreat back home from what may by then be known as an “unnecessary” war in various capitals."

2012 isn't the minimum time for America to "clean up its beat". Perhaps Europe.

"Considering that under the emerging geo-economic realities, Afghanistan’s pivotal location can be leveraged to usher in a new environment of interdependence and regional trade that can offer not only a more productive engagement of most populations of Central, West and South Asia, but also foster initiation of socio-economic progress within Afghanistan with the unfailing consequence of embedded but educated and informed awareness."

Are we discussing the same Afghanistan? This guy really is a "snap the finger" fellow. Let's discuss this in a couple of generations but I'm all over this if he's some tangible means of accelerating such without America's presence. Cool but, personally, I don't see it happening soon nor without our participation.

So much for Obama exiting Afghanistan anytime soon.

"...it is their land and they have a right over it. Hand it back to them with all their rights. Tie them into the mainstream..."

Ummm...can we hand it back to them with all their rights EXCEPT the right to embrace obscurantist and archaic views such as the right to wandering across borders because that's the way it's always been and never going to sleep without an armed AK within reach?

Those days need to be done with on both sides of the Durand line.