Xeric
RETIRED THINK TANK
- Joined
- Mar 31, 2008
- Messages
- 8,297
- Reaction score
- 42
- Country
- Location
And then there is another thing in the military which is known as "Generation of Combat Power" (GoCP). A very complex issue which requires an indepth understanding of military affairs.
This GoCP is related with the 1) application of correct number /amount of forces at 2) the correct time at 3) the correct place.
i.e. i may be having a Corp plus force sitting near Hyderabad which is fully capable of blunting india's assault, but of what use that Corps is to me if india attacks me near Okara and i cannot put that hefty Corps to use against india? That's to say, i may be weaker than india if we take into account the overall ratio of forces, but then i may be able to be stronger than india at the Point of Decision (PoD), how? Well if i am smart enough i can pull out forces from dormant sectors and pump in the same to a sector which by virtue of my military acumen i have sensed to be the PoD (i.e. a battle whose result would result into a decision (loss/victory) for both the countries), so i may be weak at Faislabad (doesnt matter because i have read/sensed that india would not attack me here) but i m much stronger than india at Sikarpur where i know that india would launch his main attack, and in this way when india attacks and was expecting a much smaller force defending Sikarpur would rather go in shock when it would find double the resistance that she had actually expected.
So may be the Air Cdre's decision was correct to generate his combat power right there and then, rather then waiting for outside forces (SSG) to finally reach Kamra and by time may be a few aircraft had already been damaged, a dozen of men including foreigners taken hostage and 10s of them killed.
i mean what use had it then been to kill the terrorists (who are there to be eventually killed) if they have done the requisite damage and have achieved their aim?
Didnt the same thing happen at Mehran Base?
We lost Orions, men were killed and a stand off that the terrorist knew was going to end up in their demise took place, but to what avail?
And when one has to undertake unorthodox tactics, the commander himself has to devise a method to motivate his men so that they are able to digest the drastic change in plans but setting up personal example, or else the men would probably not respond with the same zeal as they could have if things were going to what they have expected, no?
So as they say, the first casualty in any war is the Plan itself! Nothing goes as per the plan, ever in war, so leaders has to, at times take matters in their own hands so that the rigid minds of their under commands (which normally are not as dynamic as the commanders) can be molded and made ready to accept the change, believe in the new plan and put in their effort with the same force and zeal as if it had been the original plan, savvy?
Military tactics is an art, though lately people have been saying it's a science, you (and VCheng) decide
This GoCP is related with the 1) application of correct number /amount of forces at 2) the correct time at 3) the correct place.
i.e. i may be having a Corp plus force sitting near Hyderabad which is fully capable of blunting india's assault, but of what use that Corps is to me if india attacks me near Okara and i cannot put that hefty Corps to use against india? That's to say, i may be weaker than india if we take into account the overall ratio of forces, but then i may be able to be stronger than india at the Point of Decision (PoD), how? Well if i am smart enough i can pull out forces from dormant sectors and pump in the same to a sector which by virtue of my military acumen i have sensed to be the PoD (i.e. a battle whose result would result into a decision (loss/victory) for both the countries), so i may be weak at Faislabad (doesnt matter because i have read/sensed that india would not attack me here) but i m much stronger than india at Sikarpur where i know that india would launch his main attack, and in this way when india attacks and was expecting a much smaller force defending Sikarpur would rather go in shock when it would find double the resistance that she had actually expected.
So may be the Air Cdre's decision was correct to generate his combat power right there and then, rather then waiting for outside forces (SSG) to finally reach Kamra and by time may be a few aircraft had already been damaged, a dozen of men including foreigners taken hostage and 10s of them killed.
i mean what use had it then been to kill the terrorists (who are there to be eventually killed) if they have done the requisite damage and have achieved their aim?
Didnt the same thing happen at Mehran Base?
We lost Orions, men were killed and a stand off that the terrorist knew was going to end up in their demise took place, but to what avail?
And when one has to undertake unorthodox tactics, the commander himself has to devise a method to motivate his men so that they are able to digest the drastic change in plans but setting up personal example, or else the men would probably not respond with the same zeal as they could have if things were going to what they have expected, no?
So as they say, the first casualty in any war is the Plan itself! Nothing goes as per the plan, ever in war, so leaders has to, at times take matters in their own hands so that the rigid minds of their under commands (which normally are not as dynamic as the commanders) can be molded and made ready to accept the change, believe in the new plan and put in their effort with the same force and zeal as if it had been the original plan, savvy?
Military tactics is an art, though lately people have been saying it's a science, you (and VCheng) decide