Air Cdre Azam Khan - The man who got injured defending Kamra Base

[Jango]

WRONG. Firstly, the Base Commander, of all people, must follow laid down procedures too, and ALL incidents MUST be analyzed, probed and questioned in detail to improve the SOPs for future incidents.

Agreed.

There should be questions so we can get the answers this time, rather than the next time, when half of the base gets blown.

 

[eik_pagall]

Defending Kamra Airbase or he fell down of his bed due to big explosion and firing?

His fractured arm needs to be examined again

 

[United]

well done but how r these people getting in so deep?

 

[Machoman]

when there is no one around then commander take situation in his own hand and take care of A$$ holes. Good Job I salute you Sir!

 

[eik_pagall]

when there is no one around then commander take situation in his own hand and take care of A$$ holes. Good Job I salute you Sir!

Salute for getting terrorists into the BASE, killing soldiers and damaging jets?
He should be held responsible.

I wonder for emotional fools

 

[Pfpilot]

The top heavy nature of our armed forces; a leftover from a colonial past does place a greater value on the life of higher officers. The organizational philosophy of following leaders into hell if ordered lends itself to a situation where clearly capable men suddenly turn into headless chickens without their commander. With the hierarchy setup the way it is, it makes perfect sense to keep the base commander far away for any potential danger; a commander is the first and last line of defense. Had the base commander died, we may have been dealing with a far bigger fiasco.

Moving forward, this is an important debate: if we are not going to empower the foot soldiers and won't distribute power and responsibility at all levels; if we plan to maintain the current setup where a few men own every decision, then what happened at Kamra must be prevented at all costs. The commander must lead the operation from a distance that allows him wider perspective and greater depth of the entire battlefield, not necessarily literally, but in the information he has at his disposal. It is the commander's responsibility to see the operation through and stay alive and attentive throughout for the sake of his men.

On a separate note, it is important to honor one man who gave more to his nation than it could have ever asked of him; he made the response time seem lightning quick by defying the odds for such an outrageously long time that even the Ethiopian Army would have had time to prepare.

 

[jabalultariq]

You cannot inspire foot soldiers by empty speeches , action speak louder than words

Just one question out of curiosity.

If commanders decide to join the fight themselves just like regular foot soldiers, who will command the battle?

 

[Bossman]

Good for them. We need them to come out in the open from where we could shoot them in clear line of sight.

I doubt it with your officers leading from the toilet Indian soldier will not have any leadership

 

[Xeric]

Just one question out of curiosity.

If commanders decide to join the fight themselves just like regular foot soldiers, who will command the battle?

Unfortunately you are banned, but still i will answer your query.

As they say there's a hairline difference between stupidity and bravery, so this was not a war with india where the commander was alone with his Staff Officers (quite junior to him) in his HQ to direct his men who are fighting over several KMs (i.e. he can/should not participate physically in the battle as doing so would mean risking himself and also devoid his other regiments from his command which are fighting away from him), rather this was a base where quite a few senior officers were there to take on the chain of command and keep up the command succession, that's one.

Two, in a confined combat zone (as was the case here) commanders dont lock them up in their bunkers and just give orders because this ultimately can lead to undesirable consequences such as the commander being captured etc. Ofcourse, a commander while keeping himself safe should always be there to "command" his men, especially in this case where he can influence the battle personally as the space over which the battle is being conducted is restricted.

Why do you think even a Brigade Commander of an Armour Brigade is up and on ground with his Tactical HQ (much farther away from his Main HQ) and directing his Regiments during an armour assault? And this not what i say, this is what the western tactics say, check out some field manual over the internet. Because by your definition the brigade commander should button up inside his bunker somewhere in the rear while his armour brigade is blitzkrieg-ing over a span of 100s of KMs, no?

He's a brigadier (Air Cdre) with his Colonel Staff and an army of staff officers who can succeed him in case he is causality, not the Mighty POTUS!!

And also, his staff officers cant be tasked to jump into the battle because if so, who is going to coordinate the battle? So a commander must influence the battle with his presence notwithstanding the fact that he is a rare and precious commodity.

So like i said, there is a hiar line difference between stupidity and bravery, there is also a similar difference between a stupid question and a genuine one.

 

[Xeric]

You have to keep in mind the circumstances in which the commander took the decision. It was a moment to make a split second decision. Whether to sit and assemble the men and risk loosing some prized assets or fight and let the men assemble. he took the second route and it paid. Salute to the soldier. I have no questions on what he did.

Correct!

A commander is only paid to make (correct) decisions.

What do you say a brigadier should do if he sees a suicide bomber approaching the COAS? Should he go jump over his azz and make him explode himself before reaching the target or should he start directing his soldiers which are away or are unaware of the bomber for whatever reason?

Alternatively, what decision would one make if he sees a grenade among him and his soldiers and he knows that he is the only one who have seen the grenade landing near his men. Should he start shouting grenade, grenade (as the book suggests) knowing fully well that by the time his men would be warned the bloody grenade could explode or should he jump over the grenade so that his own life can spare the life of many others? i think most would go for the second option, because the Americans has done the same in Afg and there are instances where your own (indian) soldiers have also done the same in the past.

Therefore, in this case it was a risk, a gamble (for which every soldier actually exists or else everyone can carry a gun) the Air Cdre was ready to take i.e. should he duck, take refuge, assemble his chain of command, see through the situation and then order the corrective measures or should he (after having a very quick appreciation of the situation and understanding that a quick reaction would mostly likely stall the terrorists' efforts as compared to a delayed action) take the battle TO THE TERRORISTS and send them to hell right there?

i think he took the second option and succeeded! And that's what matters. That's what initiative is - a prerequisite for every soldier and every operation.

And as i remember one of the Corps Commander while addressing his Officers and answering to a question of an officer that now a days junior leaders are not allowed initiative as it used to be in the past, replied; Son, initiative is not allowed or given, it is TAKEN, you take an initiative and if you prevail, you are honored, but if you screw up (like in this case if the Air Cdre could have been killed and let's say the terrorists had succeeded in their aim), be ready / grow the balls to face the music!!

 

[Xeric]

Those who are questioning the actions of the Air Cdre, i ask them can you guys even differentiate between the mechanics of open-warfare and and the battle of confined spaces?

Do you guys even know about the difference in tactics applied during very high intensity battles (like the one happened at Kamra) and those that takes between two armies over large battlefields?

Do you guys even understand the application of similar Principles of Wars differently / varyingly in opposing conditions of Urban-Warfare and the Conventional Warfare?

Just for the sake of creating an analogy, do you guys even understand the sentence when it was said that 'XYZ Army is trained for Conventional Warfare and is untrained for LIC?' i mean we all have heard this, but can someone actually explain me the differences that are there and needs to be catered for to convert a force from a conventional war fighting machine to an unconventional one? Sure, you guys can quote, quote and quote such lines everywhere, but how many of you actually have the understanding of the mechanics involved? What does it actually implies if we say some force cannot be employed in LIC as it is trained for conventional warfare? Because, for a layman, fighting would mean fighting just like anywhere, bandook say goli he chalani hai na? So why the fuss about this conventional and unconventional thing?

Similarly i must say that you guys dont have an iota of an understanding of the difference between an Air Cdre commanding squadrons during a war with let's say india and the same Air Cdre directing / fighting along with his men while he was siting inside the base and was attacked by terrorists.

i bet you guys cant even differentiate between the various levels of operations / commands i.e. the Strategic level, the Operational level and the tactical level. i know, you guys can narrate me paragraphs and paragraphs about these levels like laymen, but none of you possesses the actual understanding of of these, as if i were to put it simply, you cant do it because that's NOT your JOB!!

Granted, that we have among us very serious military enthusiastics, but admit it, you can't surpass the understanding of a professional in such issues, not unless you have been involved in some strategic / national / defence planning as part of your job description

It's just like, some asking me as a soldier to comment on the mechanics of a country's economics. Okay, i may be a die hard student of economy, but still i would not be able to understand it like a dude who has been playing economics economics on ground and possesses the wealth of a thing known as EXPERIENCE!!

So, i ask you again, can anyone of you 'experts' actually differentiate between a situation where a General or a Brigadier (Air Cdre) is batteling with a professional army Vs the same General or Brigadier in a situation where he is fighting / directing his soldiers in the context of Urban Terrorism or Fighting in a Built Up Area (FIBUA)?

The answer is a big NO!!

Unless you guys tell me that you have been part of '65 and '71 wars and also have the experience of fighting terrorists in open spaces (FATA) and close spaces (Mehran Base, GHQ Attack etc), i wont believe you. Because even a soldier who have been there during Kargil War cannot demarcate the differences that existed during the GHQ attack as he lacks the experience of such a warfare, how do you expect me you take your illfounded comments even on their face value?

Do you know, among others, the very basic Fundamental of War in built up areas (FIBUA) (as in Kamra Case) is "Decentralization of Command"? Though the same fundamental is also applicable during conventional warfare, but then it wouldnt mean copy/pasting the the principle in its essence and applying it similarly as one would have during FIBUA, because in conventional warfare you dont find Generals allowing their under-command commanders complete liberty (as it might result into wrong initiatives) as opposed to the same commander allowing full liberty to the subordinate commanders if fighting in Urban Warfare (because a commander would never be able to impress his will over his soldiers in FIBUA as effectively as he could have done during a war because of a whole list of issues that a soldiers faces during FIBUA, which i cannot discuss here). Now, seriously, how many of you can actually understand the hair line difference in application of the SAME Fundamental of Attack during these two different scenarios, despite the fact that it means the same thing in both the case, even though its understanding is so complex that people have written books in order to explain them separately?

Now this is only ONE Principle that we are talking about, how about the numerous others?

i have seen you people using LIC, COIN, Counter-Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism so loosely and interchangeably on this forum that sometimes i really feel sorry for your understanding of these words, as each and every word that i have mentioned above is different from the other, yet we and (the media) uses it as synonyms.

It's like using Trojan, Virus, Malware, Spyware interchangeably infront of a software engineer. He will either bang his head against the wall or would kick you guys out.

So buddies, this is the level of understanding that most of you here possess about military affairs, yet you people have the cheeks to give verdicts over the actions of the Air Cdre?

Like i mentioned in my post # 54, this was not a Brigade Commander directing his men over vast spaces neither was this Air Cdre the CoAir Staff that it was absolutely forbidden for him to take part in the fight.

Had the Air Cdre been at his home and from there he had came and had entered the battle directly without giving any Operational Instructions (as opposed to Operational Orders - i bet you guys dont even know the difference between the two) may be then i would have said that his actions were wrong.

May be if this Air Crde had been the CoAir Staff and he had flown from Air Headquarters, got his weapon issued from the Kotes and joined the battle, then i must have said that it was a wrong action.

May be if the battle had lasted for several hours (as in the case of GHQ and Mehran base attack), and still the Air Cdre instead of establishing his operations rooms and directing the battle from there had joined in the battle, then may be i had said that it was a poor decision on his side. But the battle lasted for only 5 hours (excluding the time of initial contact and giving of 'All Clear', meaning thereby that the actual battle had only taken place for a maximum of 2 may be 3 hours), do you actually think that at such a quick pace it was actually suitable to man offices rather than directing the fight on the ground?

For your very kind info, as per WW2 doctrine even a Brigade Attack (within the framework of a Corps operation) reaches its "Culminating Point" (a military terminology, not the one you find on dictionary.com) within 2 hours i.e. approximately 4000 soldiers are either dead or injured within 2 hours. Now this probably is the case where a mighty Brigadier (Air Cdre) would like to rest his bottoms inside his command post and direct the attack from there so that he can 'read' the battle as it unfolds, but when the entire operation was finalized in 2-3 hours, which of you would like to sit up in your bunkers? i mean having sex with your legally wedded wife is ok with all that foreplay and shyt, but you dont establish an operations room when you are doing your secretary in your office bathroom, or do you?

Another point is that we as the Pakistan military dont posses Network Centric Enabled Forces whereby every soldier can present hsi commander with a real time feed of whats happening infront of him, and also for such a high tempo operation the conventional modes of communication are useless as by the time an info reaches the commander, the actual situation on ground had already changed and the decision taken by the commander would have become un-actionable. Moreover, even today's conventional operations (what to talk about high tempo unconventional warfare where initiative ALWAYS rests with the terrorists) have gone so fast and quick that a commander without a potent C4I and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reporting) system is left paralysed and is unable to direct his under commands effectively during battle.

And before some smartarses try to tell me that the military instead of spending on their messes should spend on achieving Net Centric Warfare (NCW), i must enlighten you that as of today, the status of modern western militarys as regards to NCW is as follows:

US Army

- Which is the most advanced in NCW, has (only) 7 x Stryker Brigades which are NCW enabled i.e not the entire military, as opposed to what is shown in Transformers and The Avengers.

NATO
Currently (only) a battle group of brigade plus size is NCW enabled.

British Army
- Though transforming its military, still complete success in a brigade group is yet to be achieved.

Italian Army
- Has just recently concluded its feasibility study for NCW transformation and is going to implement NCW capabilities a 10 years plan

Israeli Def Forces
- Israeli C4I is a 5 years plan earmarking several hundred million dollars in annual C4I spending, still a long way to go.

So, please dont ask your military to act like Thor or Stark Industries when you cant even afford clean drinking water for your militray!

Ok.

So where was i, yes, so what the Air Cdre did was absolutely in consonance of what commanders are supposed to do during such situations (FIBUA, warfare in limited spaces, short / quick battles where initiative lies with the adversary, battles where quick response is the primary concern, battles which have time-sensitivity attached to it), or else the same 'experts' who are mongering about the bravery of the Air Cdre would have mongered about the fact that why did it take the mighty Pak Military soooo long to flush out the terrorists from Kamra (Re-Mehran Base Attack, no?).

So in short, i must say that before opening ones beak, one should first develop a complete understanding of affairs, weigh the pros and cons of a particular action (this again is only possible if one has developed a complete understanding of affairs) and see the alternatives realistically (not jingoistically or ideally) and only then should comment.

Seriously, i do like the idea of the Air Cdre activating his operations room, collecting is staff inside the room, turning on the hi-tech computers and satellite feeds, asking is staff officers to brief him about the latest situation, then discussing with his staff the various Courses of Action available to him, then evaluating each Course of Action separately and determining feasibility of each, and then nominating commanders for the action and then giving instructions and orders regarding the Dos and Donts blah blah and blah, and by the time he would have given a "Go", one of the Khan Lala attacking the base would probably have landed inside his operations room and had sent the Air Cdre and his staff flying to heavens without a ticket!!

And for those who think that all of the above actions could have been done more expediently, they should stop playing with Xbox and come back to the real world of terrorism / military actions or refer to the above info regarding NCW or should try re-reading the response of the mightiest military of the world during 9/11 or a regional might during 26/7. (we cleared douchebags out of GHQ within hours, out of Mehran base within half a day and out of Kamra within 4 hours and we did in FATA what the entire ISAF couldnt do in 10 years inside Afg).

 

[VCheng]

Xeric: Great post, but it begs one question:

Did the Air Cmdre follow SOPs to be carried out in case of an attack on his base, or not? (If not, why not?)

 

[Xeric]

Sure he did, how else do you expect that 9 terrorists are killed within a short span without any actual damage/casualty? Try to understand that it was a terrorist attack not a war that broke out after intense negotiations between two countries had failed (and probably both the countries had already planned what would they do once the negotiations actual broke).

In a terrorist attack huge damage / causalities are bound to take place as the entire element of surprise rests with the initiator, the best one could do is stop the terrorists from reaching it's 'primary' target whatever that be at the cost of (huge) own casualties.

So, it was only after the commander has gone through the battle procedures, staff checks and delivered his orders/instruction/line of action that he had decided to join in the battle.

Bhai, noora kushti tu nahi hai jahan Air Cdre sahib tashreef laye or farmaya; 'aj mora dil bhi karay hai larnay ko, tu lao meri langothi'.

The SOPs were followed (BTW following of SOPs is mainly concerned only till the time an attack doesnt take place i.e. before an incident, SOPs are their to prevent accidents/incidents), it is the battle procedure and their timely/correct implementation that counters an attack.

So, again yes, the battle procedures were followed, decisions made, orders delivered, men told what is expected out of them and Aim/Mission (both a two very different things in military language) given and then once the counter-stroke was deliver, the Commander himself was among the soldiers. Seriously, i dont find anything odd in it.

 

[gubbi]

the same 'experts' who are mongering about the bravery of the Air Cdre would have mongered about the fact that why did it take the mighty Pak Military soooo long to flush out the terrorists from Kamra (Re-Mehran Base Attack, no?).

Nice post Xeric. Kudos to the Air Cdre for his brave actions and kudos to the Pak military for bringing the attack under control in such a short time.

The excerpt you wrote and which I quote is exactly what people who point out the "inefficiency" of NSG/Mumbai police in bringing the perpetrators of the MUmbai terrorist attacks dont understand. Not that I am an expert, far from it!

Hope such attacks dont occur in the future, but then....its a long war and people need to realize that it would take atleast a generation to undo the fundamentalist indoctrination.

 

[Xeric]

Nice post Xeric. Kudos to the Air Cdre for his brave actions and kudos to the Pak military for bringing the attack under control in such a short time.

The excerpt you wrote and which I quote is exactly what people who point out the "inefficiency" of NSG/Mumbai police in bringing the perpetrators of the MUmbai terrorist attacks dont understand. Not that I am an expert, far from it!

Hope such attacks dont occur in the future, but then....its a long war and people need to realize that it would take atleast a generation to undo the fundamentalist indoctrination.

You probably are right.

See, there's a difference between telling your friend what to do when daciots have entered his house and he is hiding in some place and asking you for options that he have to deal with the situation over his cell (in this case you have established an operations rooms and are directing him, your under command soldier after consulting may be your other friends i.e. staff officer).

But if it is you who happens to be right inbetween the thick shyt, you dont start consulting your parents of what action you guys should take, especially when the thieves are still outside the room where you are hiding and you still have the option to "act" with a fair chance of success. In this case you, you father, your brother who ever is with you, just act according to a very very quick appreciation of the situation that you have had with your family and may be you are able to scare away the daciots.

That's what is called taking "Calculated"-risks. You open up any field manual regarding (any) offensive operations (raid, ambush, attack, room entry, advance etc etc), you would find the writer telling you to take "calculated risks", if you actually want to succeed.

And the success of this very (calculated) risk is what defines a leader, or a general.

If your risk was well calculated, you would succeed (1971) and if it was flawed, you might have to suck it up (Kargil).

Now had the NSG commanders (the GOC or the Senior commander) in your case or the SSG in our case after having cordoned the base and while sitting outside and instead of manning his operations room had decided to jump inside the fight, then surely he has done a wrong thing, but if one is the one who is being effected directly by an external action, i dont recommend him to sit tight especially when he still has the option of influencing the course of the battle. May be if a few AWACS had been bombed, a couple of hostages taken and a quite a few men lost their lives, may be then it would have been a poor decision on Air Cdre's part to take panga in such a delayed case. As they say, a right decision is one that is taken at the right time, a delayed decision is as guud as a wrong one.