War of narratives
Saturday, July 18, 2009
Asad Durrani
While serving with the army, the thought that the pen might be mightier than the sword never crossed my mind. No longer wearing the cross-swords and occasionally fiddling with the pen, it was still hard to believe that one had stumbled over a more lethal weapon. If the power flowed through the barrel of the gun, as the wise man Mao once famously contended, a hardcore gunner had no reason to give up on familiar tools in favour of some abstract notion. Lately, however, the wielders of the pen are proving to be a greater threat than the Drones and the suicide bombers.
Perceptions are deemed to be more important than the reality. Most of us therefore try to influence perceptions. Concocting conspiracies works for a while. For a more profound effect though, one needs a good narrative. Take the example of our current discomfiture: depending upon whom one dislikes more- the Army, America, or India; a narrative suitably woven works wonders. The army is charged to have committed some "strategic" sins. During the Soviet occupation, it got us involved with the Afghan resistance to protect its "strategic depth"; its policy of using non-state actors as "strategic assets" in Afghanistan and Kashmir has blown back to haunt us; and it has used hostility with India to safeguard its larger than life role. The army has also often been accused of keeping threats alive to ensure cash flow in its coffers
The US related narrative is indeed a long and an impressive one. It is supposed to have lured the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; persuaded us to fight a "proxy war" on its behalf; pressured the Saudis to sponsor madressahs that churned out Taliban fired by salafi ideology to wage jihad against the infidels; and it left us high and dry when the Soviets withdrew. Post-9/11 (stage-managed of course), it invaded Afghanistan to establish a foothold in an area that enables it better access to the natural resources in Central Asia, contain China, keep an eye on Iran, and create chaos in Pakistan to takeout our nuclear teeth. And of course that was the reason it keeps Osama or its myth alive, provides covert support to the Pakistani Taliban and avoids targeting the likes of Baitullah.
Thanks to America, India has receded on our target seeking radar. But it still is good enough to be mentioned in some of our despatches. The "archrival" has not only tricked America in the so-called civilian nuclear deal but has also trapped it to grant India a special role in Afghanistan, where it has opened God knows how many consulates to create mischief in Balochistan and plant rogue groups in our border regions. Under cover of Mumbai attacks, it is dragging its feet on the peace process to prevent us from taking out troops from the eastern borders that we so direly need on the Western.
Narratives, never entirely true or false, are a useful tool. Besides putting the nemesis on the spot, they promote innovation and rationalise inaction. If the likes of the army, America, or India, have designed our misfortunes, indeed there was nothing that we could do to change the course! That's bad news for those who want to be the masters of their own destiny. They obviously need another narration that encourages them to do what they can, and at times what they must.
The Soviets occupied Afghanistan because they could. They did not invade China or Western Europe even though the provocation was greater and the likely dividends more attractive. Strategic Depth may be a sound concept or merely another name for a "buffer", we now had not exactly a friendly superpower in the west. With India in the east, Pakistan was now caught in the proverbial "nutcracker". Helping the Afghan resistance was risky, even with the US' aid. Despite deeper involvement, America had failed in Korea and Vietnam, and later in Yemen, Saudi support notwithstanding. We still took the leap, and with America joining up two years later, succeeded. The Soviets withdrew behind the Oxus.
We could not manage the fallout drugs, Kalashnikovs, militancy and also failed to restore peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban, regardless of whose creation, at one stage looked all set to reunify the country. We therefore backed them, as did the Americans and the Saudis, possibly because of a pipeline that was to pass through areas under Taliban control. Of course the US left Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal since their objective had been achieved. In all fairness, no one should expect a country with global interests to stay on till the bitter end. And undoubtedly, they will leave Afghanistan when they no longer can stay; regardless of any real, perceived, declared or evolving interests. That is how they came in, in the first place, because they could. Hypothetically, if it was Russia, China, or India, where Al-Qaeda had sought refuge, the US response would have been different.
So would have been ours, if we had more faith in our ability to withstand the US' pressure. Saving causes like Kashmir and nuclear, were mere rationalisations, as we must have found out in the meantime. An unsaid reason made more sense: had we not agreed to carry out the assigned role, the Indians were all set to stand in. The mere thought that the American planes would be flying over Pakistan from the Indian territory, dropping some lethal cargo, accidentally or by design, was not very comforting. And God forbid if these were Drones attacking targets in Pakistan, declaring war on India, at least by our loose cannons, might have become inevitable.
Assuming that the charges against the army, that it shelters its strategic assets for the rainy days were true; could one not try to be more reflective? After sealing the Dayton Accord, Richard Holbrook, now of AfPak fame, did concede: "But for the foreign militants, who of course must now leave, Dayton would not have been possible". True, but for the resistance the invaders never leave. If they hang on nevertheless, what do we do with the resistors? A thoughtful state, a rare commodity, will rehabilitate them, or keep them on leash till the job was done. Otherwise there were good chances that they would turn their guns inwards, especially when they are joined by rogue groups hijacking their movement and morphing their agenda- as is the case on our western borders. The state then has little choice but to tame them.
The non-state actors, the non-militants amongst them, can do better. If they believe what was being done was wrong, they should say so when there was still time. Many of them applauded the use of force in the erstwhile East Pakistan till it was lost. Right now, there may be good reasons to act against our renegade militants; there are equally good reasons to caution against the use of wrong means - area weapons and extrajudicial killing, to quote but two. The best contribution, however, that our pen pushers can make is to take on narratives which use this lethal weapon for subversion. So successful are they that we now understand terms like terrorists, Taliban, even jihadis solely as defined by them. Semantics is the latest and the most effective form of terrorism.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and former head of the ISI. Email: asad.durrani@gmail.com
