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Attack on PAF Base Minhas

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lets talk abut replacement for one minute if a saab is distoryed now PAF will must replace it . what you guys think abut ? PAF will send J-019 for fitting on it erieye ?

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Hi windhammer,

I don't think you can compare a burglar in a home with a terrorsit attack at the base. At home the owner himself is responsible for the security and even then if the burglars are armed and he runs to meet them unarmed would be pure stupidity and it would be wise to wait for the police to arrive, if the burglars take ou or anyone of your family member hostage, the situation would be worst than before.

In case of attack on the base, base commander running around unarmed does not make any sense, what possibly could he have achieved by being in the vicinity of firefight? tell the SSG team where to shoot? are they not capable to do it rhemselves?

What if while he was running around on one front, a seconfd or third terorist team team attacks from other directions on other targets? who would take charge of the control room, take the full picture in and devise strategy to tackle that? I think it enough to say that what he did was courageous, but a big big blunder, simply put a bse commander is not suppoosed to engage in fire fights when he has a security set up on his disposal to do the same.

What i am saying is these are all assumptions. Let's be realistic, on that fateful night, no emergency was in place, hence i doubt the base at that hour was launching or recovering any flights, hence there was no real reason for the base commander to be manning his station. Maybe he ran out of his living quarters to see or find out what's happening, may be he just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, but it's ludacris to conclude that he grabbed the gun since security wasn't in place. !!
 
Let me highlight some of the available technologies which help maintain physical security for various types of facilities.

Just for information, there are night vision cameras available which can read the number of a vehicle from even 6-8 KMs. Identifying an individual and taking his photo at such distance is not a problem these days.

Secondly, the ruggedized systems mentioned on some earlier posts are meant for field operations and are pretty old models as well. The newer models are much smaller and more advanced.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
• Microwave
• Passive/Active infrared
• Ultrasonic
• Balanced magnetic switch
• Proximity
• Sonic
• Vibration
• Video motion detection
• Laser
• Passive Magnetic Concealed Sensor Cable
• Fence Intrusion Sensors - Fiber

SURVEILLANCE
• HD Cameras
• Tower Mounted Cameras
• Hidden Cameras
• Body Worn
• Thermal
• Patrol Vehicle Cameras

Video Analytical System

To integrate the available systems, many more aspects have to be added in the above mentioned items.
 
True, Nation does not spend millions for an individual to get shadat, for that we can send them in untrained. Shadat should be an outcome of a courageous fight, not the sole objective.

Protecting one's life is the highest responsibility of every person, and in doing so he is alowed to take his oponents life even in non-war scenarios.


“The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his.” ― George S. Patton Jr.
 
A total bloody shambles by the so-called Pakistanis on this forum. I refuse to play your game, it's almost like you losers are sad that the takfiri scum was sent to hell.
I don't know what a Takfiri is, however if you're referring to the dead insurgents, then good riddance! I just wish that they should have enjoyed more pain in an interrogation room, before meeting the 72 dudes!
 
While the discussion on perimeter security is very interesting to read, the real solution lies some place else. Its not very creditable to be in this position in the first place.

Defend as far as tactically feasible.

These attacks are planned in Afghanistan, so that is out. But when they enter Pakistan, we should be actively searching for them rather than re-actively. Once they set out, they will do damage, f not to Kamra, then to some place else. Nakas with half awake policemen, well one policeman, the other are busy in gup shup, is not going to do the job.
 
I don't know what a Takfiri is, however if you're referring to the dead insurgents, then good riddance! I just wish that they should have enjoyed more pain in an interrogation room, before meeting the 72 dudes!

Takfir can be loosely translated to 'excommunication' in English !
 
Is this how it is supposed to be, a base commander running out to find out whats happening? What happend to the modern communication. This was only a terrorist attack, what will he do in a real war if the base comes under attack, run to the AAA battery? What we are arguing is he as the base commande rhas a bigger role to play, a larger picture to see, utilize the training and experience he has been given to achieve the objectives, not showing his personal courage and bravery. Let the men on the ground do their job, they can take care of 9/10 terrorists on their own.

No one is supposed to be on duty 24/7, he may well have been asleep at that time, and tha tis quite acceptable too. In larger organizations like millitary, specific roles and duties are assigned. If this was not something he was supposed to do, he violated the rules and could have caused more mayhem than good.

What i am saying is these are all assumptions. Let's be realistic, on that fateful night, no emergency was in place, hence i doubt the base at that hour was launching or recovering any flights, hence there was no real reason for the base commander to be manning his station. Maybe he ran out of his living quarters to see or find out what's happening, may be he just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, but it's ludacris to conclude that he grabbed the gun since security wasn't in place. !!
 
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LAHORE: It was the 27th night of the Islamic month of Ramadan in Pakistan, one of the holiest nights for Muslims worldwide. At around 0200 hours PST, one of Pakistan Air Force's most crucial airbase 'Minhas' which is situated in Kamra city, trembled when its control room received radio calls from a boundary checkpost that it has come under attack. The call was from Sepoy Muhammad Asif, a young security officer who was the first one to challenge the intruders.
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Although just 20 years old by age, Sepoy Muhammad Asif engaged 6-7 terrorists alone with his G-3 rifle at the checkpost when they failed to identify themselves since they were wearing military uniforms. The terrorists were armed with AK-47 rifles, RPG-7s and an assortment of hand grenades. Despite being outnumbered, Sepoy Muhammad Asif gave a stiff resistance and 3 terrorists were killed in the crossfire. After 15 minutes of continuous gunfire exchange, the terrorists managed to overrun the checkpost but not before Sepoy Muhammad Asif was martyred. His body showed signs of physical resistance which indicate that he had even fought the terrorists by hand before eventually sacrificing his life for his motherland.

The resistance that Sepoy Muhammad Asif gave to the terrorists resulted in two significant developments for the forces: First, that the control room was put on alert quite well in advance which allocated reasonable time to send the urgency call to the Special Service Wing (SSW) commandos to prepare for the assault against the terrorists. Second, the terrorists were split into two teams but the unexpected death of 3 of their comrades at the very start of the attack forced them to change their plan. This resulted in panic which quickly spread among their ranks.

The next thing that the terrorists did was to fire RPGs at the hanger side of the base. Fortunately, the targets were not accurate as they were firing it from quite a long distance, technically still standing outside the base premises. Here, the point to be noted is that these militants were so well informed that they had proper HUMINT of exactly which hanger had the Saab-2000 Erieye AEW&C parked inside. One rocket did manage to strike the said hanger's gate though, which resulted in minimal damage to an Erieye; yet another landed near an IL-86MP Tanker of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) which was parked near the runway in open. It also resulted in minimum damage to the aircraft. The PAF spokesman later confirmed that one aircraft was damaged but the identity of the plane was not revealed, even to this point.
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The checkpost which the terrorists managed to cross was the first tier of security at the base; they were on their way to the second tier, which is also manned by personnel of the Pakistan Army like the outer checkposts, though here in greater numbers. The militants were engaged by the SSW commandos in between these two tiers. Two companies of the PAF's dedicated Elite SSW are deployed at the Minhas airbase. The terrorists had no way left to go then: They tried to run and hide in different directions while firing indiscriminately. This is the point in time when Base Commander Air Commodore Mahhammad Azam got injured. He was present on ground with the troops to boost their morale and received an injury in his arm; whether a bullet hit him or not is still not clear. Some sources said he was hit by a shrapnel.
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The firefight continued for another half an hour. Meanwhile, the Special Service Group (SSG) commandos of the Pakistan Army had joined their SSW counterparts as reinforcements. The operation was still lead by SSW though, and at around 0400 hours (roughly two hours after the attack had took place), 4-5 terrorists were killed in a 30-40 minute battle with the commandos. None of them were able to detonate their suicide vests which were laden with enough amount of C-4 explosives to bring down a medium-sized building.
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A PAF C-130 aircraft equipped with FLIR system Star Safire III EO/IR sensor ball was used to track the movement of the terrorists.

One Saab-2000 Erieye which was coincidentally on surveillance mission at the time of the attack, was ordered to stay airborne till the situation at ground was restored back to normal.

1-2 terrorists were left, who managed to show resistance for a few minutes but subsequently, they too were gunned down. When all hostiles were eliminated, the SSW/SSG started a joint search operation around the base and the premises adjacent to it.

One terrorist, the leader of the militant group, was hiding outside the base; he detonated his suicide vest and blew himself up when he sensed security forces were near him.

The search operation continued for 2-3 hours and a number of IEDs were defused from the combat area.

This attack by the terrorists belonging to the TTP was a very well-planned tactical operation, even more sophisticated than the infamous PNS Mehran attack, which was quite an embarrassment for the Pakistani military. But this time, due to the quick response of security forces and alertness on the basis of reflexive intelligence, a major attack was foiled. On an overall basis, the threat was eliminated before any strategic blow was received.

In the entire operation, the Pakistani Special Forces (SSG/SSW) received no casualties. Although two soldiers did embraced martyrdom: The first was Sepoy Muhammad Asif and the second was Sepoy Muhammad Iqbal, both of whom got wounded during the operation and breathed their last two days later in the hospital.

A total of 9 terrorists were eliminated during the successful operation by the Pakistani Special Forces.
 
we have discussed this subject to death already?
 
This perimeter e-fence solution is something that could have prevented this attack to a great extent!

Perimeter Security, Warehouse Security: Flexiguard™ Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS)

Also watch the video that explains the e-fence function. This e-fence coupled with day/night PTZ cameras, intruder alarms, thermal imaging towers with auto zoom is perhaps the best solution.


All refineries/gas plants etc. installed in states like Africa, have similar perimeter in double and security vehicles patrol in between.

Whenever you touch any part of the fence the control room knows exactly where.

It is always part of the design specifications.. and is very basic package. I wonder which idiot prepared the design specs. of Pakistan's airbases and airports.

Additionally, high voltage tape, used in farms can be used to ward of astray animals etc..

We can also have flood lights, linked with motion sensors & proximity switch.

Imagine the battle was fought with night vision goggles!!!

No light? Pathetic state of affairs!
 
Who wrote this article?

Because I am pretty sure he should be knowing what a Il-86 is.

Meanwhile, the Special Service Group (SSG) commandos of the Pakistan Army had joined their SSW counterparts as reinforcements. The operation was still lead by SSW though, and at around 0400 hours (roughly two hours after the attack had took place), 4-5 terrorists were killed in a 30-40 minute battle with the commandos.

If they had two hours after the attack until the SSW confrontation, what were they doing then? Definitely not baking pastries.

This slot is enough for them to do anything.
 
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