Baitullah is now food for worms, what can Pakistanis, Afghans and Americans now expect:
Beyond Baitullah
Shaukat Qadir
On August 5, an American drone targeted the house of Maulana Ikramuddin, Baitullah Mehsuds father-in-law, killing Baitullah, his second wife and three others. It took two days after the attack for his death to be announced. If he was a CIA agent, as many among the Mehsuds believe, he had finally outlived his utility.
Let us first examine how Baitullah was different from the other Taliban. I have, in the past, attempted to explain that the tribes bordering Afghanistan Mehsuds, Wazirs, and Mohmands revolted against their traditional tribal leadership and the Pakistan government after the US invaded Afghanistan, since both the tribal leadership and the Pakistan government did not want these tribes to get involved in the Afghan struggle against US occupation. Thus this revolt at two levels threw up a new leadership in these tribes. Baitullah was a product of this revolt.
In 2007, Baitullah formed the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and attempted to unite all Taliban groups under his leadership. However, neither the Wazirs nor the Mohmands nor even Fazlullah in Swat accepted him as their leader. He did, however, at that stage, enjoy considerable support within his tribe.
This was the period when Pervez Musharraf was still domestically selling the line that we have been forced into fighting Americas war; while taking the occasional step against terrorism to pacify the gullible Bush administration. This was also the period when the Lal Masjid episode, the judicial crisis, and the declaration of emergency had diminished Musharrafs authority, spreading uncertainty in the rank and file of the army, causing large number of forces to surrender to a handful of Taliban; thus strengthening Baitullah et al.
This year also witnessed Al Qaedas announcement that Pakistan had replaced the US as its enemy number one. Meanwhile, the Wazirs, under Maulvi Nazir, were fighting pitched battles to oust foreigners from their area; mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks, with a smattering of others. At this stage, Baitullah decided to take up Al Qaedas call and, instead of fighting against the US occupation of Afghanistan, took on the Pakistani state.
He began by welcoming all foreigners to his area. He also received assistance from Al Qaeda to set up training schools, run by his aides Hakeemullah and Qari Hussain, for potential suicide bombers. Al Qaeda also provided advisers who helped plan attacks in meticulous detail.
While the influx of foreigners and his decision to target Pakistan steadily diminished the support from his own tribe, Baitullah seemed to be rolling in dollars, was reputedly in possession of the best communication and communications monitoring equipment available, as well as the most sophisticated weaponry. In addition, while he took foreigners under his wing, they undertook his protection. What is more, he replenished his stock of suicide bombers with volunteers from Southern Punjab. At the last estimate, there were over two thousand of these; trained or under training.
A less publicised fact is that on the day of his death, a delegation from the Mehsud tribe came to Islamabad to meet with government officials, seeking internally displaced persons status for thousands of families from the Mehsud tribe, people who opposed Baitullahs attacks on Pakistan and who wanted to escape before military operations began in their area, just as residents of Swat did. I gather that these included a number of erstwhile supporters of Baitullah who were willing to provide information in return for amnesty.
Official reports say that during a dispute that erupted at a meeting to decide Baitullahs succession, one of his aides, Hakeemullah, was killed. This was but natural, and is probably true. On August 16, a group of Wazirs was attacked and seventeen of them killed; ironically, they were returning from a raid on pro-US forces in Afghanistan. Turkistan Bittani, one of Baitullahs rivals still surviving, has accused Baitullahs group and reported Maulvi Nazir, leader of the Wazir TTP. While the Wazirs are not certain who attacked them, most of them are convinced that they were ambushed by Uzbeks and Tajiks, who had been under Baitullahs protection and were returning to Afghanistan after his death. They believe this was their parting revenge for the Uzbeks killed by the Wazirs since 2007.
Although it is rumoured that Maulvi Nazir is among the dead, I tend to believe the (other) rumour that he is seriously injured and might not survive.
In any case, Baitullah is no more. His tribe no longer finds foreigners acceptable, nor are they willing to accept the supremacy of any of his aides; Hakeemullah, Waliullah, or Qari Hussain. None of them can bring in Baitullahs wealth, weapons, or support from Al Qaeda.
So, what implications does this have for our future?
Like I stated in an earlier article, if there are only five thousand trained and committed suicide bombers left and they carry out only one attack daily, it will take almost fifteen years for them to end. Consequently, suicide attacks are something we are destined to live with, for quite some time to come.
However, the support that Al Qaeda provided to Baitullahs TTP is likely to dry up. Which implies that when and if high value targets are subjected to attacks, they are likely to be less damaging and may even be less frequently successful. It also implies that the mechanism that was churning out these killing machines is likely to slow down in the immediate future and dry up soon thereafter.
It also means that while the freedom struggle against US occupation is unlikely to diminish in intensity, military operations in Waziristan may not even be necessary. If it is still necessary, it is likely to be a far easier operation than it would have been were Baitullah alive and supported by his foreign troops.
Has the tide turned? The anti-Taliban feeling in mainland Pakistan seems to have become more unanimous than the anti-American feeling. Rebel tribesmen are feeling the heat and, it is very possible that soon, bodies of ex-Taliban might start turning up in Waziristan like they are doing in Swat.
I am no supporter of vigilantes, but it seems that they might well replace the Taliban, unless the government acts, and acts very soon, to fill the administrative vacuum of law enforcement. Otherwise, we may next have to battle the vigilantes if we defeat the Taliban.
This article is a modified version of one originally written for the daily National. The writer is a former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Insititute (IPRI)