DAWN
THURSDAY’S attack on the airbase in Kamra shows that terrorist groups in Pakistan have developed a level of resilience that has survived the killing of several high-profile leaders.
It is for another day to consider why this attack failed where others have caused considerable material damage to security forces.
After the killings of Ilyas Kashmiri, a self-styled expert in multilayered terrorist attacks, Qari Hussain, who was known as ustadul fidayeen (master of suicide bombers), Badar Mansoor, chief of Al Qaeda’s operational network in Pakistan, and Abu Laith al-Libi, strategic mastermind of Al Qaeda in the country, it was presumed that the terrorists were losing their destructive edge.
There were indications that they would need time to recover from these losses. Terrorist attacks decreased by 46 per cent in the first half of the year compared to the same period in 2011.
At the same time, a change in the nature of attacks reflected that the terrorists were under some pressure or lacked human resources. Their reliance on target killings grew. There was a clear decline in the number of suicide attacks in the first quarter of 2012: 13 attacks occurred during that period, a 65 per cent drop over the same period in 2011.
These factors provided reason to believe that the space for terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal areas was shrinking amid the ongoing military campaign and US drone strikes against them.
The Taliban appear to have quickly realised that the erosion of high-value resources could lead to the annihilation of their movement. First, they combined their scattered forces and formed a shura-i-murakeba to resolve their internal disputes.
Al Qaeda took the initiative and brokered an alliance among the Haqqanis, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and militant groups led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir.
The shura also resolved differences between TTP head Hakeemullah Mehsud and his deputy, Waliur Rehman. Members of the shura-i-murakeba agreed to cease attacks against Pakistani security forces and focus their attention on Nato forces in Afghanistan.
After this alliance came about, the strike on the airbase in Kamra is a major assault aimed perhaps at impressing upon the people and the military that these terrorist groups still have the capability to launch substantial operations against high-profile installations.
In order to identify the true potential of the threat they pose, it is important to consider how they managed to evolve a recovery mechanism after heavy losses.
As far as the objective and selection of the target is concerned, it was obvious that they wanted to convey they could target and breach the military’s defences and, perhaps more importantly, make these seem vulnerable. As TTP spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan claimed, they will continue to attack security installations “until the establishment of a true Islamic state in Pakistan”.
The pattern indicated that Al Qaeda was involved in the attack at a certain level just as Saiful Adil, Al Qaeda’s strategic mastermind, had allegedly been involved in the GHQ and Mehran naval base attacks along with Ilyas Kashmiri.
The question is, in the absence of key masterminds, how was the attack managed and by whom?
Initial investigation has focused on, among others, Adnan Rasheed, a former employee of the air force who was sentenced to death for his role in an attempt to assassinate Gen Pervez Musharraf. He was among those who escaped from Bannu jail in April this year.
It is possible that Rasheed was part of the planning team, as he could be aware of details about security at the airbase and could have sympathisers inside the base, but it is yet to be established if he could have managed a high-profile attack. If that is the case, some to follow in Ilyas Kashmiri’s mould may be available to the terrorists. An even more important question is the identity of the strategic mind behind the attack, especially when al-Libi has been killed.
Anyone including Farman Ali Shinwari, successor of Badar Mansoor as Al Qaeda’s operational chief in Pakistan, Ustad Farooq, head of the so-called Punjabi Taliban, Abdul Shakoor al-Turkistani, a powerful Al Qaeda leader, Saiful Adil, who operates from Iran, or Hakeemullah Mehsud could have been the mastermind.
Although the terrorists failed to show the level of destructive skill in the Kamra attack that they did under Kashmiri’s supervision in the Mehran base, GHQ and Lahore police academy attacks, the emerging pattern reflects that they will continue to try.
Besides collaborative operations, the terrorist groups are also looking for a replacement for Qari Hussain, and the Darra Adam Khel Taliban have reportedly taken responsibility for filling this void.
The unity among terrorist groups is not the only source of their strength. They also gain strength from fragmentation and confusion over the war against terrorism among the security, political and civil society leaderships in Pakistan.
The spread and reach of terrorists has become a critical challenge for the state, and yet ambiguity on the issue of terrorism pervades society. The collective mindset reflects a state of out-and-out denial.
Although the army chief’s speech on Independence Day was encouraging, as he stressed clarity on the issue of extremism and terrorism, the political leadership has not shown commensurate enthusiasm.
Ahead of the general elections, political parties do not appear to be ready to take any clear stance because of the uncertainty over the issue and its external linkages. Parties are staying on the sidelines despite a dire need for a national security policy that security experts have been crying themselves hoarse about for many years.
In order to avoid external and regional caveats, the security and political leadership ought to at least be able to agree on an internal security paradigm and mechanism that should be based on close vigilance and appropriate response in view of the threat perception.
