United Nations still consider Kashmir to be a territorial dispute.
Nice try though.
The Kashmir challenge
Ashraf Jehangir QaziSeptember 28, 2018
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The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.
INDIA cancelled talks with Pakistan blaming it for ‘acts of terror’, along with a vicious attack on the newly elected prime minister. Pakistanis and Indians back their own versions regarding an alleged atrocity. Tragically, the truth is rendered irrelevant. The prime minister, however, must ensure he gets to know the unvarnished truth. Otherwise, like his predecessors, he will be systematically blindsided.
Pakistan wants dialogue. India says Pakistan must first stop ‘cross-border terrorism’. Why did Modi first respond positively to the prime minister’s proposal and then change his mind? Does he believe Imran Khan okayed an atrocity? Or that he is irrelevant?
Does India regard the Kashmiri freedom struggle as terror? There is a legal and a political reality. The UN has acknowledged the Kashmiri right of self-determination in 1948-49. In 1974, it reaffirmed “the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination”.
Armed struggle and resistance against illegal military occupation and repression are not terror.
In 1982, the UN “reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial or foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle”.
The UN has rejected India’s claim that Jammu and Kashmir is part of the Indian Union. It remains disputed territory. The right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people has been forcibly denied by the Indian military occupation of Jammu and Kashmir.
India blames Pakistan for not fulfilling conditions for the plebiscite. Even if this were so, it could not derogate from the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that UN resolutions on Kashmir were adopted under Chapter 6 in no way reduces the obligation of member states and of parties to the dispute to respect and implement them. Nor does the Shimla Agreement affect Kashmiri rights.
Politically, however, India refuses to accept any of the above. Moreover, other than expressing concern over the human rights situation in India-held Kashmir (IHK), the international community is not prepared to press India on the subject of a Kashmir settlement. This, despite the dispute having triggered three wars between India and Pakistan which are today adjacent nuclear weapons countries.
This, and so much elsewhere, may underline the irresponsibility of the international community. It certainly highlights the structural ineffectiveness of the UN whose primary purpose is to preserve the peace and address situations that have led to war and threaten far more devastating conflicts.
Nevertheless, acts of terrorism including torture and mutilation are unlawful and unacceptable under any circumstances, including in the context of legitimate freedom struggles. The rights of innocent civilians are inviolable. The terror of one party can never justify that of others, including victims. However, armed struggle and resistance against illegal military occupation and repression is not terror.
Despite all of the above, political realities cannot be wished away. Only UNSC resolutions under Chapter 7 are enforceable. It is inconceivable that the UNSC will ever pass a Chapter 7 resolution on Jammu and Kashmir against the wishes of India. None of Pakistan’s friends would support such a development.
At best major powers will continue to encourage and try to persuade India to engage with Pakistan on all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. India may agree to what passes for dialogue. It has done so in the past.
After several barren rounds on core issues it breaks down over one or more incidents. Tensions rise. Conflicts happen. Hawks thrive. Peaceniks cower. Cynics laugh “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds!”
Should Pakistan abandon dialogue with India? The prime minister rightly rejects such advice. Nor is it necessary for Pakistan to solicit dialogue if India is unwilling. Over time, however, Pakistan must strengthen its credibility. If that happens, India will, sooner or later, have to accept the reality that it can neither permanently crush the Kashmir liberation struggle nor successfully blame Pakistan for its inability to do so.
Meanwhile, Pakistan needs to improve and intensify its Kashmir advocacy and diplomacy. The prime minister’s offer to engage India in a dialogue process to resolve all issues between the two countries is also, sooner or later, likely to be taken up. The challenges of the 21st century, which threaten to further exacerbate Indo-Pakistan tensions, will leave either country no choice.
However, Modi for the moment has chosen to accuse Imran Khan of being the ‘true face’ of an ‘evil agenda’. He hopes to exploit Pakistan’s isolation in the international community progressively brought about by the consistently incompetent decision-making of the establishment.
It is not clear if Modi’s ‘U-turn’ was influenced by a reported atrocity, the approach of the 2019 national elections, a major corruption scandal hanging over him, the usual persuasion of influential anti-Pakistan lobbies or personal spite. Whatever it was, it has discouraged sensible realists and encouraged right-wing ideologues in both countries.
Pakistan’s formal position on Kashmir does not need to change at all. But its strategy does need to be revisited to ensure its own policies do not inadvertently harm Kashmiris by allowing India to distract international attention away from its repression. Pakistan should honestly inform its people there is no alternative to a negotiated and principled compromise settlement with India that is verifiably acceptable to Kashmiri opinion.
Once India cannot credibly accuse Pakistan of aiding ‘terrorism’ in IHK it will not be able to portray its repression as ‘counterterrorism’. Nor will it be able to sustain its obduracy on Kashmir forever. Pakistan will require imaginative and skilled diplomacy and leadership of a high order. It will also need to make clear ‘red lines’ that cannot be crossed and ‘vital interests’ that cannot be compromised.
The 21st century has one message for nuclear-armed India and Pakistan: cooperate or perish. The seas are rising. Land, water and jobs will disappear. Populations cannot cope. Stresses of every kind are increasing. Reason and moderation are giving way to atavistic passions, insane hatred and self-destructive machismo. Cooperating to reverse this fatal trend will provide a context for a Kashmir settlement.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.
ashrafjqazi@gmail.com
www.ashrafjqazi.com
Published in Dawn, September 28th, 2018
This is from Dawn newspaper, which is more credible than the Express Tribune.
Kashmir talks: reality & myth
Riaz Mohammad KhanSeptember 11, 2017
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The writer is a former foreign secretary.
KASHMIR is so deeply emotive that perceptions often mix reality with myth. This is true of discussions over the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla Accords, the Lahore Summit Declaration and, most of all, of bilateral efforts to address the dispute.
On YouTube, I saw Prof Christine Fair snap at a Pakistani questioner who referred to the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir. She averred that Pakistan violated the UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) calling for a plebiscite by refusing to withdraw “tribesmen” from the territory of the state.
This is a half-truth. Pakistan had expressed reservations to the resolution which led to the formation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and finally to Resolution 98 (1952) allowing Pakistan to deploy up to 6,000 troops and India up to 18,000. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India rejected it invoking change of circumstances because of reports of an incipient Pakistan-US defence treaty.
Half-truths and political spin thus cloud agreements and talks on Kashmir. Politics was played around Tashkent and Simla. A text on Kashmir, similar to that of the Simla Accords, adopted at Lahore was projected as a pathway to a settlement. The 2005-06 backchannel negotiations drew criticism that Pakistan had abandoned its principled position. The fact is that Pakistan’s position, based on the UNSC resolutions and the Simla Accords, will remain intact until Pakistan accepts a new international legality affecting Kashmir. Neither the backchannel nor the earlier inconclusive talks changed this position. This aside, the plebiscite as conceived in the 1948 UNSC resolution is as academic today as is India’s claim based on the controversial accession document.
Kashmiri sacrifices and suffering must not be viewed through the prism of our security.
The first variant on the 1948 resolution came in the 1950 Owen Dixon plan for region-wise plebiscites, which was recognition of the demographic and communal realities in Kashmir. Later, Ayub Khan tried to persuade Nehru to accept a territorial adjustment; he had the Valley in mind. The Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks were not about the plebiscite. The Valley is the heart of the dispute. It represents 55 per cent of the India-held Kashmir population, where the Kashmiri people have refused to acquiesce to and have constantly agitated for freeing themselves of Indian occupation. This is the only pressure that India faces pushing it to look for a settlement. The latest youth uprising across the Valley lends fresh urgency to our moral response in support of Kashmiri rights and self-determination.
Moral principles alone provide justification for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. Discussions sometimes meander into security considerations or the need to protect water sources, that Kashmir has tied down over half million Indian troops; and that Pakistan must remove an existential threat by securing control of rivers which pass through Kashmir. These are false arguments. Kashmiri sacrifices and suffering must not be viewed through the prism of our security; it will knock out the moral basis of our position, suggesting that we are not interested in a just political settlement. The argument negates the fact that nuclear deterrence is an equaliser which will not be altered even if India doubles its military strength. As for rivers, maps show that the upper reaches of the Indus and the Chenab lie in Ladakh and Jammu respectively, the two non-Muslim majority regions which are unlikely to accede to Pakistan under any scenario.
We may ask: what is Pakistan’s locus standi to speak with India on behalf of the Kashmiris for this or that formula? The question has logic, yet history imposes a responsibility on Pakistan to seek a solution that is consistent with Kashmiri aspirations. Otherwise all our efforts, declarations and resolutions will make little sense. Meanwhile, we must do all we can to help attenuate the suffering and human rights violations of the Kashmiris. Personally, I would say that we should be supportive if they demand azadi provided we can protect our vital interests which, in the strictly territorial sense, are linked to Gilgit-Baltistan. So, what are the realistic options for a way forward?
Do we have a military option, or jihadi recourse, or resort to the United Nations or to diplomacy? Let us focus on the political and diplomatic options. In the UN and other forums, we always make strong references to Kashmir, particularly on human rights. This must continue more emphatically. However, I do not recall any proposal for a resolution or initiative received from our UN missions since 1993 when a resolution was moved and then withdrawn in the Human Rights Council. For UN matters, the Foreign Office normally defers to the advice of our permanent representatives who are invariably persons with great experience and grasp.
India stubbornly rejects third-party or multilateral mediation and accepts no such modality to address Kashmir. Bilaterally, the 2005-06 backchannel has been the most sustained effort. I was associated with it. Doubts swirl around that effort, largely because its deliberations have not become public.
The so-called Four-Point Formula was centred on a provisional arrangement for self-governance within sub-regions of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. The last draft, received from the Indian interlocutor in March 2007, included issues yet to be settled. Much of the text was, however, agreed through exchanges spread over two years, including sections on self-governance, intra-region movement and trade and economic activity. Sub-regions were supposed to have similar systems with their own administration, security, legislatures, police and law-enforcement agencies, in other words, optimum autonomy. The Kashmiris could freely move and trade across sub-regions. Joint mechanism related to specified issues such as international treaties (the Indus Water Treaty), connectivity and travel. This section and the demilitarisation provision needed further work. However, the process, which also envisaged political consultations, was stymied by the judicial crisis in Pakistan and then the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
The present circumstances offer little hope for picking up the threads. The Modi government has even tried to scuttle the IHK special status under the Indian constitution. If ever diplomacy revives for a peace plan, its contours will be no different than those outlined through the 2005-06 effort. Political realities and demography impose limits on what diplomacy can achieve.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Published in Dawn, September 11th, 2017
