Nadja
In the question above I had asked if you could shed some light on "root causes" because I really could not find credible "root causes", see what you can make of the case Nasim Zehra makes - Has Nasim diagnosed correctly, is she correct in her explanation of what this insurgency is about:
The eleven indispensables
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Nasim Zehra
With the Army now having demonstrated its will and ability to inflict military damage on armed insurgent groups, specifically in parts of Malakand and FATA, Pakistan will now be involved in a relatively prolonged counterinsurgency effort. While Pakistan-based sleepers and active allies of insurgents join with externally based ones, sections of Pakistan's forces will have to remain engaged in battling these groups. This would include regular fighting groups, Special Forces and various elements within the intelligence agencies. However, the initial indicators are that both numerically and in scale the insurgency threat is neither chronic, nor deep-rooted enough to turn into a long drawn out affair. Yet, factors like the terrain, weapons availability, its sporadic spread across the country and its ability to potentially win the hearts and minds of the people means that it's not a quick-win affair.
However, the speed with which this the military operations will terminate and the ability of the counterinsurgency to disable and delegitimise the militants on a long-term basis will not only depend on the military issue. The military is only one, though essential dimension. Also the causes of what Pakistan eventually faced, a national and regional insurgency, emanated from multiple sources. All those sources will have to be blocked, and simultaneously, to ensure a successful counterinsurgency effort. Of the numerous contributing factors the following 11 are noteworthy and require Pakistan to take action:
One, beginning with support to the internally displaced persons, therefore the immediate fallout of the counterinsurgency effort to sustained and focused effort on reconstruction and rehabilitation of the IDPs as they begin their homeward journey, are high-priority moves that the government must make.
Two, the government must ensure that especially military actions and reconstruction-related actions are kept transparent for the public.
Three, communication with the people on the counterinsurgency goals, actions, and achievements including timelines must be kept realistic and regular. For example, if the government prematurely announces the end of military operations in any area, as was done in the case of Swat, it will prove counterproductive. Depleting trust and perception of army's ineffectiveness in its own field of performance will be the outcome.
Three, the government must make no offer for talks to the gun-totting militants. The government's position that the militants "have to surrender to the writ of the state in accordance with laws...that we have no other option but to win this war," is a correct position.
Four, the insurgency acquired a scale and complexity also because of Pakistan's other aggravated situations, including Balochistan. Simultaneous and substantive moves are required by the government to resolve other crises that have proved to be important contributing factors in the insurgency.
Five, the government needs to move on "opening the hearts and minds" of our own people who fell prey to the insurgents' indoctrination, ironically co-authored initially by sections of some state institutions. Indoctrination through state-sponsored and private madrasas were also a principle contributing factor for these people to falling prey to the insurgents. That too must be altered.
Six, the state's failure to provide people their constitutional rights was an important factor that won the insurgency some support, but indeed the defining factor was the state's own security strategy which it initially co-authored in the eighties with the US and other players. Policy reorientation too is required to prevent through another round of state-sponsorship the resurgence of such militant groups.
Seven, the two important yet weak institutional links required for effective good governance are the local administration machinery and the law enforcement agencies. These require immediate strengthening.
Eight, alongside the practical steps taken on the civil and military fronts, a clearly articulated political message needs to be conveyed to the public, by all political leaders, reiteratively. This message, spelling out the concrete steps the government intends to give to the people the promise of a homeland that the Quaid had planned, would help create the political and emotional stamina in the public that maybe required to face the negative costs of a long drawn out counterinsurgency. A united message needs to be given to prepare the public for also the dangers that may still lie ahead. Such a message should be a unifying message coming from all political leaders.
Nine, given the genesis of the insurgency that Pakistan is now trying to defeat and debilitate, government's clearly articulated commitment to constitutional democracy and constitutionally parliamentary national security policy, is necessary. Indeed, public rejection of any attempt to opt for extra-constitutional or extra-parliamentary policy, even in the name of national interest, must be rejected.
Ten, it must remain clear that Pakistan will through legitimate means pursue its its national security and foreign policy interests within the regional and international context. This would include commitment to a resolution of Kashmir, to a democratic, not dictatorial, expansion of the United Nations Security Council, the international community's acceptance of Pakistan as a nuclear power, availability of nuclear energy to Pakistan, firming up of Pakistan's borders, including the Durand Line.
Eleven, given that the insurgency has thrived within the context of unresolved regional issues on the one hand and unresolved principles of inter-state relations on the other. Clearly to successfully battle cross-border a visionary approach requires opting for collective regional security frameworks. Pakistan should lead the move in the region for collective security.
At the core of any successful counterinsurgency effort must be factors that constitute the content of regime legitimacy. Insurgencies are always born within a de-legitimatised socio-political context to unseat incumbent authority. They typically thrive on regime hatred, people's support for the incumbency, tightly woven organisation, regular supply of weapons and guerrilla warfare tactics. Pakistan's insurgency was, however, unique in both its inception and evolution. If the current insurgency was to be traced back to the eighties it was indeed created by the state itself, it was politically and financially underwritten by the international community, it was viewed as a security asset, its militant-cum-religious ideological moorings were largely state-authored and internationally supported, multiple state players regionally and globally mobilised foot-soldiers for this insurgency.
Hence, what for want of a more appropriate label is referred to as an insurgency is actually a mini-war machine that the state and its internal and external allies put together. The mini-war machine did eventually acquire its own regional and international persona, its own autonomy and operated as a fragmented entity combining a fiend's persona with that of a Robin Hood's. If it captured hearts and minds it also spread terror in people's hearts. The rollback of this entity therefore required both counterinsurgency elements but also an ideological and political reorientation of the state itself. Unless the state and the governments remain committed to exercise of state and government authority strictly within the context of the parameters laid down with the Constitution this early signs of success in counterinsurgency may not translate into sustained and national-level success.
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst. Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com
